CAMBRIDGE GREEK AND LATIN CLASSICS

PLATO
PROTAGORAS

EDITED BY NICHOLAS DENYER

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PREFACE

The Introduction to this book contains general remarks that could not conveniently be digested into the piecemeal format of the commentary. In spite of its name 'Introduction', and its position before the text, there is no need to have read the Introduction before starting to read the rest of the book. If some preliminary orientation to the *Protagoras* is required, it will be found in the italicised paragraphs of summary that are scattered throughout the commentary.

I have incurred many intellectual debts in writing this book: to the Editors of this series; to the unfailingly efficient and helpful staff of that marvellous resource, the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae; to those who took part in the Mayweek 2004 seminars on the *Protagoras*; to Bernard Dod, an exact and scrupulous copy-editor; and to Adam Beresford, Lynne Broughton, Myles Burnyeat, Andrea Capra, Giovanni di Pasquale, David Konstan, Geoffrey Lloyd, Catherine Osborne, Philomen Probert, Christopher Rowe, Catherine Steel, Liba Taub, Christopher Taylor, James Warren, Roslyn Weiss, and Jo Willmott.

More important than any intellectual debt is my debt to my father, Ronald Denyer. He died while I was writing this book. I dedicate it to his memory.

Trinity College, Cambridge N. C. D.
29 February 2008

ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES

PLATO

The page numbers of Stephanus' 1578 edition continue to be printed in the margins of editions and translations, and used for references to the text of Plato. References to the *Protagoras* itself are given here simply in the form 345a6, where '345' is the number of a Stephanus page, 'a' the letter of a section within the page, and '6' the number of a line within the section. References to other works in the Platonic corpus are given here by title (sometimes abbreviated), Stephanus page number and section letter. The following abbreviations are used:

Alc. Ma. = *Alcibiades Major*, *Alc. Mi.* = *Alcibiades Minor*, *Ap.* = *Apology*, *Chrm.* = *Charmides*, *Clit.* = *Clitophon*, *Cra.* = *Cratylus*, *Cri.* = *Crito*, *Ep.* = *Epistles*, *Euthd.* = *Euthydemus*, *Euthphr.* = *Euthyphro*, *Grg.* = *Gorgias*, *Hp. Ma.* = *Hippias Major*, *Hp. Mi.* = *Hippias Minor*, *La.* = *Laches*, *Lys.* = *Lysis*, *Mnx.* = *Menexenus*, *Phd.* = *Phaedo*, *Phdr.* = *Phaedrus*, *Phlb.* = *Philebus*, *Plt.* = *Politicus*, *Prm.* = *Parmenides*, *Rep.* = *Republic*, *Smp.* = *Symposium*, *Sph.* = *Sophist*, *Thg.* = *Theages*, *Tht.* = *Theaetetus*, *Tim.* = *Timaeus*

OTHER ANCIENT AUTHORS AND WORKS

Ael.	Aelian *Varia Historia*
Aesch.	Aeschylus; *Pr.* = *Prometheus Bound*
Aeschin.	Aeschines
Amm.	Ammonius *On expressions that are similar yet different*
Anax.	Anaxagoras
And.	Andocides
Anon. Iamb.	Anonymus Iamblichi
Ant.	Antiphon
Antisth.	Antisthenes
Anth. Pal.	*Anthologia Palatina*
Ar.	Aristophanes; *Ach.* = *Acharnians*, *Ec.* = *Ecclesiazousae*, *Lys.* = *Lysistrata*, *Pl.* = *Plutus*, *Th.* = *Thesmophoriazousae*
Arist.	Aristotle; *Ath.* = *Constitution of Athens*, *EE* = *Eudemian Ethics*, *EN* = *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Met.* = *Metaphysics*, *PA* = *Parts of Animals*, *Pol.* = *Politics*, *Prob.* = *Problems*, *Rh.* = *Rhetoric*, *SE* = *Sophistici Elenchi*

Ath.	Athenaeus
Bacch.	Bacchylides
Cic.	Cicero
Crt.	Critias
Ctes.	Ctesias
Demet.	Demetrius *On Style*
Democ.	Democritus
Demos.	Demosthenes
D.L.	Diogenes Laertius
D.S.	Diodorus Siculus
Emp.	Empedocles
Epich.	Epicharmus
Eup.	Eupolis
Eur.	Euripides; *Alc.* = *Alcestis*, *Bac.* = *Bacchae*, *Hipp.* = *Hippolytus*, *IA* = *Iphigeneia in Aulis*, *Med.* = *Medea*
Eust.	Eustathius
Grg.	Gorgias
Harp.	Harpocration *Lexicon*
Hdt.	Herodotus
Her.	Heraclitus
Hes.	Hesiod; *Th.* = *Theogony*, *WD* = *Works and Days*
Hipp.	Hippocrates
Hom.	Homer; *Il.* = *Iliad*, *Od.* = *Odyssey*
Isae.	Isaeus
Isoc.	Isocrates
Long.	'Longinus' *On the sublime*
Lys.	Lysias
Men.	Menander; *Dys.* = *Dyscolus*, *Sam.* = *Samia*
Paus.	Pausanias
Pind.	Pindar; *O.* = *Olympians*, *N.* = *Nemeans*
Plu.	Plutarch; *Alc.* = *Alcibiades*, *Per.* = *Pericles*
Soph.	Sophocles; *Aj.* = *Ajax*, *Ant.* = *Antigone*, *OC* = *Oedipus at Colonus*, *OT* = *Oedipus Tyrannus*, *Phil.* = *Philoctetes*
Theogn.	Theognis
Thphr.	Theophrastus
Thuc.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon; *An.* = *Anabasis*, *Ap.* = *Apology*, *Ath. Pol.* = *Constitution of Athens*, *Cyr.* = *Cyropaedia*, *HG* = *Historia*

	Graeca, *Hr.* = *Hiero*, *Lac.* = *Constitution of Sparta*, *Mem.* = *Memorabilia*, *Oec.* = *Oeconomicus*, *Smp.* = *Symposium*
Xphs.	Xenophanes

COMPENDIA AND WORKS OF REFERENCE

DK	Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edn, Berlin 1964
FGH	Felix Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der greichischen Historiker*, Berlin and Leiden 1923–55
GP	J. D. Denniston, *The Greek particles*, 2nd edn revised by K. J. Dover, Oxford 1954
IEG	M. L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati*, Oxford 1971–2
IG	A. Kirchhoff and others, *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Berlin 1873–
LSJ	H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English lexicon*, 9th edn revised by H. S. Jones, Oxford 1940
PCG	R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae comici Graeci*, Berlin 1983–
PHibeh	Bernard P. Grenfell and Arthur S. Hunt, *The Hibeh papyri*, Part 1, London 1906
PMG	D. L. Page, *Poetae melici Graeci*, Oxford 1962
SSR	G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, Naples 1990
TrGF	B. Snell and others, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, Göttingen 1971–

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INTRODUCTION

1. THE SOPHISTS, PROTAGORAS AND THE *PROTAGORAS*

These days, the term 'sophist' is used solely as a term of disdain, for those who hope to get away with shoddy reasoning. It was not always thus. Our term 'sophist' derives from a Greek term σοφιστής; and in the fifth century BC, when that term was first used, σοφισταί were men to be reckoned with.

The first σοφισταί were so called because of some expertise or σοφία. In principle, any expert might be given the name σοφιστής. We hear, for example, of those who were given the name because they were experts in poetry, statecraft or ritual (311e4n.). In practice, the main bearers of the name were men like three of the characters in the *Protagoras*: Protagoras of Abdera himself, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos. Among the better documented of the others like them were Gorgias of Leontini, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon and Antiphon of Athens.[1] These men did not all make claim to exactly the same expertise (312d9–e1n.): for example, Prodicus had a special flair for distinguishing between words of very similar meaning (337a1–c4); Hippias cultivated a special mnemonic technique that enabled him to repeat a list of fifty names after hearing it just once (*Hp. Ma.* 285e; cf. 318e3n.); and Protagoras won so special a reputation for his understanding of how institutions can be managed (318e4–319a6) that he was commissioned to devise the constitution for a new Panhellenic settlement at Thurii (DK 80 A 1.50). Sophists did, however, have one important thing in common: whatever else they did or did not know or claim to know, they characteristically had a great understanding of what words would entertain or impress or persuade an audience (315c6n.).

Whether as calculated self-promotion, or from simple exuberance in their own virtuosity, or sometimes even because they had managed to persuade themselves, sophists loved to argue for the unsettling and the improbable. Among the unsettling conclusions for which Protagoras himself argued were theories of religion and morality that, without ever quite debunking them outright, suggested that there was less in them than people might suppose (320d1n. on θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, 322b5–c1n.); among the improbable conclusions for which Protagoras argued was a theory whereby Greek had misassigned some nouns to grammatical genders (349b4n.; cf. 342b1n. on improbable conclusions for which other sophists

[1] Kerferd (1981) and Guthrie (1971) discuss all these, and some lesser sophists. DK 79–90 collects much of the evidence. The rest of the evidence consists, in most cases, in representations of these sophists in the dialogues of Plato and of Xenophon. In the case of Antiphon, there is also a body of speeches that survives under his name; and his case is further complicated by the suggestion that there were two Antiphons, who both 'operated as sophists [σοφιστεύσαντες]' (Hermogenes *De Ideis* 399.18–22 Rabe).

argued). Protagoras called arguing for such conclusions 'making the weaker argument stronger [τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν]' (DK 80 A 21). At their most extreme, sophists would argue for conclusions that were not merely unsettling or improbable, but downright inconsistent. For example, each of Antiphon's *Tetralogies* contains speeches for both prosecution and defence in an imaginary lawsuit; and something similar may have been true of Protagoras' two books on *Contradictions* (DK 80 A 1.55; cf. 328c1–2n. for a Protagorean lawsuit in which each side had a compelling argument). Protagoras also taught people how they might both commend and condemn the same man (DK 80 A 21). More generally, he maintained the thesis that it is always possible to contradict whatever another says; and – in keeping with that thesis, even if not consistently with it – he maintained the rival thesis that contradiction is never possible (DK 80 A 19–20, B 6a). Both theses amounted to the same thing in the end: whatever you assert, I can always deny, with equal correctness; but my denial can never be so correct as to rule out your assertion. And Protagoras invented various devices to substantiate both theses; most notorious of these devices was a version of relativism whose slogan was 'Man is the measure of all things [πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος]' (356d3–4n.; cf. also 331d3–e3, 334a1–3n.).

These argumentative extravaganzas led eventually to the current meaning of 'sophism'. In their original context, however, such extravaganzas flaunted a severely practical ability. To get anywhere in the public life of Athens, or any other democratic city, people needed to be able to talk persuasively to gatherings of their fellow citizens. And in Athens, even people without political ambitions might have need of persuasive powers. The Athenians were particularly litigious (324c2–3); and if you were prosecuted, there were no professional advocates whom you could hire to speak on your behalf. Hence, even if you never attempted to address the assembly, you might well nevertheless find yourself brought before a court, where your livelihood, or even your life, would depend on your being able to talk more persuasively than your prosecutor. In 399, this happened to Socrates.

Not everyone who had a flair for words was called a σοφιστής. This name was never given to the great statesman Pericles, whose magisterially compelling oratory won him the nickname 'Olympian' (Ar. *Ach.* 530; cf. *Phdr.* 269e–270a), who was renowned for his σοφία (*Meno* 94b, Isoc. 15.111 and 16.28), who had 'bandied tricky arguments [ἐσοφιζόμεθα]' for unsettling theories about law and justice (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.46), and who freely associated with those called σοφισταί, Protagoras among them (315a1–2n., DK 59 A 17). Those called σοφισταί earned the name because of a special use of their skills, not to participate directly in public life (cf. DK 37 A 4 on Damon the sophist, and Arist. *EN* 1180b35–1181a1 on sophists generally), but to earn money by equipping others to participate (310d7–8n., 316d1–8n.). Protagoras was the first to earn money in this way (349a1–4); by the dramatic date of the *Protagoras* (309a3n.), he was an old man who had been earning money in this way for many years (317c2–4).

Sophists earned lots. 'Protagoras has, all by himself, made more from this expertise,' claims Socrates in *Meno* 91d, 'than Pheidias, who made such conspicuously beautiful statues [311c5n.], and ten other sculptors put together.' Admission to even the cheapest of Prodicus' lectures would cost a drachma (three times the daily subsistence allowance for an Athenian juror), and admission to the most electrifying would cost fifty (*Cra.* 384b–c, Arist. *Rh.* 1415b16). Euenus of Paros – who was hardly the most celebrated of sophists – was able to charge five minas (= 500 drachmas, and what Xen. *Oec.* 2.3 estimates as the value of Socrates' entire estate) for what was presumably an entire course of instruction 'in human and political virtue' (*Ap.* 20b; cf. 318e4–319a4). For the celebrated, the rewards could be even greater. 'I once went to Sicily,' Hippias of Elis boasts, 'and even though Protagoras was also there at the time, and had a fine reputation, and was far older than me, nevertheless I, who was far his junior, managed to make, in a very short time, much more than 150 minas – and more than twenty minas from one single tiny little spot, Inycum' (*Hp. Ma.* 282d–e). The host of the sophists whom we meet in the *Protagoras* is Callias, whose father had been the richest man in Greece (311a2n.). There can have been few others rich enough to have simultaneous visits from Protagoras, Prodicus and Hippias.

Those who command high fees for a highly valued service are not always liked. So it was with sophists: even as they attracted adulation from some, they attracted also disdain, and worse, from others. Protagoras speaks of the resentment aroused when young men forsook their native mentors to associate instead with travelling sophists like himself (316c5–d2). No doubt this was important; for unless he belonged to the largest of cities, an ambitious and talented sophist would find his own city too small to offer him enough scope, and so would travel, and so might meet xenophobia. Even so, travel was no essential part of what made a sophist, or of what made a sophist objectionable (cf. 313c5–6n.). Anytus, who was to prosecute Socrates, wants cities generally to expel all sophists 'whether local or foreign' (*Meno* 92b); this is because sophists are uniformly damaging to those who consort with them (*Meno* 91c), and because, if Meno 'goes to any decent Athenian, there is not one who won't make more improvements in him than the sophists would, so long as he is willing to do as he is told' (*Meno* 92e). Here is Thucydides 8.68.1 on the attitude of the Athenians to a sophist who shared their citizenship: 'Antiphon was, of all the Athenians of his day, second to none in virtue; he had also the greatest capacity for thinking and for expressing his knowledge; he never addressed the assembly or – unless he was forced to – any other venue in which issues are contested [ἀγῶνα; cf. 335a4], but the masses viewed him with suspicion because of his reputation for cleverness [διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος; cf. 312d6–e8, 341a8n.]; not but what, when people had issues to contest [ἀγωνιζομένους], whether before the assembly or in a court of law, he was the man best able to help whoever consulted him on anything.' In short, sophists were too clever by half; they used their excessive cleverness to help the rich escape justice, and mislead the assembly; and they taught those foolish enough to pay

their fees nothing worthwhile that could not have been learnt much more cheaply from ordinary decent people. Thus democracy viewed with suspicion those who supplied the education for which it had created such a demand.

Part of the brilliance of Protagoras was the way that he addressed this suspicion. In 320d1–328d2, he presents a beautiful and plausible explanation both for why knowledge of justice and statecraft must be as widespread as democracy presumes, and for why nevertheless there is room for paid experts – σοφισταί – like himself: when Protagoras teaches his customers how to manage the affairs of their community, he teaches them subtleties and refinements of a virtue or virtues that people must already practise, and practise pretty well, if there is to be a community with affairs for Protagoras' customers to manage.

Unfortunately, a beautiful and plausible explanation is not therefore the correct explanation. And we might summarise the *Protagoras* by saying that it presents a test of Protagoras and his explanation. The test asks what exactly is the virtue or virtues which ordinary people already practise well, and of which Protagoras teaches the refinements. After a prolonged resistance, and many detours, Protagoras is finally forced to say that there is only one virtue. This one virtue has many names – among them 'justice', 'temperance', 'holiness' and 'courage'. All these are names for a single piece of knowledge. The subject of this piece of knowledge may be given any of several equivalent descriptions: the good and the bad, the pleasant and the painful, the scary and the emboldening. If you have this knowledge, you will assess accurately the merits and demerits of all the possible courses of action open to you; moreover, you will unfailingly act on this assessment, and do what is, all things considered, the best possible thing for you to do. Such would be the knowledge sold by Protagoras if Protagoras deserves his income. At least, this is what Protagoras is eventually forced to concede. Perhaps there can be no such knowledge, as the *Protagoras* sometimes hints (333b5n., 337c2n., 351c5–6n., 352b7–c1n., 359d4n.); or perhaps there can, but in an unexpected form and from an unexpected source, as the *Protagoras* also sometimes hints (329c7–d1n., 345e1–2n., 352c4–6n., 354c8n., 357e2–3n.); either way, Protagoras' change of mind indicates that not even the doyen of all sophists is quite such an expert on these subjects as he pretends.

2. SOCRATES THE SOPHIST?

'You put Socrates the sophist to death,' said Aeschines (1.173) to the citizens of Athens in 345. He meant our Socrates, the Socrates who in the *Protagoras* describes an encounter with Protagoras, the Socrates who in 399 was executed on the charges that 'he does wrong by not accepting the gods whom the city accepts, but introducing strange supernatural beings instead, and he does wrong also by corrupting the young' (*Ap.* 26b, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.1). Aeschines' view that Socrates was a sophist may have been also the view of the jurors who sentenced him to death. Such a view was certainly taken in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, a play

written and set in the mid 420s, which is more or less the dramatic date of the *Protagoras* (309a3n.). A man who wants to cheat his creditors is getting his son to join a school supposedly run by Socrates: 'The people here teach anyone who'll give them the money how to be victorious when he speaks, however just or unjust his cause may be [λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ δίκαια κἄδικα].... They say they've got both the arguments, both the stronger, on whatever subject, and the weaker [ἄμφω τὼ λόγω, | τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα; cf. DK 80 A 21], and they say that one of these two arguments, the weaker one, is victorious when it speaks, even though its cause is less just. So if you please learn this one, the unjust argument, I won't have to repay any of the debts that you've been running up, not one obol to anybody' (Ar. *Clouds* 97–8, 112–18). In the *Protagoras*, however, when Callias' doorkeeper takes Socrates for a sophist, he denies it (314d3–e1).

Which is correct: Aeschines' affirmation that Socrates was a sophist, or Socrates' denial? The *Protagoras* is only one of several works in which followers of Socrates addressed this question by showing Socrates dealing with sophists. Plato also shows him dealing with Gorgias and Polus in the *Gorgias*, with Hippias in both the *Hippias Major* and the *Hippias Minor*, with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the *Euthydemus*, and with Thrasymachus in the *Republic*. Xenophon shows Socrates dealing with Hippias in *Memorabilia* 4.4 and with Antiphon in *Memorabilia* 1.6. Crito presumably showed Socrates dealing with Protagoras in his now lost *Protagoras* (fr. 42 *SSR*). Those who approved of Socrates, but disapproved of sophists, had good reason for so often returning to how Socrates dealt with sophists. For the difference between the sophists and Socrates, or between the other sophists and Socrates, was not as easy to discern as they might wish. And if we can now see a clear difference between people like Protagoras and people like Socrates, and label it as the difference between sophists and philosophers, then that is due to the efforts of Socrates' followers in the generation or so after his death (311e4n., 335e1n.).

Unlike normal sophists, Socrates charged no fees for his wisdom. As we have seen, Aristophanes' *Clouds* says otherwise; but it is hard to believe that this or any comedy cared much about the precise differences between one intellectual and another. Plato and Xenophon, who certainly cared and were in a position to know, both assert quite directly that Socrates took no payment (310d7–8n.). And in some ways more compelling than any direct assertion that Socrates took no payment is the evidence of this anecdote about Aristippus (fr. 3 *SSR*) and the consensus which it presupposes: 'Someone criticised him once for taking money even though he was a pupil of Socrates. "Absolutely," he said. "For Socrates too, when people sent him food and wine, used to take a bit before sending the rest back. This was because he had the most prominent men in Athens to be his stewards, whereas I have my slave Eutychides."'

Even if Socrates charged no fees, he still had quite as much flair for words as any of those who were incontestably sophists. He does indeed make much of his preference for conversation, διαλέγεσθαι, instead of the long speeches

that the sophist Protagoras likes to deliver (314c4n.). But incontestable sophists were versatile enough with words to do more than simply produce long speeches (315c6n., 329b2–3n., 335b6–c1; cf. 338b1–2n.); and even sources that lay most stress on Socrates' preference for conversation make it clear that he was quite capable of producing long speeches himself (e.g. 342a6–347a5, *Grg.* 523a–527e). As we have seen, sophists might sometimes use or misuse their talent for words in frivolous entertainments, and also in apparently earnest arguments for unsettling and subversive conclusions about gods or politics. So might Socrates: admirers with every wish to distinguish him from sophists nevertheless represented him in frivolous mood as expatiating on the intellectual interests of the Spartans (342a6–343b4) and as arguing that his snub nose and pop eyes make him look beautiful (Xen. *Smp.* 5.2–8); they also represented him in earnest mood as arguing that, whatever the family structures and democratic institutions of Athens might presume to the contrary, young people should obey expert strangers rather than inexpert parents on questions about education (Xen. *Ap.* 20), and that we should all follow a single expert rather than many fools on questions about justice (*Cri.* 46c–48a; cf. 319b3–e1).

Socrates, unlike a Pericles, did not make public life the main place where he employed his flair with words. Quite the contrary: he participated in the public life of Athens as little as a citizen decently could. He did indeed have one notorious term in high office, during which he presided over a particularly contentious meeting of the assembled citizens (338a7–b1n.). Moreover, he does seem to have claimed occasionally that his own apparently inactive life constituted a profound engagement with politics. Hence *Grg.* 521d 'I suppose that there are few other Athenians, if any, who undertake the genuine art of politics [ἐπιχειρεῖν τῆι ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῆι τέχνηι], and that I am the only one around nowadays to engage in political activity [πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν]'; and Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.15 'How would I have the greater engagement in political activity [μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττοιμι]? By engaging in it all by myself? Or by taking care that there be as many people as possible who are fit to engage in it [ὡς πλείστους ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά]?' However, Socrates' term in high office came to him through the luck of the draw, rather than because of any skill in speaking. And if someone lives so apparently inactive a life as Socrates, then any claim of his to be engaged in politics would itself be so paradoxical as to suggest that he is indeed a sophist.

The difficulty goes deeper. If Socrates made people fit to engage in politics, would this not mean teaching people the skills and virtues that a political career demands? In particular, would it not mean teaching them something of his own skill with words? In which case, what remains to distinguish him from a sophist, apart from the fact that he never took payment for this teaching?

Certainly, Socrates made a profound intellectual impression on many with whom he dealt. We can tell this, not only from the extant writings about him of Plato and of Xenophon, but also from the scraps that now survive of what was

once a vast mass of writing by other followers and associates.[2] But is teaching the only way to make a profound intellectual impression? Perhaps not. At any rate, teachers seem to have, or at least to need and claim, some intellectual authority over their pupils, some knowledge which the teachers have, and then impart to the pupils. Yet no such authority is claimed when proceeding 'conversationally', by asking questions and getting answers, as Socrates did in preference to delivering lectures or writing books (314c4n.). Moreover, no such authority is even needed for 'conversations' to benefit intellectually those to whom the questions are put. For example, when Socrates' questions lead Hippocrates to confess his ignorance of what a sophist is (312e8), Hippocrates learns a useful lesson about his need for intellectual caution, but he does not learn it by relying on the authority of Socrates. Or again, when Socrates' questions lead Protagoras first to affirm (349b2–d8), and then to deny (360e1–5), that courage is distinct from the rest of virtue, Protagoras learns a useful lesson about his need for intellectual humility; yet those who can benefit from lessons in intellectual humility are hardly going to learn them by relying on the authority of anybody else. Nor are the intellectual benefits of Socratic conversation confined to lessons about the limits of our knowledge. A Socratic conversation can actually improve our understanding of its subject matter if there is the slightest truth in any of the various explanations given in Plato for how Socrates can improve people intellectually, not by teaching them, but by, for example, reminding them of what in some sense they know already, or acting as an intellectual midwife to help them bring their own ideas to birth (312d9–e1n.).

3. PLATO AND THE EXAMPLE OF SOCRATES

Plato was born in Athens around 428 and died there in 348. He came to maturity in turbulent times. Before he reached thirty, Athens had lost a major war, and all its empire; the Athenian democracy had been twice overthrown and twice restored; and Socrates had been tried, condemned and executed.[3]

Plato was of an aristocratic family, and a kinsman of Critias (316a4–5n.) and Charmides (315a2n.). His origins were therefore similar to those of many ambitious young men who hired sophists to teach them how to make their way in public life. As it was, however, he remained faithful to the example set by Socrates, and

[2] Much of this material is collected in *SSR*, a book whose title says that it contains remnants of Socrates and his followers. *SSR* does not, however, contain the material related to Critias (316a4–5n.). This material is collected in DK 88, a book whose title says that it contains fragments of Socrates' predecessors. The explanation of this bibliographical curiosity may be some embarrassment that admirers of Socrates continue to feel about his connection with Critias: if Critias is classed as a predecessor, not a follower, then Socrates, so far from being blamed for how Critias turned out, can be presented as making a decisive shift for the better in the history of philosophy.

[3] The best account of the entire period remains the *History* of Thucydides, together with its continuation by Xenophon's *Historia Graeca*.

never took direct part himself in the public life of Athens. Any ambitions he might once have had to the contrary he apparently decided to abandon for good after the death of Socrates; and he must have felt his decision confirmed by his later experiences of political practice, when entangled by court intrigues in Syracuse.[4]

Not all participation in public life needs to be direct. As we have seen, Socrates' own life could be taken to show, not only how and why to avoid speaking in assemblies and law courts, but also how to contribute to public life nevertheless, by educating people who were to participate directly. Plato himself perhaps intended to make indirect contributions of this kind in two of what might seem to be his most sophistic and least Socratic activities: his Academy; and his writings.

Like many of the institutions that have subsequently been called after it, the Academy that Plato founded was a sort of school. In ordinary schools, small boys were taught literacy, playing the lyre, and gymnastics (312b1–2n.). The Academy was out of the ordinary, in several ways. The original Academics were, if not all fully adult, at least adolescent: we know that Aristotle, for example, was seventeen years old when he joined the Academy, and that he stayed for twenty years (Philochorus *FGH* 328 fr. 223, Apollodorus *FGH* 244 fr. 38). Such instruction as Academics gave was not confined to members of the school: Aristotle had a favourite anecdote of how Plato baffled the general public with an abstrusely mathematical lecture advertised as being 'On the good' (Aristoxenus *Elements of harmonics* 39.8–40.4). Nor was giving and receiving instruction the only activity of Academics within their school. Academics sometimes engaged in collaborative discussions: a charming passage from a contemporary comedy (Epicrates fr. 10 *PCG*) describes Plato as the insistent but gentle leader of a seminar in which he has the Academy's young men (μειράκια; see 315d7n. on νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον) debate how to classify cucumber; the young men proceed by 'delimiting [ἀφορίζειν]' and 'dividing [διαιρεῖν]', like the characters in Plato's *Sophist* 218e–221c, when they hone their skills by finding a definition of angling. Academics also engaged in research on austerely technical subjects: Plato sparked some very sophisticated astronomy by setting them the problem 'What uniform and determinate movements can be hypothesised that would save the phenomena concerning the movements of the planets?' (Eudemus fr. 148 Wehrli; cf. 356c5–6n.).

It may seem improbable that Plato could have intended the education offered in his Academy to fit people for an active life in politics. However, in *Republic* 521d–540b, he has Socrates propose that future rulers be given an education that is, if anything, even more abstruse. Furthermore, there are persistent reports of political activity by members of the Academy: for example, Plutarch *Against Colotes*

[4] In the seventh of the *Letters* that have come down under his name, Plato, or someone making a well-informed attempt to pass for him, tells the story, from his adolescent ambitions (*Ep.* 7, 324b–c 'I had the same experience as many others: I thought I would immediately enter public life, as soon as I came of age') down to the late 350s.

1126c–d lists associates of Plato whose political activities were for the good, while Athenaeus 11.508d–509b claims, with many names and much circumstantial detail, that 'most of his pupils turned out to be pretty tyrannical'. In having such controversial effects upon practical politics, the education offered in the Academy was like the uninstitutional education offered by Socrates himself.

Writing philosophical works, like organising a philosophical school, was liable to seem out of keeping with the 'conversational' (314c4n.) style of philosophy favoured by Socrates. At any rate, when Socrates' predecessors and contemporaries philosophised in writing, they uniformly adopted genres in which the writer presents himself as an authority, possessed of some philosophical truth which he proclaims to docile readers. Consider, for example, the bold proclamations at the start of works by Heraclitus (quoted in 346e2–3n.), Hippias (quoted in 337c7–d1n.) and Protagoras (quoted in 320d1n. on θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, and in 356d3–4n.); even bolder was Empedocles, who started his *Purifications* with the announcement that 'in me you now have an immortal god, mortal no longer, going about among you, honoured by all' (DK 31 B 112.4–5). With such models before him, it is no surprise that Socrates himself never wrote a word of philosophy.

To combine writing with the conversational style of philosophy, Socrates' followers invented a new literary genre: written accounts of conversations – dialogues – between Socrates and others, or Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι (Arist. *Rh.* 1417a21, *Poetics* 1447b11). Like most of Plato's works, the *Protagoras* belongs to this genre.

Someone who writes an account of a conversation does not vouch for the accuracy of anything said in the conversation. Or at least, that applies to most cases; the exceptions are dialogues where the writer takes part in the conversation, and where, like Cicero's *De divinatione* and unlike Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.3.8–15, there is no suggestion that the writer has learnt better since taking part. It certainly applies to every one of Plato's dialogues, the *Protagoras* included; for Plato never represents himself as speaking in any of them, and could not, without intolerable anachronism, represent himself as speaking in the *Protagoras*, which he sets around the date of his birth (309a3n.).

Plato does not even include in the *Protagoras* a character to be his spokesman, as Philonous is spokesman for Berkeley in the *Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. For no character apart from Socrates might conceivably be Plato's spokesman; yet what writer would have as his spokesman a character who makes two opposite pronouncements on whether virtue is teachable (361a2–b6), who speaks as if it is entirely proper to test people by putting falsehoods to them (341b4–d9, 349d1–2), who indulges in whimsically elaborate praise of concision (342a6–343b4), who pleads a transparently fictive prior engagement (335c5n.), and who recounts from memory a long conversation in which he spoke of his poor memory (334d1n.)? No doubt Plato did believe many of the things that he had Socrates say; but he also took great care to thwart the lazy inference from 'This is what Plato has Socrates say' to 'This is what we are to believe, on the authority of Plato.'

None of this means that Plato's own philosophical views are kept wholly concealed. On the contrary, in the *Protagoras* he expresses a clear view about deference to intellectual authority on philosophical questions, not indeed by stating that view himself or through a spokesman, but by the very act of writing a dialogue in which he abstains from such statements. And perhaps there are more views of Plato's to be gleaned from how he marshals the various things done and said in the *Protagoras* (see e.g. 310d3n., 337c2n., 342b3–5n., 358e1n.). But we face difficulties if we wish to philosophise by taking on trust the views that we can glean in this way. For example, what view are we to glean from complaints in a book that books are intellectually inert (329a2–4), and complaints in a work of literature that works of literature are too inscrutable for them to be authorities on anything (347c3–348a5)? The view that discussing works of literature is at best a stimulus to, and certainly no substitute for, philosophising of our own? That may well have been Plato's view. We may well come to share it, as a result of reading the *Protagoras*. But that cannot be because we take it on trust from Plato; it can only be because the *Protagoras* has nudged us into seeing it for ourselves. And if this is how the *Protagoras* affects us, then in writing it, Plato remained faithful to Socrates' example of philosophising in conversation.

4. EVIDENCE FOR THE TEXT

The text presented in this edition depends, for the most part, on printed reports of what survives of four manuscript copies of the entire *Protagoras*. The reports were printed in the twentieth century;[5] the manuscripts were copied at various times from the third century to the eleventh century AD. Occasionally the direct evidence supplied by these manuscripts is supplemented by indirect evidence: quotations in other ancient works of passages from the *Protagoras*. In many passages, this evidence presents variant readings. In some passages, the variations are serious: that is, it makes a difference which we choose, and the choice is not obvious. In some passages – and this includes some passages where the evidence attests to only one reading – there is reason to think that what Plato actually wrote differs from any reading to which the evidence attests. Some of the evidence is reported in the notes at the foot of the text. The notes use these signs:

- D a reading attested in every manuscript, or fragment of manuscript, that in this passage supplies direct evidence for the text, even if one of those manuscripts attests also another reading as a correction or annotation.
- d a reading attested, but not unanimously, in our direct evidence.
- i a reading attested in our indirect evidence.
- c a reading attested in neither our direct nor our indirect evidence.

[5] They are Burnet (1903), Croiset and Bodin (1923), and, for the surviving fragments of the third-century manuscript, the edition of them in Tulli (1999).

We may think of 'c' as short for 'conjecture', so long as we do not forget that some of the readings marked with other signs may also have originated as conjectures, that is, as guesses by a scholar dissatisfied with the readings attested in the evidence then available. There is always a note when a reading describable as c is printed in the text. There is always a note when a reading describable as D is not printed in the text. Otherwise there are notes only when the evidence for the text leaves it more than usually in doubt, in a more than usually significant way.

ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ *ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ*

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ ΑΝΩΝΥΜΟΣ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

ΕΤ. πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνηι; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου **309**
τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μήν μοι καὶ πρώιην ἰδόντι καλὸς
μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν
εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.

ΣΩ. εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ὃς ἔφη χαρι- **b**
εστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἣν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

ΕΤ. τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἦ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνηι; καὶ πῶς πρός σε ὁ νεανίας
διάκειται;

ΣΩ. εὖ, ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῆι νῦν ἡμέραι· καὶ γὰρ 5
πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι.
ἄτοπον μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου, οὔτε προσεῖ-
χον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά.

ΕΤ. καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κἀκεῖνον τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα; οὐ **c**
γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίονι ἐνέτυχες ἄλλωι ἔν γε τῆιδε τῆι πόλει.

ΣΩ. καὶ πολύ γε.

ΕΤ. τί φήις; ἀστῶι ἢ ξένωι;

ΣΩ. ξένωι. 5

ΕΤ. ποδαπῶι;

ΣΩ. Ἀβδηρίτηι.

ΕΤ. καὶ οὕτω καλός τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέν σοι εἶναι, ὥστε τοῦ Κλεινίου
ὑέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;

ΣΩ. πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι; 10

ΕΤ. ἀλλ' ἦ σοφῶι τινι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν πάρει;

ΣΩ. σοφωτάτωι μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος **d**
εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

ΕΤ. ὢ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;

ΣΩ. τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.

ΕΤ. καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνωι συγγεγονὼς ἥκεις; 5

ΣΩ. πάνυ γε, πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας. **310**

ΕΤ. τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, εἰ μή σέ τι κωλύει,
καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί;

ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἴσομαι, ἐὰν ἀκούητε.

ΕΤ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, ἐὰν λέγηις. 5

309a3 ἀνὴρ ἔτι c: ἀνὴρ ἔτι D, ὁ ἀνὴρ ἔτι i

ΣΩ. διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ' οὖν ἀκούετε.

τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἱπποκράτης, ὁ
b Ἀπολλοδώρου ὑὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν θύραν τῆι βακτηρίαι πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶι ἀνέωιξέ τις, εὐθὺς εἴσω ἤιει ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῆι φωνῆι μέγα λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις;

καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, Ἱπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος· μή τι
5 νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις;

οὐδέν γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε.

εὖ ἂν λέγοις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου;

Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἥκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί.

πρώιην, ἔφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι;

c νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ἑσπέρας γε. καὶ ἅμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ εἶπεν· ἑσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὀψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν ὅτι διωξοίμην αὐτόν, ὑπό τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην.
5 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δεδειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει ὅτι ἥκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἰέναι, ἔπειτά μοι λίαν πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι·
d ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστά με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην.

καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, τί οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο; μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας;

5 καὶ ὃς γελάσας, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ.

ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἂν αὐτῶι διδῶις ἀργύριον καὶ πείθηις ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν.

e εἰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν τούτωι εἴη· ὡς οὔτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆις αὐτῶι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γὰρ
5 παῖς ἦ ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησε. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν καί φασιν σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ
311 βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλίαι τῶι Ἱππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· μήπω, ἀγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν—πρῶι γάρ ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν
5 ἕως ἂν φῶς γένηται· εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον.

310a7 τῆς D: τῆς γὰρ i   310b1 ὑὸς c: υἱὸς d, υἱέος d

μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῆιμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώ- **b**
μενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτων, εἰπέ
μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι,
ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνωι μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος
καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον 5
ἐλθὼν Ἱπποκράτη τὸν Κῶιον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν
ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκείνωι, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· "εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ
Ἱππόκρατες, Ἱπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι;" τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; **c**

εἶπον ἄν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς ἰατρῶι.

ὡς τίς γενησόμενος;

ὡς ἰατρός, ἔφη.

εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἐπενόεις 5
ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· "τελεῖν
τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῶι ἔχεις Πολυκλείτωι τε καὶ Φειδίαι;"
τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;

εἶπον ἂν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς.

ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός; 10

δῆλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιός.

εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ **d**
ἀργύριον ἐκείνωι μισθὸν ἕτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἐξικνῆ-
ται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ
τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες. εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφό-
δρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο· "εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἱππόκρατες, 5
ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῶι Πρωταγόραι ἐν νῶι ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν;" τί ἂν
αὐτῶι ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου **e**
ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποι-
ητήν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἠκούομεν;

σοφιστὴν δή τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη.

ὡς σοφιστῆι ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες τὰ χρήματα; 5

μάλιστα.

εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο· "αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος **312**
ἔρχηι παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν;"

καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας, ὥστε κατα-
φανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι—εἰ μέν τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι
σοφιστὴς γενησόμενος. 5

σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας
σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων;

νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.

312a7 σαυτὸν c: αὑτὸν D

ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν
b παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμ-
ματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ
ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνηι ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
παιδείαι, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.

5 πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρω-
ταγόρου μάθησις.

οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἤ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

τοῦ πέρι;

c ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς
φήις, σοφιστῆι· ὅτι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστιν, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶσθα.
καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτωι παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ
ἀγαθῶι οὔτ' εἰ κακῶι πράγματι.

5 οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναι.

λέγε δή, τί ἡγῆι εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν;

ἐγὼ μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὥσπερ τοὔνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν
ἐπιστήμονα.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ
d περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ' εἴ τις
ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς· "τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες;" εἴποιμεν ἄν
που αὐτῶι ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τἆλλα
οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο· "ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν;" τί
5 ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῶι; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης;

τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι
δεινὸν λέγειν;

ἴσως ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως
γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ
e λέγειν· ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὗπερ καὶ
ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως· ἦ γάρ;

ναί.

εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;

5 δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπίσταται.

εἰκός γε. τί δή ἐστιν τοῦτο περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ
σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ;

μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

313 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον μετὰ τοῦτο· τί οὖν; οἶσθα εἰς οἷόν τινα κίνδυνον
ἔρχηι ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχήν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει
τωι διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ
ἂν περιεσκέψω εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὔ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλὴν τούς τε
5 φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνάς·
ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγῆι, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ὧι πάντ'

ἐστὶν τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γενομένου, περὶ δὲ τούτου οὔτε τῶι πατρὶ οὔτε τῶι ἀδελφῶι ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε **b** ἡμῶν τῶν ἑταίρων οὐδενί, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῶι ἀφικομένωι τούτωι ξένωι τὴν σὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἑσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φήις, ὄρθριον ἥκων περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλὴν ποιῆι, εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῶι εἴτε μή, ἕτοιμος δ' εἶ ἀναλίσκειν τά τε σαυτοῦ 5 καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκὼς ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόραι, ὃν οὔτε γιγνώσκεις, ὡς φήις, οὔτε διείλεξαι οὐδεπώποτε, **c** σοφιστὴν δ' ὀνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν φαίνηι ἀγνοῶν, ὧι μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν;

καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας, ἔοικεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις.

ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔμπορός τις ἢ 5 κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται; φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις.

τρέφεται δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι;

μαθήμασιν δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσηι ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος 10 τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὧν ἄγουσιν **d** ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχηι γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὤν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῶι ἀεὶ 5 ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἃ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ' ἄν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν ὧν πωλοῦσιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς **e** τὴν ψυχήν· ὡς δ' αὔτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχηι περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὖ ἰατρικὸς ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὦ 5 μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς. καὶ γὰρ **314** δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῆι τῶν μαθημάτων ὠνῆι ἢ ἐν τῆι τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν συμ- 5 βουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαΐοντα, ὅτι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅτι μή, καὶ ὁπόσον καὶ ὁπότε· ὥστε ἐν τῆι ὠνῆι οὐ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος. **b** μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλωι ἀγγείωι ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῆι τῆι ψυχῆι λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα

313c9 μαθήμασιν d: μάθησιν d, μαθήσει d

5 καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν, ἴωμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα· καὶ γὰρ
c οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος—οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον—καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.

δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῶι προθύρωι ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν
5 ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν, στάντες ἐν τῶι προθύρωι διελεγόμεθα ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν, κιν-
d δυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν ἡμᾶς, ἔα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῶι· καὶ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οἷός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν,
5 καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλεισμένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῶι;

ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν οὔτε σοφισ-
e ταί ἐσμεν. ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γάρ τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν. μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέωιξεν τὴν θύραν.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῶι προστώιωι περιπατοῦντα, ἑξῆς δ' αὐτῶι συμπεριεπάτουν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα
315 Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἕτερος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος, καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος
5 ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνηι μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν διεξέρχεται,
b κηλῶν τῆι φωνῆι ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι· ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῶι χορῶι. τοῦτον τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἥσθην, ὡς καλῶς ηὐλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδὼν
5 ἐν τῶι πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμωι περιεσχίζοντο οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλωι περιιόντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

c τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὅμηρος, Ἱππίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον, καθήμενον ἐν τῶι κατ' ἀντικρὺ προστώιωι ἐν θρόνωι· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ

314e1 τοι c: τι D 314e2 ἄνθρωπος c: ἄνθρωπος D 315a3 ἕτερος d: ἑταῖρος D
315a4 εὐδοκιμεῖ c: εὐδοκίμει D 315a5–6 δὲ οἳ c: δὲ D

βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχός τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα 5 διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἱππίαν, ὁ δ' ἐν θρόνωι καθήμενος ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ διεξήιει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον— ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος **d** ὁ Κεῖος—ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματί τινι, ὧι πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμιείωι ἐχρῆτο Ἱππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωιδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα 5 πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῶι ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναις Παυσανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Παυσανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς μὲν ἐγῶιμαι καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. **e** ἔδοξα ἀκοῦσαι ὄνομα αὐτῶι εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυγχάνει ὤν. τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τὼ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, ὅ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, 5 καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου—πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν **316** τῶι οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.

καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθεμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός, ὡς φὴις σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου. 5

ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς εἰσήλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι προσῆιμεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ **b** Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἤλθομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτης οὗτος.

πότερον, ἔφη, μόνωι βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων;

ἡμῖν μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα ἤλθομεν, αὐτὸς σκέψαι. 5

τί οὖν δή ἐστιν, ἔφη, οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκετε;

Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου ὑός, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῆι πόλει, τοῦτο **c** δὲ οἴεταί οἱ μάλιστ' ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο· ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἴει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθῆι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα 5 καὶ ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς

316a1 ἀνὴρ c: ἀνὴρ d, ὁ ἀνὴρ d   316b2 τοι c: τι D   316c2 μάλιστ' ἂν c: μάλιστα D

βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας, καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων, ἑαυτῶι συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους
d ἐσομένους διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα· οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν
5 ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμωιδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίους δέ τινας ἤισθημαι καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ
e Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἥττων σοφιστὴς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς
317 τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ συμφέρομαι· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὔ τι διαπράξασθαι ὃ ἐβουλήθησαν—οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὧνπερ ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα·
5 ἐπεὶ οἵ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἅττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν—τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήμα-
b τος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι
5 βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ ἄλλας
c πρὸς ταύτηι ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῶι εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστὴς εἶναι. καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῆι τέχνηι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν—οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην—ὥστε πολύ μοι ἥδιστόν ἐστιν, εἴ τι
5 βούλεσθε, περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι.

καὶ ἐγώ—ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῶι τε Προδίκωι καὶ τῶι
d Ἱππίαι ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἶμεν—τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἱππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

5 βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη, συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθεζόμενοι διαλέγησθε;

317a6 τὸ c: τὸν D

ἐδόκει χρῆναι· ἄσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῶι Ἱππίαι—ἐκεῖ γὰρ προϋπῆρχε τὰ βάθρα—ἐν δὲ τούτωι Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, **e** ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἵδε πάρεισιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιοῦ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. 5

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι ἡ αὐτή μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἥπερ ἄρτι, **318** περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίαι ὢν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας· ὅτι οὖν αὐτῶι ἀποβήσεται, ἐάν σοι συνῆι, ἡδέως ἂν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὅ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος.

ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν· ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, 5 ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῆις, ἧι ἂν ἡμέραι ἐμοὶ συγγένηι, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῆι ὑστεραίαι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα· καὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι.

καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν **b** λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σύ, καίπερ τηλικοῦτος ὢν καὶ οὕτως σοφός, εἴ τίς σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ 5 νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν, ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ **c** σοῦ, ὅτι ἑκάστης ἡμέρας συνὼν αὐτῶι βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο· τί δὴ φὴις βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν; εἴποι ἂν αὐτῶι ὁ Ζεύξιππος ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν· κἂν εἰ Ὀρθαγόραι τῶι Θηβαίωι συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ σοῦ, 5 ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὅτι βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνωι, εἴποι ἂν ὅτι εἰς αὔλησιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἰπὲ τῶι νεανίσκωι καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε Πρωταγόραι συγγενό- **d** μενος, ἧι ἂν αὐτῶι ἡμέραι συγγένηται, βελτίων ἄπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἑκάστης οὕτως ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ;

καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, σύ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾶις, 5 ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται ἅπερ ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλωι τωι συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες **e** ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν

318c2 ἐπιδώσει c: ἐπιδώσοι D

καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἥκει. τὸ δὲ
5 μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ
319 οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.

ἆρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἕπομαί σου τῶι λόγωι; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας.

5 αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

ἦ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἅπερ νοῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
b οὐκ ὤιμην διδακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὁρῶ οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλη-
5 σίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέηι πρᾶξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως,
c ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῆι αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ἦι καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῆι ὁ
5 ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσιν ἢ ἐξάρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχ-
d νηι εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὰν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως δέηι βουλεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο
5 ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῶι, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ
e ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίαι ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων
320 εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἃ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τωι ἄλλωι παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῆι ἀρετῆι. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτουῒ νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων

319b1 ὅπως c: ὅπως ἂν D   319c6 ἐξάρωνται c: ἐξαίρωνται d, ἐξέρωνται d

ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῆι δὴ 5
ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος
ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἓξ μῆνας γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τούτωι οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι **b**
χρήσαιτο αὐτῶι. καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ αὐτοὶ
ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε
τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ
ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, 5
κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον
γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις
ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσηις **c**
ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον.

ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσ-
βύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγωι διεξελθών;

πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῶι ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων ὁποτέρως 5
βούλοιτο οὕτως διεξιέναι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον
ὑμῖν λέγειν.

ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ **d**
δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἱμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ
γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆι κεράν-
νυται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ
καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. 5
Προμηθέα δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι. "νείμαντος δέ μου,"
ἔφη, "ἐπίσκεψαι." καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ
τάχους προσῆπτεν, τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει ἐκόσμει· τοὺς δὲ **e**
ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο
δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν
φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν· ἃ δὲ ηὖξε μεγέθει, τῶιδε αὐτῶι **321**
αὐτὰ ἔσωιζεν· καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο
εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν
διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφι-
εννὺς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριξὶν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν ἀμῦναι 5
χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ εἰς εὐνὰς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ
αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυὴς ἑκάστωι· καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ **b**
μὲν ὁπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ θριξὶν καὶ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. τοὐντεῦθεν
τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ
δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζώιων
ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις 5
ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῶι γένει πορίζων. ἅτε δὴ οὖν

321b1 ὑποδῶν c: ὑπὸ ποδῶν D

c οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῶι ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅτι χρήσαιτο. ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῶι ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὁρᾶι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶια ἐμμελῶς πάντων 5 ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον· ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρῆν, ἐν ἧι ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς. ἀπορίαι οὖν σχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς ἥντινα d σωτηρίαν τῶι ἀνθρώπωι εὕροι, κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητήν τωι ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπωι. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτηι ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ 5 εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῶι Διί. τῶι δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν—πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν—εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν e ὧι ἐφιλοτεχνείτην, λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τήν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπωι, 322 καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπωι τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπιμηθέα ὕστερον, ἧιπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν ζώιων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, καὶ ἐπεχείρει βωμούς 5 τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῆι τέχνηι, καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ηὕρετο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι b κατ' ἀρχὰς ἄνθρωποι ὤικουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν· ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῆι αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής—πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὔπω 5 εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική—ἐζήτουν δὴ ἁθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώιζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἁθροισθεῖεν, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν c πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας περὶ τῶι γένει ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί.

5 ἐρωτᾶι οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· "πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ ὧδε· εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ d ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω;"

322b1–2 ἀπώλλυντο c: ἀπώλυντο d, ἀπόλλυντο d

"ἐπὶ πάντας," ἔφη ὁ Ζεύς, "καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν 5 κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως."

οὕτω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἦι λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐκτὸς ὢν τῶν ὀλίγων **e** συμβουλεύηι, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φήις—εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι—ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν **323** ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴηι ἀπατᾶσθαι ὡς τῶι ὄντι ἡγοῦνται πάντες ἄνθρωποι 5 πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φῆι ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην ἣν μή ἐστιν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν **b** ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνηι καὶ ἐν τῆι ἄλληι πολιτικῆι ἀρετῆι, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, ἐὰν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγηι ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καί φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, 5 ἐάντε ὦσιν ἐάντε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον **c** οὐδένα ὅντιν' οὐχὶ ἁμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, 5 ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ὧι ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχηι, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ **d** νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχηι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ 5 τἀναντία τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, ἐάν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχηι, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία **e** τούτων κακά, ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἵ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὧν ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ **324**

323c1 προσποιούμενον c: προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην D

θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς
οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦν-
5 τας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει ὅτι οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται
παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς
b τούτωι τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ
θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν
οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό
γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις
5 ἀδικήσηι μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. καὶ
τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἀποτροπῆς
γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν ὅσοιπερ
c τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι. τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται
οἵ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθη-
ναῖοι οἱ σοὶ πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι
τῶν ἡγουμένων παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν. ὡς μὲν οὖν
5 εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμ-
βουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγοῦν-
d ται ἀρετήν, ἀποδέδεικταί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς, ὥς γέ μοι φαίνεται.

ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
τί δήποτε οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς αὑτῶν ὑεῖς διδάσκουσιν
ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοὶ
5 οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ πέρι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μῦθόν
σοι ἐρῶ ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὧδε γὰρ ἐννόησον· πότερον ἔστιν τι ἓν ἢ οὐκ
e ἔστιν οὗ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, εἴπερ μέλλει πόλις
εἶναι; ἐν τούτωι γὰρ αὕτη λύεται ἡ ἀπορία ἣν σὺ ἀπορεῖς ἢ ἄλλοθι
οὐδαμοῦ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἓν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ
325 χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον
εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἓν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν—εἰ
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὗ δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα, ἐάν
τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, οὕτω πράττειν, ἄνευ δὲ
5 τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν καὶ παῖδα
καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, ἕωσπερ ἂν κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, ὃς δ᾽
ἂν μὴ ὑπακούηι κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦ-
b τον ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν—εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ᾽
αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς ὑεῖς,
τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ
διδακτὸν αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι, ἀπεδείξαμεν· διδακτοῦ
5 δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς ὑεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ᾽
οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ᾽ ὧι δὲ ἥ τε ζημία

325b6 ἐφ᾽ ὧι d: ἐφ᾽ ὧν d

θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν c
εἰς ἀρετήν, καὶ πρὸς τῶι θανάτωι χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν συλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκον-
ται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι 5
καὶ νουθετοῦσιν. ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῆι τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς
καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχον- d
ται, ὅπως βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον
διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι "τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον," καὶ
"τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν," καὶ "τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνό-
σιον," καὶ "τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει." καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται· 5
εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν
ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων e
τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν
αὖ γράμματα μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὥσπερ
τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν
ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολ- **326**
λαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἔνεισιν πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια
παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται
τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἵ τ' αὖ κιθαρισταί, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης
τε ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ τού- 5
τοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιή-
ματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς b
ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς
τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρ-
μοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράτ-
τειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας 5
δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ
σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῆι διανοίαι χρηστῆι οὔσηι, c
καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων
καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν. καὶ ταῦτα
ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα—μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ
πλουσιώτατοι—καὶ οἱ τούτων ὑεῖς, πρωιαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς 5
ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ
διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ τούς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει
μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ d
ἐφ' αὑτῶν εἰκῆι πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ

325d2 ὅπως D: ὅπως ὡς d 326c4 δυνάμενοι μάλιστα—μάλιστα δὲ c: δυνάμενοι μάλιστα δὲ D

τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῆι γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδόασιν καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ
5 τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὣς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, ὃς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνηι τούτων, κολάζει· καὶ ὄνομα
e τῆι κολάσει ταύτηι καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, "εὐθῦναι". τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι, θαυμάζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.

5 διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ ὑεῖς φαῦλοι γίγνονται; τοῦτο αὖ μάθε· οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς
327 ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὃ λέγω οὕτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὁτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ μὴ οἷόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι εἰ
5 μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἦμεν ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ
b τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων—λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα—εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν
5 καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἴχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἴει ἄν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς ὑεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων; οἶμαι μὲν οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ ὑὸς εὐφυέστατος
c γενόμενος εἰς αὔλησιν, οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ηὐξήθη, ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ' ἂν φαύλου ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαΐοντας. οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν,
5 ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγ-
d ματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες οἷοίπερ οὓς πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίωι. ἦ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιού-
5 τοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνωι τῶι χορῶι μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις ἂν εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτωι καὶ Φρυνώνδαι, καὶ ἀνολο-
e φύραι' ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν. νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς,

327b2 ἡμῖν c: ὑμῖν D   327c3 γ' ἂν c: γοῦν D

ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδείς σοι φαίνεται· εἶθ', ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φανείη, οὐδέ γ' ἂν οἶμαι εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν **328** διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν ὑεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ' ἦν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ῥάιδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων 5 παντάπασι ῥάιδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπη- **b** τόν. ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνῆσαί τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῶι δοκεῖν τῶι μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι· 5 ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθηι, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας ὅσου ἂν φῆι **c** ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατατέθηκε.

τοιοῦτόν σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ λόγον εἴρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως ἡγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυ- μαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους ὑεῖς γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων 5 ἀγαθούς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου ὑεῖς, Παράλου καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε ἡλικιῶται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν. τῶνδε δὲ οὔπω ἄξιον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν ἐλπίδες· **d** νέοι γάρ.

Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἠισθόμην ὅτι τῶι 5 ὄντι πεπαυμένος εἴη, μόγις πως ἐμαυτὸν ὡσπερεὶ συναγείρας εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποκράτη· ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προύτρεψάς με ὧδε ἀφικέσθαι· πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἃ **e** ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῶι ἔμπροσθεν χρόνωι ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ἧι ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἐμποδών, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥαιδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξεν. καὶ γὰρ 5 εἰ μέν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων συγγένοιτο ὁτωιοῦν τῶν δημηγόρων, **329** τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσηι τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα πληγέντα μακρὸν 5

328b3 ὀνῆσαί c: νοῆσαί D 328c2 κατατέθηκε c: κατέθηκε D

ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηταί τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω, σμικρὰ
b ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα.
5 νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ᾽ ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἀρετὴν φὴις διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλωι
c τωι ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι· ὃ δ᾽ ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψειε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὖ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ
5 ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἕν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή· ταῦτ᾽ οὖν αὐτὰ δίελθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῶι λόγωι, πότερον ἓν μέν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, ἢ ταῦτ᾽
d ἐστὶν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος. τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.

ἀλλὰ ῥάιδιον τοῦτό γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἑνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστιν ἃ ἐρωτᾶις.

5 πότερον, ἔφην, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστιν, στόμα τε καὶ ῥὶς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι;

e ἐκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον.

πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, ἐάνπερ τις
5 ἓν λάβηι, ἅπαντα ἔχειν;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὔ.

330 ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία;

πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων.

ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο;

5 ναί.

ἦ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς οἷον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδ᾽ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον

329b1 δόλιχον c: δολιχὸν D

τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, **b**
εἴπερ τῶι παραδείγματί γε ἔοικε;

ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' οἷον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ' οἷον 5 σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ὁσιότης.

οὐκ ἔφη.

φέρε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῆι σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; **c** ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί;

καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη.

τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· "ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δή μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, 5 αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον;" ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶι ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην;

τὴν αὐτήν, ἔφη.

"ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι" φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῶι ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ; **d**

ναί, ἔφη.

εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· "οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι;" φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.

ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. 5

"οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι;" φαῖμεν ἄν· ἢ οὔ;

καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη.

"πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὅσιον;" ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῶι ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμ' ἄν· "εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῆι μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον 10 εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται." τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν **e** ἀποκρίναιο;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· "πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἆρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς 5 μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον·" εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι "τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἴει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας γὰρ ὅδε **331** ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων." εἰ οὖν εἴποι· "ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῂς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν;" τί ἂν αὐτῶι ἀποκρίναιο;

330d9 ἔφην c: ἔφη D

5 ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν.

τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῶι, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· "οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὅσιον ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δ'
b ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;" τί αὐτῶι ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἴ με ἐώιης, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι "ἤτοι ταὐτόν γ'
5 ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη." ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως.

c οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τήν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῶι διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον.

5 μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ "εἰ βούλει" τοῦτο καὶ "εἴ σοι δοκεῖ" ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ' "ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ" τοῦτο λέγω,
d οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ "εἴ" ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτωιοῦν ἁμῆι γέ πηι προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῶι μέλανι
5 ἔστιν ὅπηι προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῶι μαλακῶι, καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἁμῆι γέ πηι προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον. ὥστε τούτωι γε
e τῶι τρόπωι κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχηι τὸ ὅμοιον.

καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν· ἦ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
5 τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις;

332a οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς;

5 ἔφη.

τούτωι τῶι πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

331b1 ἀλλ' ἄδικον c: ἀλλὰ δίκαιον D 331d5 ὅπηι c: ὃ μὴ d, ὧι μὴ d

πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ τοὐναντίον;

σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. 10

οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνηι σωφρονοῦσιν; **b**

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες;

συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. 5

τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῶι σωφρόνως;

ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνηι πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνηι;

ὡμολόγει. 10

οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείαι, ἀσθενῶς;

ἐδόκει.

καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, βραδέως; **c**

ἔφη.

καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου;

συνέφη. 5

φέρε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν;

συνεχώρει.

τούτωι ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν; 10

ἔστιν.

τούτωι ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῆι;

ἔφη. 15

τούτωι μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ;

οὐκ ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστωι τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;

συνωμολόγει. 20

ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. **d** ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή;

332a8 ἄνθρωποι c: ἄνθρωποι d, οἱ ἄνθρωποι d 332a9 ἢ τοὐναντίον c: ἢ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἔπραττον D

ὡμολογήκαμεν.

τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι;

5 ἔφη.

ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῶι σωφρόνως πραττομένωι;

ἔφη.

τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ 10 ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;

e συνεχώρει.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτ' ἄν;

ναί.

πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;

5 ναί.

ἐναντίως;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων;

ναί.

10 ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης;

φαίνεται.

μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίαι ἐναντίον εἶναι;

συνωμολόγει.

333 ἓν δὲ ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι;

φημί.

πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ὧι ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, 5 μόριον δὲ ἑκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῶι ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνάιδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς b γὰρ ἂν συνάιδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μὲν ἓν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσιν δὲ μή, τῆι δὲ ἀφροσύνηι ἑνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται· ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως;

ὡμολόγησεν καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως.

5 οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν. ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἆρά c τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ;

332e12 μέμνησαι c: μέμνημαι D

αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ;

εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν. 5

ἀλλ' οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἴτε μή· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας—τὸν γὰρ λόγον ᾐτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. **d**

ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; 5

ἔστω, ἔφη.

τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν;

ἔφη.

τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν;

ἔστω, ἔφη. 10

πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς;

εἰ εὖ.

λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι;

λέγω.

ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἅ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; 15

καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ᾖι, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά. **e**

καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην. πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἃ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἃ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; **334**

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστι, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ κυσίν· τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί, δένδροις δέ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον 5 **b**

334a4 οἶδ' ἃ c: D οἶδα   334a6 καὶ κυσίν c: κυσίν D

τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασίν ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξὶν πολεμιώτατον
5 ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζώιων πλὴν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῶι ἄλλωι σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
c παντοδαπόν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῶι ἀνθρώπωι, τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίωι ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι σμικροτάτωι ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον
5 τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.

εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρω-
d πος, καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγηι, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ἦι ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν, ὤιου ἂν χρῆναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βρα-
5 χυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι.

πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ;

μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

ἀλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη.

e ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί;

ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἷός τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι
5 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούληι, οὕτως ὥστε τὸν λόγον
335 μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ βραχέα οὕτως ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἰπεῖν· εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῶι ἑτέρωι χρῶ τρόπωι πρός με, τῆι βραχυλογίαι.

ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην
5 ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν ὃ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέν με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων ἐφαινόμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.

b καὶ ἐγώ—ἔγνων γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὐτῶι ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἑκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι—ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἀλλά τοι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω
5 παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούληι διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. σὺ

334e2–3 ἀποκρίνωμαι c: ἀποκρίνομαι D

μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φὴις δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίαι καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίαι οἷός τ᾽ εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι—σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ— ἐγὼ **c** δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ᾽ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ᾽ εἴην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με 5 δεῖ—εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον.

καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ᾽ εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καί μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῆι δεξιᾶι, τῆι δ᾽ ἀριστερᾶι ἀντελάβετο **d** τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτουΐ, καὶ εἶπεν· οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθηις, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἑνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. 5

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον—ἤδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιών—ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, **e** ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαί σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο· νῦν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῶι Ἱμεραίωι δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἕπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τωι ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἕπεσθαι, εἴποιμι ἄν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θέουσιν τούτοις **336** ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τι δέηι θεάσασθαι ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο 5 διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ **b** δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ᾽ ὤιμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν.

ἀλλ᾽—ὁρᾶις;—ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὐτῶι τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται, καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν 5 αὖ σὺ βούληι.

ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναί οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόραι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ ἐπί- **c** στασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ᾽ ἂν εἴ τωι ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστηι ἐρωτήσει 5 μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι **d** λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν

336b5 καὶ σὺ d: καὶ σοὶ d

οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων· ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καί φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ
5 ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρὴ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών· ὦ
e Πρόδικε καὶ Ἱππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσηι· ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόραι, ἀλλὰ κοινῆι ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν.

337 εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, καλῶς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία· χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή—ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταὐτόν· κοινῆι μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι
5 ἑκατέρωι, ἀλλὰ τῶι μὲν σοφωτέρωι πλέον, τῶι δὲ ἀμαθεστέρωι ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς
b συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή—ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὔνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις—καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία γίγνοιτο· ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν
5 τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε—εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγωι
c πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων— ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα—εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῆι τῆι διανοίαι, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῶι τῶι σώματι.

5 ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἱππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολί-
d τας ἅπαντας εἶναι—φύσει, οὐ νόμωι· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῶι ὁμοίωι φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται—ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν
5 συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε,
e μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς
338 ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ

336d3 ἐγγυῶμαι c: ἐγγυῶ καὶ D 337c2 ἡδοίμεθα d: ἡδοίμεσθα d

τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ μὴ ἡδὺ Πρωταγόραι, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ὑμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίαι ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ 5 πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὣς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἑλέσθαι ὃς ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων **b** ἑκατέρου.

ταῦτα ἤρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπήινεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἑλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἴη βραβευτὴν ἑλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται 5 ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὅμοιος, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὅμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε ἐκ περιττοῦ ἡιρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἱρήσεσθε. **c** τῆι μὲν ἀληθείαι, ὡς ἐγὦιμαι, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἑλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῶιδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλωι ἀνθρώπωι ἐπιστάτην αἱρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὑτωσὶ 5 ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν' ὃ προθυμεῖσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, **d** ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῶι δεῖξαι ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὁπόσ' ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῆι πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον 5 ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῆι δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου ἕνεκα ἕνα **e** ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῆι ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι.

καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογῆσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἱκανῶς ἐρωτήσηι, πάλιν δώσειν 5 λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος. ἤρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὑτωσί πως· ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν **339** τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὗπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει 5 γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν τὸν Κρέοντος ὑὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ ὅτι

338a4 ὑμῖν d: ἡμῖν d   338a7 ποιήσετε D: ποιήσατε c   338c2 αἱρήσεσθε c: αἱρήσεσθαι D

b ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι
χαλεπόν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόωι
τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.
τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ᾆσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω;

5 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.

εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὔ;

πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς.

10 δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῶι ὁ ποιητής;

οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

c ὅρα δή, ἔφη, βέλτιον.

ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς.

οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προιόντος τοῦ ᾄσματος λέγει που
οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον
5 νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰ-
ρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.
ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κἀκεῖνα τὰ ἔμπροσθεν;

οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι;

10 φαίνεται ἔμοιγε·—καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μή τι λέγοι—ἀτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται;

d πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῶι ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀλαθείαι, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα ἑαυτῶι, ὅτι "χαλεπὸν 5 ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι," τοῦτον μέμφεταί τε καὶ οὔ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῶι λέγοντος; καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα αὑτῶι μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει.

e εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ εἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα—ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τἀληθῆ, ἵνα 5 μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῆι σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής—τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι

339b1 ἄνδρ' c: ἄνδρα D 339b2 χερσίν c: χερσί D 339b7 οὖν c: οὐ d, οὗ d
339b9 ἐγώ, καλῶς τε c: ἐγώ τε d, ἔγωγε d, i 339c6 φάτ' c: φάτο D

Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῶι ἀνδρί. δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ **340**
παρακαλεῖν σέ· ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον
ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα

φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
σχῶμεν, 5

ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην
ἐκπέρσηι. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς
σῆς μουσικῆς, ἧι τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν **b**
ὄν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ
ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὑτῶι Σιμωνίδης. σὺ
γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι
τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; 5

ἄλλο νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείαι γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη; **c**

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.

τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς οἴεται Πρωταγόρας,
ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῶι λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγεν
τὸ "χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν", ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἔμμεναι"· 5
ἔστιν δὲ οὐ ταὐτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὥς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ
τὸ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι τῶι γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία
λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὑτῶι. καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ **d**
ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καθ' Ἡσίοδον γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι—τῆς
γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἱδρῶτα θεῖναι—ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς
ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δἤπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπήινεσέν με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, 5
τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὃ
ἐπανορθοῖς.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, **e**
καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἰώμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ.

ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.

πῶς δή; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν 5
εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὅ ἐστιν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν
δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρόν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου **341**
σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ

340d4 ἐκτῆσθαι c: κτῆσθαι D

ἔτι παλαιοτέρα. σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὢν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνηι, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου
5 τουτουΐ· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός
b ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾶι εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τἀγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν. "τὸ γὰρ δεινόν," φησίν, "κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἑκάστοτε δεινοῦ πλούτου οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲ δεινῆς ὑγιείας, ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος." ἴσως οὖν καὶ τὸ
5 χαλεπὸν αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις· ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον—δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου
c φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν—τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ χαλεπὸν Σιμωνίδης;

κακόν, ἔφη.

διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιττακὸν λέγοντα "χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι," ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος
5 ὅτι "ἐστὶν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι."

ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῶι Πιττακῶι ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἅτε Λέσβιος ὢν καὶ ἐν φωνῆι βαρβάρωι τεθραμμένος;

d ἀκούεις δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε. ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν;

καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι,
5 οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μὴ ῥάιδιον ἦι ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι εἰ οἷός τ' ἔσηι τῶι σαυτοῦ λόγωι βοηθεῖν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε
e Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας,

οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, "κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι," εἶτα τὸν θεόν
5 φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῶι θεῶι τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνωι· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἄν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην ὁ Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ἅ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτωι τῶι ἄισματι,
342a ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· ἐὰν δὲ βούληι, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι.

341e3 τοῦτ' c: τοῦτο D

ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. 5

ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτηι τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ **b** πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσιν· ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὦσιν ὅτι σοφίαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ δοκῶσιν τῶι μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείαι περιεῖναι, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν ὧι περίεισιν, πάντας τοῦτο 5 ἀσκήσειν, τὴν σοφίαν. νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἐκεῖνο ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς, καὶ ἱμάντας περιειλίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν **c** καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὰν βούλωνται ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς καὶ ἤδη ἄχθωνται λάθραι συγγιγνόμενοι, ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι τῶν τε λακωνιζόν- 5 των τούτων καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ξένος ὢν ἐπιδημήσηι, συγγίγνονται τοῖς σοφισταῖς λανθάνοντες τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐῶσιν τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξιέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρῆτες, ἵνα μὴ ἀπο- **d** μανθάνωσιν ἃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. γνοῖτε δ' ἂν ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα πεπαίδευνται, ὧδε· εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαι- 5 μονίων τῶι φαυλοτάτωι συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὑρήσει αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχηι τῶν **e** λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἳ κατανενοήκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν φιλοσο- 5 φεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. τούτων ἦν καὶ **343** Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ ἕβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας, 5 καὶ καταμάθοι ἄν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα ἑκάστωι εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῆι συνελθόντες

342b5 ὧι περίεισιν c: ὧιπερ εἰσὶν d, οἵπερ εἰσὶν d, οι περίεισιν d

b ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα ἃ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, "γνῶθι σαυτόν" καὶ "μηδὲν ἄγαν." τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ
5 Πιττακοῦ ἰδίαι περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν
c σοφῶν, τὸ "χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι." ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἅτε φιλότιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφίαι, ἔγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα τούτωι ἐπιβουλεύων
5 κολοῦσαι αὐτὸ ἅπαν τὸ ἆισμα πεποίηκεν, ὥς μοι φαίνεται.

ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῆι ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἄισματος μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν
d ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ "μέν"—τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι—ἐὰν μή τις ὑπολάβηι πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην· λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα
5 εἰπεῖν ὅτι "οὔκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὦ Πιττακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς"—οὐκ ἀληθείαι ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτωι λέγει τὴν
e ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς—εὔηθες γὰρ τοῦτό γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου—ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῶι ἄισματι τὸ "ἀλαθέως", οὑτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν
5 λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπόντα "ὦ ἄνθρ-
344 ωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι," τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι "ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόωι τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως." οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς λόγον τὸ "μέν" ἐμβεβλημένον
5 καὶ τὸ "ἀλαθέως" ὀρθῶς ἐπ' ἐσχάτωι κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτωι μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἑκάσ-
b του τῶν ἐν τῶι ἄισματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται—πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει—ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς
5 τοῦ ἄισματος.

λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι "γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπί γε
c χρόνον τινά· γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτηι τῆι ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ

343d1 ἐνέβαλε τὸ c: ἐνεβάλετο D 344a4 φαίνεται c: φαίνεται τὸ D

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι γέρας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ
ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέληι. 5

τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῆι; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ καθήιρηται. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἑστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἄν τις ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὔ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα **d** ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὔ, καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμὼν ἐπιπεσὼν ἀμήχανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελθοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. τῶι μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῶι ἐγχωρεῖ κακῶι γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ' 5 ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός·

τῶι δὲ κακῶι οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη. ὥστε τὸν μὲν **e** εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέληι, οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι· σὺ δὲ φήις, ὦ Πιττακέ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι· τὸ δ' ἐστὶ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον· 5

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθος,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς.

τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ **345** εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις. τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι ὧι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῶι εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῶι ἰατρῶι—οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς 5 γένοιτο—ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· **b** ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός. οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος—αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι—ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ 5 ἄν ποτε γένοιτο κακός—ἔστιν γὰρ ἀεί—ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι. ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ᾄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα **c** ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ᾄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γάρ 5

344c3 γέρας c: τὸ γέρας D δ' c: δὲ D 344c5 ὃν c: ὃν ἂν D

τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι
δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ-
πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι
10 καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω,

d φησίν—οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῶι τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι—

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω
ἑκὼν ὅστις ἕρδηι
5 μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκηι
δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται·

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆι, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ ἑκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι e οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἑκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῆι ἑκών, τούτων φησὶν 5 ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ "ἑκών". ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγ-**346** νεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην, οἷον ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονηρούς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῆι, ὥσπερ ἀσμένους ὁρᾶν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα 5 αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδ' ὀνειδίζωσιν b ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἑκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι 5 προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δὲ οἶμαι καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζό-c μενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῶι Πιττακῶι λέγει ὅτι "ἐγώ, ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦι,

345d3 δ' c: δὲ D 345e6 αὐτὸν c: αὑτὸν D 346a1 ἐπαινέτην c: ἐπαινέτην φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν D 346b2 ἀναγκαίαις c: ἀνάγκαις D

μηδ᾽ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰ-
δώς τ᾽ ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν 5
ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ· οὔ μιν ἐγὼ
μωμήσομαι
—οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος—
τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων
ἀπείρων γενέθλα. 10
—ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπλησθείη ἂν ἐκείνους μεμφόμενος—
πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί
τ᾽ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται.

οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε "πάντα τοι λευκά, οἷς μέλανα μὴ **d** μέμεικται"—γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇι—ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν. "καὶ οὐ ζητῶ," ἔφη,

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι
καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, 5
ἐπί θ᾽ ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω·

ὥστε τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλά μοι ἐξαρκεῖ ἂν ἦι μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆι, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι"—καὶ τῆι φωνῆι ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῆι τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν **e** λέγων τὸ "πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκών"— ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῶι ἑκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα—"ὅστις ἕρδηι μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἄκων δ᾽ ἔστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ **347** Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἔψεγον· νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω." ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾆσμα. 5

καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, εὖ μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστιν μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ **b** ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ἂν βούλησθε.

καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ναί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰς αὖθίς γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἃ ὡμολογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ 5 βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἕτερον.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόραι ὁπότερον αὐτῶι ἥδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ᾀσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ **c** ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγώ σε ἠρώτησα, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ

346c5 τ᾽ ὀνησίπολιν c: γ᾽ ὀνήσει πόλιν D 346c6 μιν c: μὴν D

5 ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῶι πότωι μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν
d λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρί-
5 δας οὔτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε
e καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως, κἂν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν οἷοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε
5 αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι· ἀλλὰ
348 τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν δι' ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους
5 τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας· κἂν μὲν βούληι ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἕτοιμός εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· ἐὰν δὲ βούληι, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχες, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.

b λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ'
5 ἤτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτωι μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν, Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλωι τωι διαλέγηται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν βούληται ἄλλωι.

c καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὥς γέ μοι ἔδοξεν, τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόγις προυτράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινούμενος.

5 εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἴου διαλέγεσθαί μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἑκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸ

d σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν.

347d3–4 συμπόται καὶ d, i: συμπόται D   348b1 ἀπεσάφει c: ἀπεσάφη D

εὐπορώτεροι γάρ οὕτως πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα·

μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε νοήσηι,

αὐτίκα περιιὼν ζητεῖ ὅτωι ἐπιδείξηται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσηται, ἕως 5 ἂν ἐντύχηι. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕνεκα τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλωι τινί, ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ **e** ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὅς γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οἴει καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν· σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῶι, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν 5 τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος **349** εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σὲ χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὔ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, 5 ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, ὡς ἐγὦιμαι, **b** τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἑνὶ πράγματί ἐστιν, ἢ ἑκάστωι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὂν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν 5 τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον **c** ἰδίωι πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὅμοιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῶι ὅλωι οὗ μόριά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῶι ὅλωι οὗ μόριά ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν 5 ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πηι ἄλληι νῦν φήσηις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου ταῦτα **d** ἔλεγες.

ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μέν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὧδε δὲ γνώσηι 5 ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὑρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.

348d2 γὰρ οὕτως πως c: γάρ πως D   349c7 ὑπόλογον c: ὑπολόγον d, ὑπὸ λόγων d, ὑπολόγων d

e ἔχε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι;

καὶ ἴτας γε, ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι.

φέρε δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῂς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ 5 σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις;

κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε.

πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον καλόν;

ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.

350 οἶσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως;

ἔγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί.

πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;

ὅτι ἐπίστανται.

5 τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοί; ἢ οἱ ἄφιπποι;

οἱ ἱππικοί.

τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοί; ἢ οἱ μή;

οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ 10 ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ b ἑαυτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.

ἤδη δέ τινας ἑώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων;

ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας.

5 οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν;

αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἡ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν.

πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι;

καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη.

c οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη;

5 οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. ἔγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην—εἰ γάρ με d τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες—τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτωι οἴει τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ 5 τὴν σοφίαν ταὐτὸν εἶναι· τούτωι δὲ τῶι τρόπωι μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν

οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετιὼν ἔροιό με εἰ οἱ ἰσχυροὶ δυνατοί εἰσιν, φαίην ἄν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν **e** δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἄν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήσαντος ἐξείη ἄν σοι, χρωμένωι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ' 5 ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς δυνατούς· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι δύναμίν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ **351** ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας γε καὶ θυμοῦ, ἰσχὺν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων. οὕτω δὲ κἀκεῖ οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τούς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας· θάρσος 5 μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γε καὶ ἀπὸ **b** μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.

λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; 5

ἔφη.

ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζώιη;

οὐκ ἔφη.

τί δ' εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν; οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως 10 βεβιωκέναι;

ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.

τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν. **c**

εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζώιη ἡδόμενος.

τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἡδέ' ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθά; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἆρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ 5 τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά;

οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾶις, εἰ ἐμοὶ **d** ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν 5 ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δ' ἃ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθά.

ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα **e** ἡδονήν;

πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν
5 αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.

ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῆι εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν.

πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ
10 ἡγῶμαι;

δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου.

352a ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆιδέ πηι καταφανὲς ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας εἴποι· "ἴθι δή μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον,
5 ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον," καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν· θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς
b φήις, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἴθι δή μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν
5 εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπωι ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα,
c πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκηι τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά,
5 μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύηι, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῶι ἀνθρώπωι;

d καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τωι ἄλλωι, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.

καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολ-
5 λοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτε αἴτιόν ἐστι τούτου,
e ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας.

πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

352c5 ἢ ἂν c: ἢ ἃ ἡ d, ἣ ἂν d, ἡ ἂν d

ἴθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὅ 5
ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ **353**
πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν
λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι "οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθε,"
ἔροιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς· "ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ
πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε 5
εἶναι; εἴπατον ἡμῖν."

τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν
ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν;

οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, **b**
πρὸς τἆλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν
οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι ἧι οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν
γενέσθαι, ἕπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐῶ χαίρειν.

ἀλλ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ ἤρξω. 5

πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς· "τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ **c**
ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς
ὡδί· "ἀκούετε δή· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φρά-
σαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε,
οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων 5
ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν;"

φαῖεν ἄν.

οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν· "πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ
πῆι φατε εἶναι; πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῶι παραχρῆμα **d**
παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον
νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει; ἢ
κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον
ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπηιοῦν;" ἆρ' 5
οἰόμεθ' ἂν αὐτούς, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἢ ὅτι "οὐ κατὰ
τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ **e**
τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τἆλλα";

ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρί-
νασθαι.

"οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας 5
ποιεῖ;" ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.

συνέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

"οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρω-
ταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε
ἀποτελευτᾶι καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ;" ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν; **354**

353a2 ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν c: ἐπεὶ γινώσκειν d, ἐπιγιγνώσκειν d   353c1 τί c: ἔτι D

συνεδόκει ἡμῖν ἀμφοῖν.

οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροίμεθα· "ὦ ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τά τε
5 γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεών τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μέν ἐστιν, ἀνιαρὰ δέ;" φαῖεν ἄν;

συνεδόκει.

b "πότερον οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῶι παραχρῆμα ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξίαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι;" φαῖεν ἄν, ὡς
5 ἐγῶιμαι.

συνεδόκει.

"ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾶι καὶ
c λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας;" οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν, ὡς ἐγῶιμαι.

οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

5 "οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακόν;"

συνεδόκει.

"τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ' εἶναι κακόν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν
10 ἀποστερῆι ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζηι τῶν ἐν
d αὐτῶι ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε."

οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

"ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος;
5 τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττηι ἢ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζηι; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι
e ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε."

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

"πάλιν τοίνυν," ἔφην ἐγώ, "εἴ με ἀνέροισθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, 'τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἕνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῆι;' 'συγγιγνώσ-
5 κετέ μοι,' φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. 'πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ῥάιδιον ἀποδεῖξαι τί ἐστίν ποτε τοῦτο ὃ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτωι εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις.' ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν,

354c2 ἢ ἡδονάς c: ἡδονάς D

εἴ πηι ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν **355**
ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν· ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ
λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν
ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾶι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου
οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε ὅτι πολλάκις 5
γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν
μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὖθις **b**
αὖ λέγετε ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τἀγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ
τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενος.

"ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι
χρώμεθα ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶι καὶ ἀγαθῶι καὶ κακῶι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ 5
δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον
μὲν ἀγαθῶι καὶ κακῶι, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶι. θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω **c**
λέγωμεν ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ
ποιεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, 'διὰ τί;' 'ἡττώμενος,' φήσομεν. 'ὑπὸ
τοῦ;' ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ 'ὑπὸ' μὲν 'ἡδονῆς' οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν
εἰπεῖν—ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν— ἐκείνωι 5
δὴ ἀποκρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι 'ἡττώμενος.' 'ὑπὸ τίνος;' φήσει. 'τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ,' φήσομεν νὴ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχηι ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστὴς ὤν,
γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· 'ἦ γελοῖον λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά, **d**
γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ
τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἆρα,' φήσει, 'οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν
τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων;' φήσομεν δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι 'οὐκ ἀξίων
ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν.' 'κατὰ 5
τί δέ,' φήσει ἴσως, 'ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἦι; ἢ **e**
πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἦι;' οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. 'δῆλον ἄρα,'
φήσει, 'ὅτι τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω
κακὰ λαμβάνειν.'

"ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ 5
ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄνθρω-
πος πράττει—τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ
ἀνιαρά—γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, **356**
δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῆι πρὸς λύπην
ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε
καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον
καὶ ἧττον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι 'ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ 5

355a2 ἄλλο d: ἢ ἄλλο D 355b5 ἅμα c: ἄρα D 355b6 προσαγορεύωμεν c: προσαγορεύομεν D 355c6 φήσει c: φησι D 355e3 λέγετε c: λέγεται D 356a2 ἡδονῆι c: ἡδονὴ D, ἡδονῆς c

παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ,' 'μῶν ἄλλωι τωι,' φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, 'ἢ ἡδονῆι καὶ λύπηι; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ'
b ὅτωι ἄλλωι. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῶι ζυγῶι, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἱστῆις, τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω
5 καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐάντε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάντε τὰ πόρρω
c ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ἧι ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῆι· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα.' μή πηι ἄλληι ἔχει," φαίην ἄν, "ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι;" οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν.

συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνωι.

5 "ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε," φήσω. "φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῆι ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὔ;"

φήσουσιν.

"καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν
10 μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι;"

φαῖεν ἄν.

d "εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτωι ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῶι τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἆρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω
5 πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτὰ καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον
e μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῶι ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον;" ἆρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σώιζειν ἂν τέχνην ἢ ἄλλην;

5 τὴν μετρητικήν, ὡμολόγει.

"τί δ' εἰ ἐν τῆι τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὁπότε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁπότε τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτ' ἐγγὺς εἴτε πόρρω
357 εἴη; τί ἂν ἔσωιζεν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἆρ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἆρ' ἂν οὐ μετρητική τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἆρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητική;" ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὔ;

356b3 εἰπὲ c: εἶπε D 356c2 οὐ πρακτέα d: πρακτέα D 356c9 φωναὶ αἱ c: φωναὶ D 357a1 οὐκ ἐπιστήμη d: ἐπιστήμη D 357a3 τις ἢ c: τις d, τις ἡ d

ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῶι Πρωταγόραι ὁμολογεῖν. 5

"εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῆι τῆι αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ὑμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἆρα πρῶτον **b** μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις;"

ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη.

"ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκηι δήπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη." 5

συμφήσουσιν.

"ἥτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη, εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἣν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ **c** μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆι, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὡμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε 5 ἡμᾶς· 'ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε ἡμῖν.' εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελᾶτε **d** ἂν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὡμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείαι ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας—ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά—καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧς τὸ πρόσθεν 5 ἔτι ὡμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πρᾶξις ἄνευ **e** ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίαι πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη, ἧς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἱππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων 5 διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι."

ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἦμεν· ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρω- **358** ταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, ὦ Ἱππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε—κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος—πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι.

ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα.

ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν 5 κακόν; τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι·

357a6 ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ c: ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ d, ἐπειδὴ δὲ d   357a7 ὑμῖν d: ἡμῖν D   357b7 αὕτη c: ἡ αὐτή D
357d1 εἴπατε c: εἴπετε D   357e5 αὐτοὶ D: αὐτοὶ ἴτε c, αὐτοὶ ἤιτε c, ἐφοιτᾶτε αὐτοὶ c
358a2 ἐρωτῶ, ὦ c: ἐρωτῶ D

εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως
b χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὦ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ
βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι.

γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

τί δὲ δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις
5 ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἆρ' οὐ καλαί; καὶ τὸ καλὸν
ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;

συνεδόκει.

εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰό-
c μενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι ἢ ἃ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν
τὰ βελτίω· οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὑτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ
κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία.

συνεδόκει πᾶσιν.

5 τί δὲ δή; ἀμαθίαν ἆρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ
ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων;

καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει.

ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ ἐπὶ
d ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ
ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῆι
δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ
ἔλαττον;

5 ἅπαντα ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν.

τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ· καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἆρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; πρὸς
σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον
εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε.

ἐδόκει Πρωταγόραι μὲν καὶ Ἱππίαι δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο,
e Προδίκωι δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ.

ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ
ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν, ἆρά τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἃ δέδοικεν,
ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἃ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων; ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν,
5 ὡμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι
ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἑκόντα.

359 ἐδόκει καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.

οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἱππία,
ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο πῶς
ὀρθῶς ἔχει—μὴ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε
5 ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον,

358b5 καλαί c: καλαὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι D 358c1 ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά c: ἐποίει, καὶ δύναται D
358d6 καλεῖτέ τι c: καλεῖτε D 358e2 ἐγώ, ὦ c: ἐγὼ D 359a2 ἐγώ, ὦ c: ἐγὼ D

ἰδίαν δὲ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἃ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἓν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, **b** τὴν ἀνδρείαν, γνώσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίωι τῶιδε· "εὑρήσεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ· ὧι γνώσηι ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς." καὶ ἐγὼ 5 εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον. ἠρόμην δ' οὖν τοῦτον εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὁ δέ, "καὶ ἴτας γ'," ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, **c** ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος;

ὡμολόγει.

ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἦ ἐφ' ἅπερ οἱ δειλοί; 5

οὐκ ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἕτερα.

ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.

πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά; 10

λέγεται δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῂς **d** ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἆρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά, ἡγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μή;

ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον. 5

καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ὥστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ εὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα.

ὡμολόγει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἅ γε θαρροῦσι πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ 10 ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτηι γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοί τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. **e**

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἃ οἵ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν.

πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὂν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; 5

καλόν, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν.

359c10 δεινά c: δειλά D

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

360 ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φῂς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὂν καὶ ἀγαθόν;

τοὺς δειλούς, ἦ δ' ὅς.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ;

5 ὡμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη.

ἆρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον;

ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας.

10 τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἔρχεται;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν.

b οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἆρ' οὐ καλά;

5 ὡμολόγει.

εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά;

ναί.

οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι τοὐναντίον αἰσχρούς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;

10 ὡμολόγει.

θαρροῦσιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν;

c οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.

τί οὖν; τοῦτο δι' ὃ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;

δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες;

5 πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

διὰ ταύτην ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοί εἰσιν;

ὡμολόγει.

δι' ὃ δὲ δειλοί εἰσιν, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ;

συνέφη.

10 οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη;

ἐπένευσε.

d ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον ἀνδρεία δειλίαι;

ἔφη.

360a6 κάλλιόν i: καλόν D 360c4 δεινῶν c: δειλῶν D 360c10 δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν c: δειλῶν καὶ μὴ δειλῶν D

οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῆι τούτων ἀμαθίαι ἐστίν;

καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν. 5

ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία;

πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν.

ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὖσα τῆι τούτων ἀμαθίαι;

οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε. 10

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φὴις ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφηις;

αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.

ἕν γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι **e** δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μέν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ.

φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι. 5

οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστ' ἂν κατάδηλον **361** γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἑκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καί μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι "ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ 5 Σώκρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῶι τἀναντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδεῖξαι **b** ὡς πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ὧι τρόπωι μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἀρετή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, 5 ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν. Πρωταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος, νῦν τοὐναντίον ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν **c** ἥκιστα εἴη διδακτόν." ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε διδακ- 5 τὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῆι

360d3 δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν c: δειλῶν καὶ μὴ δειλῶν D   361b4 ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ c: ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἢ D

d σκέψει σφήληι ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῆι διανομῆι ἠμέλησεν ἡμῶν, ὡς φὴις σύ. ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῶι μύθωι ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως· ὧι χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλοις, ὅπερ 5 καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην.

καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προ- e θυμίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τἆλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἥκιστ' ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἴρηκα ὅτι ὧν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν 5 ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίαι. καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰς αὖθις, ὅταν βούληι, διέξιμεν· νῦν δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι.

362a ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἷπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαι τῶι καλῶι χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.

ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆιμεν.

COMMENTARY

309a1–310a6: SOCRATES MEETS SOME FRIENDS

Socrates explains to his friends that he has just come from a conversation with Protagoras, a man whose wisdom makes him so attractive that Socrates found him even more attractive than the most handsome youth in Athens. The friends invite him to tell them the full story, and he agrees. These many friends all remain anonymous, as perhaps befits the audience for a dialogue that will have, as a leading character, a composite figure called 'the many' (352d4–357e8).

309a1 πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ; has something of the air of 'Where have you been all this time?'; cf. *Ion* 530a πόθεν τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεδήμηκας; and Xen. *Mem.* 2.8.1: Socrates 'once saw another old friend [ἀρχαῖον ἑταῖρον] after a gap, and said to him πόθεν, Εὔθηρε, φαίνῃ;' **ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι** forestalls Socrates' answer, as in 330b1, *Mnx.* 234a, *Rep.* 452a. Plato sometimes uses this and sometimes uses the singular form ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι (as in *Ap.* 26b, *La.* 190d). This indifference reflects the fact that in no serious sense is the content of a ὅτι clause one thing rather than many, or many rather than one (cf. 323c3–7n.). **κυνηγεσίου:** the use of hunting metaphors for sexual pursuit, as here and in e.g. Eur. *Bac.* 459 and Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.24, which describes Alcibiades as 'hunted [θηρώμενος] by many grand ladies because of his beauty', was no doubt all the more appealing in that the life of the lover was sometimes contrasted with that of the hunter: thus Maira (Pherecydes *FGH* 3 fr. 170) and Hippolytus (Eur. *Hipp.*) both reject sex in order to follow the virgin goddess Artemis in hunting. In Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.28, Socrates says he may be able to help someone hunt the fine and the good (εἰς τὴν τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν θήραν) because he is so versed in love (διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι). **a2 τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν:** this roundabout way of referring to Alcibiades elevates him and his beauty to epic grandeur; cf. e.g. the periphrases for Priam and Heracles in Hom. *Il.* 3.105 Πριάμοιο βίην, Hes. *Th.* 951 ἲς Ἡρακλῆος. On his looks, see also 316a3–4n. Alcibiades was, by turns, one of the commanders of the massive expeditionary force that the Athenians sent out to conquer Sicily (Thuc. 6.8.2), strategic adviser to the Spartans (Thuc. 6.91.4–6) and lover of a Spartan queen (Plu. *Alc.* 23.7; cf. Xen. *HG* 3.3.2), Universal Leader Plenipotentiary of Athens (Xen. *HG* 1.4.20: ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ), and a bandit chieftain operating from a castle that he owned in Thrace (Xen. *HG* 1.5.17, Plu. *Alc.* 36.3–5). The many betrayals in this switchback career raised acute questions about the effects of an association with Socrates; hence e.g. *Alc. Ma.*, *Alc. Mi.*, *Smp.* 212d–223a, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12–46, and Isoc. 11.4–6. **a3 ἀνὴρ μέντοι** 'but a man nevertheless', and therefore too old to be, by ordinary standards, sexually attractive to men. Not for nothing was Greek homosexuality often called παιδεραστία: the usual pattern was for an older man (the ἐραστής) to pursue an adolescent boy (his ἐρώμενος or

παιδικά), so usual that a reversal of this pattern can be described as a beardless youth making a bearded man his παιδικά (Xen. *An.* 2.6.28; the description is meant to disgust and disturb). Alcibiades was born about 451. These remarks about his age therefore suggest a dramatic date in the late 430s; for further suggestions, cf. 311a2n. (424 at the earliest), 315a1–2n. (430 at the latest), 315d7n. on νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον (430s or 420s), 327d3–4n. (420–419). **a3–4 ὥς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρῆσθαι** 'to speak between ourselves'. The implication is that this remark is not to be reported to Alcibiades, who might take offence. Cf. *Rep.* 595b, where Socrates introduces a remark derogatory of tragic poets with the words 'ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι – for you will not denounce me to the tragic poets'.

309b1 εἶτα τί τοῦτο; the tone is of a brusquely conversational 'What of it?' (cf. *Alc. Ma.* 119b εἶτα τί δὴ τοῦτο; Ar. *Clouds* 347 εἶτα τί τοῦτο; Men. *Sam.* 592 εἶτα δὴ τί τοῦτο;). Socrates refuses to answer his companion's question, and, in a foretaste of the digression on Simonides at 339a–347a, attempts to change the subject to poetry. **b1–2 χαριεστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου:** the allusion is to Hom. *Il.* 24.348 = *Od.* 10.279 πρῶτον ὑπηνήτηι, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἥβη ('just starting to get a beard, and his youth was most delightful'). Both occurrences of the line come in descriptions of Hermes, setting out to escort someone safely through dangerous circumstances. Athenian sculptors (according to Clement of Alexandria *Protreptic* 4.53.6) modelled their statues of Hermes upon Alcibiades. In a foretaste of the perversity of the interpretations of Simonides at 339a–347a, Socrates' quotation mischievously omits Homer's πρῶτον, thus making Homer assert that the most attractive age is when a man has a beard, rather than when he first starts to grow one. **b7 οὔτε . . . b8 τε:** the first clause ('I didn't concentrate on him') is capped by the second ('and I often didn't notice him at all'), as also at 347e4, 360d10 and 361e1–2. See *GP* 508. **b7–8 προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν:** as one would expect of a lover (cf. *Lys.* 205b ἐραστὴν ὄντα καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τῶι παιδί). **b8 αὐτοῦ:** on the contrast between this and 309b7 ἐκείνου, see 310d7–8n.

309c1–2 οὐ γὰρ δήπου . . . γε: this turn of phrase is sometimes used when someone supports something by eliminating an alternative to it (*GP* 268); the thing supported here is the presumption that something astonishing (τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα) must have happened to Socrates and Alcibiades. **c7 Ἀβδηρίτηι:** Abdera was a city in Thrace, on the north coast of the Aegean. It was the city of many other intellectuals besides Protagoras (DK 80): Democritus, who developed the atomic theory of matter (DK 68); Bion, who was the first to decide that nights and days are, at the poles, six months long (DK 77); Hecataeus, a grammarian who also composed fanciful ethnography (DK 73); and Anaxarchus, a political theorist (DK 72). Abderites also had a reputation for stupidity: thus Demos. 17.23 harangues an Athenian crowd 'Most outrageous of all is the fact that, while the other Greeks and the barbarians fear your enmity, these nouveaux riches alone

compel you, whether by persuasion or by violence, to despise yourselves, as if they were operating among Abderites or Maronites, and not among Athenians'; Galen (*Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur* 4.822.5–6 Kühn) treats it as an evident fact, to be explained by any serious theory of the causes of human character, that 'there are lots of fools in Abdera, but few such in Athens'; and there was a genre of Abderite jokes, of which a typical example is 'An Abderite saw a eunuch talking to a woman, and asked him whether she was his wife. When the eunuch said that he could not have a wife, the Abderite replied that she must be his daughter' (*Philogelos* 115; the Abderite jokes run from 100 to 127). **c8 οὕτω καλός τις** 'so, well, beautiful'. The enclitic τις here is in effect an acknowledgement that καλός may not be exactly the right word. Cf. 313c5–7 ἔμπορός τις . . . τοιοῦτός τις, 340e2 εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός, 357a2 μετρητική τις. **c10 πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει . . . ;** 'Surely we must expect that . . .' This idiom, and the variant with τί instead of πῶς, are at home in all stylistic levels (cf. e.g. *Smp.* 198b, Soph. *Ant.* 448, Demos. 60.29, Adespota fr. 1017.64 *PCG*). **ὦ μακάριε:** this form of address is typically, as here, combined with the suggestion that the bliss of the addressee is naive, resting on ignorance or error (e.g. *Alc. Ma.* 132b, *Cra.* 391a, Men. *Perikeiromene* 469; cf. Thuc. 5.105.3 'we felicitate [μακαρίσαντες] you on your lack of acquaintance with evil, but we do not envy your folly'). **τὸ σοφώτατον κάλλιον:** the idea that wisdom is beautiful, and more so than bodily beauty, is much elaborated in *Smp.* 204b–223a, in a form less flattering to Alcibiades than this remark that he is less beautiful than what is not merely wise, but superlatively so. Cf. also 310d3n. on πτοίησιν, on the attractions of intellectual beauty.

309d3 ὤ is a strongly emotional expression, frequent in tragedy, comedy and epic, but in Plato only here and *Phdr.* 227c.

310a1 καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας: see 362a3n. on εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες. **a2 τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω:** the same formula as in *Smp.* 173b. Such questions with τί οὐ are equivalent to imperatives, and the aorist of the indicative διηγήσω here has the same import as the aorist of an imperative: it contains no reference to the past but rather suggests something like 'give a description now, just this once'. Thus *Grg.* 468c and 468d τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; ('Why not answer my questions?'), by contrast with 509e τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω; ('Why not answer *this* question for me?'). Cf. also 310e7 and 317d2 for other τί οὐ questions, and 342e2n. for other aorist indicatives without reference to the past. **a3 ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί:** Greeks liked to grumble about the reluctance with which slaves offered their seats to their betters (Herondas 6.1–3; Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.10). The way that Socrates here makes the slave stand may illustrate the authority that wisdom should possess. Contrast 352c1–2, on a theory whereby the appetites can manhandle knowledge, 'as if it were a slave'. **a4 πάνυ μὲν οὖν** 'Certainly.' This otherwise rare formula occurs frequently in Plato and in Xenophon's Socratic works. It had a distinctly philosophical ring, to judge by the pointed way in which

people start using it when Socrates starts asking questions (Xen. *Smp.* 4.56), and to judge by this parody in Epich. DK 23 B 3: '"Is pipe-playing a thing?" "πάνυ μὲν οὖν." "Is pipe-playing a man then?" "Not at all." "Let's see then: what of a pipe-player? What do you think he is? A man, isn't he?" "πάνυ μὲν οὖν." "Now don't you think that the same applies to the good?"' **a6 διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις:** Socrates portentously adopts the stately courtesy of a bygone age: Megara in Eur. *Hercules Furens* 327–8, Dolon in Eur. *Rhesus* 163, Deianeira in Soph. *Trachiniae* 618–19, Philoctetes in Soph. *Phil.* 1370 and Polycrates in Hdt. 3.42.2 all talk about 'double the gratitude'.

310a7–311a6: THE ARRIVAL OF HIPPOCRATES

Early that morning, Socrates explains, he was awakened by his young friend Hippocrates. Hippocrates was full of excitement at the news that Protagoras was in town, and hoped that Socrates would present him to the great man.

310a7 τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτός: the asyndeton after the imperative 'listen' has many parallels (e.g. *Lys.* 216d, Lys. 17.1–2, Ar. *Lys.* 1123). It would be idiomatic also to use the connective γάρ, as in 353c3, 355a4. **ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου** 'while the dawn twilight was still very dim'. Having Socrates still resting at this hour, while others are up and anxiously about, is a neat device to indicate his immunity from ordinary excitements and cares, without implying that he is lazy or weak. Compare *Cri.* 43a: it is ὄρθρος βαθύς, when Socrates wakes from a peaceful sleep to find Crito watching over him with the news that his execution is imminent. Contrast Prodicus, who at 315d4–5 is still in bed at a much later hour. **Ἱπποκράτης:** we know about this Hippocrates only what we can glean from this dialogue. A name compounded with the element ἱππ- suggests aristocratic origins (Ar. *Clouds* 60–74), and the name 'Hippocrates' itself was borne by both a grandfather (Hdt. 6.131.2) and a nephew (Thuc. 4.66.3) of the great aristocrat Pericles (315a1–2n.).

310b1 Ἀπολλοδώρου ὑὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός: apart from their relationship to Hippocrates, nothing more is known of Apollodorus and Phason. It was common to identify a man by reference to his father, and very rare to identify him by reference to his brother also. Perhaps Phason is particularly well known to Socrates' interlocutor. Perhaps reference to Phason distinguishes this Hippocrates son of Apollodorus from others (the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, accessed 12 January 2007, listed 162 Hippocrateses, 996 Apollodoruses, and only 3 Phasons). **b2 τις:** this indefinite pronoun is standardly used when speaking of slaves, and even when giving orders to them (e.g. *Phd.* 60a, Ar. *Clouds* 1490). Contrast 314d3n. on the pronoun used to speak of masters. **b4 Ἱπποκράτης . . . οὗτος:** when someone is addressed as οὗτος, the effect is of a rather blunt and brusque second person pronoun. Cf. *Smp.* 172a οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος, *Smp.* 213b Σωκράτης οὗτος, Ar. *Birds* 658 οὗτος, σὲ καλῶ, σὲ λέγω, Ar. *Wasps* 144 οὗτος, τίς εἶ σύ; and Soph.

OC 1627 ὦ οὗτος οὗτος, Οἰδίπους. **b4–5 μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις** 'not bad news, I hope'. For the effect of negating the indicative with μή, cf. 351c3 μή . . . καλεῖς 'I hope you don't call'. Contrast the effect of negating with οὐ, as in *Phdr.* 242b οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις 'that's hardly bad news'. For the idiomatic use of νεώτερον to mean 'untoward', cf. Thuc. 7.86.4 δείσαντες . . . μή . . . σφίσι νεώτερόν τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται ('fearing that he might do them some mischief'), Ar. *Ec.* 338 δέδοικα μή τι δρᾶι νεώτερον ('I'm afraid that she's up to no good').

310c1 τοῦ σκίμποδος: a cheap and low bed, light enough to be used as a stretcher for invalids (Eust. on Hom. *Il.* 16.612; scholion on Ar. *Clouds* 254). Such austere furniture was felt to be so much in keeping with the character of Socrates that when, in Ar. *Clouds* 254, someone is initiated into membership of Socrates' school, he is instructed to sit, not upon a θρόνος as in other initiation rites, but ἐπὶ τὸν ἱερὸν σκίμποδα. Contrast the elaboration of Prodicus' bedding in 315d5–6. **c3 Οἰνόης:** Attica contained two demes of this name (Harp. s.vv. Οἰνόη καὶ Οἰναῖος), each about 19 miles from Athens. Someone trying to escape Attica would have been more likely to head for the one in the mountains near the border with Boeotia. It was presumably this Oenoe whose inhabitants gave rise to the phrase Οἰναῖοι τὴν χαράδραν, a phrase 'proverbial for those who bring some evil upon themselves', as Hippocrates risks doing, in his ignorant pursuit of Protagoras (313a1–c4): the Oeneans diverted a mountain stream (χαράδραν) to irrigate their land, and thus washed away most of their possessions (Demon *FGH* 327 fr. 8). **με . . . ἀπέδρα:** the accusative is regularly used for the person from whom one runs away (e.g. *Rep.* 548b ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, Demos. 59.49 ἀπέδρα τὸν Φρυνίωνα); clauses with the genitive are reserved for the things or circumstances from which one runs away (e.g. *Rep.* 495d ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, Lys. 16.17 ἐκ δὲ τῶν κινδύνων ἀποδιδράσκουσιν). **c4 ὑπό τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην** 'something else made it slip my mind'. ὑπό with the genitive is the regular way to express the thing that causes forgetfulness; cf. e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 855 ἐπελανθανόμην . . . ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐτῶν, Hipp. *Airs, waters, places* 22 ὑπό τε τοῦ ψύχεος καὶ τοῦ κόπου ἐπιλαθέσθαι. **c6 ἀδελφός:** for the omission of the article, cf. 325c6–d1 καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγός, *La.* 179a πάππου ἔχων ὄνομα Θουκυδίδης, and And. 1.48 ἦκον δὲ τῶι μὲν μήτηρ τῶι δὲ ἀδελφὴ τῶι δὲ γυνὴ καὶ παῖδες. **c7 πόρρω . . . τῶν νυκτῶν:** for the plural of a single night cf. *Smp.* 217d πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν, Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.52 ἐν μέσωι νυκτῶν.

310d1 ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν: Hippocrates describes his awakening in the words of a Homeric formula. **d3 ἀνδρείαν:** this virtue will eventually become the focus of a discussion between Protagoras and Socrates. The discussion will start from a claim that the courageous are 'bold', and 'rush towards things that the masses are afraid to approach' (349e1–3), like Hippocrates here. The discussion will conclude

that 'wisdom about what is and is not terrible is courage' (360d8). The discussion will not tell us how to square this conclusion with Socrates' recognition of courage here in someone who will, at 313a1–c4, prove to be ignorant of the risks that he is running. The eventual theme of courage is anticipated also when two other characters are introduced: the eunuch doorkeeper (314e1n.) and Protagoras (316d5n.). **πτοίησιν:** in *Smp.* 206d–e, Diotima uses this word to describe the effect of beauty. We all yearn to release our offspring/seed into something beautiful, 'which is why, when one is pregnant and already swollen, one gets all of a flutter over beauty [πολλὴ ἡ πτοίησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλόν], since the possessor of it will put an end to one's travails'. Such fluttering can of course be caused by the prospect of intellectual procreation, no less than physical (cf. *Smp.* 208e–209e, 210d, 212a), and it is no doubt the prospect of intellectual procreation with Protagoras that gets Hippocrates so excited here. Cf. 317d1 ἐρασταί and 318a2–3n. **d4 μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας;** the idea behind the present tense is that the ἀδικία persists until the penalty is paid. Cf. the tenses of Lys. 4.12 οὔτε πρόνοια ἐγένετο οὔτε ἀδικῶ τοῦτον ('there was no premeditation, and I am guilty of no offence against him') and Lys. 25.1 τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἐξημαρτηκότας ('both those who are guilty of no offence and those who have done many wrongs'). **d5–6 νὴ τοὺς θεούς . . . ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός:** in 333b5–334a3, Socrates will attempt to argue against the flippant presumption of Hippocrates here that being wise is compatible with being unjust. **d7–8 ἂν αὐτῶι διδῶις ἀργύριον καὶ πείθηις ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν:** Socrates said that he himself did not sell wisdom for money, and he insisted that this distinguished him from the sophists (e.g. *Ap.* 19d–e, Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.11-12). Others disagreed with him on both points: thus Ar. *Clouds* 98 says that Socrates and his associates 'teach anyone who'll give them the money [ἀργύριον ἤν τις διδῶι]'; and Protagoras, who in 316d3–e4 claims to be only the latest in a long line of sophists, allows Socrates to describe him at 349a3–4 as the first to charge for his services. In a conversation with Antiphon the sophist, Socrates says that if he took payment he might be forced to talk to people whom he would rather not talk to, and compares the sale of wisdom to the sale of sexual favours (Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.5 and 13). **d7 αὐτῶι . . . 8 ἐκεῖνον:** Greek idiom is reluctant to repeat the same pronoun, even for repeated reference to the same thing. Cf. 309b7–8, *Euthphr.* 6e ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῆι παραδείγματι ('looking to it and treating it as a model'), Eur. *Iphigenia in Tauris* 565 τάλαιν' ἐκείνη χὠ κτανὼν αὐτὴν πατήρ ('she is pitiable, and so is the father who killed her'), Thuc. 1.132.5 παιδικά ποτε ὢν αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστότατος ἐκείνωι ('his one-time boyfriend, and someone on whom he could very much rely').

310e1 ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί: this extravagant invocation is without parallel in Socratic dialogue. But Hippocrates is easily excited: he invokes gods more often than all the other characters put together (Hippocrates five times; Socrates twice, Prodicus once, Protagoras once). **e2 αὐτὰ ταῦτα . . . 3 ἵνα** 'for this very reason . . .

in order to'. Idiom would permit a preposition with αὐτὰ ταῦτα in this context (cf. e.g. *Thg.* 122a ἥκω ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἵνα), but it does not require one (cf. e.g. 346c1 ταῦτα, *Smp.* 174a ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα, Soph. *OT* 1005 τοῦτ' ἀφικόμην, ὅπως). **e5 ἀλλὰ γάρ . . .** 'But that is all by-the-bye, for the important thing is . . .' Cf. 336a2 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι and *GP* 101–2. **e6–311a1 τί οὐ βαδίζομεν:** βαδίζειν is used of going to a school for instruction in Ar. *Clouds* 128, 964. For the import of the present tense βαδίζομεν, see 310a2n.

311a2 Καλλίαι τῶι Ἱππονίκου: Hipponicus was the richest Greek of his day (And. 1.130 and Isoc. 16.31). He inherited a fortune estimated at two hundred talents (Lys. 19.48; 1 talent = 60 minas, 1 mina = 100 drachmas, 1 drachma = 6 obols, and the daily subsistence allowance of an Athenian juror was just two obols). Among his other investments were 600 slaves mining silver, who brought him a net income of one mina a day (Xen. *Poroi* 4.15). After the death of Hipponicus in 424 (And. 4.13), Callias inherited this enormous fortune (and apparently has done so at the dramatic date of this dialogue; cf. 309a3n.); by 387 he had, in spite of his dealings with Protagoras, the expert on household management (318e5), reduced his fortune to less than two talents (Lys. 19.48); and he died (some time after 371: Xen. *HG* 6.3.2) in penury, unable to afford the necessities of life, and in possession of just one slave, a barbarian and an old woman at that (Ath. 12.537c). According to Socrates in *Ap.* 20a, Callias spent on sophists more money than everybody else put together; and Socrates in Xen. *Smp.* 1.5 says to him, 'You have given a vast amount of money to Protagoras for his wisdom, and also to Gorgias, to Prodicus, and to many others.' Callias' troubles with his father, and his dealings with the sophists Prodicus and Anaxagoras, were the subject of a dialogue *Callias* by Aeschines (fr. 73 *SSR*). In Eupolis' comedy *Flatterers*, staged in 421 BC, Callias' expenditure on sophists is part of a general pattern of dissipation: for example, he entertains Protagoras, who orders him to drink (Eup. fr. 158 *PCG*; cf. 311a5–6n., 315c5n. on τῶν μετεώρων for other quotations from this play). In *Tht.* 164e–165a, Theodorus, a friend of Protagoras', who is invited to defend Protagoras' doctrines, says that Callias would be better placed than him to do so. **a3 πρῶι γάρ ἐστιν:** the obvious and immediate reference is to the early hour of the day. But the phrase may also suggest that, while Hippocrates is in his current unenlightened state, any meeting with Protagoras would be intellectually premature. Cf. 312a3–4n. and the exchange between Parmenides and the youthful Socrates at *Prm.* 135c: '"So what are you going to do about philosophy? Where are you going to turn, given your ignorance of these things?" "I don't think I can altogether see, not at the moment." "That, Socrates, is because you are trying to define beautiful and just and good and each of the forms prematurely [πρῶι], before being trained."' **a5–6 τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει:** that a man should spend his time indoors is a mark of unhealthy luxury: in *Rep.* 556d Socrates contrasts the performance in battle of 'a poor man, lean and sunburnt', with that of 'a rich man, reared in the shade, with lots of surplus flesh'. Indoor life is for women, not men:

in Xen. *Oec.* 7.22 and 30, Ischomachus tells his wife that 'since both indoors and outdoors [τά τε ἔνδον καὶ τὰ ἔξω] require labour and care, God in the beginning fitted the nature of woman to indoor labours and cares [ἐπὶ τὰ ἔνδον ἔργα καὶ ἐπιμελήματα], and the nature of man to outdoor ones [ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω]', and that 'the law demonstrates to be honourable the different degrees of natural capacity which God implanted into either sex. For a woman, it is more honourable to remain indoors than to camp out [κάλλιον ἔνδον μένειν ἢ θυραυλεῖν]; while for a man, it is more disgraceful to remain indoors than to care for things outdoors [αἴσχιον ἔνδον μένειν ἢ τῶν ἔξω ἐπιμελεῖσθα].' King Ninyas so outdid in τρυφή (327e1n.) even other Asiatic kings that 'ἔνδον μένων καὶ τρυφῶν he was seen by nobody, except the eunuchs [cf. 314c7n.] and the harem' (Ctes. *FGH* 688 fr. 1n). Ar. *Clouds* 198–9 suggests that the members of Socrates' own school spend too much time indoors. And there was perhaps a similar joke at Protagoras' expense in Eupolis' *Flatterers* (fr. 157.1 *PCG* ἔνδοθι μέν ἐστι Πρωταγόρας; cf. 311a2n. for other quotations from this play). But Protagoras, although leading a debilitated, indoor, life, is not quite as debilitated as his rival sophists: see 314e4n. **a6 θάρρει** foreshadows the way the dialogue will eventually focus upon courage; cf. 310d3n. on ἀνδρείαν.

311b1–312e8: HIPPOCRATES BAFFLED

Socrates asks Hippocrates why he is so attracted to Protagoras as to be willing to pay for his teaching. It is because Protagoras is a sophist, says Hippocrates; but, beyond saying that he does not want to learn to become a sophist himself, Hippocrates is unable to say what he hopes Protagoras the sophist will teach him.

311b1–2 ἀποπειρώμενος: on the propriety of testing people in conversation, see 341d8–9n. **b6 Ἱπποκράτη:** a contemporary of Socrates, and (at least since Arist. *Pol.* 1326a15) the paradigm of the great physician. Several dozen medical treatises have come down to us under his name. None is known to be authentic, but some may be.

311c5 Πολύκλειτον: a character in Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.3 says that Polycleitus was to sculpture as Homer was to epic, Sophocles to tragedy, and Zeuxis (cf. 318b6n.) to painting. Something of his sculpture survives in copies pictured in Stewart (1990) vol. II, plates 378–85. There survive also some fragments of a book that he wrote on the proportions of the human body (DK 40 A 3, B 1–2). **Φειδίαν:** Pheidias was a friend of Pericles (315a1–2n.), and supervisor of, and contributor to, a massive programme of public works adorning the city of Athens (Plu. *Per.* 13.6–15, 31.2–5). Isoc. 15.2 indignantly says that when he is described as writing speeches for lawcourts, that is 'as if someone had the cheek to describe Pheidias, the man who constructed the seated statue of Athena, as a maker of dolls, or said that Zeuxis and Parrhasius practised the same trade as people who paint shop

signs'. Something of his sculpture survives in copies pictured in Stewart (1990) vol. II, plates 361–75.

311d2–4 ἂν μὲν ἐξικνῆται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες: English idiom demands that we spell out explicitly the apodosis of the ἂν μέν conditional: '*leaving it at that* if our own money is enough for us to persuade him with it, but otherwise spending also our friends' money too'. Greek idiom, by contrast, allows an apodosis which means 'Nothing more needs doing' to remain implicit in such a context as this: cf. e.g. 325d5–6, *Rep.* 575d ἐὰν μὲν ἑκόντες ὑπείκωσιν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ ἡ πόλις . . . ('if they willingly give way to him, *then that'll be that, and the tyrant will take control without any further ado*; but if the city resists . . .'), Hipp. *De Morbis* 2.38 ποιεέτω δὲ ταῦτα ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας, καὶ ἢν μέν οἱ δοκέῃ ἐν ταύτῃσιν ἡ χροιὴ κεκαθάρθαι ἐπιεικῶς· ἢν δὲ μή, καὶ ἑτέρας τρεῖς ταῦτα ποιεέτω ('let him do this for a week, and *then stop* if he thinks that during the week his skin has got reasonably clear; otherwise, let him do it for another three days'), Thuc. 4.13.3 παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀνήγοντο, ἢν μὲν ἀντεκπλεῖν ἐθέλωσι σφίσιν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐπεσπλευσούμενοι ('they put to sea, ready for battle: if the enemy was willing to sail out to meet them on open waters, *then they would be satisfied with that*; if not, their plan was that they themselves should sail into the enemy's harbour and attack him there'). Such omissions were frequent enough to acquire a technical term of their own: τὸ σχῆμα ἀνανταπόδοτον 'the figure of omitting the balancing apodosis'. It is easy to believe that the so-called 'omitted apodosis' might be supplied in actual speech by some shrug or other standard gesture that meant 'Nothing more needs doing.' Cf. 335c1–2n., and Boegehold (1999). **d5 εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἱππόκρατες:** the singular imperative implies 'I want an answer from Socrates on behalf of you both'; compare *Euthd.* 283b εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, and contrast 330c5n. on εἴπετον.

311e2 ἀκούομεν . . . e3 ἠκούομεν: for the change of tense from present to imperfect when the question is repeated, cf. Ar. *Ach.* 156–7: 'A: τουτὶ τί ἐστι τὸ κακόν; B: The Odomantine army . . . A: Odomantine schmodomantine. Tell me, τουτὶ τί ἦν;' When you use the imperfect tense in a question about the present, you imply, even when you have not previously asked the question in the present tense, that you should have had the answer already: thus, when Alcibiades finally notices that, all along, he has been right beside Socrates, he asks ὦ Ἡράκλεις, τουτὶ τί ἦν; (*Smp.* 213b). Cf. the use in English of e.g. 'What was your name?' **e4 σοφιστήν:** when coined in the fifth century, this term could apply to experts of any sort (e.g. to poets in Pind. *Isthmians* 5.28; to Prometheus, who taught the human race all skills, in Aesch. *Pr.* 62 and 944; to those who theorised about nature, in Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64 A 4; to those who introduced cultic practices, in Hdt. 2.49.1; to statesmen, in Hdt. 1.29.1). But the term soon acquired its present overtones of an unscrupulous gift of the gab (Ar.

Clouds 1111, 1309–10). Plato attempted to confine the application of the term to the likes of Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus, itinerant purveyors of, above all, the skills in persuasion that would be needed by a young man ambitious to succeed in democratic politics. But contemporaries of Plato would apply the term to him (Aelius Aristides Πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων 311.12 says that Lysias called him a sophist, and Isoc. 5.12–13 says that rhetorical displays at festivals are 'as ineffective as the *Laws* and the *Republics* that the sophists have written'). And well into the fourth century the term could be applied admiringly (Androtion *FGH* 324 fr. 69, quoted in 343a6n.) or contemptuously (Aeschin. 1.173) to Socrates. **ὀνομάζουσι . . . εἶναι:** Greek idiom allows verbs for calling and naming to appear with the infinitival constructions of indirect speech; another example is 325a2 προσαγορεύω εἶναι.

312a3–4 ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας, ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι: Demet. 218 cites this passage as a model of how a circumstantial detail can make a story vivid. For the way that here the physical dawn coincides – in both time and colour – with something's dawning upon Hippocrates intellectually, cf. 311a3n.

312b1–2 γραμματιστοῦ . . . κιθαριστοῦ . . . παιδοτρίβου: literacy, playing the lyre, and gymnastics were the three standard elements of Greek schooling (*Alc. Ma.* 106e, *Clit.* 407b–c, Xen. *Lac.* 2.1, Arist. *Pol.* 1337b23–5). For an ampler account, see 325d7–326c3. **b3–4 οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ:** for the turn of phrase, cf. 315a5. The contrast between knowledge sought 'for professional purposes, in order to be a practitioner', and knowledge sought solely 'for education' recurs in *Amatores* 135c–d, and Arist. *Pol.* 1282a3–7 and *PA* 639a1–6. All three passages agree that someone who intends to practise a τέχνη needs a more exact knowledge than someone who seeks only παιδεία. Socrates' interlocutor in the *Amatores* goes on to give a tasteless reason for being πεπαιδευμένος: it means 'being better able than other people present to follow what the practitioner says, and contribute an opinion of one's own, so that one gives the impression of being the most elegant [χαριέστατον] and clever [σοφώτατον] of the people who are present on the occasion'. The Aristotle passages give a better reason: a πεπαιδευμένος is able to 'assess [κρίνειν, κρῖναι]' those who are supposed to have expertise proper. But no such reason can justify Hippocrates' behaviour here. For if Hippocrates is going to Protagoras in order to acquire the sort of education that will enable him to distinguish a genuine σοφιστής from a mere charlatan, then he is not yet able to know that it is Protagoras to whom he should be going. Cf. Isoc. 15.264–5, quoted in 318e2–3n. **b5 πάνυ μὲν οὖν:** see 310a4n.

312c2 ὅτι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστιν: such phrases are the standard way of talking about definitions (cf. e.g. 353a5–6 τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; 361c5

τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν). A proper definition of sophists would spell out a feature that all and only sophists have, and that makes them all sophists. A definition therefore should not simply give an example of a sophist (*La.* 190d–191e: courage cannot be defined as fighting the enemy while staying where one is posted, since there are other ways of being courageous). Nor should a definition give a one-word synonym of 'sophist' (*Tht.* 145d–146a: Socrates accepts that ἐπιστήμη is σοφία (cf. 330b5n.), but still wants to know ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν). Nor should a definition give a feature that is common to all and only sophists, but is an effect of their being sophists rather than the cause (*Euthphr.* 9e–11b: a thing is holy if and only if it is loved by all the gods; nevertheless, gods love things because they are holy, rather than the other way round; and so the holy cannot be defined as what all the gods love). Proper definitions are therefore not easily devised. *Meno* 76a gives one example: 'A figure is a boundary of a solid [στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα].' The next note, 330d10–e1n. and 360e7–361a1n. give others. **c3–4 εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτωι παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῶι οὔτ' εἰ κακῶι πράγματι:** on the impossibility of knowing the answer to such questions, before knowing the proper definition, cf. 361c4–6, *Rep.* 368b–444e (where Socrates and friends, following the policy set forth in *Rep.* 354b–c, define justice and injustice as the first step in establishing which of the two is preferable), and *Meno* 70a–71b (where Socrates refuses to discuss whether virtue is teachable without first defining virtue). Socrates expects also that, once the proper definition is known, such questions become trivial: thus, given that justice is mental harmony, and injustice is mental disintegration, it is obvious that the former is preferable (*Rep.* 445a–b); and if we knew whether or not virtue was knowledge, we would know whether or not teaching was the way to make people virtuous (361b1–c6, *Meno* 87b–c). We might compare the way that someone who knows that aspirin is $C_9H_8O_4$ is better equipped to synthesise aspirin. Socrates was not the only one to think definitions so important. Thus Hipp. *On Ancient Medicine* 20 reports: 'Some physicians and sophists say that it would be impossible for one who does not know what man is [ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος] to know medicine, and that, on the contrary, anyone who means to take proper care of men must learn this thoroughly.' **c7 ἐγὼ μέν:** Hippocrates makes some pretence – to be deflated in Socrates' next remark – of being boldly controversial. The force of his phrase is '*I* think – though others will not agree – that . . .' It is common to have a μέν without a δέ, as here and e.g. 337a6, 353e3, 361d6, 'with personal and demonstrative pronouns, implicitly contrasted with other persons and things' (*GP* 381), where the contrast is too obvious to need spelling out. **c7–8 ὥσπερ τοὔνομα λέγει . . . τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα:** Hippocrates is mistaken. The ιστ of σοφιστής is in fact quite different from the ιστ of ἐπιστήμων. The former is added to a stem to make a noun for an agent, like the *-er* of English *singer*; the latter is part of the stem that ἐπιστήμων shares with the verb ἐπίσταμαι 'I know', and the augmented forms of this verb, like ἠπιστάμην, show that this stem was not felt to be a compound with ιστ as a component.

312d5 ἐπιστάτης: Socrates responds with a dodgy etymology of his own. The word elsewhere means 'the person put in charge', and it comes from ἐφίσταμαι, the passive of the compound of ἐπί and ἵστημι. But Socrates gives Hippocrates a chance to apply the etymological techniques of 312c7–8, and take this word to mean 'knowledgeable', as if it came from ἐπίσταμαι. Cf. *Rep.* 443e, where Socrates puns on ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιστατῶ. **d9–e1 περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν:** the difficulty is that apparently there is no one topic in particular on which sophists have specialist knowledge, and that apparently there would have to be such a topic if sophists are to deserve their fees. Hippias' answer to the difficulty is that he can impart a specialist knowledge of every topic (318e3n.). Protagoras' answer is that he can impart a general managerial skill, or εὐβουλία, apt for running any organisation (318e4–5n.). Gorgias' answer is that he can persuade an audience of more or less anything, true or false (*Grg.* 455a–456c). Protagoras himself purveyed a general skill in persuasion (DK 80 A 21). So did Socrates, according to unsympathetic accounts (*Ap.* 19b–c, Ar. *Clouds* 111–14). Sympathetic accounts offer other explanations of why we might benefit intellectually from Socrates, even though he too is like a sophist, in that there is no one subject in particular about which he can impart information: he can expose ignorance masquerading as knowledge (*Ap.* 21b–e), he can remind us of what we already know (*Meno* 81a–86c), he can help us bring our own ideas to birth (*Tht.* 149a–151d).

313a1–314c2: HIPPOCRATES AT RISK

Hippocrates, says Socrates, is foolish in wanting to be taught by a sophist, when he has so little idea of what that might mean: he is like someone who wants to eat something that is, for all he knows, poisonous.

313a2 ἔρχηι ὑποθήσων 'you are going to submit'. The Greek idiom is almost exactly the same as the English: neither ἔρχηι nor 'you are going' implies any actual locomotion (cf. *Tht.* 198e ἀριθμήσων ἴηι . . . ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος). **a3 διακινδυνεύοντα** 'facing a serious prospect that'. The uncompounded κινδυνεύοντα would be 'standing some chance that'. **πολλά** 'often'; cf. *Phd.* 61c πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῶι ἀνδρί ('I've often met the man'). **a6 ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγῆι, τὴν ψυχήν:** it is a point in favour of Hippocrates that he already has some awareness of this; for although it is a commonplace that your soul matters more than your body (e.g. *Cri.* 47e–48a, *Grg.* 512a, *Hp. Mi.* 373a), many seem to need to have this drawn to their attention (e.g. *Grg.* 477c–e, *Ap.* 30a–b, *Clit.* 407e). The reason why your soul matters more than your body is that your soul is the rightful master and controller of your body (e.g. *Phd.* 79e–80a, *Phlb.* 35d, *Rep.* 353d; cf. 326b6–c1n. on why bodies should be at the disposal of souls), and that, because you are the rightful master and controller of your body, your soul is therefore you yourself (*Alc. Ma.* 129b–130c). **τὴν ψυχήν:** accusative,

because it belongs inside the relative clause, as the object of its verb ἡγῆι. Cf. 342a1 τοῦτο, 342b4 τοὺς σοφιστάς.

313b1 περὶ δὲ τούτου: the clause already has one δέ at 313a6 ὃ δέ. Repeated occurrences of δέ with two coordinated pronouns, relative and demonstrative, are a way to marshal an otherwise straggly sentence. Cf. 325b6–c3 and *GP* 184–5. **b3 ὄρθριον** is the neuter singular of the adjective ὄρθριος, playing the part of an adverb, as in Ar. *Ec.* 526–7 πῶς οὖν ὄρθριον | ᾤιχου σιωπῆι θοἰμάτιον λαβοῦσά μου;

313c1 ὃν οὔτε γιγνώσκεις . . . οὔτε διείλεξαι: γιγνώσκειν takes an accusative, and διαλέγεσθαι takes a dative, but the accusative ὅν provides the object for them both. English idiom, unlike Greek, likes to divide such clauses into two, each introduced by the appropriate case of the relative pronoun. Cf. 327d1–3 οἷς . . . , ἀλλ' εἶεν 'for whom . . . , but who were'. **c2 τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν φαίνηι ἀγνοῶν:** see 312c2–4nn. on what such questions are, and why they matter. **c5–6 ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος:** the difference between the two is that 'we describe as καπήλους those who provide a service of buying and selling while settled in a marketplace, whereas those who wander from city to city we describe as ἐμπόρους' (*Rep.* 371d; cf. *Sph.* 223d). Either form of trade is liable to elicit the disdain of a young gentleman like Hippocrates; cf. 347c4–5n. In *Sph.* 224c–d and 231d, a sophist is defined as an ἔμπορος of knowledge – which makes Protagoras' travels essential to his being a sophist, and which implies also that Socrates was certainly no sophist, since he hardly ever travelled from Athens, and then only for military service, or to be a spectator at the Isthmian games (*Cri.* 52b). **c6–7 φαίνεται γάρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις:** see 309c8n.

313d1 ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος 'the merchant and the shopkeeper'. Unlike English, Greek does not require two occurrences of the definite article to make it clear that these are two people. Cf. 334c6 τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις, 355e5–6 τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρόν.

313e3 περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἰατρικός: talking of the soul's doctor was quite as metaphorical as talking of the soul's nutrition (313c5–9): medicine had no such specialism as psychiatry. Quite what stands to the soul as medicine does to the body was disputed: according to 357e3–4, the medicine of the soul is whatever Protagoras, Prodicus and Hippias do to relieve a soul of the grossest form of ignorance; according to *Grg.* 478d and Demos. 26.26, it is lawful punishment, ridding a soul of savagery and vice; according to Men. fr. 865 *PCG*, it is the kind words of a friend, assuaging a soul's sadness; according to Isoc. 8.39, it is reasoned reproofs, emptying a soul of ignorance and evil desires. This difficulty of identifying the soul's doctor is of course a further reason for Hippocrates to be cautious.

314b2–4 ἀνάγκη καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῆι τῆι ψυχῆι λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπιέναι: we might object that knowledge can be stored in books instead of in the mind; Socrates would reply that books are too inert to contain and convey genuine knowledge (329a3–4n.). **b5 ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι:** Socrates was born in 469 (he was 70 at the time of his trial in 399: *Ap.* 17d), and was therefore in at least his late thirties by the dramatic date of this dialogue (309a3n.). The fact that, even at this age, he thinks himself still young for the job, shows how difficult he takes the job to be. **νέοι ὥστε** 'young to'; i.e. too young to do it properly or comfortably or well, but not necessarily too young to do it at all, the construction for which would use, not the positive, but the comparative: νεώτεροι ἢ ὥστε. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.13.3, where someone says that his slaves enjoy washing in a water supply that ψυχρόν ἐστιν ὥστε λούσασθαι.

314c1 Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος: he has large parts in two dialogues by Plato that bear his name, and also in a dialogue by Xenophon: *Mem.* 4.4.

314c3–316a5: OFF TO CALLIAS'

Socrates, and a chastened Hippocrates, go off to the house of Callias, where they find Protagoras, together with two other sophists, Hippias and Prodicus, and throngs of admirers from Athenian high society and beyond.

314c3 δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα 'once we reached these decisions'; an accusative absolute, of a clause that in the indicative would be something like ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν, with ταῦτα the object of ποιεῖν. Contrast *Ep.* 7, 347b ταῦτά μοι δόξαντα, the indicative version of which would be ταῦτά μοι ἔδοξεν, with ταῦτα the subject of ἔδοξεν. Cf. 358c1–2 ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω ('he does these [inferior] things, although it is possible for him to do the superior ones'). **ἐν τῶι προθύρωι:** in *Smp.* 175a, where Socrates lingers in a doorway to complete a train of thought, we are told that such behaviour was a habit of his; and in *Tht.* 172d, Socrates tells us that leisurely consideration of arguments is the philosophers' ideal. With the way that Hippocrates now waits patiently at the door of Callias until agreement is reached, contrast the way that at 310b1–2 he hammered on the door of Socrates. **c4 διελεγόμεθα** 'we continued talking together' or even 'we continued chatting'. This ostentatiously unassuming word was the standard word for Socrates' preferred way of proceeding intellectually. In the ideal conversation, people test thoughts, sometimes to destruction, by asking one another questions, and getting terse and apposite answers. Conversing properly is contrasted with producing and using written texts (329a3–4n.), with discussing any fixed texts whose authors are not present (347b7–348a8), with delivering speeches to an audience who may not talk back (336b2–3), and even with exchanges where the parties do take turns in speaking and listening, but do not ask and answer questions (362a3n. on εἰπόντες

καὶ ἀκούσαντες). So eager is Socrates for conversation, that he will often imagine a conversation (e.g. 330c4–331b6), and sometimes even imagine a conversation in which another conversation is imagined (e.g. 355c1–e4). Socrates turns what should be his speech in his defence into a conversation with one of his accusers (*Ap.* 24c–28a; cf. Xen. *Ap.* 19–21), and takes both parts in a conversation himself when his preferred partner refuses to take one (*Grg.* 506c–507c). The private thoughts of a single individual are described as a conversation: 'the conversation of the soul with itself' (*Tht.* 189e–190a; cf. *Sph.* 263e–264b). 'We suppose that the art of how to conduct a conversation is placed on top of all the other sciences as their coping stone [ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι], and that no other science could rightly be set above it,' says Socrates in *Rep.* 534e; and according to Xen. *Mem.* 4.5.12, 'He said that conversing [διαλέγεσθαι] was so called from coming together to share in decision-making, by distinguishing [διαλέγοντας] things according to their kinds. One should therefore try to make oneself fit for this above all, and to care for this above all; for it was this that made men very virtuous, very suited to lead, and very good at conversation [ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους].' **c7 ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις:** simply by having a eunuch in his household, Callias gives an impression of expensive, oriental, and somewhat sinister luxury (cf. Hdt. 8.105.1, on a man who made his living ἀπ' ἔργων ἀνοσιωτάτων: he castrated pretty boys, and sold them to the East for high prices). The impression is strengthened by the fact that Callias uses so expensive a slave for so undemanding a task as doorkeeping (Arist. *Oeconomica* 1345a33–5: 'it is thought that even in large households someone who is useless for other jobs can make a useful doorman'). Indeed, not even all those paradigms of luxury, the Great Kings of Persia (cf. Ctes. *FGH* 688 fr. 1n, quoted in 311a5–6n.), had eunuch doormen: Smerdis did not (Hdt. 3.77.1–2), and the 'fact' that Cyrus did is found worthy of special remark (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.65).

314 d2 ἔα is a decidedly histrionic exclamation. Here and a melodramatic passage at *Euthd.* 302c are the only places in classical literature where the expression is used by someone who is not a character on the stage. **d3 αὐτῶι:** this definite pronoun was as standard a way of referring to the master of a house as the indefinite τις (310b2n.) was of referring to a slave. Cf. e.g. *Rep.* 327b, Soph. *OT* 927, Men. *Sam.* 256, and 315b5n. **d3–4 ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οἷός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξεν:** eunuchs 'are considered to be somewhat lacking in bodily strength' (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.65), and the door of so rich a man as Callias (311a2n.) was no doubt large and heavy. **d5 ὦ ἄνθρωποι:** in so addressing Socrates and Hippocrates, the slave shows brusque manners, of a kind that Athenians thought democracy encouraged in their slaves (*Rep.* 563b, Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.10, Demos. 9.3). ὦ ἄνθρωποι is how gods address human beings (*Clit.* 407b, *Smp.* 192d, *Ap.* 23b) and legislators address subjects (*Cra.* 408b). Litigants by contrast never use this phrase to address jurors; they use the more polite ὦ ἄνδρες instead. And it is not just in the vocative plural that ἀνήρ is more honorific than ἄνθρωπος: cf. 330d1on.,

Isoc. 16.23 'everyone knows that it is possible for even τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων to make insulting remarks not only about τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀρίστων but also about the gods', and Xen. *Hr.* 7.3 'those who differ most from brute beasts, and are thought to be ἄνδρες and no longer just ἄνθρωποι'. **d7–e1 οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν:** if Socrates' denial that he is a sophist is to settle the question, then Protagoras cannot be altogether right in his claim that the world contains many sophists who deny that they are sophists (316d3–317a1). By admitting Socrates and Hippocrates now, having earlier refused them admission when he took them for sophists wishing to talk to Callias, the slave shows himself independent of, and wiser than, his master, who is set on the foolish course of filling his house with sophists, and having them talk to him. At least since the time of Xanthias and his master Dionysus in Ar. *Frogs*, comedy has had fun with the theme of a slave who is his master's better. Plato gives a special twist to the theme by having Callias less sensible than, and imperfectly in control of, a eunuch.

314e1 θάρρει is a small anticipation of what will eventually come to be at the focus of discussion: the virtue of courage, and its connection with θάρρος or boldness (349e1–351b3, 359b7–360c1). For other such anticipations, see 310d3n. on ἀνδρείαν. **ἤλθομεν:** for the contrast with 314d7 ἥκομεν, see 316b6n. **e4 περιπατοῦντα:** while Protagoras walks up and down, Hippias is seated (315c1), and Prodicus is in bed (315d5). Thus even though Protagoras' liking for the indoor life marks him out as not exactly vigorous (311a5–6n.), he is nevertheless shown to be more vigorous than his rival sophists. No doubt we are to take differing degrees of vigour in bodily matters as emblematic of differing degrees of vigour in intellectual ones: Protagoras will be, of all these sophists, the hardest for Socrates to contend with.

315a1–2 ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους: Pericles was the leading figure in Athenian politics for the three decades until his death in 429. Under him, the government of Athens was 'in theory a democracy; in practice, rule by the leading man' (Thuc. 2.65.9). One anecdote has him spend an entire day with Protagoras, discussing a complicated question about responsibility for an accidental death (DK 80 A 10). According to Plu. *Per.* 24.8, 'Pericles was married to a kinswoman of his, who had earlier been wife of Hipponicus, to whom she bore Callias the rich. To Pericles she bore Xanthippus and Paralus.' Paralus, like his brother Xanthippus, died in the plague of 430 (Plu. *Per.* 36.6–8; Protagoras DK 80 B 9 describes Pericles' calm response to their deaths); cf. 309a3n. for other indications of dramatic date. **a2 Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος:** Charmides was brother of Plato's mother Perictione (D.L. 3.1), and cousin of Critias (316a4–5n.). He was, in youth, 'thought to be the greatest beauty of his day' (*Chrm.* 154a), and his blush made him look even more beautiful (*Chrm.* 158c). He was too bashful to enter political life until Socrates encouraged him to do

so (Xen. *Mem.* 3.7). He was, says Alcibiades in *Smp.* 222b, one of the many younger men (Alcibiades among them) whom Socrates tricked into becoming his ἐρασταί. Towards the end of his life, he was one of those whom the Thirty Tyrants (cf. 316a4–5n. on Critias) appointed to govern the Peiraeus; and in 403 he died, near the Peiraeus, fighting against democratic forces (Xen. *HG* 2.4.19). He may well have been the Charmides who, along with Alcibiades (309a2n.) and Adeimantus (315e3–4n.), was exiled in 415 after accusations of blasphemy: they were all said to have mimicked the Eleusinian mysteries in Charmides' house (And. 1.16). **a3 Ξάνθιππος:** see 315a1–2n. **Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου:** the son of this Philippides, named Philomelus after his grandfather, was a pupil of Plato's rival, the sophist Isocrates (Isoc. 15.93; cf. Androtion in 315c4n.). **a4 Ἀντίμοιρος:** Antimoerus has left on the historical record no other trace than this, for all that Socrates is about to describe him as the most highly regarded of those whom Protagoras is training to be sophists. There may be a sly point here: why did Protagoras' star pupil not himself become a successful sophist if Protagoras' capacities really did merit the term ἡ σοφιστικὴ τέχνη (316d3)? For, as 319e1–3 presupposes and as *Clit.* 409b and *Alc. Ma.* 118c–d say outright, someone who understands some skill should be able, not only to have the effects characteristic of that skill, but also to teach the skill to others: for example, someone skilled in the art of medicine should be able, not only to heal the sick, but also to train medical students. (This is indeed one of the things that distinguishes a skill from a non-rational capacity with a similar effect: antibiotics can heal the sick, but they cannot teach medicine.) The sly point is a small anticipation of what will become a major theme in 318e–328e: how to square the claim that there is such a thing as πολιτικὴ τέχνη with the fact that no such thing seems to be taught? **a5 ἐπὶ τέχνηι μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς ἐσόμενος:** see 312b3–4n. **a6 ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων:** the genitive implies that the hearers do not hear all that is being said. Cf. *Rep.* 450b λόγων ἀκούειν, of arguments that it would take a lifetime to hear in full, and *Laws* 708d ὑπακοῦσαι μέν τινων νόμων καινῶν, by contrast both with being wholly resistant to new legislation, and with being easily moulded by a legislator into unanimous conformity. When the things heard are heard in full, then Greek speaks of them in the accusative, and uses the genitive for the people from whom those things are heard (e.g. 318d5 ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, 330e5 ὑμῶν κατήκουσα, 340d5 ἀκούσας ταῦτα).

315b1 κηλῶν τῆι φωνῆι ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς: this is somewhat derogatory of Protagoras' followers: the song of Orpheus was renowed for being able to charm not only rational beings, but also birds, fish, wild beasts, trees and rocks (Simonides fr. 567 *PMG*, Eur. *Bac.* 562–4, *IA* 1211–12). **b2 κεκηλημένοι:** this echo in the passive voice of the active κηλῶν at 315b1 shows how responsive Protagoras' followers are to his charms. There are similar echoes, to a similar effect, in *Smp.* 196c κρατοῖντ' ἂν ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ, *Alc. Ma.* 104c κεκράτηκας τῶν ἐραστῶν, ἐκεῖνοί τε ὑποδεέστεροι ὄντες ἐκρατήθησαν, *Alc. Ma.* 135d παιδαγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε

τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσηι, *Grg.* 490a τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι. **b2 τῶι χορῶι:** this metaphor reinforces the idea that Protagoras has a mass of followers, systematically subordinated. The same metaphor is used, to the same effect, for the followers of some other sophists in *Euthd.* 276b–c: 'The followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus simultaneously cheered and laughed, like a chorus on a cue from a director [ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος].' **b3 τοῦτον τὸν χορόν:** no connecting particle is needed; the connection is supplied by this repetition, with a demonstrative pronoun, of the noun from the previous sentence. Cf. 315d7–e3 μειράκιον. . . . τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, and 343a4n. on οὗτοι. **b5 αὐτός** here almost means 'the Boss'. Cf. 314d3n. on the use of this word for the master of a house, Ar. *Clouds* 219 (where it is used of Socrates, by one of the pupils in his school), and the tag αὐτὸς ἔφα (Doric for αὐτὸς ἔφη), whereby Pythagoreans introduced quotations from Pythagoras (D.L. 8.46).

315c1 τὸν δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα: Socrates quotes from Odysseus' description of what he saw when he went to the edge of the earth, and summoned up the ghosts from the underworld. The suggestion is therefore that sophists are as feeble as ghosts (cf. 311a5–6n, 314e4n.), that the money which sophists need before they teach (cf. 310d7–8n.) is like the blood which Odysseus must give to the ghosts before they speak (e.g. *Od.* 11.84–99, 152–4), and also that Socrates himself displays something like the resolution and curiosity of Odysseus when he risks this visit to the sophists' den. Socrates quotes the start of *Od.* 11.601, the line that marks the transition from an account of Sisyphus to an account of Heracles. The repetitive movement of Protagoras and his audience (315b2–7) is therefore implicitly compared to the repetitive punishment of Sisyphus: he had to roll a rock up a hill; but just as it reached the top, the rock would roll back down, and he would have to start all over again (*Od.* 11.593–600). Likewise, the questions of the audience who surround Hippias and ask him about astronomy are implicitly compared to what surrounds Heracles: 'a noise of corpses, as if of birds, panicking in every direction' (*Od.* 11.605–6). **ἔφη Ὅμηρος:** it is not obligatory to have a ὡς or the like when acknowledging quotations, but it is permissible: cf. 340a2 ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος, *Euthd.* 304b ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος, *Meno* 76d ἔφη Πίνδαρος. **c2-3 ἐν θρόνωι . . . ἐπὶ βάθρων:** being seated is a mark of comparative debility (314e4n.). Furthermore, being seated on a chair with arms, while addressing people seated merely on benches (like schoolboys: 325e4), is a way of claiming special authority for one's words (whence *ex cathedra* pronouncements and professorial chairs). Socrates of course (as Dicaearchus fr. 29 Wehrli observes) philosophised without such equipment, οὔτε βάθρα θεὶς οὔτε εἰς θρόνον καθίσας. **c3 Ἐρυξίμαχος . . . ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ** is a major character in the *Symposium.* In 415, an Eryximachus was among those accused of mutilating herms (And. 1.35), and an Acoumenus was (like Phaedrus and Alcibiades) among those accused of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries (And. 1.17–18). **Φαῖδρος** was a friend of Eryximachus' (*Phdr.* 268a),

and a major character in the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*; in both dialogues, he appears as an enthusiast for fancy speeches on erotic themes. In 415, he was among those accused of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries (And. 1.15). **Μυρρινούσιος:** Myrrhinus was a deme in Attica, named for its groves of myrtle (scholion on Ar. *Pl.* 586), a plant dedicated to Aphrodite (e.g. D.S. 1.17.5). Plato no doubt here (and at *Smp.* 176d Φαῖδρον τὸν Μυρρινούσιον, *Phdr.* 244a Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου ἀνδρός) relishes the insinuation that Phaedrus has a flowery and erotic character. **c4 Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος:** described in *Grg.* 487c–d as one of a group of people who discussed how far to practise wisdom (μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον), and who decided not to philosophise pedantically (εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν), for fear of being corrupted (διαφθαρέντες, cf. 320a5–6n.) by becoming wiser than need be (πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι). Andron was one of the oligarchic junta of Four Hundred that held power in Athens for a time in 411 BC (Harp. s.v. Ἄνδρων), and he had his son Androtion (cf. 343a6n.) educated by Plato's great rival, the sophist Isocrates (Suda s.v. Ἀνδροτίων; cf. 315a3n. on Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου). **c5 περὶ φύσεως** was the standard term for the subject of an ambitious enquiry that seeks 'to know the causes of each thing: why each thing comes to be, and why it perishes, and why it exists' (*Phd.* 96a). This term was given as the title (no doubt in some cases by the author himself) to books on these matters by at least seventeen authors down to the time of Plato. **τῶν μετεώρων** 'things up above'; but the word can be applied metaphorically to something thoroughly terrestrial that is the subject of wild speculation (Demos. 19.122). It was a cliché of comedy that intellectuals are interested in such matters. Thus Protagoras is described as someone 'who brags – the crook – περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, and eats what's on the ground' (Eup. *Flatterers* fr. 157.2–3 *PCG*; cf. 311a2n. for other quotations from this play); Prodicus is counted among τῶν νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν (Ar. *Clouds* 360–1; cf. Ar. *Birds* 690–2); and Socrates is made to claim that he has discovered τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα, and that he gives instruction περὶ τῶν μετεώρων (Ar. *Clouds* 228, 490). In *Tht.* 175d–e, Socrates allows that the cliché would indeed be true of an ideal philosopher, but in *Ap.* 18b, 23d he denies that it is true of himself, and there is no sign that it was true of either Prodicus or Protagoras. **ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα** 'something or other connected with astronomy'. The ostentatious vagueness of these words expresses some disdain, as if the questions put to Hippias are not worth precise specification. Cf. the disdain shown for the details of commercial law in *Rep.* 425c–e, where it is agreed to delegate to others legislation on ἀγορανομικὰ ἄττα; cf. also Thuc. 6.6.2, which suggests that a territorial dispute is a more significant cause of war than 'something or other to do with marriage' when it says: 'they shared a boundary with the Selountians, and went to war with them περί τε γαμικῶν τινῶν καὶ περὶ γῆς ἀμφισβητήτου'. For more on Socrates' attitude to astronomy, see 318e2n. For Hippias' attainments in the subject, see 318e3n. **c6 διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἱππίαν:** Hippias took great pride in being able to answer any question that anyone cared to put to him. Thus at *Hp. Mi.* 363c–d he says: 'It

would be pretty odd of me to dodge Socrates' questioning [ἐρώτησιν] now, given that, whenever the Olympiad is held, I always leave my home in Elis and go up to Olympia, to the festival of the Greeks, to the shrine, and there offer to talk on demand about any subject that I have prepared for display [εἰς ἐπίδειξιν παρεσκευασμένον; cf. 320c1–2n., 347b2n.], and to answer any questions anyone wishes to ask [ἀποκρινόμενον τῶι βουλομένωι ὅτι ἄν τις ἐρωτᾶι].' Gorgias boasted of the same versatility, and claimed, 'I haven't had a fresh question in years' (*Grg.* 448a; cf. *Meno* 70c). The versatility of which Protagoras boasted was slightly different: see 335b6–c1, and 329b2–3n.

315d1 καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον: a reference to Hom. *Od.* 11.582 καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον, which, like 315c1, comes from Odysseus' description of the underworld. Tantalus' punishment was to be surrounded by food and drink that moved away whenever he tried to consume it (Hom. *Od.* 11.583–92). The suggestion is that knowledge, which is the nutrition of the soul (313c8–9), will escape us if we try to get it by the intellectual methods of Prodicus that are parodied in 337a1–c4. ἄρα 'as I only then knew for sure'. Cf. *GP* 36, and 314c1–2, where Socrates asserted that Hippias was staying with Callias, and added that he thought Prodicus was staying there too. **d5–6 κωιδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς:** contrast 310c1n. on the simplicity of Socrates' σκίμπους, and 341e6n. on the austere ways of Prodicus' native Ceos. **d6 παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῶι ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναις:** Pausanias and Agathon therefore are, or are affecting to be, as weak as Prodicus himself. **d7 Παυσανίας:** a central character in the *Symposium*, where he produces, at 180c–185c, a brilliant speech in defence of sexual double standards. **ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων:** the Κεραμεῖς ('Potters') was a deme in Athens. **νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον:** this does little to limit the dramatic date (309a3n.). A μειράκιον would be in his late teens or early twenties, and a νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον therefore perhaps in his late teens; and our only clue to Agathon's date of birth is that in 416 he was still a νεανίσκος (*Smp.* 198a, Ath. 5.217b), and therefore still in his twenties or thirties (Pythagoras in D.L. 8.10).

315e1 τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός: to bring out the force of adding οὖν to this δέ clause, *GP* 460–1 says 'οὖν marks the opposed idea as essential', and paraphrases the clause by 'certainly handsome, whether good or not'. **e2 Ἀγάθωνα:** Agathon grew up to be a highly successful playwright. To celebrate a victory for some of his tragedies, he gives the party described in the *Symposium*. In Ar. *Th.* 88–265, he and his writings are represented as thoroughly effeminate; and, in *Smp.* 194e–197e, he adopts a preciously Gorgianic style to speak in praise of Love. **e2–3 οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυγχάνει ὤν:** Socrates' suspicion was correct. And in fact, Agathon's relationship to Pausanias endured long after he had ceased to be a παῖς. It is represented as still enduring in 422 (the dramatic date of Xen. *Smp.* 8.32), and in 416 (the dramatic date of *Smp.* 193b). Ael. 2.21 says that the relationship endured even later, when Agathon left Athens

for Macedon. **e3 τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον:** on the connection of this to the previous sentence, cf. 315b3n. **e3–4 τὼ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, ὅ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου:** the use of the dual of the proper name is perhaps jocularly Homeric, like e.g. *Il.* 12.265 ἀμφοτέρω δ' Αἴαντε (cf. 317e1). We have no further knowledge of Adeimantus son of Cepis. Adeimantus son of Leucolophides was among those accused of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries (315a2n.). He was elected στρατηγός for three successive years in 407–4 (Xen. *HG* 1.4.21, 1.7.1, 2.1.30). In his final year of office, he was defeated by the Spartans at the Battle of Aegospotami and taken prisoner. He alone was allowed to live, when the Spartans killed all their other Athenian prisoners. This was because he alone had opposed an Athenian decision to mutilate all Spartan prisoners, although some circulated the alternative explanation that he had betrayed the Athenian fleet to the Spartans (Xen. *HG* 2.1.32; cf. Lys. 14.38). **e5 διελέγοντο:** that Prodicus should engage in something so modest as conversation (314c4n.) makes him different from Protagoras and Hippias, and similar to his pupil (341a4) Socrates. Prodicus continues to show a taste for Socratic conversation in his brisk and apposite responses at 340b6, 340c2, 341c2, 358b3, 358e1. **e6–316a1 πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος:** cf. 341a4–5n., on Socrates' claims to have learnt from Prodicus. To praise someone as both 'all-wise' and 'godly' conflicts with *Meno* 99c–d, where Socrates says that θεῖος is apt praise for someone who, without any understanding of his own, gets right so much of what he says and does as to suggest divine inspiration. Socrates thereupon adds that women and Spartans (on whose intellectual qualities see 342a7–343b4) are liable to praise a good man by calling him θεῖος.

316a3–4 Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός: with this specification of Alcibiades by reference to his beauty, contrast the way that other characters are specified by reference to their father (e.g. Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος 315a1–2) or deme (e.g. Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος 315c3, Παυσανίας . . . ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων 315d7) or city (e.g. Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον 311c5); and cf. 309a2n. **a4 ὡς φῂς σύ:** Socrates' companion spoke of Alcibiades' beauty in 309a2–c9. **a4–5 Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου** is appropriately paired with Alcibiades: they were the two most scandalously ill-behaved of all Socrates' associates. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12 relays this complaint: 'Once they became associates of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades did enormous harm to the city: Critias was the most thievish and most violent and most murderous of the oligarchic party; Alcibiades was, of the democratic party, the most incontinent and most outrageous and most violent.' Critias was one of Plato's cousins (his father Callaeschrus and Plato's maternal grandfather were brothers). One injury that he did to Athens was to arrange for the return of Alcibiades from one of his periods of exile (DK 88 B 5). As leader of the Thirty Tyrants who had control of Athens in 404–3, he arranged for the deaths, without trial, of 1,500 citizens (Isoc. 7.67), and the death, after a trial, but without a conviction, of a member of the Thirty who was not

extreme enough for his tastes (Xen. *HG* 2.3.15–56), before being killed himself by democratic forces (Xen. *HG* 2.4.19).

316a6–319a2: THE PROFESSION OF PROTAGORAS

Socrates presents Hippocrates to Protagoras. Protagoras speaks with pride of how bold he is to be a sophist openly. His rivals are summoned to listen to the conversation between him and Socrates. He explains what he will teach Hippocrates: how to run properly anything from his own household to the entire city.

316a6 σμίκρ' ἄττα: a dismissive phrase, used at *Smp.* 199b and *Phlb.* 20c of some large and important topics.

316b2 τοι is a classic instance of the use of this particle described in *GP* 542 as 'With the second person singular pronoun (usually accusative), conveying a summons to attention, often peremptory in tone.' **b3 διαλεχθῆναι** 'to have a conversation'. See 316c3n. on διαλέγεσθαι. **b6 ἥκετε** is in effect 'you are here'. This verb focuses on the present effect of a past coming ('you have arrived, and not yet left'), by contrast with 316b4 ἤλθομεν, which focuses instead on the past coming itself ('we came'). Cf. 314d7–e1, *Smp.* 174e 'You've come at just the right time to join us for dinner [εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις ὅπως συνδειπνήσηις]; if you came [ἦλθες] for anything else, forget about it for the moment,' and Isae. 1.1 'In those days, he gave us such a strict upbringing that we never entered [οὐδέποτε ἤλθομεν] a courtroom, not even to be part of the audience; now, however, we are here [ἥκομεν] to fight a case in which all our worldly goods are at stake.' **b7 τῶν ἐπιχωρίων** 'one of the locals'. Describing someone as ἐπιχώριος implies simply that he is a local; describing him as τῶν ἐπιχωρίων implies also that the locals constitute a group with something of an identity of its own. Cf. 319c3, 324c4, 361e4–5.

316c1 ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῆι πόλει: at 318e4–319a2 Protagoras will equate this 'getting a reputation in public life' with being good at handling the city's business. In a well-run democracy, the equation is fair enough: those handling the city's business will be subject to public scrutiny, and the public will be wise enough not to think highly of them unless they handle the city's business well. The various parties to this conversation (even Socrates: 319b3–4) will agree that the Athenian democracy is well-run. Hence the equation may, at least as it applies to Hippocrates, pass unchallenged. Under other arrangements, the equation falters. **c3 σκόπει:** this present imperative contrasts with the aorist imperative σκέψαι at 316b5. Since using the aorist imperative, to enjoin what was then presented as a single, simple act, Socrates has spelled out some complications attaching to the original question, and his present imperative enjoins Protagoras to undertake what it acknowledges may be a complicated series of

enquiries. For similar switches from σκέψαι to σκόπει, similarly motivated, see *Grg.* 510a–b, *Chrm.* 161b and 167b–d, *Phlb.* 24a. **διαλέγεσθαι** 'to be conversing'. Socrates' present tense suggests something perhaps a bit more complicated, and open-ended, than Protagoras' aorist διαλεχθῆναι at 316b3. **c5 προμηθῆι:** the choice of this word for taking precautions will acquire a new resonance after Protagoras tells his tale about Prometheus in 320d1–322a2; cf. also 361d2–3 Προμηθεύς . . . προμηθούμενος. **ὦ Σώκρατες:** Protagoras obviously remembers Socrates' name from some previous meeting. Cf. 351e6n. on how Protagoras shows himself familiar with one of Socrates' characteristic turns of phrase, and 361e2–3 on how good an impression Socrates had made on Protagoras before the present meeting. **c5 ξένον . . . d1 συνουσίαν:** with Protagoras' description of his life as a wandering sophist, cf. the descriptions offered by Socrates of the lives of 'Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Acragas, and many others' (*Thg.* 127e–128a) and of 'Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis' (*Ap.* 19e–20a). **c6 ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας:** Socrates' parallels are free from Protagoras' self-important talk about *big* cities (ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων *Ap.*, εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἰόντες *Thg.*). **πείθοντα:** cf. πείθουσι *Ap.*, πείθουσι *Thg.* It is uncontested that sophists are persuasive. **c6–7 τῶν νέων τοὺς βελτίστους:** Socrates' parallels are free from Protagoras' claim that it is the best of the young men whom he attracts. Instead, they have sophists attracting either young men generally (τοὺς νέους *Ap.*), or those young men who are of highest birth and greatest wealth (τῶν νέων τοὺς γενναιοτάτους τε καὶ πλουσιωτάτους *Thg.*). **c7 ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας . . . c8 ἑαυτῶι συνεῖναι:** Socrates uses similar turns of phrase (τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι *Ap.*, ἀπολείποντας τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας αὐτοῖς συνεῖναι *Thg.*), and his ἐκείνων, like Protagoras' ἄλλων, refers to all the fellow citizens of the young men whom sophists attract. But Socrates emphasises that these young men could associate for free with any of their fellow citizens (ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα συνεῖναι ὧι ἂν βούλωνται *Ap.*, ἔξεστιν τῶν πολιτῶν ὧι ἂν βούλωνται προῖκα συνεῖναι *Thg.*), while Protagoras does not give even this hint that his relationship with the young men is commercial. **c8–d1 ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν:** Socrates' parallels offer neither this nor any other description of what the young men hope to get from sophists. They do, however, describe, as Protagoras does not, what the young men have to give to sophists: money and gratitude (χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι *Ap.*, προσκατατιθέντας ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ μισθόν, καὶ χάριν πρὸς τούτοις εἰδέναι *Thg.*).

316d5 φοβουμένους: Protagoras' concern throughout this, his first major speech, with fear, risk, and precautions against danger, is some anticipation of the way that the discussion will eventually come to focus upon courage; cf. also 351d3–4 ἀσφαλέστερον. For other such anticipations, see 310d3n. on ἀνδρείαν. Protagoras otherwise avoids discussing courage; see 330a1–2n. **d5–6 πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι:** the idea of secret traditions of wisdom is connected with

Protagoras again at *Tht.* 152e, where Socrates, in expounding a view of Protagoras', lists a number of other sages who are also supposed to have held that view in secret. **d6 τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν . . . e4 ἄλλοι πολλοί:** such lists were a favourite of sophistic oratory. Cf. Protagoras' list of animal attributes (320d7–321b6), his list of good things (334a4–c6), his list of possible relationships between pleasant and painful and good and bad (351d5–7), Hippias' list of sources of wisdom (337c7–d1n.), Prodicus' list of pleasures (337c2n.), Gorgias' list of adornments (DK 82 B 11.1), Alcidamas' list of honoured sages (343a4n. on Χίλων), and what may be Lysias' list of courtesans who retired young (Ath. 13.592e). Socrates' list of the Seven Sages (343a2–4) spoofs the genre. Such lists evidently pleased the audiences of sophists as e.g. the Catalogue of Ships (Hom. *Il.* 2.494–760) pleased the audiences of rhapsodes, or a list of lists pleases a writer of commentary. Protagoras' list here, attempting to assimilate sophistry and other trades, merits contrast with Socrates' attempts at 311b2–e6 to distinguish them, and comparison with Protagoras' own attempts at 331d3–e3 to argue that 'Everything resembles everything, at least in some respect.' **d6 Ὅμηρον:** Homer is a good start to a catalogue of undercover sophists, for he was widely thought to teach the knowledge that makes a man virtuous. In Ar. *Frogs* 1034–6, Aeschylus asks 'How did the divine Homer get his glorious reputation, if not because he taught useful things [χρήστ' ἐδίδαξεν]: captaining troops, valiant deeds [ἀρετάς], arming warriors?' In *Ion* 540d–541c, a bard claims that, because of his familiarity with the works of Homer, he would make an excellent general. In Xen. *Smp.* 4.6, Niceratus, who knew the whole of Homer by heart (see Xen. *Smp.* 3.5, quoted in 326a1n.) says, 'I too could tell you ways in which you will be improved [ἃ ἔσεσθε βελτίονες] if you understand me. For you do appreciate, I suppose, that the supremely wise [σοφώτατος] Homer has composed poetry about almost every aspect of human life. So if any of you wants to become capable of running his household, or speaking in public, or commanding an army [cf. the things that Protagoras professes to teach at 318e5–319a2: in private life, household management; and in public life, speech and action about the city's business], or to become like Achilles or Ajax or Nestor or Odysseus, he should pay court to me. For I understand all these things.' (Niceratus was joking; but his joke depended on exaggerating something that others would say in earnest.) Plato did not share this belief in the educational value of Homer: see *Rep.* 377d–398b and 596b–608b for a series of arguments that Homer is in fact morally pernicious, and *Ion* for a representation of someone whose familiarity with Homer has left him thoroughly fatuous. **Ἡσίοδον:** as the second great poet in the Greek canon, Hesiod is standardly paired with Homer (e.g. *Tim.* 21d οὔτε Ἡσίοδος οὔτε Ὅμηρος οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ποιητής, Isoc. 12.33 τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ποιήσεως). The few who thought Homer pernicious thought the same of Hesiod too (*Rep.* 377d–e, 600d; Xenophanes DK 21 B 11). **d7 Σιμωνίδην:** one of his poems will be the subject of an extended discussion at 339a–347a, introduced by Protagoras. Perhaps the occurrence of Simonides' name on this list here is some small

anticipation of that eventual discussion (cf. 335e1n.). Perhaps he is mentioned also for his reputation as giver of advice on politics (Xen. *Hr.* recounts some of this advice), and as taker of large sums of money (346b6–c1n.). At any rate, it is not that Simonides is standardly mentioned, whenever one needs a third poet to go along with Homer and Hesiod (cf. *Ion* 532a, where the third poet is Archilochus, and *Ap.* 41a, where the third and fourth are Orpheus and Musaeus). **τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμῳδίας:** the activities of such people are scornfully described in *Rep.* 364b–365a: 'they go up to the doors of rich men, and persuade them that they have, through sacrifices and incantations, procured from the gods the power of healing, by revelry and feasts, any injustice the rich man himself or one or his ancestors has committed, and also that, if he wishes to damage any enemy, then their power will, in return for a small consideration, use charms and binding spells to hurt just and unjust people alike. . . . They display a welter of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, by the offspring, so they say, of the Moon and the Muses. They follow these books when they sacrifice, and they persuade, not just private individuals, but also entire cities, that we can be freed and purged from our unjust deeds by sacrifice, jollification and revelry, both in our lifetimes and also after we are dead. All this they call τελετάς, which free us from the evils of the underworld. If, however, we do not make the sacrifices, then dreadful things lie in store for us.' Plato speaks of sacrifice together with jollification, because sacrifice was the only way apart from hunting of getting meat for dinner. He speaks of a welter of books, because books were an essential tool of the trade (Ar. *Birds* 959–991, Isoc. 19.5–6); for some samples of the mumbo-jumbo that such books contained, see DK 1 B 17, 2 B 22. **d7–8 τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον:** the phrase amounts to no more than a vague 'people like Orpheus and Musaeus'; cf. e.g. *Euthd.* 286c, which says that οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν were terribly keen to argue that nobody can contradict anyone. It looks slightly irregular to place the enclitic τε, which coordinates Ὀρφέα with Μουσαῖον, before both those words and immediately after ἀμφί. But the air of irregularity diminishes when we reflect that ἀμφί governs Μουσαῖον also, so that the whole phrase can be understood as the perfectly regular ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ ἀμφὶ Μουσαῖον. Cf. *GP* 518–19, and 317b3–4 ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, 317d8 αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν, 325b6–c1 ᾗ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαί, 336c2 λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι. **d8–e1 Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος:** a celebrated Olympic victor, who is variously described as a wrestler (Ael. 11.3), a pentathlete (Paus. 6.10.5), and a sprinter (scholion on *Laws* 839e). He was notorious for the austerity of his regimen: 'the story goes that, throughout the entire time he was in training, he never touched a woman or even a boy' (*Laws* 840a), and the phrase δεῖπνον Ἴκκου was proverbial for a simple meal (Eust. on Hom. *Il.* 5.801). This reputation for high-achieving austerity, together with the fact that his city, Tarentum in the south of Italy, was, like many others in the region, a centre of Pythagoreanism, made Pythagorean philosophers of late antiquity eager to claim him as one of their predecessors (Iamblichus *De vita Pythagorica* 267.25).

316e1 Ἡρόδικος: supposedly one of the teachers of the great physician Hippocrates of Cos (311b6n., Suda s.v. Ἱπποκράτης). His theory was that disease occurs when the body is not in its natural state, and that the body may be brought to, and kept in, its natural state by subjecting it to appropriate labours and pains (πόνοι, ἄλγη; Anonymus Londinensis 9.20–33). He thus subjected himself and his patients to a regimen full of hardship, as if they were athletes in training (hence γυμναστικήν 316d8, and the description of him in *Rep.* 406a–b as μείξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῆι). When he fell ill, this regimen managed to prolong his life until old age, but in such a miserable fashion that his life was, as *Rep.* 406b put it, no more than a 'protracted death'. Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1361b3–6: 'The good state of a body is health, and health of such a sort that people are free of disease and can use their bodies. For many are healthy in the way that Herodicus is said to have been, and nobody would congratulate them on their health, since they abstain from all or almost all human activities.' **e2 Ἀγαθοκλῆς:** an obscure figure, who is said to have taught music to various people active at various periods in the fifth century: Lamprocles (scholion on *Alc. Ma.* 118c), Pindar (*Pindari Vita Ambrosiana* 1.12) and Damon (*La.* 180d). **ὁ ὑμέτερος:** i.e. the Athenian. Cf. 326e1 παρ' ὑμῖν, 343a3 Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος. **e3 Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος:** a contemporary, and, according to *Alc. Ma.* 118c, an associate, of Pericles (315a1–2n.). A scholion on *Alc. Ma.* 118c adds that he taught Agathocles. Some held that Pythocleides devised the mixolydian mode (Plu. *On Music* 1136d). This mode had a particularly mournful sound, and therefore, according to *Rep.* 398e, was to be abolished, as 'useless even for those women who are supposed to be decent, never mind for men'. Contrast 341e5n. on the austerity of Ceians.

317a2 κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι 'as far as this point is concerned'. The idiomatic insertion of the apparently redundant εἶναι is more readily paralleled than explained: cf. e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.6.9 τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον εἶναι, Lys. 28.14 τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἶναι, and 335b2n. **a5 οἵ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται:** see 352e3–4 and 353a7–8 for other examples of Protagoras' contempt for the masses.

317b3–4 ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους: for the placing of the τε, cf. 316d7–8n. **b5–c1 καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτηι ἔσκεμμαι:** the vagueness of this talk about his other precautions gives the impression that going into detail would compromise their effectiveness. No doubt that impression is itself a precaution. We do not know whether there were more precautions still, or whether this impression is simply bluff.

317c1 σὺν θεῶι εἰπεῖν: this phrase here and at e.g. *Tht.* 151b, *Laws* 858b indicates that the speaker is aware that he might sound over-optimistic. Eur. *Med.* 625 and Ar. *Pl.* 114 use σὺν θεῶι δ' εἰρήσεται for the same purpose. **c2–3 πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῆι τέχνηι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν:** according to *Meno* 91e, Protagoras died when aged almost seventy, having spent

forty years in business as a sophist. **c3–4 οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην:** since Socrates was born in 469 (314b5n.), this suggests that Protagoras was born around 490 at the latest, and was therefore in at least his late fifties by the dramatic date of this dialogue (309a3n.). **c5–6 τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι** 'to present my argument' (as in 333c4), or even perhaps 'to deliver my speech' (as in e.g. *Phdr.* 264b, Thuc. 1.37.1, Hippias DK 86 B 6, quoted in 337c7–d1n.); at all events, the phrase suggests something more one-sided than λέγειν τε καὶ ἀκούειν (362a3n.) or διαλέγεσθαι (314c4n.).

317d1 ἐρασταί: see 310d3n. on πτοίησιν for further descriptions of the desire for wisdom as sexual. **d2 τί οὖν . . . οὐ . . . ἐκαλέσαμεν:** see 310a2n. **d4 πάνυ μὲν οὖν:** see 310a4n. **d5 συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν:** Callias shows some pretension in talking thus about rearranging the furniture. συνέδριον is generally restricted to the grander sorts of 'sitting together': conferences, congresses, councils, courts, their meetings and the buildings where they hold them. Thus in Men. *Dys.* 174–7, building a συνέδριον is a stage beyond building a mere θῶκος for people to sit and chat in; and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 2.13.1, uses the phrase κατεσκευάσατο καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν τῶν γερόντων συνέδριον to describe the foundation of the Roman senate. Plato's joke here was anticipated by, and perhaps borrowed from, Pherecrates fr. 70 *PCG*, which talks scornfully of a shopkeeper 'κατεσκευασμένον [middle voice: the shopkeeper did not do all the work himself] a συνέδριον for youngsters to spend the day chatting in'. **d8 αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν:** cf. 315c2–3n., 316d7–8n. **d9 κατεσκευάζομεν** 'we started constructing' sc. a συνέδριον.

317e1 ἡκέτην ἄγοντε . . . e2 ἀναστήσαντες: once the duals have done their job of emphasising how Alcibiades and Critias were operating as a pair, the relaxation into the plural is thoroughly idiomatic. Cf. 330c5, and Hom. *Il.* 10.228 ἠθελέτην Αἴαντε δύω θεράποντες Ἄρηος, 12.335–6 ἐς δ' ἐνόησ' Αἴαντε δύω πολέμου ἀκο-ρήτω | ἑσταότας.

318a2–3 ἐν ἐπιθυμίαι ὢν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας: Socrates continues to use sexually charged language for the desire to be wise. Cf. 310d3n. on πτοίησιν, and LSJ s.v. ἐπιθυμία 'esp. *sexual desire, lust*' (cf. 340b1–2n.) and s.v. συνουσία 4 'sexual intercourse'. **a5 ὦ νεανίσκε:** a potentially patronising mode of address, otherwise used to youngsters who are getting above themselves (*Laws* 904e, Xen. *An.* 2.1.3, Demades fr. 62).

318b3 εἴ τίς σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος: the indicative τυγχάνεις here implies that Protagoras does in fact happen to be ignorant of something, and that the hypothesis is only that someone should teach him such a thing; the optative τυγχάνοις here would imply instead that the ignorance is as hypothetical as the teaching. Cf. *Smp.* 194a εἰ δὲ γένοιο οὗ νῦν ἐγώ εἰμι ('if you were to be where

I now am') and *Smp.* 194c εἴ τισιν ἐντύχοις οὓς ἡγοῖο σοφούς ('if you were to meet people whom you took to be wise'). **b4 αὐτίκα** here and at 359e3 means, in effect, 'to take the first example that comes to mind'. A word whose basic sense is 'promptly' comes to have such a meaning because Socrates is using it to characterise his own action in offering this example. Compare English: I say 'He'll come, hopefully', and the hopefulness characterises my utterance, not his coming. **b6 Ζευξίππου:** for the enormously high reputation of Zeuxippus, see Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.3 and Isoc. 15.2 (quoted in 311c5n.; both passages, like Plato himself in *Grg.* 453c, give Zeuxippus' name in the alternative form Ζεῦξις).

318c4 'Ορθαγόραι: according to Aristoxenus fr. 96 Wehrli, he taught Epaminondas, the eminent Theban general, how to play the pipe. Otherwise, nothing is known of him.

318d8–e1 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους: Protagoras here expresses agreement with an opinion of sophists that was widely held, at least among the older generation (*Meno* 91c, *Rep.* 492a). Agreeing with such opinions risks alienating the rebellious young, and encouraging them to go to his rival sophists. Protagoras ingeniously avoids these risks by the explanation he is about to give of the harm that other sophists do the young: they subject them to a drearily technical schooling.

318e1 τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας: the presupposition is, of course, that τέχναι are arduous and degrading. The young gentlemen described here do not expect to have to earn their living as τεχνῖται, and so they have 'made their escape from the arts' in that, once they have been schooled by the γραμματιστής, the κιθαριστής and the παιδοτρίβης (312b1–2), they might hope to avoid all τέχναι thereafter. **e2 ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας:** the word ἐμβάλλειν can be used of casting someone into slavery, and into places of detention and execution (*Rep.* 615b εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες, *Grg.* 516d–e εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν, Demos. 53.14 ἐμβάλλειν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, Isae. fr. 9 εἰς τὸ ἀνάκαιον ἐνέβαλε). **e2–3 λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικήν:** these four arts are, almost exactly, the curriculum that *Republic* 525a–531d recommends for those who are to be rulers. The difference is that the *Republic*'s curriculum also includes stereometry (528a–b), a subject that could not be mentioned here without grotesque anachronism. In Isoc. 15.264–5, a relation by marriage of Hippias (DK 86 A 3) gave this explanation of the advantages of an education in geometry and astronomy: 'The nature of other subjects is to benefit us after we acquire knowledge of them; these subjects by contrast, although they would be of no advantage to those who have acquired an exact understanding [ἀπηκριβωμένους; cf. *Grg.* 487c–d, quoted in 315c4n.], unless they have chosen to make their living thereby [ἐντεῦθεν ζῆν προῃρημένους; cf. 312b3–4n.], nevertheless profit those who are studying them. For when people pass their time

on the wordy exactitude of astronomy and geometry, and are forced to attend to things that are hard to learn properly, and in addition are getting accustomed to stick at and work on what is said and shown to them, without letting their minds wander, then, because they have been trained and sharpened up on these subjects, they can with greater speed and ease grasp and understand those things that are of greater dignity and worth.' **e2 λογισμούς:** this term means sums, and not the whole of arithmetic. Thus λογιστική answers only questions like 'What are seven eights? Are they less than sixty?'; it does not answer also questions like 'Does every number have a unique decomposition into primes?' Even so, λογιστική was not part of ordinary Greek schooling (312b1–2n.). **e2 ἀστρονομίαν:** this term ἀστρονομία suggests, not just any study of the stars, but mathematical theories of their courses. Thus in *Grg.* 451c Socrates and Gorgias take it as evident that οἱ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας deal with 'the motion of the stars, the sun and the moon, and their speeds relative to one another'. According to Ar. *Clouds* 171–2, 194–6 (cf. 201, 225) Socrates and his pupils – or at least their backsides – studied ἀστρονομία, and in particular 'the paths and orbits of the moon'. More plausible is Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.4–6, which says that Socrates encouraged people to learn basic ἀστρολογία for practical purposes like navigation and time-reckoning, but discouraged them from pursuing ἀστρονομία to the point of 'knowing about the wandering and moving stars, their distances from the earth, their periods of revolution, and their causes'. **e2 γεωμετρίαν:** the study of γεωμετρία had already developed into an abstract mathematical discipline, far removed from its origins in land-surveying. Ar. *Clouds* 177–9 (cf. 202–4) says that Socrates had geometrical instruments – which he used for stealing clothes from gyms. More plausible is Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.2–3, which says that Socrates encouraged people to master practical land-surveying, but not to go on to 'the proofs that are so hard to grasp [τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων]'; although he did know a bit about them, he could not see their utility. Protagoras remarked on the mismatch between perceptible objects and the abstract theorems of geometry ('It is not just at a point that the circle makes contact with the ruler'), and meant this as an objection to the geometers (DK 80 B 7). Plato agrees on the mismatch, but takes it instead as an objection to perceptible objects: they are only imperfect imitations of the objects described, with perfect accuracy, by the theorems of geometry (e.g. *Phd.* 72e–77a). **e3 μουσικήν:** at a pinch, this term can be taken to mean any kind of intellectual cultivation, including those of Prodicus (340b1) and Socrates (*Phd.* 60e–61a). It most easily means the knowledge of how and what to sing and play that was imparted to schoolboys by their κιθαριστής (326a5–b6). Here, it presumably includes such things as the mathematical treatment of harmonics (cf. *Tht.* 145a, which uses λογιστικός, ἀστρονομικός, γεωμετρικός, and μουσικός to describe Theodorus, the mathematician and friend of Protagoras). **e3 εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν:** Hippias professed expertise in a vast array of τέχναι (*Hp. Mi.* 363c–d (quoted in 315c6n.) and 366c–368d); but, in the more demandingly mathematical τέχναι, there was perhaps less to his expertise than met the

eye. He had indeed what was, by the standards of his day, a remarkable facility at λογιστική, being able to answer, instantly and accurately, such questions as 'What is three times seven hundred?' (*Hp. Mi.* 366e; in Ar. *Wasps* 656–64 and Alexis fr. 15 *PCG* ordinary folk resort to their fingers, or an abacus, for comparably trivial calculations); but there is no sign that Hippias knew anything of the upper reaches of the theory of numbers that were handled by ἀριθμητική. Somewhat similarly, Hippias' only recorded contribution to the study of the stars is the claim (DK 86 B 13) that there are seven stars in the Hyades (a star cluster in the head of Taurus); and this testifies, not to any expertise in the mathematical modelling of the movements of heavenly bodies, but, if anything, to the unsurpassed sharpness of his eyesight (nobody else claimed to distinguish more than seven stars in the cluster; and Thales, for example, distinguished only two: DK 11 B 2). Again, Hippias talked about the history of geometry (DK 86 B 12), but the nearest thing to evidence that he contributed to geometry itself is the fact that there was a geometer called Hippias (Proclus, *Commentary on the First Book of the* Elements *of Euclid* 272.7, 356.11; Knorr (1986) 80–4, 87, explains why this is not our Hippias). And as for μουσική, we are told that Hippias composed poetry in various genres (ἔπη καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ διθυράμβους *Hp. Mi.* 368c–d, ἐλεγεῖα DK 86 B 1); but, apart from the claims that he was an expert περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν, and that he introduced these subjects into his speeches (*Hp. Mi.* 368d, DK 86 A 2.1), we have no evidence of any expertise in the mathematical end of the subject. To persuade his audiences that he was sharing with them a profound technical knowledge, Hippias no doubt used the techniques whereby the Earl of Chesterfield persuaded the House of Lords to accept the calendar reforms of 1751 (Stanhope (1932) vol. IV, 1699): 'I could just as soon have talked Celtic or Sclavonian to them as astronomy, and they would have understood me full as well: so I resolved to do better than speak to the purpose, and to please instead of informing them. I gave them, therefore, only an historical account of calendars, from the Egyptian down to the Gregorian, amusing them now and then with little episodes; but I was particularly attentive to the choice of my words, to the harmony and roundness of my periods, to my elocution, to my action. This succeeded, and ever will succeed; they thought I informed, because I pleased them; and many of them said that I had made the whole very clear to them; when, God knows, I had not even attempted it.' **e4–5 τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία:** this is Protagoras' way of meeting the challenge faced by any sophist: 'What good are you, if there is no particular subject in which you specialise?' (312d9–e1n.). The etymology of the word εὐβουλία ('being good at working out what to do') allows it to be applied quite widely, to planning of every kind. In practice the word is applied more narrowly, to some planning, rather than to all; but even then the application is to the planning that exercises a general supervision over specialist planners. Thus *Rep.* 428b–d says that one would call a city εὔβουλος, not because its carpenters, smiths and farmers know their jobs, but because its rulers are equipped with the skill 'which takes decisions [βουλεύεται], not for some one special part of the city, but for the city itself as a whole'; and Arist.

EN 1142b28–34 distinguishes εὐβουλία proper (ἁπλῶς), which is directed at *the* goal (human well-being, the goal of the statesman: *EN* 1094a18–29), from more special sorts of εὐβουλία, which are directed at more special goals. **e5 περὶ τῶν οἰκείων . . . 319a1 καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως:** a household was the smallest institution that a man could expect to run; a city was the largest. The consensus was that any man fit to run one of these institutions would also be fit to run the other (e.g. Aeschin. 1.153, Isoc. 15.285), and sophists generally undertook to fit their customers to run both (*Rep.* 600c–d, *Meno* 91a–b). In Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.6–12, Socrates presents a version of the consensus, generalised to cover also all institutions of intermediate size ('whatever someone has to supervise, then, so long as he knows what is needed and is able to provide it, he would be a good supervisor, whether he is supervising a chorus or a household or a city or an army . . . for care of private matters differs only in scale from care of public ones, and in other respects they are pretty much the same'), and argues for it at length. The consensus can be invoked in arguments that political power should be widely distributed, on the grounds that it does not take much to run a household; but the consensus can also be invoked in arguments that, since so few are capable of running a city, nobody else is capable of running even a household, but is instead fit only for slavery (e.g. *Alc. Ma.* 135b–c, Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.22–3).

319a1–2 ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν: this was the ambition of Socrates' interlocutor in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1, a young man 'with great hopes of outdoing everybody τῶι δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν'. Excelling in both speech and action was the usual ambition of a Homeric hero (Hom. *Il.* 1.490–1 and 9.443: the sulking Achilles 'kept away from the assembly, where men win glory, and kept away from war', although he had been taught 'to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds'). It remained a perfectly proper ambition in democratic Athens, where competition in virtue was encouraged (325d1–2n.), and where the proposer of a defeated motion 'abides by your vote, whatever it may be, even if he is πρῶτος τῶι δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἐν ὑμῖν' (Demos. 26.8): for it was simply the ambition of being a second Pericles (315a1–2n.), 'the man who was foremost among the Athenians of his day, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος' (Thuc. 1.139.4).

319a3–320c2: SOCRATES HAS DOUBTS

Socrates hesitates to accept that people can be taught to run cities well. Athenian democracy, he points out, presumes that there are no experts in running the city: on the contrary, it lets all and sundry take part. Besides, he adds, the finest statesmen do not manage to get their sons to share in their statesmanship, as they would if it were teachable.

319a4 πολιτικὴν τέχνην: this suggestion that Protagoras himself teaches a τέχνη is a malicious reminder of his attempt at 318e1–4 to distinguish himself from those who inflict τέχναι on their pupils. **ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας** 'to produce

good citizens'; *not* 'to make men good citizens' or the like. Cf. Ar. *Knights* 1304, where ἄνδρα μοχθηρὸν πολίτην has to be a unitary phrase meaning 'a bad citizen'. Socrates and Protagoras here assume that citizenship is citizenship in an extreme democracy like Athens, where any citizen was able to address the Assembly, and was liable to be allotted executive office. For only on such an assumption about citizenship can they equate being a good citizen with being 'thoroughly competent in speech and action about the city's business' (319a1–2). On less democratic assumptions, being a good citizen might mean instead being a good subject, who obeys the laws, rather than a good ruler, who makes them. Either way, good citizenship is not obviously identical with what at least some of Protagoras' customers must have hoped to learn from him: the persuasive techniques that would enable them to advance themselves in politics (cf. 312d6–7, and DK 80 A 21 on how he professed 'to make the weaker argument appear the stronger'). **a5–6 αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν . . . τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι:** nobody but sophists made such a profession, and not even all sophists did: Gorgias laughed at such professions, and thought one should simply teach people how to speak (*Meno* 95b–c). **a7–8 οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἅπερ νοῶ:** the γε helps make Socrates' frankness less offensive. The suggestion is that he has to be frank before Protagoras, even if he might hope to succeed in dissimulating before someone else. The third person passive εἰρήσεται, instead of a first person active, distances Socrates from his remarks; and the description of them as 'what I think', instead of as 'the truth', is a further way to avoid offending Protagoras. Compare and contrast Isoc. 12.225 εἰρήσεται γὰρ τἀληθές, εἰ καί τισιν δόξω λίαν παράδοξα λέγειν.

319b1 οὐκ ᾤμην διδακτὸν εἶναι: cf. Theogn. 428–37, who talks as if virtue is a matter of cognition, but who argues nevertheless that it is not teachable: 'It is easier to get and rear a mortal than put good wits [φρένας ἐσθλάς] into one. No one has ever yet worked out how to make a fool [ἄφρονα] wise [σώφρονα] or a bad man good. If God had granted the Sons of Asclepius [i.e. doctors, as in 311b6] the power to heal men's badness and thoughtless wits, then they would be earning lots of large fees. But if intelligence [νόημα] could be created and put in a man, no good father's son would ever turn out bad, by obeying wise advice. You'll never make a bad man good by teaching [διδάσκων].' Theognis' first argument, that doctors don't earn fees for teaching virtue, was superseded once sophists came to earn such fees. His second, that good men have bad sons, is the same as the argument presented by Socrates in 319e1–320b4 and rebutted by Protagoras in 326e5–327c4. *Dissoi Logoi* DK 90.6 presents these two arguments, together with three weaker ones, all to show that virtue and wisdom are not teachable, and then rebuts the lot. **b2–3 αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις:** the switch from οὐ to μηδέ marks a contrast between 'cannot be taught' and 'may not be provided'. For verbal adjectives with -τός, rather like optatives, express both notions like feasibility or

attainability, and notions like desirability or permissibility; and Greek tends to negate the former with οὐ and the latter with μή. Cf. 310b4–5n., 345b5–6n., *Rep.* 407c–d φῶμεν . . . Ἀσκληπιόν . . . οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν . . . μὴ οἴεσθαι δεῖν ('let us say that . . . Asclepius . . . does not try . . . , and does not think he should') and Soph. *Ant.* 686 οὔτ' ἂν δυναίμην μήτ' ἐπισταίμην ('I could not, and I hope I never learn to'). Socrates here makes little of the distinction between teaching people to be good citizens (which requires good citizenship to be a matter of knowledge), and more generally getting people to be good citizens (which requires only that good citizenship is not beyond human control). In this, he will be followed by Protagoras: see 323e2–324a1n. By 360e6–361c6, they will have learnt the need for precision on such matters. **b3–4 ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι:** cf. the words of a native of Elis in 337d5, and of a native of Halicarnassus in Hdt. 1.60.3 'the Athenians, who are said to be, in point of wisdom, first among the Greeks'.

319c3 τῶν γενναίων 'among the well-born'. For the idea that the well-born are something of an organised class within the city, cf. *Laws* 841d, Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.2, Arist. *Pol.* 1296b22; and for use of the genitive plural to indicate membership of an organised class, see 316b7n. **c5–6 οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσιν ἢ ἐξάρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυτάνεων:** the 'archers' were a body of slaves in public ownership, used to maintain public order. Keeping slaves to manhandle citizens, like having citizens drink hemlock when sentenced to death (e.g. *Phd.* 116b–118a), saved citizens from laying violent hands on one another. Before he came of age, Plato's brother Glaucon often tried to address the Assembly, only to be laughed down, and dragged away by the archers (Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.1). Such incidents were, for obvious reasons, great favourites in comedy: Aristophanes has them acted out in *Ach.* 54–8, *Lys.* 455, and narrated in *Knights* 664–6 and *Ec.* 143.

319d2–4 συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος κτλ: the Athenians liked to boast or grumble of their equal freedom of speech (ἰσηγορία, παρρησία). They would trace it back to legendary times (Eur. *Hipp.* 421–3, *Ion* 671–2), and claim it extended even to foreigners and slaves (Demos. 9.3, Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.12; cf. *Grg.* 461d, where a visitor from Acragas asks, 'What? Won't I be free to speak as much as I like?' and is answered, 'It would be dreadful, my dear chap, if, now that you have come to Athens, where there is greater freedom of speech than anywhere else in Greece, you were to be the only one to miss out on it.') A native of Halicarnassus takes the Athenians' freedom of speech to explain how 'they came to be top by a very large margin' (Hdt. 5.78). **d4 τούτοις:** English idiom demands a translation like 'any of these' to fit this plural with the subsequent singulars μαθών, αὐτῶι and ἐπιχειρεῖ. On such switches from plural to singular, see 324a6–b1n. **d5–6 οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῶι, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ:** cf. Socrates' sarcastic remarks in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.3–4 about a young

man who means to start a career in politics before studying the subject properly: 'He will evidently start his speech with this exordium: "I have never, men of Athens, learnt anything from anyone [παρ' οὐδενὸς . . . πώποτε . . . οὐδὲν ἔμαθον], nor, when hearing of people competent at speech and action [319a1–2n.] have I ever sought to meet them, nor have I ever bothered to get any of the experts to be my teacher [οὐδ' ἐπεμελήθην (cf. e.g. 323c6 διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας, 324a3 ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως, 325c3–4 οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν) τοῦ διδάσκαλόν τινά μοι γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπισταμένων]. Quite the opposite: I have spent my time in the avoidance, not just of learning anything from anyone, but even of giving the impression that I've learnt anything. Nevertheless, I will contribute to your deliberations [συμβουλεύσω] whatever comes to me spontaneously [ὅτι ἂν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἐπίῃ μοι; cf. 323c5 ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου]."'

319e1 μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι is tantamount to 'quite apart from the fact that'. Cf. *Cra.* 427e ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον ('any thing at all, not just one this big'), Isae. 10.1 μὴ ὅτι ὑπὲρ ἄλλου, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ('not even on my own behalf, never mind anybody else's'), Xen. *Smp.* 2.26 οὐδὲ ἀναπνεῖν, μὴ ὅτι λέγειν τι δυνησόμεθα ('we won't be able so much as to breathe, let alone speak'); cf. also 351c4–5n. **τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως** 'the public arrangements of the city', as in *Cri.* 50a (with reference to the city's legal system), Isoc. 8.96 (its foreign policy), Isae. 7.30 (its procedures for adoption and inheritance). **e2–3 οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι:** Socrates elaborates on this observation elsewhere, again using as a prime example the fact that Pericles never taught anyone to be virtuous, but hinting (*Meno* 93a–94e, *Alc. Ma.* 118c–119a), or even affirming explicitly (*Grg.* 515c–516e), that Pericles' failure to teach virtue to others was the result, not of virtue's being unteachable, but of his not being virtuous himself. Cf. *La.* 179a–d, where Lysimachus makes similar observations but with other examples. **e4–320a1 ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν** 'gave a fine education in whatever could be taught'. Plato noticeably relished such phrases, to speak in a catch-all way about cognition. Cf. e.g. 324d3–4 διδάσκουσιν ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται ('they teach whatever can be taught'), *Alc. Ma.* 120b μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται ('to learn whatever can be learnt'), *Meno* 94b ἐπαίδευσεν ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται ('educated in every skill'), *Laws* 661b πάντα ὅσα ἔχεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν ('well able to perceive all that is perceptible'), *Tht.* 145a ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται ('good at astronomy, arithmetic, music – every branch of culture'), *Phlb.* 16c ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε ('whatever has been discovered at any time in connection with a skill').

320a2 οὔτε τῳ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν: i.e. does not hand his sons over to any other person for that other person to educate them in the matters in which Pericles himself is expert. See 357e5n. for οὔτε clauses that demand even more

substantial supplementation from context. **a2–3 αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι:** the comparison is with animals that were owned by temples, and allowed to graze free, unlike ordinary livestock. The comparison would not have been felt insulting: Isoc. 5.127 applies it to Philip of Macedon, in a passage meant to flatter. Arist. *Rh.* 1411b23–30 cites the comparison as a model of vividness, and contrasts it with Simonides' description of the good man as 'four-square' (339b3). **a3 ἐάν που** 'just in case'. Variants on the idiom are ἐάν πως (e.g. *Alc. Ma.* 122d) and ἤν που (e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 535). Such conditionals come close to being final clauses, but they always have the implication that the end envisaged is too much a matter of luck to be the object of a genuine intention, and that implication is emphasised here by the words αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν. **a4 Κλεινίαν:** in *Alc. Ma.* 118e, while attempting to explain, in a manner creditable to Pericles, his failure to educate Cleinias, Alcibiades dismisses Cleinias as a madman. **a5–6 μὴ διαφθαρῆι δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου:** Plato here (as at *Alc. Ma.* 132a) attempts to turn the tables on those who prosecuted Socrates. One of their charges was 'he corrupts [διαφθείρει] the young men' (*Ap.* 26b, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.1), and Alcibiades was cited as a prime example of the young men whom Socrates had corrupted (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12). **a6 Ἀρίφρονος:** Ariphron was Pericles' brother, and, like his brother, a guardian of Alcibiades and Cleinias (Plu. *Alc.* 1.2).

320b1 ἐπαίδευε 'tried to educate'. With this imperfect tense, contrast the aorist ἐπαίδευσεν at 320a1 for successfully educating. **ἀπέδωκε τούτωι:** i.e. Pericles returned him to Alcibiades. **b5–6 ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι:** Socrates is not entirely neutral when he says that Protagoras' words make him bend. For while 'bending' may be an obvious metaphor for any change of mind, 'straightening' is an even more obvious metaphor for those changes of mind that are improvements. Cf. Protagoras' own talk of bending and staightening in 325d6 and 326e1–2.

320c1 ἐπιδεῖξαι . . . c2 ἐπίδειξον: this verb is a general word for 'show' (cf. ἐπίδειξον 352a4). Here, however, and at 328d3 and 347b2, we cannot forget that it and its cognates are used specifically for a kind of rhetoric in which sophists specialised, 'display oratory', a sort of rhetoric for its own sake, in which the speaker simply shows off his own virtuosity, and is not attempting to persuade any lawcourt or assembly to reach any decision. For the classic statement of where epideictic fits into the taxonomy of kinds of rhetoric, see Arist. *Rh.* 1358a36–b29.

320c3–322d6: PROTAGORAS TELLS A STORY

Protagoras, in a speech which may owe something to his book On how things were originally arranged (DK 80 A 1.55), *presents his theory of political expertise in a fable of human origins. Human beings were, from the first, distinguished from the other animals by their intelligence.*

Their intelligence enabled many marvellous achievements, but it did not enable them to live together harmoniously in cities. Harmonious life in cities came along only when human beings acquired a new skill, justice. And in this skill, though not in others, all must share if cities are to continue.

320c4 μῦθον . . . λόγωι: the contrast, at its crudest, is that μῦθοι are false whereas λόγοι are true. Thus e.g. *Tim.* 26e contrasts 'a made-up μῦθος' with 'a truthful λόγος', and Pind. *O.* 1.28–9 contrasts 'the true λόγος' with 'μῦθοι embroidered with fancy falsehoods'. And even when the contrast is at its least sharp, it is never to the advantage of μῦθοι. Thus contrasts within λόγοι are drawn by *Rep.* 522a between the μυθώδεις and the ἀληθινώτεροι, and by Isoc. 2.48 between the ὠφελιμώτατοι and the μυθωδέστατοι. (Such contrasts are a development of the fifth century: earlier authors, like Xenophanes DK 21 B 1.14, use μῦθοι and λόγοι indifferently for speech of all kinds.) Even if μῦθοι may be contrasted with strictly truthful speech, Plato still has some justifications for using them. *Tim.* 29c–d suggests that we should accept 'the likely μῦθος' on subjects like the gods and the origins of the universe, since it is not in human nature to be able to give fully exact and consistent λόγοι about such subjects. *Laws* 903b suggests that when we are dealing with someone who denies God's providential control of the world, then in addition to compelling (βιάζεσθαι) him by λόγοι to say that he was wrong, we may also need to charm him into wholehearted agreement by μῦθοι of a sort (ἐπωιδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι τινῶν; cf. *Phd.* 77e–78a on how 'the child in us' still needs charms to soothe his fear of death, even after we have had rational proof that death is nothing to fear). But neither the *Timaeus* nor the *Laws* gives any justification for using a μῦθος as Protagoras does here, as the sole medium for presenting an idea that could also be presented in a λόγος. The advantage to Protagoras of speaking in what he himself calls a μῦθος is that he can thus avoid committing himself on some sensitive issues: see 320d1n. on θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, 322a4n., 322b5–c1n.

320d1 ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε 'once upon a time'. This phrase and its variants are used to introduce remarks about a more or less distant past that is now definitively over (at one extreme is *Alc. Ma.* 106e: ἦν χρόνος ὅτε Alcibiades was not cocksure; at the other is Linus in D.L. 1.4: ἦν ποτέ τοι χρόνος οὗτος, ἐν ὧι the world was made). In particular, variants of this phrase are used to introduce other tales of the origins of human society: ἦν χρόνος ὅτε (Crt. DK 88 B 25.1), ἦν γάρ ποτ' αἰὼν κεῖνος, ἦν ποθ' ἡνίκα (Moschion fr. 6.3 *TrGF*) and ἦν χρόνος ἡνίκα (Orpheus in Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* 9.15). **θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν:** it is, no doubt deliberately, unclear whether this talk of the gods is meant as literal truth, or is simply a fictional adornment to a theory whose atheist character would (like that of the theories of Prodicus DK 84 B 5 and Crt. DK 88 B 25) be plain if it were spelled out in a λόγος. There is no such talk of gods in the second part of Protagoras' speech, after his announcement at 324d5–6 that he

will no longer be giving a μῦθος; for the policy described at 328b5–c2 requires, not that there are gods, but only that people are not prepared to risk acting as if there are no gods. And there was a firm agnosticism at the start of Protagoras' book *On gods:* 'As for gods, I cannot know [οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι], either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what they are like to look at. For many are the things that prevent one knowing: these matters are unclear, and human life is short' (DK 80 B 4). It is of course possible to affirm that one fully believes a theology which one says cannot be known. But this possibility depends on a distinction between knowledge and belief that is not readily available to one who also affirms, like Protagoras, that 'Man is the measure of all things' (cf. 356d3–4n.). At any rate, in *Tht.* 162e, Protagoras is made to say that he excludes the gods 'from all spoken or written discussion of their existence or non-existence'; and there are persistent reports that, in consequence of the *On gods*, Protagoras' books were burnt and that he himself was expelled from Athens (DK 80 A 1–4, 12, 23). **d2** καὶ τούτοις: i.e. 'for mortal species too, in addition to the gods'. The implication of the καί in context is that gods are as much creatures of fate as mortals are, differing only in that they were created earlier. **d3** γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρός . . . πυρὶ καὶ γῆι: those predecessors of Plato who wrote 'about nature' (315c5n.) much enjoyed adorning their writings with such chiastic patterns: cf. e.g. Her. DK 22 B 90 πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός, Melissus DK 30 B 8.3 δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τό τε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλθακὸν καὶ τὸ μαλθακὸν σκληρόν, and Anax. DK 59 B 10 πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θρὶξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός; γῆς ἔνδον: having a first generation of animals originate within the earth is a favourite device of Greek zoogonies, whether popular (Demos. 60.4), philosophical (Emp. DK 31 B 62.4), or frankly fictive (*Rep.* 414d). **d3–4** ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆι κεράννυται: those who theorised 'about nature' (315c5n.) would select some stuff or stuffs like earth, air, fire or water and say that their selection made up the human race, and even the entire universe. Hipp. *On the nature of man* 1 complains, with some justice, of how arbitrary such selections were. But these hints at a physical theory may be meant no more literally than Protagoras' theology (320d1n. on θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν); for they too are confined to a μῦθος (320c4n.), devised by a man who professes to teach only useful knowledge (318d6–319a6). **d3–4** μείξαντες . . . κεράννυται: earth and fire are paradigmatically dry stuffs (e.g. Arist. *De generatione et corruptione* 330a30–b7), and κρᾶσις is distinguished from other species of the genus μεῖξις in that the μεῖξις of dry stuffs is not κρᾶσις (e.g. Arist. *Topics* 122b30–1). The 'things that are blended with earth and fire' are therefore presumably the damp stuffs that other cosmogonies would name as air and water. **d4–5** Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ: Prometheus and Epimetheus were both sons of the titan Iapetus; their misadventures are described in Hes. *Th.* 507–616. **d5** κοσμῆσαι: this metaphor makes the improbable suggestion that the natural characteristics of an animal are as readily separable from it as the

clothes, jewellery and accessories with which human beings adorn themselves. The improbable suggestion is no doubt deliberate: it is in keeping with the story that animals were first created and only subsequently endowed with their natural characteristics (320d1–4), and it is iterated in later turns of phrase (cf. 320e1 τάχει ἐκόσμει, 321c2 ἀκόσμητον, 320d7–e1n., 320e3n.). Such suggestions are a way of recording, in the language of μῦθος (320c4n.), the metaphysical distinction between substances and their attributes; cf. 360e7–361a1n. νεῖμαι is the first of a sequence of seven occurrences of forms of νέμω, ending with ἔνεμεν at 321a2. Such repetitions were a device characteristic of those who wrote 'about nature' (315c5n.) in the generations before Plato: thus the single paragraph of Anax. DK 59 B 12 contains five occurrences of forms of μείγνυμι and cognates, seven of νοῦς, seven of κρίνω, eight of περιχωρῶ, and thirteen of πᾶς. The repetitions give the paragraph cohesion, and a certain naive grandeur. Cf. *Phdr.* 245c–246a, another imitation of earlier writing about nature, containing six occurrences of forms of ἑαυτόν, eight of ἀρχή, and fourteen of κινῶ. Cf. also the nine words in 326d2–5 whose root is γραφ. **d7 τοῖς μέν . . . e1 τοὺς δέ . . . τοὺς δέ . . . e2 τοῖς δέ:** except in the hands of a virtuoso, a list (316d6–e4n.) is apt to be monotonously structureless. Protagoras gives structure and variety to his list of animal attributes by starting with this neatly arranged sublist of four steps taken to provide animals with protection from other animals (cf. 321b3–4n.). This sublist itself is structured, not only by the chiastic arrangement of τοῖς and τούς, but also by the subdivision into two antithetical pairs. And the antithetical pairs themselves display variety, by their scrupulous avoidance of all syntactical correspondence: the correspondence in 320d7–e1 ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους and ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει is, like that in 320e2 between ὥπλιζε and ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν, entirely a matter of semantics. **d7 ἰσχύν . . . e1 προσῆπτεν:** poets often used abstract nouns as objects of the verb προσάπτειν. But their talk of 'attaching' reputation to people (Hom. *Il.* 24.110 κῦδος, Soph. *Electra* 356 τιμάς, Pind. *N.* 8.37 κλέος) is only a partial preparation for talk of attaching strength to animals that are naturally strong. Cf. 321b5 προσῆψε, 320d5n. on κοσμῆσαι.

320e1 τάχει ἐκόσμει: cf. 320d5n. on κοσμῆσαι. **e3 σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν** 'clothed in smallness'. The metaphor adds a further improbability to what is in any case the improbable suggestion that natural characteristics are separable from the animals whose characteristics they are (320d5n. on κοσμῆσαι). For a thing in its clothing bulks bigger than the same thing naked. Cf. 321a4–5 ἀμφιεννύς.

321a1 ἔνεμεν . . . a2 ἔνεμεν: the sequence (320d5n. on νεῖμαι) of seven occurrences of forms of νέμω is brought to a satisfying close by the device of having its last two items identical, just as its first two were (320d5 νεῖμαι . . . d6 νεῖμαι). Cf. 321b3–4n. for another use of such a device. **a4–5 ἀμφιεννύς:** cf. 320e3n.

321b1–2 ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν ὁπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ θριξὶν καὶ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις 'shoeing some with hooves, others with fur and thick and bloodless skin'. The 'others' would be animals like dogs, with tough hairless skin on the bottom of their feet, and fur on the top. This makes tolerable sense; even so, it is easy to suspect that textual corruption accounts for the similarity of our phrase to 321a5 πυκναῖς τε θριξὶν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν. (If, instead of the conjecture ὑποδῶν, we keep the manuscripts' ὑπὸ ποδῶν, we would have to translate as 'wrapping them (ἀμφιεννύς 321a4–5) under their feet, some with hooves, others with fur and thick and bloodless skin'. Protagoras would then be singling out the δασύπους ('shaggyfoot', or hare), which, according to Arist. *De generatione animalium* 774a31–6, is the only animal to have fur under its feet.) **b3 τοῖς μέν . . . ἄλλοις δέ . . . b4 τοῖς δέ . . . ἔστι δ' οἷς:** Protagoras displays his virtuosity by devising four different phrases in the dative plural. The items that these phrases introduce (various steps taken to provide animals with diets) are the last four items in the list of animal attributes that began at 320d7, and themselves constitute a sublist, whose structure repeats with variations that of the initial sublist at 320d7–321a1: four items (cf. 320d7–e2), the last of which is subdivided into two antithetical sub-items (320e3–321a1 ἃ μέν . . . σμικρότητι . . . ἃ δέ . . . μεγέθει, 321b5-6 τοῖς μέν ὀλιγογονίαν . . . τοῖς δέ . . . πολυγονίαν). This parallelism of structure brings the whole list to a satisfying close (cf. 321a1–2n.). **b5 ὀλιγογονίαν . . . b6 πολυγονίαν:** Protagoras' observation about the relative fertility of predators and prey occurs also in Hdt. 3.108.2, where it is explained by the plans, not of titans, but of gods: 'Divine providence, with the wisdom that one might expect, has somehow arranged for all animals that are cowardly of soul and edible to be πολύγονα, so that they should not be eaten to extinction, and for all animals that are fierce and savage to be ὀλιγόγονα.' For a modern ecologist's perspective see Colinvaux (1978) 18–31. **b5 προσῆψε:** cf. 320d7–e1n.

321c1 οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεύς: he was living up – or down – to his name 'Afterthought', by contrast with his brother Προμηθεύς or 'Forethought'. The contrasting etymologies go back to Hes. *Th.* 510–12, *WD* 85–9. **ἔλαθεν αὐτόν:** i.e. he disobeyed the much praised inscription on the temple of Apollo at Delphi: γνῶθι σαυτόν (343b2). **c2 ἀκόσμητον:** cf. 320d5n. on κοσμῆσαι. **c3 ἠπόρει . . . ἀποροῦντι . . . c7 ἀπορίαι:** there was evidently some liking for stories that display grand beings as puzzled: titans here, Heracles in Prodicus' *Choice of Heracles* DK 84 B 2, Zeus and the other gods in *Smp.* 190c, the judges of the dead in *Grg.* 524a, Palamedes in Grg. DK 82 B 11a.4. **c5–6 ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον:** Arist. *PA* 687a23–b5 alludes to this passage, and objects that human 'nakedness' is neither as complete nor as disadvantageous as Protagoras supposed: 'the other animals have only one resource, and cannot change this for another, but must always, as it were, sleep and do everything with their shoes on, and never take off what covers their body,

or change the weapon that they have. Man, by contrast, can have many resources, and can always change them; and as for weapons, he can have whatever he likes wherever he likes. This is because his hand amounts to a talon and a hoof and a horn, and to a spear and a sword and any other weapon or tool you care to name; for his hand will be all these things in virtue of being able to grasp and hold them all.' Aristotle and Protagoras are not entirely at odds here. For Aristotle insists that man is the only animal to have so versatile an organ as the hand because man is the only animal with the intelligence to make proper use of such an organ (*PA* 687a8–23), and Protagoras insists that it is only our intelligence which enables us to survive without the houses, clothes, shoes and bedding that other animals have as parts of their bodies (compare 321a4–b2 with 321e1–322a7). Yet there is some disagreement nevertheless. For Protagoras speaks as if our intelligence compensates for a total lack of useful organs (321c1–2), while Aristotle insists that intelligent animals need, and therefore have, quite distinctively useful organs in their hands.

321d1 Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς: Hephaestus and Athena are the traditional deities of the crafts, and hence of civilisation (thus Hom. *Od.* 6.232–4 = 23.159–61 speaks of 'someone gilding silver, a skilled man whom Hephaestus and Athena have instructed in craft of every kind, and who makes delightful works', and the Homeric *Hymn to Hephaestus* 1-4 asks the Muse to sing of Hephaestus, 'who with grey-eyed Athena taught glittering works to human beings upon the earth, who hitherto had dwelt in caves, in the mountains, like wild beasts'). Prometheus, Hephaestus and Athena were worshipped together in the Academy, and this joint cult was presumably already in existence when Plato established his school there (in the second century BC, Apollodorus *FGH* 244 fr. 147 thought of the cult as 'ancient'). Cf. *Smp.* 189c, another story of human origins, referring to the cult of Love, another deity worshipped in the Academy (Paus. 1.30.1). **d2–3 ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί – ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητήν τῳ ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι:** cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.3.7, where Socrates is listing ways in which the gods have shown their love of humanity: 'What of the fact that they gave us fire, to help us against the cold, to help us against the dark, and to collaborate in every craft and in every effort that human beings make for their advantage? To put it briefly, none of the efforts that human beings make to improve their lives would deserve note were it not for fire.' In a very obvious way, fire goes along with intelligence: all human cultures use it; no animal does. For this or some other reason, those who theorised about nature liked to hypothesise that fire is the active and intelligent ingredient in things (e.g. Her. DK 22 B 30 and 64, Parmenides DK 28 A 35, Democ. DK 68 A 101); and it is easy to imagine that what Protagoras' μῦθος describes as the gift of fire might be redescribed by a λόγος saying that human beings contain a lot of fire and are therefore intelligent and therefore able to devise and master all manner of skills. Cf. Aesch. *Pr.* 110–11, where Prometheus describes his gift of fire as 'teaching mortals every craft [διδάσκαλος τέχνης |

πάσης βροτοῖς]', and 254, where he says that from fire 'they will learn many crafts [πολλὰς ἐκμαθήσονται τέχνας]'; and *Plt.* 274c–d, which speaks of how 'we were given gifts from the gods, along with the instruction and education that they entail [μετ' ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς καὶ παιδεύσεως]: fire from Prometheus, the crafts from Hephaestus and his fellow worker in craft [τῆς συντέχνου, i.e. Athena], and seeds and plants from others'. **d4 ἔσχεν . . . d5 εἶχεν:** the aorist form ἔσχεν speaks of a particular incident ('man *at that time* acquired wisdom enough to stay alive'), the imperfect form εἶχεν speaks of an enduring state ('man *throughout the period to which that time belongs* did not have in his possession the skill needed for political life'). Cf. *Rep.* 580d: 'The third part, because of its heterogeneity, we were not able, *on the occasion when we discussed it* [οὐκ ἔσχομεν], to call by a single proper name of its own, but we named it after the largest and strongest thing that it contained *as an enduring element* [εἶχεν].' **d5–6 τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν** 'the acropolis – the place where Zeus lives'. Zeus occupies the acropolis of the gods, just as Athena occupies the acropolis of Athens. Cf. Ovid *Metamorphoses* 1.175–6 on the palace of Zeus: 'hic locus est, quem, si uerbis audacia detur, | haud timeam magni dixisse Palatia caeli' (Englished by George Sandys as 'This glorious Roofe I would not doubt to call, | Had I but boldnesse lent mee, Heauen's *White-Hall*'). Even though Protagoras does not nudge us by drawing attention to how bold he is, he too presumably intends the same joke. **d6 οὐκέτι:** by using this word, Protagoras contrasts the state of his present subject, not with its own previous state, but with the state of his previous subject. The idea is: Prometheus had access to the treasures of Hephaestus and Athena, but his access did not extend to the treasures of Zeus. The idea is not: Prometheus previously had access to the treasures of Zeus, but his access was later withdrawn. Cf. *Grg.* 515e, in response to an accusation of repeating hearsay, 'But my next point is οὐκέτι hearsay. On the contrary, we both know clearly that . . .'; *Laws* 757b, after a statement that other kinds of equality can be easily achieved, 'but the truest and best sort of equality is οὐκέτι easy for everyone to see'; *Meno* 73a, after agreeing that health and size and strength for a woman are the same as health and size and strength for a man, and then being asked whether virtue for a woman is the same as virtue for a man, 'but this is οὐκέτι like those others'; *Cra.* 422a–b, contrasting compounds that are divisible into elements, with elements that are οὐκέτι divisible into elements of their own. **αἱ Διὸς φυλακαί:** Force (Κράτος) and Violence (Βία), 'who have no home apart from Zeus, nor any seat, nor any path where God does not lead them, but always are seated beside Zeus the heavy thunderer' (Hes. *Th.* 385–8), and who, at the start of Aesch. *Pr.*, chain Prometheus to a mountain in punishment for his theft of fire. **d7–e1 εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧι ἐφιλοτεχνείτην κτλ:** after the remarks about how Prometheus could not give us the art of living in cities, Protagoras reverts to the story of what Prometheus did manage to give us. On such reversions, see 344c7–d1n. and 346d4n. With this description of Athena and Hephaestus, cf. *Critias* 109c, which describes them as 'having a κοινὴν nature, . . .

since, because of their φιλοσοφία and φιλοτεχνία, they pursued the same goals'.

322a1–2 Προμηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπιμηθέα ὕστερον, ᾗπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν: Prometheus' punishment is described in Hes. *Th.* 521–5. **a3–4 διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν:** cf. Hes. *WD* 108 'both gods and mortal men have the same origin [ὁμόθεν γεγάασι]'; Pind. *N.* 6.1–3 'one is the race, one both of men and of gods; and from one mother [i.e. the Earth] do we both draw breath [ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι]'; Ant. DK 87 B 48 'man, whose claim is that he is, of all animals, the one shaped most like a god [πάντων θηρίων θεειδέστατον]'. **a4 ζώιων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν:** contrast Psalm 104:21 'The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God.' The fact that man is the only animal to accept the anthropomorphic gods of Greek religion is mentioned with pride in *Mnx.* 237d–e, and explained by Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.13 as due to human intellectual superiority over the other animals. This fact was sometimes given a more subversive explanation: human beings make gods in their own image (Xenophanes DK 21 B 15 and 16 'If cattle and horses and lions had hands, and were able to draw and make statues as men do, then horses would draw the shapes of gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and each species would make the bodies of gods similar to the form that they themselves had.' 'Ethiopians say that their gods are black with snub noses; Thracians, that they have grey eyes and red hair.'). By using a μῦθος (320c4n.) to present his explanation of anthropomorphism, Protagoras can safely hint that perhaps a λόγος would give the more subversive explanation instead (cf. 320c4n.).

322b1 ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν: in themselves, these words allow that early human beings lived socially, in societies smaller than πόλεις (cf. Isoc. 10.35 on gathering scattered villages to make the city of Athens: τὴν πόλιν σποράδην καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκοῦσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών). Nevertheless, Protagoras must be envisaging an altogether presocial phase of human development, if he is to be consistent with the later talk of a gift that simultaneously enables both political life in particular and φιλία in general (322c4), and with the earlier talk of a single social skill, needed both for political and for domestic affairs (318e5–319a2: if that is a single skill, then if people ever lacked the ability to live in cities, they would have thereby lacked the ability to live even in families). The historical implausibility of an altogether presocial phase is no difficulty for what claims to be only a μῦθος (320c4n.). It is, however, a difficulty that Protagoras seems to have no clear sense of social bonds without a πόλις, such as the family bonds of the apolitical Cyclopes in Hom. *Od.* 9.112–15: 'They have no assemblies that take counsel, no laws; they dwell in the peaks of lofty mountains, in hollow caves, and they each give laws to their children and wives, and they do not care for one another.' For the bonds that unite husbands with wives, and parents with children, seem to have a different basis from the bonds that unite men who may have

nothing more in common than that they are fellow citizens. Cf. Hobbes (1651) 63 on 'the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in': without a social contract to institute a sovereign, there would be a 'warre of every man against every man', although even in that condition men might bond with their wives and children in 'small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust'. Contrast 324d6–325b1, where Protagoras says that the virtue needed for political life is the virtue of a man, and then that it is needed by everyone, man, woman, or child. **b1–2 ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῆι αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι:** cf. *Plt.* 274b–c, which relates how, after the end of the golden age, 'and after the majority of beasts whose physiques made them hard to handle had gone wild, human beings, thrown back on their own resources, were weak and unable to protect themselves, and so were ravaged by them [αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονότες διηρπάζοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν]'. In the *Politicus*, however, as in Isoc. 3.5–9 and Moschion fr. 6 *TrGF*, this inability to defend ourselves against wild beasts was simultaneous with an inability to find food for ourselves, and both inabilities were simultaneously overcome by the gifts of fire, the crafts, and agriculture (274c–d). But that is because these other stories of human origins are not trying to distinguish the political craft from other applications of human reason. **b4–5 πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὔπω εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική:** the art of war is presumably the ability to cooperate against a common enemy, taking a fair share of danger, and not leaving one another in the lurch. Protagoras says nothing about the relation of this art to the virtue of courage (cf. 330a1–2n.). Clearly, cowards will lack this art of war. Even so, this art of war is not courage – or at least, it is not courage if Protagoras is right to say that people can be courageous even if they are unjust (329e6 and 349d4–8), and therefore lack the art of politics, of which the art of war forms part. And certainly, whether or not a readiness to face danger in pursuit of your own interests amounts to courage, you might combine such a readiness with a readiness to abandon your comrades; and if so, you will not be any good in a war. **b5 ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώιζεσθαι . . . c1 πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο:** why should people whose common desire is to unite for their own preservation, and whose technological prowess enables them to satisfy all their other desires, nevertheless be disunited to the point of destruction? Protagoras' answer to this question is obscured by its presentation in a μῦθος (320c4n.), but is presumably the same as the unsettling answer that many other sophists presented in λόγοι along the lines formulated by Glaucon in *Rep.* 358e–359a: 'Inflicting injustice is by nature a good thing, and suffering injustice a bad one. But the bad of suffering injustice is greater than the good of inflicting it. In consequence, as soon as people have inflicted injustice on one another and suffered it, and had a taste of the pair together, then, in their inability to get the one while avoiding the other, they decide that it is to their advantage to make a contract with one another that they are neither to inflict injustice nor suffer it. Thus it is that people started to make laws and contracts among themselves, and to call what is required by the

law lawful and just.' Glaucon presents this theory as a 'restatement' of the views of the sophist Thrasymachus, and 'countless others' (*Rep.* 358b–c); the countless others would include Ant. DK 87 B 44, Lycophron DK 83.3, Anon. Iamb. DK 89.6 and Crt. DK 88 B 25 (Axelrod (1990) is a beautiful account of some similar theories from recent times). According to such a theory, no mere technological achievement, consisting solely in the discovery of effective means to an agreed end, could solve the problem that we solve by the contract requiring us to be just. For the problem arises because we are not wholly in agreement on our ends. For other respects in which such a theory seems to underlie Protagoras' μῦθος, cf. 322d3–4n., 323a2–3n., 323b5–c1n., 325d3–5n., 326c6–7n., 327b2–4n.

322c1–2 Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας περὶ τῶι γένει ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν: Zeus was traditionally concerned for justice among human beings (Hom. *Il.* 16.384–92), the only species to whom he had given this splendid gift (Hes. *WD* 276–80). His concern was traditionally expressed in the language of personification and genealogy by saying that Justice is his daughter (e.g. Hes. *WD* 256, Aesch. *Seven against Thebes* 662, Eur. fr. 151 *TrGF*). **c2 Ἑρμῆν:** Hermes was a thief and a liar: the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* describes the first episodes of his career in crime, which at 156 lead even his own mother to speak of his ἀναιδείην. Protagoras no doubt wants us to relish the incongruity of having Hermes – rather than Iris, the other and far more honest messenger of the gods – convey the present message of justice. He may also want us prepared for his claim at 327c4–e1 that notorious criminals have a larger share in justice than we might realise. **c3 αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην:** tradition had confidently associated these two (e.g. Hes. *WD* 192–3, Tyrtaeus fr. 12.40 *IEG*, Theogn. 291–2, *Laws* 943e). It was, however, becoming the custom to associate – sometimes even to equate – αἰδώς with σωφροσύνη (*Chrm.* 160e, Thuc. 1.84.3, Isoc. 7.48, Xen. *Smp.* 1.8, Arist. *EE* 1234a27–33). Such vagaries present a crack where Socrates can insert the wedge of his question about the unity of virtues (329c1–d2). **c5 ἐρωτᾶι . . . τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη . . . · c6 "πότερον . . . νείμω;"** '. . . asks . . . how he is to give . . . : "Should I assign . . ?"' Such switches from indirect to direct speech are discussed by Long. 27.1–2, who sees the figure as a sort of outburst, particularly apt for representing urgency.

322d3–4 πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν: even if justice must be shared by more than simply a few, the immediate consequence is at most that it must be shared by many. Why then does Zeus say that justice must be shared by all? If Protagoras' theory of justice is the social contract theory sketched in 322b5–c1n., there will be something unstable about a city in which any noticeable number get away with being unjust: the cooperative will come to feel that they are taken advantage of, and soon there will no longer be enough cooperation for there to be any kind of city. **d5–6 νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν:** contrast 325b1, where Protagoras, after moving from μῦθος to λόγος (320c4n.), uses the more

prosaic word ἀποκτείνειν rather than the more poetic κτείνειν, and allows not only death but also exile as a suitable treatment for the resolutely unjust. **d6** ὡς νόσον πόλεως: Zeus implies that killing those unable to be just is medicinal rather than punitive. He is thus consistent with what 323c7–324a4 says about punishing people only for what they are able to avoid.

322d7–323c2: UNIVERSAL JUSTICE

Protagoras says that, since everyone must know about justice if there is to be a city, everyone may rightly share in the city's deliberations about justice. Moreover, we would all think someone mad who claimed he did not know about justice; and we thereby acknowledge that justice has to be universal.

322d8 ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς: it would be more idiomatic to speak of τεκτονική as a τέχνη. But, if he is to maintain that virtue is teachable, Protagoras needs to undermine the distinction between virtues and crafts; and this he does by calling a craft a virtue, just as he did by calling a virtue a craft at 322b4. Cf. 323a7–8n.

322e2 ὡς σὺ φῄς: Socrates said this in 319b4–d1. Protagoras speaks of this statement in the present tense because Socrates has yet to withdraw it. Cf. 361d2n.

323a1 ἥν: Protagoras does not make clear whether the antecedent of this relative pronoun is συμβουλήν or πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς. No doubt this is because he is happy to say both that advice about political excellence, and that political excellence itself, must proceed wholly by way of justice and temperance. **a2** ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται: the genitive is the idiomatic case for the people whose behaviour is tolerated; cf. e.g. *Rep.* 564d–e ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, And. 4.38 ἀνασχέσθαι τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων, and Demos. 21.204 νομίζεις ἡμᾶς μὲν ἀνέξεσθαί σου, αὐτὸς δὲ τυπτήσειν; **a2–3** παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις: this is ambiguous. It might be construed as 'There can be no social life unless everyone is just.' On this construction, it is simply false. It might be construed instead as 'There can be no social life unless it is everyone's duty to be just.' On this construction, it is only part of the truth: social life requires also that people in fact do, to a large extent, act in accordance with the universal duty to be just (322d3–4n.). Perhaps clarity on this point would make it embarrassingly clear that Protagoras is assuming the social contract theory of justice (322b5–c1n.). **a7** ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς . . . **a8** ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην: to maintain his thesis that virtues are teachable, Protagoras continues to speak of skills and virtues as the same. Cf. 322d8n.

323b5 ἐνταῦθα 'in the case in hand', i.e. in the case of justice. The idiom recurs at 334c1. **b5–c1** φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, ἐάντε ὦσιν ἐάντε μή 'they say that everyone must claim to be just, whether they are or not'. According

to the social contract theory of justice sketched in 322b5–c1n., I will want others to think that I am just, however unjust I am in actual fact. For whatever the advantages intrinsic to being unjust in actual fact, considerable disadvantages are attached to being thought unjust. *Rep.* 359c–360d brings this out well by imagining the injustices we would commit if we had magic rings to make us invisible; Ant. DK 87 B 44.A.1.12–2.23, discusses why 'a man would deal with justice in the way most beneficial to himself if, in the presence of witnesses, he treated the laws as important, and, in isolation from witnesses, he treated as important the demands of nature'; and a wicked titan in Crt. DK 88 B 25.9–40 says that gods were invented to make us believe that we always are in the presence of witnesses, and thus to keep us just.

323c1 τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον 'the person who does not pretend' sc. to be just. If Plato had wished to spell this out, some thirty parallels show that he would have spelled it out by δικαῖον εἶναι; but, as in *Chrm.* 171c, *Epinomis* 991c, he leaves it to the context to settle what the pretence is a pretence of. (The manuscripts all have δικαιοσύνην, which is an explanatory note that has crept into the text.) **c2 ἀμῶς γέ πως:** without this qualification, Protagoras' reasoning would be evidently invalid. For the consensus that you would have to be mad to deny that you were just, no matter how unjust you actually were, hardly shows that there is a consensus that you 'share in justice' in any unqualified way; for it hardly shows that you are just – which is what 'sharing in justice' has meant up until now (cf. 322d3), and what it will mean later (cf. 325a3). At most, it shows that there is a consensus that each of us has an enormous interest in being thought to be just.

323c3–324d1: THE TEACHABILITY OF JUSTICE

People, continues Protagoras, all agree that it is sensible to punish those who act unjustly. This consensus presupposes that we can control the extent to which we are just, and hence that justice is teachable.

323c3 ὅτι μέν . . . c4 ταῦτα . . . c5 ὅτι δέ . . . c7 τοῦτο: for this indifference between singular and plural, see 309a1n. on ἦ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι. **c7–d2 ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας:** Aeschin. 3.175 denies this point, but in a way that bears it out. Affecting to believe that his opponent suffers from a natural cowardice, he declares that such cowardice is subject to the same legal sanctions as avoiding military service or abandoning one's place in the line of battle. He continues, 'For there can be indictments for cowardice too [εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ δειλίας γραφαί]. Yet some of you may wonder whether there can be indictments for a natural characteristic [φύσεως γραφαί]. There can. And why? It is so that each of us may fear the sanctions of the laws more than he fears the enemy, and so be a better champion of the fatherland.'

323d1 φύσει ἢ τύχηι: everything not ascribable to human activity was standardly ascribed to either nature or chance. Thus nature and chance figure as the alternatives contrasting with 'a legislator' (*Laws* 747c–d), 'artifice' (*Laws* 888e), 'philosophy and reasoning' (Isoc. 15.292), and 'violence, habit, reasoning, anger and appetite' (Arist. *Rh.* 1369a5–7). *Laws* 892b objects that the standard way of understanding these contrasts can blind us to the possibility that so-called 'natural' things are 'subsequent to and derivative from artifice and reason' – the artifice and reason of God. But even if true, this is no objection to Protagoras' point. **d6 ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς:** Protagoras runs all these together because it is in his interest to have us confuse 'There are things we can do to improve ourselves' with 'The thing we should do is submit to the instruction of a sophist.' Those without such an interest are perfectly capable of distinguishing instruction from other voluntary actions that might improve us. Thus Meno in *Meno* 70a asks, 'Is virtue teachable [διδακτόν] ? Or is it acquired by practice [ἀσκητόν] instead of by teaching? Or is it neither acquired by practice, nor learnable [μαθητόν], but do people get it instead either by nature [φύσει] or by some other means?'; Clitophon in *Clit.* 407b formulates Socrates as holding 'You won't find anyone to teach you justice, if indeed it is learnable; and if it is acquired by training [μελετητόν] and practice, you won't find anyone to give you the thorough practice and training that it would take'; and in DK 80 B 3 Protagoras himself points out that φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται.

323e2–324a1 οἵ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις: some reference to teaching would complete the parallel with 323d1–2 οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει, but a reference here to teaching would also raise awkward questions about the extent to which virtue is an intellectual matter.

324a1–2 ἔστιν ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς: Protagoras alludes to a tag from Theogn. 147: ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνηι συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετή 'στι ('in justice is the whole of virtue, all together'; Arist. *EN* 1129b30 calls the tag proverbial). Plato loves allusions to this tag, whether inverting it to talk about the unity of vice (as here and *Rep.* 444b, *Grg.* 477c), or preserving its original talk about the unity of virtue (325a1–2, *Rep.* 585b–c, *Phd.* 69b, *Sph.* 267c). **a5 αὐτό σε διδάξει** 'this will show you, all by itself', that is, without any need of elaboration by me. Other such phrases are 329b2 ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, *Hp. Ma.* 288b αὐτὸ δείξει, Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.21 δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα, Men. *Sam.* 444 αὐτὰ τἄργα δηλοῖ, Eur. *Orestes* 1129 αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοὔργον, Arist. *Meteorologica* 349b35 δηλοῖ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον, Demos. 19.167 τἄργα καὶ τὰ πεπραγμέν' αὐτὰ δηλώσει. **a6–b1 τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας . . . ἠδίκησεν:** Protagoras switches from plural to singular because he is thinking of a plurality of cases, in each of which people discuss the punishment of a single criminal. There are similar switches, similarly motivated, at 319d4–6 and 334c3–4.

324b3 παρεληλυθότος . . . b4 μέλλοντος: 'Protagoras was the first to distinguish parts of time [πρῶτος μέρη χρόνου διώρισε],' claims DK 80 A 1.52. Perhaps the claim was prompted by some reflections like these on the difference between past and future, together with the fact that Protagoras seems to have died before three fellow sophists who also reflected on these matters: Gorgias (DK 82 B 11.11), Thrasymachus (DK 85 B 1) and Antiphon (6.25 (quoted in 356a5–6n.), DK 87 B 58, and Amm. 437). **b3 οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται:** contrast Lys. 22.20, which says that deterrence for the future is a goal that punishment has in addition to, rather than, as Protagoras says, instead of, vengeance for past misdeeds: χρὴ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μὴ μόνον τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἕνεκα αὐτοὺς κολάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παραδείγματος ἕνεκα τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. Lysias therefore escapes, as Protagoras does not, the objection that he licenses punishing those who are innocent of past misdeeds. Traditional Greek thought works with the simple principle of 'be done by as you did': e.g. Pind. *N.* 4.32 'when one does a thing, then it is seemly to suffer it too [ῥέζοντά τι καὶ παθεῖν ἔοικεν]'; Aesch. *Choephori* 312–14 'let him repay bloody blow for bloody blow. Thrice-old is the tale that says this: suffer upon doing [ἀντὶ δὲ πληγῦς φονίας φονίαν | πληγὴν τινέτω. δράσαντα παθεῖν, | τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ]'; and *Laws* 872d–873a relays an old story that the cosmos arranges, by reincarnation if need be, for the application of this to matricides and patricides. **b3–4 οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη:** this truism figures often in poetry (e.g. Agathon (315d6–e3nn.) fr. 5 *TrGF* 'for this alone not even God can do: ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ' ἂν ἦι πεπραγμένα'; cf. Pind. *O.* 2.15–17, Theogn. 583–4, Simonides fr. 98 *PMG*), as well as in the writings of sophists (Ant. DK 87 B 58.6–7). Protagoras is quite wrong to insinuate that only a failure to appreciate this truism could motivate those who disagree with him. We might, for example, punish a wrongdoer to ensure that he does not gain by his wrongdoing, or so that we do not connive in it, even though we have no expectation of thereby 'turning people away' (324b6 ἀποτροπῆς) from such deeds in future (for example, because we know that, even after the wrongdoer is punished, those who would like to do such wrongs will still think the chances of being caught low enough for it to be worth risking). Poetry gives some precedent for Protagoras' false insinuation: in Soph. *Aj.* 377–8, the Chorus asks Ajax 'Why grieve over what has been done? οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν ταῦθ' ὅπως οὐχ ὧδ' ἔχειν', as if crying over spilt milk must be part of some futile project to ensure that the milk was never spilt in the first place. There is a similar false insinuation in *Laws* 934a–b 'It is not ἕνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι that he pays the penalty – οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀγένητον ἔσται ποτέ – but so that in the future he and those who see him being punished will either totally detest injustice or in large part recover from this dreadful condition.' **b4 χάριν** is mere elegant variation on 324b3 ἕνεκα: *Phlb.* 53e treats the two words as entirely interchangeable. **b4–5 ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσηι μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα:** cf. Socrates in *Grg.* 525b: 'When anyone is subject to punishment, and being correctly punished [ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένωι] by someone else, then the

proper thing is that either he improves and is benefited, or he is an example for others, so that when others see him suffering whatever it is that he suffers, they will be frightened into improving.' **b6–7 διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει:** there is a gap in Protagoras' reasoning, as he acknowledges with his γοῦν to mark what is merely a 'part proof' (*GP* 451). If I punish some kind of behaviour in order to turn people away from it, then I must certainly suppose that people can refrain from such behaviour, and that I can get them to refrain from it. But I need not suppose that anyone can make people virtuous – whether by education or by any other means. For I may suppose that virtue requires not only correct overt behaviour, but also correct motivation (I may think for instance that you do not have the virtue of honesty if the only thing that stops you cheating is the fear of being caught and punished); and while I know that threats of punishment can correct your overt behaviour, I need not suppose that they can correct your motivation.

324c1 τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται: Arist. *Rh.* 1369b12–14 draws this distinction: 'κόλασις is for the benefit of the one on whom it is inflicted; τιμωρία, for that of the one who inflicts it, so that he can be satisfied.' What Protagoras has said about the justification of punishment fits κόλασις better than τιμωρία. **c2–3 οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ σοὶ πολῖται:** it was a standard joke that the Athenians had a special love for litigation. This love provides Aristophanes with incidental remarks in *Clouds* 206–8, *Peace* 503–5 and the whole plot of *Wasps*. Behind the joke lay such facts as the Athenians' insistence (discussed in Thuc. 1.77, Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.16–18) that when Athenian allies wished to litigate, they had to come before courts in Athens. **c3–4 εἰσι τῶν ἡγουμένων** 'are on the side which considers'. For this use of the genitive plural, cf. 316b7n. **c4 παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν:** Protagoras throws back at Socrates his words from 319b2.

324d2–328d2: WHY GOOD FATHERS HAVE BAD SONS

Protagoras describes all the many arrangements – educational, legal, political – that people have devised to make one another just. Since we are all taught justice so thoroughly and so incessantly, the result is that we all do, to a very large extent, share in justice, and that differences in natural capacity to benefit from teaching explain most of what differences there are in the precise size of our shares. That is how it can happen that a son is not as good as his father.

324d3–4 διδάσκουσιν ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται: see 319e4–320a1n. **d4–5 ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσιν** 'but do not make their sons any better than anybody else at the virtue at which they are good themselves'. The accusatives ἣν and ἀρετήν are accusatives of respect, like τά . . . ἄλλα in 324d3; the accusative βελτίους is a masculine accusative plural agreeing with ὑεῖς in 324d3, like σοφούς in 324d4. **d5 μῦθον . . . d6 λόγον:** cf. 320c4n. **d6–e1 πότερον ἔστιν τι ἓν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὗ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν:**

the context shows that when Protagoras here talks of a single thing in which all citizens must share, he does so because he means 'there is something that each citizen must have, and this is the same for each', by contrast with 'each citizen must have something, which may or may not be the same as what another citizen must have'; he does not mean 'there is exactly one thing that each citizen must have', by contrast with 'there are at least two distinct things that each citizen must have'. His failure to be specific on the precise number of things that all citizens must share will prompt Socrates' question at 329c1–d1 about the unity of virtues.

324e3 εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, καί . . . : the καί introduces an explanation of the hypothesis that there is something that each citizen must have. The explanation gets so long and elaborate that Protagoras will give two reminders that he is still in the protasis of his conditional (325a2–3 εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, 325b1 εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει) before he starts the apodosis at 325b3 σκέψαι.

325a1–2 δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην: cf. 324a1–2n. **a2 ἓν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι:** for the accusative and infinite construction, cf. 311e4n. on ὀνομάζουσι . . . εἶναι. **ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν:** Protagoras does not mean the most obvious virtue of a man, ἀνδρεία. For 325a5–6 καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα shows that he means the cooperative virtue needed by all members of society regardless of age and sex (cf. 322b1n.). For other occasions where Protagoras shies away from mentioning courage, see 330a1–2n. **a7 ἀνίατον:** like Zeus in 322d6, and Socrates in *Grg.* 462e–465d, Protagoras models punishment on medicine. This is supposed to explain how punishment can be for the good of the punished, while yet being unpleasant. The explanation is imperfect: we sweeten pills, and administer anaesthetics, to reduce the unpleasantness of medicine, and we regard as an unfortunate side effect such unpleasantness as we cannot prevent; by contrast, the unpleasantness of punishment is no side effect, but the very means by which punishment is intended to work.

325b1 ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν: see 322d5–6n. for how this thought is presented in a μῦθος. When the Athenians imprisoned criminals, that was intended more to keep them until they could be punished than as itself a punishment (MacDowell (1978) 254–8). Perhaps this explains why Protagoras mentions here only death or exile for the resolutely unjust, and does not mention life imprisonment. **b1-2 εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος:** this reminds us that we are still in the μέν clause which began at 324e3 εἰ μέν, and then goes on to the δέ clause that is correlated with it. When a second μέν acts as such a reminder, it typically goes with some part of οὗτος (*GP* 385; cf. 325c3n.). **b3 ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί** 'what a strange state good men get into'. For this construction with the adverb, see LSJ s.v. γίγνομαι II.2 and both versions of the remark that guests at Plato's abstemious dinners have a good time the morning after too: Ath. 10.419d οἱ παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνοῦντες καὶ τῆι ὑστεραίαι καλῶς

γίνονται and Plu. *Advice on keeping healthy* 127b οἱ παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνήσαντες καὶ εἰς αὔριον ἡδέως γίγνονται. Cf. 335d3n. on adverbial constructions with εἶναι. **b6 ἐφ' ὧι:** the singular ὧι squares with the singular τοῦτο at 325b3, but clashes with the plural ταῦτα at 325c3. For the relative clause here has nothing to mark it out as indefinite or general, and hence as tantamount to a plural (contrast e.g. the ἄν, the μηδέν and the subjunctive ποιῆι in 345d8–9 τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆι). The clash escapes Protagoras' notice partly because the ὧι and the ταῦτα are so far apart (cf. 334c7–335c6 on long speeches), and partly because Protagoras is unclear about whether virtue is one thing or many (329c1–d2). (Instead of ἐφ' ὧι, some manuscripts have the plural ἐφ' ὧν. This regularises the grammar, but makes a striking and pointless contrast with the dative ἐφ' οἷς at 325b5–6.) **b6–c1 ἥ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαί** 'their children will be penalised with death, and with exile'. For the placing of τε here, see 316d7–8n.

325c3 ταῦτα δ' ἄρα: the δέ is repeated from 325b6 ἐφ' ὧι δέ. Cf. 313b1n. and 325b1–2n. **c4 οἴεσθαί γε χρή:** this phrase is something of a favourite with Socrates' more imperious interlocutors (Callicles, *Grg.* 522a; the Laws of Athens, *Cri.* 53d, 54b; Critias, *Chrm.* 163b), and it is used once by Socrates himself, in a place that calls for imperiousness (*Phd.* 68b). This is only the first of three consecutive sentences with no particle to connect them to their predecessor. Such asyndeton was described as ὑποκριτικόν (perhaps 'stagey' or 'giving an actor his opportunity') in Arist. *Rh.* 1413b17–22 and Demet. 193–4; it 'gives the impression of a struggle that simultaneously hampers and drives on' (Long. 19.2). The indignation that Protagoras has been expressing in the awkwardly periodic structures of 324c3–325c4 now reaches such a pitch that he can only jerk out disconnected sentences. **c5–6 ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν:** in his *Great Speech*, the historical Protagoras said something similar: ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν (DK 80 B 3). There may also be an allusion to this saying in 326c5–6, and 351b2–3 may allude to another saying from this speech. **c6–d1 καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγός:** for the omission of the article, cf. 310c6n.

325d1–2 περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς: boys in epic were urged to be, not just good, but 'always the best, and superior to others' (Hom. *Il.* 6.208 = 11.784 αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων). Democratic Athenians continued to have a competitive spirit: cf. 319a1–2n.; Isoc. 10.35, on how the founder of their city had 'arranged for them to have a level playing field for their competitions in virtue [ἐξ ἴσου τὴν ἅμιλλαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐποίησεν]'; Aeschin. 3.180, instructing a jury 'you must suppose that you are in charge of a competition in political excellence [εἶναι ἀγωνοθέτας πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς], and you must reckon that, if you hand out the prizes to the deserving few, in accordance with the laws, then you will have lots of competitors for virtue

[πολλοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς ἕξετε τῆς ἀρετῆς]'; and Demos. 61.52, advising a young man, 'And mind, if you are superior to those whom you meet, not to abandon your quest to outdo others [μηδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζήτει διενεγκεῖν]. On the contrary, you must realise that it is of supreme importance to be the first of absolutely all [τὸ πρωτεύειν ἐν ἅπασιν], and that it is far better to be seen reaching out for this, than it is to be seen to be one up on ordinary folk.' *Laws* 731a–b describes the proper spirit for competitions in virtue. **d3–5 "τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον," καὶ "τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν," καὶ "τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον," καὶ "τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει":** why does Protagoras have parents instruct their offspring in these matters, and not in the difference between beneficial and harmful? *Tht.* 172a–b proposes that there can be expert knowledge of the difference between beneficial and harmful, whereas the matters on which Protagoras has parents instruct their offspring are all conventional: 'as for fine and foul and just and unjust and holy and otherwise, whatever views a city takes and lays down as its law [νόμιμα; cf. 337d1–3nn.], those in actual truth are the case for that city, and on them there can be no differences in wisdom, neither between individuals nor between cities' (much as foot-binding is fashionable in a community if and only if the community thinks that it is fashionable). Socrates makes this proposal on behalf of Protagoras. The proposal enables him to explain how he can earn his payment when he teaches us about the just, the fine and the holy: he replaces true beliefs that are harmful by true beliefs that are beneficial (much as one might give a community the benefit of healthier feet by getting the community to think that foot-binding is not fashionable; cf. *Tht.* 166e–167b, quoted in 357e4n.). This proposal would also connect what Protagoras says here about education with the social contract theory of justice sketched in 322b5–c1n. For, according to that theory, our natural ability to recognise our own interests, and our natural tendency to pursue them, are liable to be disastrous; but we can prevent the disaster by properly deploying our ability to invent other values, like justice. **d5–6 ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μή:** the apodosis omitted after the ἐὰν μέν clause would amount to 'then so well and good'; cf. 311d2–4n. The reason why the μέν conditional uses ἐάν plus subjunctive, whereas the δέ conditional uses εἰ, is of course to represent willing obedience to the demands of justice as the more likely alternative. Cf. 351e8n.

326a1 ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν: this was the standard practice. The only dispute was that reported in *Laws* 810e–811a: should the young learn whole poems, or anthologised extracts instead? The two sides are represented by the father of Niceratus (Xen. *Smp.* 3.5: 'In his concern that I should grow up to be a good man [ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην; cf. 340b5n.], my father made me learn the complete works of Homer [ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν]; and to this day I could recite for you the entire *Iliad* and *Odyssey*'; cf. 316d6n. on Ὅμηρον), and by Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.135 introduces a quotation from Hesiod with 'I think that the reason why we learn by heart the wise sayings of the poets

[τὰς τῶν ποιητῶν γνώμας ἐκμανθάνειν] when we are boys, is so that we can make use of [χρώμεθα] them when we are men.').

326b3 ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν: see *Rep.* 398b–403c, Arist. *Pol.* 1339a11–1342b34, for much elaborate discussion of what music has this and other effects. An anonymous author (the first editors suggested he might be Hippias) provides a rare, and thoroughly inadequate, argument that music has no effect on character: 'They say that some tunes make men self-controlled, others make them wise, others just, others brave, others cowardly – so ill are they aware that the chromatic would not make men cowardly, nor would the enharmonic make brave those who use it. For who is not aware that the Aetolians and the Dolopians and all those at Thermopylae use diatonic music, but are braver than performers in tragedy, who usually sing in the enharmonic throughout?' (*PHibeh* 13, col. i.13–ii.21). **b4 λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν:** see 319a1–2n. **b6 παιδοτρίβου:** gymnastics was the third and final item in a Greek boy's schooling (312b1–2n.). *Rep.* 403c–412a, *Laws* 813b–814d and Arist. *Pol.* 1337b23–1339a10 all discuss its proper place. **b6–c1 ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῆι διανοίαι χρηστῆι οὔσηι:** such words were standard in pep talks: 'you must get your body used to serving your mind [τῆι γνώμηι ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα], and train it with toil and sweat' (Virtue to Heracles in Prodicus DK 84 B 2.28); the soul's 'task is to take decisions, whether about domestic or about public affairs; the body's task is to be at the service of what the soul discerns [ὑπηρετῆσαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς γνωσθεῖσιν]' (Isoc. 15.180); 'since the soul is superior to the body, and since the inferior is always serving for the sake of the superior [ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκα ὑπηρετουμένου τοῦ χείρονος], the body is for the sake of the soul' (Arist. *Protreptic* fr. 23 Düring). For the superiority of soul to body, see 313a6n.

326c2 καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων: Protagoras again uses a turn of phrase that puts us in mind of courage without actually mentioning it or acknowledging that it is a virtue; cf. 330a1-2n. **c4–5 μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι:** there was an exception to the rule that access to schooling depended on wealth: the lawgiver of Thurii made a law 'unthought of by previous legislators: he legislated for all the citizens' sons to learn their letters, stipends for the teachers to be paid by the city' (D.S. 12.12.4, who says that the lawgiver was Charondas; DK 80 A 1.50 says that it was Protagoras). **c5–6 πρωιαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν:** cf. 325c5–6n. **c6–7 ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ κτλ:** why need there continue, throughout adult life, such detailed scrutiny and control of those who have already received a thorough education in justice? No such thing is needed to ensure that those who have been taught how to write (326d2–5), or how to speak Greek (328a1), continue to do those things properly. Why should justice be different? The social contract theory of justice (322b5–c1n.) has a neat explanation: we have nothing to gain by writing or speaking badly; but,

however much we have been taught to be just, we each have something to gain by committing injustice.

326d2 γραμματισταί . . . **d3** γράφειν . . . ὑπογράψαντες γραμμάς . . . **d4** γραφίδι . . . γραμματεῖον . . . γράφειν . . . **d5** γραμμῶν . . . ὑπογράψασα: Protagoras is showing off; cf. 320d5n. **d3–4** ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῆι γραφίδι: a writing tablet, marked out with lines to guide the learner, has been preserved, and is illustrated in Turner and Parsons (1987) plate 4.

326e1 παρ' ὑμῖν: i.e. in Athens; cf. 316e2 Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος. **e2** εὐθῦναι: the 'straightenings' were arrangements for reviewing how officials had behaved while in office, and, if need be, punishing them for misbehaviour. 'If the people do not have even this power, they are treated as slaves and enemies' (Arist. *Pol.* 1274a17–18). Arist. *Ath.* 48.4–5 describes the procedure for 'straightenings' at Athens; Aeschin. 3.17–22 shows how wide a range of officials were subject to this procedure. The power to 'straighten' officials was all the more important when officials were not elected, but chosen by lot, and therefore free from the fear that misbehaviour during one term might mean not getting elected for another.

327b2–4 λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα: Protagoras is being disingenuous. According to the social contract theory of justice sketched in 322b5–c1n., matters are more complicated than simply that we benefit one another by being just. For the theory holds that, as *Rep.* 392b puts it, 'committing injustice is advantageous [λυσιτελεῖ] if one gets away with it, whereas being just benefits other people but damages oneself [ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζημία]'; and were it not for the gains that I stand to make from injustice, you would not need to press me to be just. After all, my being healthy is to your benefit; but you do not fear that, unless you keep me up to the mark, I will wish to infect myself with diseases and pass them on to you. **b7** εὐφυέστατος: no doubt Hippocrates is intended to think of himself here. Cf. 316b8, where Socrates told Protagoras of Hippocrates' great natural promise.

327d3 ἀλλ' εἶεν 'but who were'. This continues the relative clause started by οἷς in 327d1. Cf. 313c1n. **d3–4** ἄγριοί τινες οἷοίπερ οὓς πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίωι: the Lenaean festival at which Pherecrates staged his comedy *Savages* was early in 420 (Ath. 5.218d; see 309a3n. for other indications about the dramatic date of this dialogue). Extant fragments describe the bad old days of savagery, when there were no slaves to help housewives with their work (fr. 10 *PCG*), and people had to live on herbs and snails when they were lucky, and on their own fingers when they were not (fr. 14 *PCG*). **d6** Εὐρυβάτωι καὶ Φρυνώνδαι: in Attic comedy and oratory, Eurybatus and Phrynondas figure as

paradigms of unscrupulous deceit. Thus Aeschin. 3.137 'neither Phrynondas, nor Eurybatus, nor any other crook from times gone by, was such a wizard and a sorcerer that he would (O Earth, and gods and spirits and men who wish to hear the truth) have the nerve to look us in the face and say . . .'; Demos. 18.24 'if you were encouraging the Greeks to fight, while simultaneously negotiating peace with Philip, you would be acting like Eurybatus'; Isoc. 18.57 'after such crimes, will he attempt to say that *we* are liars? That would be like Phrynondas reproaching someone for stopping at nothing'; cf. e.g. Ar. *Daedalus* fr. 198 *PCG* on Eurybatus, *Th.* 861 on Phrynondas. No details are given of Phrynondas' crimes, but Suetonius, *On insults and their origins* 4.12–19, reports two stories about Eurybatus. One goes back to the fourth-century historian Ephorus (*FGH* 70 fr. 58): 'He was an Ephesian, a subject of Croesus. By defecting to Cyrus and betraying Croesus' secrets, he was responsible for the sack of Sardis.' The other comes from a now lost work of Aristotle's: 'In *On justice* Book I, Aristotle says that he was a burglar. He was caught and put in chains. The guards persuaded him to show them how he managed to get up across walls and into houses. So he was released from his chains. He put on his spiked shoes and took his sponges, easily climbed up, reached the roof, and made his escape.' (The sponges were to deaden the sound of his movements: see Eust. on Hom. *Il.* 19.92.)

327e1 τρυφᾶις is second person singular present active indicative of the contracted verb τρυφάω. It is distinguished by accent from τρυφαῖς, the dative plural of the noun τρυφή. Protagoras charges Socrates with being spoilt by indolence and luxury. Elsewhere, Socrates makes the same charge against Alcibiades and Euthyphro (*Alc. Ma.* 114a, *Euthphr.* 11e–12a). In all three cases, the evidence for the charge is a reluctance to submit to the rigours of argument. **e3 ὥσπερ** is coordinate with 328a6 οὕτω. **e3–328a1 εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν:** the comparison between the teachers of Greek and the teachers of virtue recurs also in *Alc. Ma.* 111a and *Dissoi Logoi* DK 90.6.12.

328a1 οὐδ' ἂν εἷς is much more emphatically negative than οὐδεὶς ἂν would be, just as 'not one thing' is more emphatic than 'nothing'. **a4–5 τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ῥάιδιον οἶμαι:** the reiteration, in reverse order, of 328a1–2 οὐδέ γ' ἂν οἶμαι εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν, saves the sentence from complete disarray. **a6 ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων:** these have the same case as τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν 328a1, to indicate that Protagoras means that his remarks about speaking Greek are to be applied also to virtue and all the rest.

328b6 ἀποδέδωκεν may be translated into English by the present-tensed 'pays'. The Greek verb takes the perfect tense in continuation of the same construction as 328b5 πεποίημαι: that the satisfied pupil pays the price nominated by Protagoras not only is now the case, but also has been the case for as long as Protagoras has made this his policy.

328c1–2 ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας ὅσου ἂν φῆι ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατατέθηκε: the pupil deposits in the temple, to become the property of the god (Hdt. 9.120.3 καταθεῖναι τῶι θεῶι, Aeschin. 3. 129 τῶι θεῶι καταθεῖναι), what he swears Protagoras' lessons are worth; thus the god, who will anyway be offended by perjury, will have also financial grounds for offence if the pupil understates the worth of the lessons. These arrangements minimise the pupil's incentive to underpay Protagoras, just as they minimise Protagoras' incentive to overcharge the pupil. And so neither party can complain about the fee paid to Protagoras, much as neither child can complain that the other has a bigger piece of cake, if one cuts, and the other chooses. Such arrangements produce consensus without resort to objective measurement (357a3n.), and they should therefore be of special interest to those who hold that Man is the Measure (356d3–4n.), and that a sophist's task is to replace harmful beliefs by beneficial ones, rather than false ones by true (325d3–5n.). That Protagoras had some special interest in arrangements to ensure fair dealing on fees is suggested by a book title (DK 80 A 1.55 *Proceedings for a fee*, or Δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ), and by a delightful anecdote: Euathlus arranged with Protagoras that he was not to pay until he had his first case in court, and won it; he then never went to court; Protagoras threatened to sue him for the fee, arguing, 'Whatever the outcome, you will have to pay: by the terms of our agreement, if you win the case; and by the terms of the court's decision, if you lose'; and Euathlus argued, 'But if I win, then, by the terms of the court's decision, I need not pay; and if I lose, then, by the terms of our agreement, I need not pay. So whatever the outcome, I need not pay' (DK 80 A 1.56; Syrianus, *Commentary on Hermogenes'* περὶ στάσεων 42.2–8). **c2 κατατέθηκε** is a correction of the manuscripts' κατέθηκε, so that it, like 328b6 ἀποδέδωκεν, can continue the construction of 328b5 πεποίημαι. The corruption of κατατέθηκε to κατέθηκε is facilitated by the repetition of ατ. It occurs also at Men. *Dys.* 920. **c3 καὶ μῦθον καὶ λόγον:** cf. 320c4n.

328d2 νέοι γάρ: so abrupt an ending to Protagoras' speech leaves the hearer expecting, and wanting, more. Mark used a similar device in 16:8, the last verse of his gospel: 'So they went out and fled from the tomb, for terror and amazement had seized them; and they said nothing to anyone, ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ' (which later writers found so unbearable a cliff-hanger that they added extra verses to bring the gospel to a satisfying close).

328d3–330b7: THE DIVERSITY OF THE VIRTUES

Socrates asks about the connection between the various virtues. Protagoras tells him that temperance, holiness, justice, courage and wisdom are not simply one thing under various names, nor even five things all like one another; in fact, these virtues differ from one another, being as diverse in their powers as the various parts of a face.

328d3 ἐπιδειξάμενος: cf. 320c1–2n. **d4 κεκηλημένος:** such enchantment is the effect that, according to 315a7–b2, Protagoras' words have on those who follow him around from city to city.

328e1 προύτρεψας: not entirely absent here may be the connotation that προτρέπειν often has of urging someone to care for virtue; cf. 348c3n. **e1 ὧδε** 'here', in the sense of δεῦρο 'to this place'; see LSJ s.v. II.

329a3–4 ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι: the complaint that Socrates makes here about long speeches and books is also among the complaints that he makes about poetry in 347c1–348a5 (cf. 347e4n.). Socrates develops his objection to books in *Phdr.* 275d–e, suggesting that, in their lack of response to questions, books are like figures in a painting. And the objection is developed further, by Plato, or people pretending to be him, in *Ep.* 2, 314b–c, 7, 341b–342a and 7, 344c. It is not known how or even whether Plato exempted his own books from such objections. Perhaps he thought that his own books, by representing conversations, came closer than books in other genres to being conversational. Socrates himself avoided all such awkwardness by never writing anything philosophical. Cf. 314c4n. on his preference for conversation. **a5 ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα κτλ:** Cratylus uses the same image at *Cra.* 430a, to express his view that so-called false statements are in fact no more than empty noise, signifying nothing.

329b1 δόλιχον: a foot race about 2,430 yards in length (335e4n.). Other descriptions of intellectual life in terms of competitive sport are 333e3 ἀγωνιᾶν, 335a4 ἀγῶνα, 335e3–4 δρομεῖ . . . δολιχοδρόμων . . . ἡμεροδρόμων, 338b5 βραβευτήν, 339e2 πύκτου, 342e3 ἀκοντιστής, 343c3 ἀθλητήν. See also 325d1–2n., and 354e7n. **b2–3 ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, . . . ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ:** Protagoras' own boast makes no reference to answering questions; it simply is that he can speak at any length, however great or small (335b6–c1). In saying that Protagoras is just as good at giving snappy answers when questioned as he is at giving long speeches, Socrates attributes to him the versatility boasted by his rival sophists Hippias and Gorgias (315c6n.). But Protagoras is not one to protest against so flattering an attribution, even though it puts him in the uncomfortable position of having to answer Socrates' questions. **b2 μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλούς:** the addition of καὶ καλούς is necessary, since the simple μακρὸς λόγος was used in particular for the rambling and incoherent rigmarole in which a slave tries to excuse his misdeeds (Eur. *IA* 313 'slave that you are, you're telling me μακρούς . . . λόγους'; Arist. *Met.* 1091a7–9 'ὁ μακρὸς λόγος, like that of slaves when they have nothing wholesome to say'; Simonides (fr. 653 *PMG*) may have written a whole book of such speeches). There are other disdainful uses of the expression at 336d1 and 361a2. **b2 ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ** 'as the facts themselves [above all, his speech at 320d1–328d2] make plain'; see 324a5n.

329c2 τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι ἀποπλήρωσον: Socrates continues to develop the conceit that knowledge is the nutrition of the soul (313c6–9). Cf. e.g. *Rep.* 586a–b, on how lack of knowledge and understanding is a sort of mental emptiness, as hunger and thirst are emptinesses of the body; and *Plt.* 286a, on how one can fill up a mental gap by answering a question. **c3 δικαιοσύνην:** in fact, at 322c5–d5 Protagoras spoke of δίκη instead. Presumably the more archaic word seemed the more suitable in a myth. **c4–5 ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἕν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή:** Protagoras said once (324e3–325a2) that virtues are one, and once (324a1–2) that vices are one, and once (323a1–3) that justice and temperance are a single virtue. In none of these passages did he name any vice apart from injustice and impiety, or any virtue apart from justice, temperance and holiness. See 329e6–330a3 for his attitude to the virtues of wisdom and courage. **c7–d1 ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος:** this was Socrates' own view, according to Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4–5: 'he drew no distinction between wisdom and temperance . . . When he was asked whether he thought that those who knew what they should do but did the opposite were wise and weak of will, he replied, "No more than I think them unwise and weak of will. For I think that all people choose, and do, what they take [οἴονται; see 358b8–c1n. on belief versus knowledge] to be the most advantageous [συμφορώτατα; see 355a3–4n. on maximising versus satisficing] to themselves [αὑτοῖς; see 354b4nn. on egoism versus altruism] of the things within their power; so I think that people who act incorrectly are neither wise nor temperate." He said also that justice and the rest of virtue was wisdom. For just things, and everything done by virtue, was fine and good. Moreover, those who knew these things would never choose anything else in preference to them, and those who did not know these things would be unable to do them; but would fail even if they tried. So, since just things and all other things that are fine and good are done by virtue, it is clear that justice and the rest of virtue is wisdom [καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστί].' Plato's Socrates argues for such a view in *Meno* 87b–89b, especially 88c–d: 'So if virtue is among the contents of the soul and is bound to be beneficial, then it has to be prudence [φρόνησις]; for all other attributes of the soul are, in and of themselves, neither beneficial nor harmful, but they become beneficial or harmful by the addition of prudence or folly [ἀφροσύνη]. By this reasoning, virtue – which is, after all, beneficial – has to be some sort of prudence'; *Grg.* 507a–c: 'The temperate person would do what is proper [τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἄν], both regarding gods and regarding human beings . . . in doing what is proper regarding human beings, he would do just things, and in doing what is proper regarding gods, he would do holy ones; and someone who does just and holy things is certain to be just and holy . . . furthermore, he is certain to be courageous. For it would not be like a temperate person to pursue or flee things not proper for him to pursue or flee; on the contrary, he will pursue and flee what he should [ἃ δεῖ], whether

things or people or pleasures or pains, and he will take his stand and hold firm where he should. So it is quite certain that . . . the temperate person . . . , being just and courageous and holy, will be a perfectly good man [τὸν σώφρονα . . . δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως]'; cf. *Chrm.* 173a–174d, *La.* 196d–199e. The idea that the virtues are identical is given by Isoc. 10.1 in a list of frivolous theses maintained by pretentious intellectuals: 'They have reached old age, some in continuing to deny that there can be false statements, or two contradictory statements about the same subjects [Protagoras himself denied these things, according to DK 80 A 19], others in giving detailed explanations that courage and wisdom and justice are the same thing, and that we have none of them by nature, but instead there is a single branch of knowledge to cover them all.'

329d5 πότερον . . . ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστιν . . . d6 ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια: a third possibility is described at *Plt.* 306a–308b: σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία are neither homogeneous, like two bits of gold, nor merely different, like two bits of a face, but positively at odds with one another; to be more precise, the disposition to be meek and the disposition to face danger can be at odds, but when properly checking and balancing one another they become these two virtues.

329e3–4 μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο: that of which the shares are shares is given by the genitive τούτων τῶν . . . μορίων, and the shares themselves are given by the accusatives ἄλλο . . . ἄλλο; for such a distinction between the two cases, cf. *Euthd.* 306b ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν. **e6–7 πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὔ:** with Protagoras' distinction of wisdom and courage from justice (and presumably therefore from temperance and holiness too: 329c4–5n.), contrast Callicles' distinction of wisdom and courage from conventional justice and temperance (*Grg.* 483a–484c, 491e–492c). Callicles shares Protagoras' view that at least a sort of justice is universally taught, but does not share Protagoras' view that the universally taught justice is universally beneficial; for it is only conventional, and the conventional kind of justice benefits only the weak, and will be ignored by anyone strong, intelligent and daring enough to get ahead in life, and seize from weaklings the goods to which natural justice entitles him (cf. 337d1–3nn. for the distinction between convention and nature). Thus the intelligence that enables one to get ahead in politics is, in Callicles' opinion, an alternative to the cooperative dispositions that enable political life in the first place. In Protagoras' opinion, this intelligence is not so much an alternative to as a refinement of those dispositions. Or at least, that is what Protagoras claimed at 327e1–328b2; and it is not contradicted by his current distinction between wisdom and justice, which holds merely that people can have justice without wisdom, and not that

they can have wisdom without justice. Contrast how he distinguishes justice from wisdom when, in 333d3–10, he gives the popular view.

330a1–2 ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, . . . σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; Socrates can be pardoned for not realising that Protagoras counts wisdom and courage as parts of virtue. For his long speech did not mention courage at all (see 322b4–5n., 325a2n. on ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, 326c2n.; cf. 316d5n.), and the only wisdom that it did mention was the intellectual and technical prowess that 321d1–322c4 distinguished from political virtue. **a3 μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων:** what motivates Protagoras to volunteer this gratuitous information? Perhaps a professional σοφιστής, teaching σοφία, is bound to call it important (cf. 352d1–3). Perhaps as well or instead, the idea is that only σοφία can be taught, and therefore that, since virtue is, to a great extent, teachable, a great amount of virtue must be σοφία. **a4 ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο:** for the omission of τὸ μέν, cf. 343e5, 355e2, and *GP* 166: 'Occasionally ὁ μέν, etc., has to be understood before ὁ δέ, etc.'

330b1 ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι: forestalls the answer, as in 309a1. **b5 ἐπιστήμη:** Socrates here treats this term as just another label for what 330a3 called σοφία; Protagoras does the same in 352d2. The terms σοφία and ἐπιστήμη are related somewhat as 'wisdom' and 'knowledge': it can be argued that they are just two names for the same thing (*Tht.* 145d–e; Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.7, quoted in 332b1n.); but it can be argued instead that σοφία should be reserved for a specially important or valuable sort of ἐπιστήμη (*Rep.* 428c–429a on how the ἐπιστήμη of wise rulers is 'the only one among all the other ἐπιστῆμαι that deserves to be called σοφία'; *Mnx.* 246e–247a 'in isolation from justice and the rest of virtue, ἐπιστήμη looks to be unscrupulousness, not σοφία'; Arist. *Met.* 1059a18 'σοφία is a sort of ἐπιστήμη that concerns first principles'). Behind this looseness of language lurks a substantive issue: to what extent does the ideal condition of the intellect consist in being well-informed?

330b8–331b7: THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN HOLINESS AND JUSTICE

Holiness, argues Socrates, is not only holy but also just. Likewise, justice is not only just but also holy. So justice and holiness are like one another after all.

330c1 ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα: in agreeing that a state of character, such as justice, is 'some thing', rather than 'no thing', we agree to at least two points. The first is that we may ask whether the state is itself just or unjust, and holy or unholy (cf. 330c6, 330d8–9, 331a7–b3). The second is that the state has some effect on what we do, and that whether we are in that state or not makes some difference to how we act (cf. 332a8–c1). The two points are connected; for deeds done from a just state will be done justly, and in general the manner in

which we act will derive its properties from that state of ours which leads to our action (cf. 330d8–e1nn., 332c3–4). An alternative view is that no agent has any very definite or durable character different from that of any other agent, and therefore that if one agent nevertheless acts justly, while the other acts unjustly, this will be explained by, if anything, a difference in their external circumstances. The alternative view is expressed by Simonides, in the lines quoted at 344e6–7. It also has much support among social psychologists, who have coined the term 'the fundamental attribution error' for our tendency to underestimate the effects of circumstance, and overestimate the effects of disposition: see e.g. Hogg and Vaughan (2005) 93–5. **c5 εἴπετον:** the dual imperative implies 'I want you to consider this together [cf. 330b8 κοινῆι σκεψώμεθα], and give me your joint answer.' This is why at 330c7 Socrates will ask Protagoras how he would vote on the question. Contrast 311d5n.; compare the εἴπετον repeatedly addressed to the team of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in *Euthd.* 273d, 274a, 274d and 296d, and *La.* 186e–187a, where Socrates begins by offensively addressing Laches alone, then corrects his slip by including Nicias, and emphasising Nicias' inclusion with a string of duals: σὺ δ', ὦ Λάχης καὶ Νικία, εἴπετον . . . συγγεγόνατον . . . μαθόντε . . . ἐπίστασθον . . . ἐξευρόντε . . . μαθόντε . . . γεγονότε. **ὠνομάσατε:** on the switch to this plural after the dual εἴπετον, cf. 317e1–2n.

330d6 φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι: see 330c1n., on the implications of describing a state of character as a πρᾶγμα. **d8 πεφυκέναι:** holiness must be holy by nature, in other words intrinsically and necessarily holy, if it is to do its job of explaining why other things are holy (330d10–e1n.). The way you act may be holy; but then again, it might well not have been. Since that is so, we need some explanation of why the way you act is holy. The explanation will be no explanation at all if it does not invoke another thing that is holy (330c1n.); and if the other thing, although actually holy, might well not have been, then the explanation will rely on something no less in need of explanation than the fact that it purports to explain. So our explanation of why the way you act is holy must invoke something holy by nature. Cf. *Phd.* 102c–e on what makes Simmias taller than Socrates: 'Simmias is not intrinsically [πεφυκέναι] taller in virtue of being Simmias [τῶι Σιμμίαν εἶναι]; rather, he is taller in virtue of the bigness that he happens to have [τῶι μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων] . . . the bigness in us [τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος] never admits the small . . . I mean, I admit smallness and remain, and while still being who I am, I – this very same man – am small; whereas that thing has never had the hardihood, being big, to be small.' Similarly, since coffee is not always milky, there must be something to make it milky when it is milky; that thing is milk; and milk can make coffee milky, without needing something else to make it milky in its turn, only because milk is itself milky by nature. **d10 ὦ ἄνθρωπε:** a brusque form of address, at home in dismissive reproofs, such as *Rep.* 329c εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, *Ap.* 28b οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, Ar. *Clouds* 644 οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὤνθρωπε, Ar. *Ach.* 1113 ὤνθρωπε, βούλει μὴ προσαγορεύειν

ἐμέ; cf. 314d5n. **d10–e1 σχολῆι μεντἂν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται:** the idea is that if anything makes a thing holy, then holiness does, and that what makes a thing holy must be holy itself. The idea is widely applicable: for example, even if other things, like anchovy essence and soy sauce, can also be said to make a stew salty, salt will certainly make a stew salty; and all these things make stews salty only because they are salty themselves. Plato applies the idea also to beauty, cold, damp and harm (*Phd.* 100e τῶι καλῶι τὰ καλὰ καλά, *Rep.* 335d οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος οἶμαι ἔργον ψύχειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου . . . οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου . . . οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου). The idea is not the trivial truth that it might look. For the slogan 'Holiness makes holy things holy' implies that common to all and only holy things is some single characteristic with a definition of its own (cf. 312c2n. on definitions, and *Euthphr.* 6d–15c for various unsuccessful attempts to define holiness); it implies, in other words, that we should be able to do for holiness what we do for heat, when we invoke its proper scientific definition and say 'The high mean kinetic energy of their constituent particles is what makes hot things hot.' Such implications are so far from being trivially true that, in some cases, they are not true at all: as *Plt.* 262d–e points out, barbarians differ quite as much from one another as any of them do from Greeks, and so barbarians do not constitute a single kind with a nature of its own.

330e3 πάνυ μὲν οὖν: see 310a4n. **e5–6 ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς . . .** 'I *thought* you were saying that virtue has parts which are so related to one another that . . .'

331a6–7 τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῶι, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται: to mark the climax of his sequence of hypothetical questions, Socrates now has a protasis using ἐάν plus the subjunctive, and an apodosis using the indicative, by contrast with the earlier protaseis using εἰ plus the optative and apodoseis using the optative plus ἄν (330c4–7 εἰ . . . ἔροιτο . . . ἄν . . . ἀποκριναίμην . . . ἄν . . . θεῖο, 330d3–4 εἰ . . . ἔροιτο . . . φαῖμεν ἄν, 330e4–7 εἰ . . . εἴποι . . . εἴποιμ' ἄν, 331a2–4 εἰ . . . εἴποι . . . ἄν . . . ἀποκρίναιο. The effect is of a change from the more distant 'What would we say, if someone were to ask . . . ?' to the more urgent 'What are we going to say, if someone asks . . . ?' Cf. 354e1n. **a7–8 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα:** this conclusion does not obviously follow from the assumption that holiness is not such as justice, which is a just thing. For the apparently parallel inference 'Holly is not such as Justine, who is a just girl; therefore Holly is not such as to be a just girl' goes from a true premiss to a false conclusion: Holly and Justine are both just girls, but Holly is a brunette and therefore not such as Justine, who is a blonde. If such parallels are to be only apparent, not real, that will have to be because holiness and justice, unlike Holly and Justine, cannot differ in respect

of any such features as colouring. And that in turn will presumably be because holiness and justice simply do not have such features (cf. *Rep.* 477c: 'I do not see that a power has a colour or a shape or any such feature, as lots of other things do, by reference to which I can in some cases distinguish some of them from others'). This will mean that justice is fully described by saying that it is just, and holiness is fully described by saying that it is holy; and so, if neither is such as the other, then holiness is not such as to be a just thing, and justice is not such as to be a holy one. Cf. 331b4–5n. **a8 οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὅσιον ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὅσιον:** it is not easy to assess the validity of the inference that Protagoras is here invited to make: 'Justice is not such as to be holy; therefore justice is such as to be not holy.' On the one hand, there are evidently invalid inferences of an apparently similar form: 'June is not always hot; therefore June is always not hot.' On the other hand, the inference is valid if the words 'such as to be' are no more than redundant padding (cf. 343e1–2n. on ἀληθῶς), so that 'Justice is such as to be holy' is simply a wordier version of 'Justice is holy', and so that 'Justice is not such as to be holy' and 'Justice is such as to be not holy' are simply wordier versions of 'Justice is not holy.' **a8–b1 ἡ δ' ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα:** it is not easy to assess the validity of this inference either. What is not just need not therefore be unjust, any more than (to borrow examples from *Smp.* 201e–202b) what is not good is therefore bad, or what is not beautiful is therefore ugly. For there is (as *Sph.* 257b–c explains, and as Protagoras will miss at 360b4) a difference between the negation of something and its opposite. Therefore 'Holiness is unjust' does not follow from 'Holiness is such as to be not just', unless that is more than simply a wordier version of 'Holiness is not just' – in which case the earlier inference 'Justice is not such as to be holy; therefore justice is such as to be not holy' would be invalid. Perhaps Socrates is aware of how problematic these inferences are. At any rate, he presents the invitation to make these inferences as that of an imaginary interlocutor, not as his own.

331b1 τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον 'while the other [i.e. justice] is unholy'. **b4–5 ἤτοι ταὐτόν γ' ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον:** how can this, the answer that justice and holiness are either identical or as like as can be, be 'the same' (331b4) as the answer that 'justice is a holy thing and holiness a just one' (331b3)? If Justine is holy, as well as just, and Holly is just, as well as holy, then that hardly means that they are identical or even that they are as like as can be; for that hardly means that Justine and Holly both have the same colouring. Presumably Socrates is again relying on the assumptions that justice has no more characteristics than are implicit in its being just, and that holiness has no more characteristics than are implicit in its being holy, and therefore that if they are both just and both holy, they have all their characteristics in common. Cf. 331a7–8n. **b5 δικαιότης:** this very rare word is a synonym of δικαιοσύνη. Perhaps Socrates uses the rare word to have one as like as can be to ὁσιότητι.

331c1–332a1: PROTAGORAS GETS AWKWARD

Protagoras objects: between any two things, however different, there will be some similarity; hence the fact that there is some similarity between holiness and justice is not enough to make them, in any interesting sense, similar to one another.

331c2–3 ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῶι διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; if the difference between them really does make no difference, then Protagoras can give a straightforward Yes to Socrates' question. **c3–4 εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω κτλ:** an indicative ἔστι would make a straightforward assertion. The imperative ἔστω suggests that Protagoras is granting the point more because he does not wish to argue about it than because it has really convinced him (cf. *Smp.* 201c 'I would not be able to contradict you, Socrates, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐχέτω ὡς σὺ λέγεις', *Grg.* 510a 'ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, so that you can finish your argument', and *Sph.* 231a, where the speaker, after objecting that someone has just overlooked a distinction, continues 'ὅμως δὲ ἔστω, for it won't be small distinctions that we'll be debating when our opponents are properly on their guard'). When Protagoras adds εἰ βούλει to the imperative, he gives the impression that he is granting the point only in order to humour Socrates (cf. *Alc. Ma.* 106c 'ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, οὕτως, so that I can find out what you are going to say', *Grg.* 513e ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως; cf. also Eur. fr. 953.13 *TrGF*, where a girl, reasoning at impudent length with her father, says 'ἔστω δ' ὃ βούλει. But tell me, what harm does it do me?'). **c5 μή μοι** 'Please don't.' Slightly less compact versions of the idiom are *Meno* 74d μή μοι οὕτως, Eur. *Med.* 964 μή μοι σύ, and Ar. *Lys.* 922 μή μοί γε. **c5–d2 οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ "εἰ βούλει" τοῦτο καὶ "εἴ σοι δοκεῖ" ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ κτλ:** a theory is not properly tested if the person whose task is to defend the theory grants objections simply to oblige the objector, or for any reason other than that the objections should or would be believed by those who believe the theory (cf. 352d2n., about granting objections out of shame, and 360e4n. about granting objections to humour the objector). Thus a proper dialectical test of a theory is also a test of defender and objector ('you and me'); for it is a test of their dialectical mettle, even if the defender is (like Protagoras in 333c4–e2) defending a theory that he does not believe, and the test is therefore not a test of the truth of his beliefs. See 333c8–9n. for a claim that such tests of the defender and objector are less important than tests of the theory itself.

331d1 τὸ "εἴ": the word εἰ has no accent of its own, and ordinarily has no accent at all except when succeeded by an enclitic. It has an accent here because each syllable needs to be part of an accentuated sequence of syllables, and εἰ therefore has to be accentuated when, because it is being quoted in isolation, it cannot form part of any longer accentuated sequence. Indeed, Greek adds an accent when quoting the enclitic τι = 'something', even though that makes it indistinguishable from the accentuated τί = 'what?' (e.g. A. Hilgard, *Grammatici*

Gracci (Leipzig 1901) vol. I.iii, 65.6: τοῦ "τί" ὀνόματος ἀορίστου). Cf. the standard English pronunciation of 'The unstressed "and" is unstressed and unemphatic.' **d4 ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἀμῆι γέ πηι προσέοικεν** 'there is some sort of similarity between anything and anything'. Protagoras confines himself to this claim, and does not make the further claim that between any two things there is also some dissimilarity. The further claim would be inconsistent with his thoughts that any two bits of gold, or any two pleasures, are perfectly homogeneous, differing, if at all, only in size (329d6–8, 356a2–5 and 358a4). **d4–5 τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῶι μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπηι προσέοικεν:** Protagoras thinks of black and white as the opposite extremes of a single scale comprising all colours, ordered by how dark or light they are (cf. Thphr. *De sensu et sensibilibus* 59: earlier philosophers in general held 'that black and white are basic, and that other colours are produced when these are blended'). Protagoras intends us to reason that, since black and white are on a single scale, they are therefore alike; and that, since black and white are opposite extremes, they are so different that if even they are nevertheless alike, then any pair of things will be alike. But even if there is a likeness between these two colours, that will not imply a likeness between cheese and Wednesday. And in any case, the fact that both black and white are colours hardly makes them alike in virtue of being colours; black and white are instead incompatible ways of being coloured; for a black thing and a white thing do not, in addition to the fact that one is black and the other white, share a common property of being coloured, in anything like the way that black and white cloth share the common property of being cloth. (*Phlb.* 12e–13a makes this point about colour, in order to illustrate a similar point about pleasure; on which see 354c9–d1n.)

331e2–3 οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχηι τὸ ὅμοιον 'It is not fair to call things similar because they have some similarity; nor is it fair to call things dissimilar because they have some dissimilarity, even if they have only very slight similarity.' Cf. the response that Socrates himself elsewhere makes to an argument that there cannot be many existent things. The argument is *Prm.* 127e: 'If there are many things in existence, then it follows that they must be both similar and dissimilar. Which is impossible; for dissimilars cannot be similar, and similars cannot be dissimilar.' The response is *Prm.* 128e–129b: 'Do you not think that there is some absolute form of similarity, and, in opposition to such a thing, something else, which is dissimilar? And that in these two things share both I and you and all that we call many? And that what shares in similarity comes to be similar, in the respect and to the extent that it does share; that what shares in dissimilarity comes to be dissimilar; and that what shares in both comes to be both? And even if all things share in both of these, opposites though they are, and, because of their participation in the pair, are both similar and dissimilar to themselves, what is surprising in that? It would, I agree, be monstrous if someone proved the similars themselves to be dissimilar, or the dissimilars similar. But if some one proves that

what shares in them both has both of these characteristics, I see nothing strange in that.'

332a1 οὐ μέντοι οὐδέ 'nor however'. Instead of cancelling out, the two negations emphasise one another. Cf. *Phlb.* 19b οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος, an emphatic negation of 'Some of us might be of some value for something sometime.'

332a2–333b6: THE IDENTITY OF TEMPERANCE WITH WISDOM

Folly, argues Socrates, is opposite to wisdom; folly is also opposite to temperance; but nothing can have two opposites. It follows that wisdom and temperance are identical.

332a3–4 ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; such questions are a standard way for Plato's Socrates to bring something into the discussion: cf. e.g. 358d6, *Cra.* 385b καλεῖς τι ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ ψευδῆ; and *Grg.* 464a σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν; Such questions are not asked by Socrates in other authors, nor (with the exception of *Sph.* 244b ὂν καλεῖτέ τι;) by other characters in Plato. **a6 τούτωι τῶι πράγματι:** see 330c1n. for the implications of agreeing that some state of an agent, such as folly, is a πρᾶγμα.

332b1 σωφροσύνηι σωφρονοῦσιν: for the thought, and for its expression with a dative, cf. this exchange between Socrates and Euthydemus in Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.7: '"What would we say wisdom is [σοφίαν δὲ τί ἂν φήσαιμεν εἶναι]? Tell me: do you think that the wise are wise at what they know [πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἃ ἐπίστανται, ταῦτα σοφοὶ εἶναι], or are there any who are wise at what they do not know?" "At what they know, obviously," he said, "for how could someone be wise at what he didn't know?" "So the wise are wise by knowledge [οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμηι σοφοί εἰσι]?" "Yes; for by what other thing could someone be wise, if not by knowledge?" "Do you suppose that wisdom is anything other than that by which they are wise [ἄλλο δέ τι σοφίαν οἴει εἶναι ἢ ὧι σοφοί εἰσιν]?" "Certainly not." "So knowledge is wisdom [ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν]?" "That's what I think."' **b8–9 τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνηι πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνηι:** on the relationship between adverbs and the corresponding abstract nouns, cf. Arist. *EN* 1105a22–6, which also brings in adjectives, as applied both to deeds and to doers of those deeds: 'One can do a literate thing both by chance and at someone else's prompting. So one will be a literate person [γραμματικός] if one both does a literate thing [γραμματικόν τι] and does it literately [γραμματικῶς] – which means: in accordance with one's own internal literacy [κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῶι γραμματικήν].' ('Doing a literate thing' might be spelling a word correctly – which one can do by lucky accident; 'doing a thing literately' would be spelling it correctly because one knows how it is spelled.)

b11 ἰσχύϊ . . . c1 μετὰ τάχους . . . c3 ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ: the three different constructions are just three different ways to express a single relationship; the same relationship is expressed by διά with an accusative in 360c2–8. Plato seems particularly fond of expressing one thought in many ways when he is talking about characteristics and their connection to the things that they characterise: cf. *Phd.* 74c αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα, ἡ ἰσότης and αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον (all referring to the Form of Equality), 100d εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία (both referring to whatever the relation is between the Form of Beauty and particular beautiful things), and 102c–d τῶι μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων, τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος and τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος (all referring to the shares of Bigness that particular big things have). This use of multiple wordings for a single thing seems to have been a matter of conscious policy, if we may judge by the apologies with which *Tht.* 184c introduces a distinction between seeing ὀφθαλμοῖς and seeing δι' ὀφθαλμῶν: 'It is in general not ill-bred to be nonchalant about words and phrases, and not examine them rigorously; indeed, the opposite attitude is mean-minded; but sometimes it is unavoidable, as for example now . . .' Cf. 358a7–b1n.

332c14 ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῆι: the word ὀξύς applies not only to high voices but also to acute angles (cf. English 'sharp', as applied both to notes and to corners). The opposite of a high voice would be described as βαρύς; the opposite of an acute angle would be described as ἀμβλύς. The qualification ἐν φωνῆι is therefore one way to forestall the objection that ὀξύ is a single thing with two opposites βαρύ and ἀμβλύ. The idea will be that only ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῆι is a single thing, and that ὀξύ generally is not. There is, however, a danger in this way of forestalling objections to the principle that a single thing has just one opposite. For it may make it too easy to claim that a single thing is in fact two: thus 'long' applies both to sticks and to strings; but we should not therefore say that length in a stick is one thing, length in a string another, and length generally not a single thing at all. To avoid this danger, we need more care in specifying the precise grounds for saying that ὀξύ is not a single thing. It may suffice to appeal to the behaviour of comparatives: we can always ask whether a stick is longer than a string; by contrast, while we can always ask whether one note is sharper than another note, and whether one edge is sharper than another edge, we cannot ask whether a note is sharper than an edge; and on these grounds we might distinguish sharpness in notes from sharpness in angles while still identifying length in sticks with length in strings. **c16–17 τούτωι μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ; οὐκ ἔφη:** the μή fishes cautiously for the negative answer that is given with οὔ. Cf. *Meno* 78c–d: Socrates asks μὴ ἄλλ' ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα; and Meno answers οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

333a3 πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; κτλ: by offering Protagoras this choice of assumptions to abandon, Socrates insinuates that, of all the various assumptions which led to the contradiction that Protagoras now faces,

only these two are at all likely to be problematic. **a7–8 οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνάιδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις:** the gibe is all the more apt, since Protagoras has himself affirmed that one goal of education is harmony (326b1–6). Metaphors of harmony were a favourite way to describe logical relationships: consistency between statements (*Phd.* 92c, *Grg.* 457e), consistency between beliefs and emotions (*Laws* 689a–b, quoted in 357e2–3n.), mutual confirmation of statements (*Phd.* 100a), consistency of what one says with what one does (*La.* 188d), the gelling of many words into a single statement (*Sph.* 261d).

333b2 τῆι δὲ ἀφροσύνηι ἑνὶ ὄντι: the participle takes its gender from its complement, rather than from its subject, as in e.g. 354c5 ἡδονήν . . . ἀγαθὸν ὄν and 359d7–8 τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ εὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα. **b4 ὡμολόγησεν:** the aorist indicates that Protagoras' agreement stands out against its background: here, against a background of reluctance to agree (like συνωμολόγησε *Rep.* 342d and ὡμολόγησε *Rep.* 350c); at συνωμολόγησε 358b3, against a background of taking no active part in the conversation. Contrast the imperfects ὡμολόγει 332b10, 356e5, 359c3, 359d9, 360b5, 360b10, 360c7 and συνωμολόγει 332c20, 332e14 to mean 'he gave his assent, and this assent was part of an unbroken pattern of assent.' Cf. also 333d2n. **b5 οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία:** for the identification of these two, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4 (quoted in 329c7–d1n.); for distinctions between them, cf. *Rep.* 442c–d and *Laws* 710a–b. **b5–6 τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν:** Socrates alludes to 330c1–332a1, where he argued that 'justice is either the same as holiness or as much like it as can be' (331b4–5). He says ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ('we thought'), rather than anything equivalent to 'we said', because Protagoras refused to acknowledge this openly at the time, and indeed will not acknowledge it openly until 349d3–5.

333b6–334c6: THE UNITY OF TEMPERANCE WITH JUSTICE?

Socrates starts to present an argument that temperance and justice are a single thing. But he has hardly begun when Protagoras interrupts, with a show-stopping display of bravura rhetoric.

333c2 αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγε . . . τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεί . . . : an elliptical expression of the thought 'I would be ashamed to agree to this point; and the reason why *my reluctance calls for explanation* is that . . .' There are similar ellipses at 335c2, 335c6 and 353a2. Cf. 352d2n. on how dialectic is damaged when people let their answers be governed by shame. **c2–3 πολλοί γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων:** in spite of what Protagoras says here, it is hard to find many, or even any, who said outright that someone can be temperate in committing an

injustice. Popular opinion held the opposite: speakers could expect audiences to agree without argument that those who are temperate are just (Xen. *HG* 7.3.6, Isoc. 15.229). Even Callicles, who is unusual in saying frankly that a strong and sensible man will despise (what conventionally passes for) justice, as fit only for fools and weaklings (*Grg.* 482c–484c), says that such a man will also despise temperance, for exactly the same reason (*Grg.* 491d–492c). Presumably Protagoras has in mind the way that advocates of *Realpolitik* sometimes use σωφροσύνη and its cognates to mean a hard-headed and clear-sighted idea of where one's interests lie, and to claim that σωφροσύνη requires one to forget about considerations of justice. Such an advocate is Diodotus in Thuc. 3.44, but even he does not say that σωφροσύνη requires that injustice be committed, rather than overlooked; for he counsels his fellow Athenians, in their own interests, not to massacre the Mytileneans for rebelling, even if the rebellion was unjust, and they all deserve to be massacred: 'It is not their injustice that we are now debating, if we have any sense [εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν], but our best plan.... We are not in a lawsuit against them, so that we need justice [ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν]; rather, we are planning how to use them to our advantage.' **c4 τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι:** see 317c5–6n. **c8–9 τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι** 'It's the theory that is above all the subject of my scrutiny; nevertheless, a side effect may be that there is some scrutiny of me, the person who asks the questions, and of the person who answers them.' The ἴσως suggests that the scrutiny may not impinge on Protagoras himself; having ἐξετάζεσθαι in the passive, without saying who conducts this scrutiny (cf. 319a8 εἰρήσεται), and mentioning Protagoras solely as τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον, rather than with a personal pronoun like that of ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, reinforces the message of the συμβαίνει that any exposure of flaws in Protagoras is entirely incidental to Socrates' chief purpose: the exposure of flaws in the theory under discussion. Cf. 331c5–d2n. on how a proper test of a theory will also be a test of those who are testing it.

333d1 ἐκαλλωπίζετο: Protagoras continues to act in the manner of a pretty boy pursued by lovers; cf. 317d1. **d2 συνεχώρησεν:** with this aorist, contrast the imperfect συνεχώρει in 332c7 and 332e1: the aorist indicates that Protagoras' agreement stands out against a background of reluctance to agree; the imperfect is used for agreements that are part of an unbroken pattern of agreement. Cf. also 333b4n. **d6, d10 ἔστω** 'Let's suppose that that is so.' In some contexts, to say ἔστω rather than ἔστι can mean that the speaker is being improperly evasive (cf. 331c3–d2); in the present context, it is quite proper, since Protagoras has made it plain that he is adopting his current position only for the sake of argument (333c5–6). **d13 λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι;** the inference seems to be that some things must be good if people sometimes do well (εὖ πράττουσιν 333d11), or more generally perhaps that some things must be good if the adverb εὖ has any application at all, whether with πράττειν or with φρονεῖν or with βουλεύεσθαι

(333d7–11). And these things might be agents, or their characters, or their deeds, or any two or all three of these things (cf. 332b1–c5 and 332b8–9n.). **d15–16 ἆρ' οὖν . . . ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἅ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;** because Protagoras, in his next speech, starts to renege on his agreement to give answers, we never learn where this question was leading. Perhaps Protagoras fears that, after getting him to say that some injustice – the injustice of the sensible people who do well out of their injustice – is a good thing, and that good things benefit people, Socrates will then press him with questions about who is benefited and who harmed by whose justice and by whose injustice. Clarity on such questions might be embarrassing: see 327b2–4n.

333e3 ἀγωνιᾶν: see 329b1n. for other comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sport.

334a1 εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην: precautions are needed, because Protagoras' latest answer shows him already violating one of the rules for productive dialectic: in response to the simple Yes/No question 'Are those things good which benefit people?', he did not simply answer Yes or No, but volunteered the further remark that 'I call things good even if they do not benefit people' (cf. 336b1 on the importance of answering αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, and 314c4n. on Socratic conversation generally). But Socrates' precautions are inadequate, because Protagoras' next answer will show him violating both this and another rule too: that requiring an answer διὰ βραχέων (336b1). **a1 πότερον . . . λέγεις . . . a2–3 ἃ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἃ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα;** Socrates takes care to formulate a question about advantage that can be answered with a simple Yes or No. Care is needed because, as Protagoras' next speech will elaborately illustrate, advantage is not absolute: nothing is advantageous without being advantageous to something, and what is advantageous to one thing may not be advantageous to another. Protagoras liked using such facts to complicate discussion. He reasoned, 'It is plain to you who are present that I am seated [φαίνομαι σοὶ τῶι παρόντι καθήμενος]; but to someone who is absent it is not plain that I am seated [τῶι δὲ ἀπόντι οὐ φαίνομαι καθήμενος]; it is unclear therefore whether I am seated or not seated [ἄδηλον εἰ κάθημαι ἢ οὐ κάθημαι]' (quoted by Didymus Caecus *Commentary on Psalms 29–34*, 222.21–3; not in DK). And Protagoras' doctrine that Man is the Measure (356d3–4n.) held that nothing is anything at all absolutely: things can be some way only for some people, and then only for those people who take them to be that way; and so, no matter how carefully a question is formulated, some might answer Yes, and others No, and both be equally right. Cf. 331d3–332a1, where Protagoras avoids giving straight answers about likeness while pointing out that likeness comes by degrees. **a4–334c6:** another list (316d6–e4n.); as an improvisation by someone who is rattled, it lacks the elaborate structure of the list of animal attributes at 320d7–321b6. **a4 πολλά:** speeches composed by sophists, or under their influence, often start like this, to display the speaker's alertness to complexities that elude lesser men. Such speeches begin:

ὑπὸ πολλῶν (Grg. DK 82 B 7), καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν (Thuc. 1.80.1), οἱ μὲν πολλοί (Thuc. 2.35.1), πολλάκις (Thuc. 3.37.1), ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαί (*Grg.* 448c), ἐν πολλοῖς μέν, ὦ Δημόνικε, πολύ (Isoc. 1.1), πολλάκις (Isoc. 4.1), πολλούς (Isoc. 7.1); cf. also, from close to the start of sophistic works, πολλά (Protagoras DK 80 B 4, quoted in 320d1n. on θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν), πολυειδῆ (Hippias DK 86 B 6, quoted in 337c7–d1n.), and the proem to Pausanias' speech in *Smp.* 180c, pointing out that Love is not a single thing, before proceeding to explain its different forms.

334b1 βλάσταις . . . b2 πτόρθους . . . b3 νέους κλῶνας: the three synonyms display the copiousness of Protagoras' vocabulary. **b3–4 τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασίν ἐστιν πάγκακον:** the use of olive oil for killing unwanted vegetation is described in Thphr. *De causis plantarum* 5.15.6 and *Historia plantarum* 4.16.5. **b6–c1 ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν:** contrast these extracts from Diotima's equally incantatory, but otherwise quite opposite, description of the Beautiful in *Smp.* 211a–b: 'not fine in this way, but foul in that; nor fine at this time but not at that, nor fine for this but foul for that, nor fine here but foul there, as if it were fine to these but foul to those [οὐ τῆι μὲν καλόν, τῆι δ' αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ' ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν], . . . but rather in and of itself always uniform [ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν]'.

334c1 ἐνταῦθα: i.e. in the case of oil; on this idiom, see 323b5n. **c1–2 τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῶι ἀνθρώπωι, τοῖς δ ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον:** according to DK 68 A 29, 'Democritus [a fellow Abderite and intellectual critic of Protagoras: DK 68 B 156] always liked honey, and when someone asked him how to live a healthy life, he replied "By drenching the inside with honey and the outside with oil."' **c3 οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν:** Protagoras' apparent familiarity with medicine may be mere bluff. Apart from this assertion, we have no evidence that any, let alone every, contemporary doctor told the sick to limit their consumption of oil in this way. **c3 τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν . . . c4 μέλλει:** for the switch from plural to singular, see 324a6–b1n. **c6 τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις:** on this use of the article, see 313d1n.

334c7–335c6: SOCRATES GETS UP TO GO

Socrates declares himself unable to cope with Protagoras' long speeches. Protagoras, in spite of his versatility with language, shows no readiness to abandon long speeches in favour of short answers to Socrates' questions. So Socrates gets up to go.

334c8 ἐπιλήσμων τις 'a bit forgetful'; cf. 309c8n.

334d1 καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγηι, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ἦι ὁ λόγος: Socrates acts like the Spartans in a famous anecdote: in response to long pleas from some Samians, they 'replied that they had forgotten [ἐπιλεληθέναι] the first

half, and didn't understand the second'; the Samians' next move was to display a sack with the words 'sack needs grain'; the Spartans replied that 'sack' was one word too many (Hdt. 3.46; cf. 342d5–e4 on Laconic remarks). But there is a difference between Socrates and the Spartans: Socrates subsequently recovers enough of his memory for him to be narrating this entire story. Cf. 359a4–c1nn. on Socrates' oddly selective memory.

335a4 ἀγῶνα λόγων: see 329b1n. for other comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sport. Protagoras was said to have been the first to set up argumentative contests (DK 80 A 1.52 πρῶτος . . . λόγων ἀγῶνας ἐποιήσατο. **a6–7 οὐδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν:** with the way that Protagoras speaks of himself here, cf. Euthyphro in *Euthphr.* 4e–5a 'I would not be much use, Socrates, nor would Euthyphro differ at all from ordinary people, if I did not have an exact knowledge of all such matters.' A hero reflecting on his reputation loves to utter his own name: thus Odysseus in Hom. *Il.* 2.259–61 'may the head of Odysseus rest no more on his shoulders, and may I no more be called the father of Telemachus, if I do not . . .', Nestor in Hom. *Il.* 11.761 'they all prayed to Zeus among gods, and to Nestor among men', Achilles in Hom. *Il.* 19.151 'so that one can again see Achilles among the foremost', Ajax in Soph. *Aj.* 98 'so that they will never dishonour Ajax again'.

335b1 ἔγνων γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν . . . b2 καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι: the indicative mood of ἤρεσεν means that Socrates' knowledge of Protagoras' past dissatisfaction with his answers was more direct than inferential; the optative mood of ἐθελήσοι means that Socrates' knowledge of Protagoras' future reluctance to give answers was more inferential than direct. Cf. *Euthphr.* 16a ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκείνωι ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη παρ' Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά (indicatives, because of the directness of Socrates' knowledge that he has now learnt divinity from Euthyphro, and that he therefore no longer makes it up as he goes along), καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην (optative, because he can hardly have such direct knowledge that he'll do better in future). **b2 ἑκὼν εἶναι** 'voluntarily'. The apparently redundant εἶναι with ἑκών is idiomatic, and is paralleled by other idioms (317a2n.); but there seems to be no explanation for why the idiom has ἑκὼν εἶναι only in that order, and occurs only (as Phrynichus *Eclogae* 239 points out) in the context of a denial or prohibition. **b7–c1 καὶ ἐν μακρολογίαι καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίαι οἷός τ' εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι:** sophists liked to be versatile with words, and the ability to speak at any length (using, for example, the techniques that one of them expounded at Anaximenes *Ars Rhetorica* 22.3–7) was an important part of their versatility. Cf. the boasts of Gorgias and Hippias cited in 315c6n.; Socrates in *Phdr.* 267a–b on Teisias and Gorgias, 'who realised that probability is to be honoured above truth, who made small things seem large, and large small, by the verve with which they spoke, who spoke of novelties in archaic

style, and their opposites in novel style, who devised, for every subject, speeches succinct and speeches interminably long'; and Isoc. 4.8: 'Speeches have such a nature that it is possible to expound the same material in many different ways, to make great things humble, to attach greatness to small things, to go through antiquities in novel style, and to speak in archaic style of what has happened recently.'

335c1–2 ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ' εἶναι: elliptical for 'I cannot cope with these long things, *which is a pity*, since I would have liked to be able to.' There is a similar ellipse at 333c2, and identical ellipses at 335c6, and *Euthphr.* 9b, where Socrates asks Euthyphro to show something to him, and Euthyphro refuses, saying 'But it might take quite a while, *which is a pity*, ἐπεί I could give you a very clear demonstration.' It is tempting to speculate that such ellipses were filled, in actual conversation, by a gesture meaning 'which is a pity'; cf. 311d2–4n. **c3 ἵνα ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο:** this final clause is in the indicative, because the purpose it expresses has been frustrated by a failure to perform the expected action whose purpose it would have been. Cf. the indicative ἀπέφαινες in Demos. 55.6 ἐπιδεῖξαί γέ σ' ἔδει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις χαράδραν οὖσαν, ἵνα μὴ λόγωι μόνον, ὥσπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔργωι τὸν πατέρ' ἀδικοῦντ' ἀπέφαινες ('you ought to have shown everybody that there was a water-course, so that you would have facts, not, as now, mere assertions, to prove that my father was in the wrong'). The imperfect tenses of ἐγίγνετο and ἀπέφαινες show that the frustrated purpose relates to the time of utterance; cf. the imperfect in the protasis of a counterfactual conditional, such as 334d2 εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν ('if I were now hard of hearing – as in fact I am not –'). **c5 ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ:** 309d5–310a1 shows that Socrates had only just left Protagoras when he bumped into his friends, and then settled down to narrate to them this conversation; hence, if real at all, the other engagement that Socrates pleads here and in 362a1–2 can hardly be as urgent as he implies. Such pleas succeed in terminating three other dialogues: *Euthphr.* 15e νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καί μοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι, *Meno* 100b νῦν δ' ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι ἰέναι, and (most movingly) *Ap.* 42a ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένωι, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις. **c5–6 εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον:** the ἐπεί clause explains, not why Socrates is about to leave, but why it is a pity that this is so. For the ellipse, see 335c1–2n.

335c7–338e3: SOCRATES AGREES TO STAY

Reluctant to see the discussion between Protagoras and Socrates end so soon, Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus and Hippias all speak up. Eventually Socrates agrees to stay, on one condition: Protagoras must abandon long and irrelevant speeches and instead adopt, whether as questioner or as answerer, the style of discussion in which questions are put, and receive short and apposite answers.

335c7 ἀνιστάμην: the force of the imperfect is 'I started to get up.' **c7–d1 ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῆι δεξιᾶι, τῆι δ' ἀριστερᾶι ἀντελάβετο**: by taking hold of Socrates to make him stay and speak, Callias does quite the opposite of what the archers do in the Assembly when they drag away people who will not otherwise be silenced (319c5).

335d2 τοῦ τρίβωνος: the τρίβων was a kind of cloak. It was the dress of the Athenian poor (Lys. 32.16, Isae. 5.11), and was therefore capable of being construed as a mark of integrity (Aristides the Just wore one, according to Aeschines *Callias* fr. 75 *SSR*, as does a character called the Just Man in Ar. *Pl.* 882), of philosophic asceticism (Aristophon frr. 9.1–3, 12.7–10 *PCG*, speaks of latter-day Pythagoreans wearing the τρίβων, living on water and vegetables, and never washing), and of Spartan sympathies (Demos. 54.34; cf. 342c2n. on βραχείας ἀναβολάς). Socrates has a τρίβων also in *Smp.* 219b, and Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.2 makes much of the simplicity of his clothes. **τουτουί**: Socrates makes some gesture to direct his anonymous companions' attention to the τρίβων. Plato often gives such reminders of the outer and later conversation when the inner and earlier conversation that it narrates has encountered a blockage. It is as if Plato wishes to mark a break in the flow of the conversation narrated by a break in the flow of the narrative. Other examples are 339e4, *Prm.* 136d–e, *Phd.* 88c–89b, *Chrm.* 155c, and *Euthd.* 303a. **d3 οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι**: for the construction with the adverb, see LSJ s.v. εἰμί (*sum*) C.I; cf. 325b3n. on adverbial contructions with γίγνομαι. **d4 οὐδ' ἂν ἑνός**: on emphasising οὐδείς by splitting it, see 328a1n.

335e1 ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι: in the fourth century, admirers of Socrates liked to distinguish philosophers from sophists as good from bad (e.g. *Sph.* 253c, Arist. *Met.* 1004b16–26), and even suggested that the distinction was evident to a bluff hunter (Xen. *Cynegeticus* 13.1–9). Callias would not have been sensitive to any difference. He would have heard Socrates' praise for his φιλοσοφία as praise for his intellectual inquisitiveness about matters transcending everyday practicalities, an inquisitiveness shown by his eagerness to entertain sophists. For in the fifth century, φιλοσοφία meant nothing more specialised than that. Cf. Prodicus' description of those who write speeches for delivery by others as 'halfway between a lover of wisdom and someone engaged in public life [φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ]' (DK 84 B 6); Thuc. 2.40.1, where Pericles boasts on behalf of the Athenians generally that 'we have a not unmanly love for wisdom [φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας]'; and Hdt. 1.30.2, where Solon (343a3n.) is asked by his host in Sardis, 'Stranger from Athens, we have heard a lot about you and your wisdom and your voyages, and how, in your love for wisdom [φιλοσοφέων] you travel long distances in order to view things. This is why the urge now comes upon me to ask you if you have ever seen anyone who was supremely prosperous.' **ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ**: the Attic version of ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω (345d3; cf. 346d8–e2), a phrase from the poem of Simonides that will be discussed in

339a4–347a5. For another such anticipation of that discussion, see 316d7n. **e3 Κρίσωνι τῶι Ἱμεραίωι δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι:** his event was the στάδιον (a distance of just over 202 yards); he was in his prime in the 440s, when he was victorious in three successive Olympiads (D.S. 12.5.1, 12.23.1, 12.29.1). See 329b1n. for other comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sport. **ἕπεσθαι** 'keep up with'. **e4 δολιχοδρόμων:** 'people who run the δόλιχος' a distance equal to twelve στάδια (Heron *Geometrica* 4.13.26). **ἡμεροδρόμων** 'people who run all day long'. It was an Athenian ἡμεροδρόμος, Philippides (or Pheidippides), who, when the Persians landed at Marathon, ran to summon Spartan help; he left Athens one day, and reached Sparta the next (Hdt. 6.105–6), having covered a distance of about 135 miles.

336a1 πολὺ σοῦ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι . . . 'I am far more eager than you are that I should . . .'; literally 'I am asking myself to . . . much more than you are asking me to do this.' σοῦ goes with μᾶλλον and is a genitive of comparison; ἐμαυτοῦ goes with δέομαι and is a genitive giving the person from whom something is asked. **a2 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι** 'But that is neither here nor there; for the fact of the matter is that I can't.' Cf. 310e5n. **a5–b1 ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα:** either Socrates has forgotten the long speech at 320d1–328d2, or he simply does not count it as an answer to any of his questions; cf. 359a4n.

336b2–3 χωρὶς γάρ κτλ 'It's one thing, I would have thought, to have a companionable conversation, and quite another to address a public meeting.' Such distinctions drawn with χωρίς have an air of too-clever-by-half intellectuality. Cf. e.g. Eur. *Alc.* 528 χωρὶς τό τ' εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ νομίζεται (in a conversation with someone who is as reluctant to give straight answers as Protagoras at 331d2–e3); Ar. *Th.* 11 χωρὶς γὰρ αὐτοῖν ἑκατέρου'στὶν ἡ φύσις (sophistic chatter from Euripides); and Soph. *OC* 808 χωρὶς τό τ' εἰπεῖν πολλὰ καὶ τὸ καίρια (from someone who has just been told he is a smart talker). **b2 ἔγωγ' ᾤιμην** is often, as here, used to imply a sarcastic contrast: 'I used to think . . . ; but thanks to you, I now know better.' Cf. e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 4.12 'ᾤιμην ἔγωγε that refusing to commit injustice was a sufficient proof that one was just'; and Ar. *Pl.* 834–6 'κἀγὼ μὲν ᾤιμην that people whom I have hitherto helped when they were in need would be my firm friends, if ever I was in need myself'. **b3 τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν:** on the distinction between conversation and other uses of language, see 314c4n. **b4 ὁρᾶις;** 'Don't you realise . . . ?' This is the idiomatic way in Greek conversation to remind people that they have been ignoring something obvious, which need not be in any literal sense visible (cf. e.g. *Ap.* 24d 'ὁρᾶις that you're silent and cannot speak?', Ar. *Frogs* 1136 'ὁρᾶις that you're talking drivel?'). **b5–6 σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὖ σὺ βούληι:** understand δίκαια δοκεῖς λέγειν κτλ from the previous clause: 'I think that you are saying only what is fair in requesting that you be permitted to converse however you like.' When

the host is so eager that each guest 'converse' as he likes, it is understandable that at 314e3–315d4 Hippias, Prodicus and Protagoras were not conversing with one another at all. (The variant σοὶ for the first σὺ would ascribe to Protagoras a request he has not made: 'I think that Protagoras is saying only what is fair in requesting that he be permitted to converse how he likes, and that you be permitted to converse however you like.') **b7 καλῶς . . . Καλλία:** Plato loves puns on proper names. Other examples are 348b3, 361d2–3, 362a2, *Smp.* 174b (ἀγαθῶν, Ἀγάθωνι), 185c (Παυσανίου, παυσαμένου), 198c (Γοργίου, Γοργόνος), *Rep.* 614b (ἀλκίμου, Ἀλκίνου), *Grg.* 481d δήμου, Δήμου), *Ap.* 25c (Μέλητε, ἀμέλειαν), *Phd.* 80d (ἀιδῆ, Ἅιδου), *Hp. Ma.* 281d (Βίας, ἀναβιοίη).

336c1 διαλέγεσθαι . . . c4 διαλεχθῆναι: Socrates is good at conversing (present, for the activity in general); and pleased if Protagoras owns himself worsted in a conversation (aorist, for a bout of the activity). **c2 λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι:** λόγον is the object of δέξασθαι as well as of δοῦναι (316d7–8n.). The phrase is more or less equivalent to διαλέγεσθαι, in the semi-technical sense of that word whereby it means discussing things according to Socrates' preferred method of question-and-answer (314c4n.). Thus *La.* 187c–d: 'If you care to ἐρωτᾶσθαί τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον about such matters, . . . join Socrates in considering them, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων.' The phrase λόγον διδόναι had a standard use in public administration, as in e.g. *IG* I.iii 52.24–6, an Athenian decree from 434–3 about temple finances: 'Hereafter, those who are the Bursars at the time are to inscribe on a pillar and submit an account [λόγον διδόντων] of the wealth owned by and revenues accruing to the gods, and of any expenditures; they are to give this account annually, to the Accountants, and they are to submit to audit [εὐθύνας διδόντων; cf. 326e2n.].'

336d1 μακρὸν λόγον: see 329b2n. on the disdainful overtones of this phrase. **ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους** 'beating back the arguments'. Alcibiades' metaphor suggests that there is some violence in the sophist's preferred style of talking; cf. *Tht.* 154d–e, quoted in 348a2–3n. **d4 οὐχ ὅτι** is almost 'although'. This turn of phrase concedes that there are things said, whether by the speaker or another, that might seem to count against what the speaker is affirming. Cf. *Tht.* 157b 'the verb "to be" should be totally abolished, οὐχ ὅτι we have often, even now, used it ourselves through force of habit and ignorance'; *Lys.* 219e–220a 'all concern of this kind is not for means, but for the end to which all such things are means, οὐχ ὅτι we often say how highly we value gold and silver'; *Grg.* 450e 'I don't think you wish to call any of these arts rhetoric, οὐχ ὅτι you did say in so many words that rhetoric is the art which has its effect through speech.' **d7–e1 μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἱππία, Καλλίας:** unusually many people are now being drawn into the conversation. Cf. the five different speakers in *Rep.* 449b–450a, another place where Socrates cannot get the conversation to go as he would wish.

336e1 προς Πρωταγόρου 'on Protagoras' side'. See LSJ s.v. πρός A.III.2. **e2** Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσηι: Thuc. 5.43.2 and And. 4.20 also insist on how eager Alcibiades was to come out on top.

337a2 κοινοὺς μέν ... **a3** ἴσους δὲ μή: there is a distinction to be marked between right and wrong kinds of impartiality, as Inspector Bones belatedly realises in Stoppard (1972) 45: 'the law is implacable, it makes no distinction between rich and poor, famous and anonymous, innocent and –'. But Greek idiom regularly uses κοινὸς καὶ ἴσος as a phrase for the right kind of impartiality (e.g. *Ep.* 7, 337c, And. 4.7, Demos. 29.1, Arist. *Pol.* 1296a30). And people even described as a form of ἰσότης policies like those that Prodicus recommends in 337a5: 'a larger share for the wiser, a smaller share for the more ignorant'. For when a good has been distributed as justice requires, so that people receive shares in proportion to their merit, then there is an ἰσότης, if not of shares, at least of ratios: the ratio between two people's degrees of merit will be equal to the ratio between their shares of the good (*Laws* 756e–758a, Isoc. 7.21, Arist. *EN* 1131a10–b24). Such an equality of ratios is called 'geometrical' (ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρική *Grg.* 508a; cf. *EN* 1131b13), by contrast with a merely 'arithmetical' equality in which all, regardless of merit, get shares of the same size. **a6** ἐγὼ μέν: see 312c7n.

337b1–2 ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή: for the distinction, cf. *Lys.* 207c, where one of a pair of friends is happy to say ἀμφισβητοῦμεν about a question that would not arouse rancour, and Socrates puts it to them that ἐρίζοιτ' ἂν about a question that might well do so. The word ἐριστική later became more or less a technical term for a style of dialectic which stops at nothing in its quest for victory, and which can be compared to fighting dirty and to cheating in a competition (Arist. *SE* 171b22–6).

337c2 εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα: as subversive prelude to an argument which will assume that pleasures are all homogeneous, and differ only in quantity (354c9–d1n.), Plato has Prodicus' distinctions culminate in a distinction about pleasure (cf. 340b1–2n. and 358e1n. on the subversive effects of his distinctions between types of desire, and between types of apprehension). Pleasure was a topic on which Prodicus' distinctions were particularly famous. According to Aristotle (DK 84 A 19), he divided ἡδοναί into χαρά, τέρψις and εὐφροσύνη (cf. 358a7n.); and in a list (316d6–e4n.) given in Xenophon (DK 84 B 2.24), he included the six different words: κεχαρισμένον, τερφθείης, ἡσθείης, εὐφρανθείης, μαλακώτατα, and ἀπονώτατα. Prodicus' distinction here between εὐφραινοίμεθα and ἡδοίμεθα accords with Greek idiom, which tends to reserve εὐφροσύνη for high-minded pleasures, and which applies ἡδονή to pleasures generally, and to low-minded ones in particular: cf. e.g. Xen. *Hr.* 7.4 'No human ἡδονή seems closer to the divine than the εὐφροσύνη connected with honour', and *Tim.* 80b ἡδονὴν μὲν τοῖς ἄφροσιν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ τοῖς ἔμφροσιν. **c5–6** ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ

Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο: Prodicus' speech might not have been so readily accepted if it had actually contained a concrete answer to the question: long speeches, or short question-and-answer? **c6** ὦ ἄνδρες: see 314d5n. **c7–d1** ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι: this conception of a unity among all the wise, which Hippias is to discern and foster, seems to have belonged to the historical Hippias himself. Thus in DK 86 B 6 he begins an oration with this list (316d6–e4n.) of sources of wisdom: 'Of these things, some may have been said by Orpheus, some by Musaeus – in short, by different people in different places, some by Hesiod, some by Homer, some by other poets, some in prose works, whether by Greeks or by barbarians – but I have put together from all these sources their most important elements, which are all kin to one another [ὁμόφυλα], and thus will I deliver this novel and multifarious oration.' The irony is that it was Socrates who brought into a single conversation the rival sophists whom he found, each with his own audience, in a different part of Callias' house (314e3–317e2). **c7** ὑμᾶς: by not explicitly including himself in the unity that he is describing, Hippias contrives to suggest that he somehow stands above it, just as he is no ordinary contributor to the synthesis that he describes in DK 86 B 6. Cf. 338a4n. on ὑμῖν. συγγενεῖς . . . οἰκείους: separately or together, these words (which a Prodicus would distinguish as 'of the same ancestry' and 'members of a single household'; cf. 338a4n.) amount to 'belonging to the same family', with the implication of owing one another decent treatment. In *Rep.* 470c, Socrates declares that the Greeks are all of one family (τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὑτῶι οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ συγγενές), and of a different family from the rest of humanity. From this, Socrates infers that Greeks should not enslave Greeks, or destroy their farmland or burn their homes (471a–b); and Glaucon infers that Greeks should do precisely those things to barbarians (471b). Where people share Glaucon's presumption that one need not be nice to those outside the family, it is more or less inevitable that Hippias should describe as all belonging to the same family those whom he wants to be nice to one another. **c7–d1** πολίτας: Greeks did not always find it easy to accept that one might be concerned for people beyond one's own πόλις. An extreme instance is a fifth-century Athenian epitaph, which describes its subject first as 'having slain seven men, and having broken off seven spears in their bodies', and then as 'having harmed no man upon the earth'; the seven were not Athenians, and so did not count (*IG* I.iii 1353). This background explains why Hippias, when he wants to unite people whom he knows to be from many different πόλεις, should describe them all as fellow citizens. This background explains also why the Stoics, to express their view that moral ties unite all rational beings, spoke of the whole κόσμος as a single πόλις (Cic. *De legibus* 1.23, *De finibus* 3.64).

337d1 φύσει, οὐ νόμωι: the contrast that Hippias invokes was a favourite in fifth- and fourth-century thought. It typically amounts, as here, to a contrast, or bundle of contrasts, between the single way that things are in actual fact, or by

rights, or when uninterfered with, and the multiple ways that people perversely take, or make, things to be. Cf. e.g. Antisth. fr. 179 *SSR* 'κατὰ νόμον there are many gods, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν there is only one'; *Laws* 889e, expounding the view of atheist materialists that 'gods exist οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισιν νόμοις, and what is more, vary from place to place, in accordance with the agreements that different groups have made among themselves νομοθετούμενοι'; Isoc. 4.105, calling it a reproach to oligarchies that in them the impoverished masses, 'although they are φύσει citizens, are νόμωι deprived of citizenship'; and Arist. *Pol.* 1253b21–3, expounding an argument of some who thought that 'holding slaves is παρὰ φύσιν. For it is νόμωι that one man is a slave, while another is free; φύσει there is no difference; which is why holding slaves is not just either, for it is βίαιον', and 1255b12–15, concluding that slavery is 'beneficial for both master and slave when they are φύσει counted as such', while conceding that slavery is 'the opposite for those that are instead κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι'. With the disdain for νόμωι diversities that Hippias here evinces, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.14, where he asks Socrates, 'How could anyone suppose that either νόμοι or obedience to them are worth much, when often the very people who have made them find them wanting and make new ones?' A minority saw νόμος as instead a force for homogeneity, obscuring a diversity that exists φύσει. The undemocratic among them celebrated φύσις and the rule of the strong over the weak (Callicles in *Grg.* 482e–484c), but the democrats celebrated νόμος and equal shares for all (Demos. 25.15–16). There does not seem to have been anyone who disdained φύσις for being drably uniform, and celebrated νόμος for producing a rich diversity. **ὅμοιον τῶι ὁμοίωι:** the idea that like is attracted to like goes back to Hom. *Od.* 17.218 αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον. *Lys.* 214a–216b cites this line, adds that the idea was often exploited in the writings 'about nature' (315c5n.) of the 'wisest' authors (an extant example is Emp. DK 31 A 20a, B 90), and then subjects the idea to ingenious development and criticism. **d2 νόμος, τύραννος:** the collocation of these two words has a pleasingly paradoxical sound, for the contrast between law and tyranny is an utter commonplace: cf. Eur. *Supplices* 429–32: 'Nothing is more hostile to a city than a tyrant: in the first place, there are no laws common to all, but power lies in the hands of a single individual, who keeps the law all to himself'; Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.12: Socrates held that 'tyranny is rule over people who do not consent, and that is in accordance, not with the laws, but with the ruler's wishes'; Aeschin. 1.4: 'Tyrannies and oligarchies are administered according to the attitudes of those in charge, whereas cities where the people have power are administered according to the established laws'; Thuc. 3.62.3: 'totally opposed to laws and the most temperate constitution, and closest to a tyrant'; and Philemon fr. 31.2–3 *PCG:* 'He and you and thousands of others are governed by law, others again are governed by a tyrant, and tyrants are governed by fear.' This pervasive contrast between law and tyranny did not prevent people suggesting (like Alcibiades in Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.40–6), or even affirming outright (like Thrasymachus in *Rep.* 338e, and Sisyphus in Crt. DK 88 B 25.5–6) that there is no difference between the commands of the

law and those of a tyrant. It merely made such thoughts more piquant. **d3 βιάζεται:** cf. *Rep.* 359c expounding what the common sophistic view of justice (cf. 322b5–c1n.) says about πλεονεξία, the desire to have more than others: 'φύσις in its entirety πέφυκεν to pursue this as good, but νόμωι it is led astray βίαι to value equality'; and Arist. *Pol.* 1253b21–3, 1255b12–15, quoted in 337d1n., on νόμωι slavery as βίαιον. Such thoughts are the more piquant, in that the term βία suggests, not merely compulsion, but compulsion by lawless violence. Hence νόμος and βία are contrasted in e.g. Xen. *HG* 6.3.8 'not in order to rule νομίμως, but in order to seize cities βίαι' and Demos. 10.4 'wishing not to rule anyone βίαι, nor to be another's slaves, but to live as equal citizens in freedom and νόμοις'. Speakers who want to allow that νόμος rightly and properly uses compulsion call such compulsion ἀνάγκη instead, as Lys. 2.61 (of people doing the right thing in the right spirit) οὐχ ὑπὸ νόμου ἀναγκασθέντες, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως πεισθέντες, and Xen. *Hr.* 3.9 (on how the love of kin for kin is both natural and legally required) φύσει πεφυκότων μάλιστα φιλεῖν καὶ νόμωι συνηναγκασμένων. **d4 σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων:** presumably Hippias means this as tantamount to 'wisest of the wise', so that Callias owns the supreme house in the supreme city in the supreme country in the world, and so that Callias' guests are the complete opposite to τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων of 337e1–2. Hellenic chauvinism of this sort may be inconsistent with the thought that only natural differences matter; but there is no reason to think that Hippias would be troubled by such an inconsistency. **d5 τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας:** according to Ath. 5.187d–e, the Delphic oracle called Athens ἑστίαν καὶ πρυτανεῖον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ('the hearth and town hall of the Greeks'), Pindar (= fr. 76 Maehler) called Athens Ἑλλάδος ἔρεισμα ('the buttress of Greece') and Thucydides (not in his *History*, but in a poem transmitted as *Anth. Pal.* 7.45) called Athens Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάδα. Athenaeus could also have quoted Pericles in Thuc. 2.41.1, summing up his description of Athens by calling it τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν.

337e1 τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον 'worthy of this reputation'. Neither this, nor any other translation that catches the meaning, catches also the fact that Hippias juxtaposes two words from the same root. Perhaps then the two words felt far enough apart in meaning for their juxtaposition to feel incongruous (unlike, for example, Protagoras' variations on νείμω in 320d5–321a2, and on γράφω in 326d2–5). The juxtaposition would then be an extreme instance of the neglect for differences of meaning that Hippias shows elsewhere in this speech (338a4n.).

338a3 ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις: poets loved to describe their poems as chariots (e.g. Bacch. 5.176–8, Pind. *O.* 6.22–8), and Parmenides and Empedocles gave such descriptions of philosophical ideas (DK 28 B 1.1–21, 31 B 3.3–5). The charm of the metaphor was that the ancients had no means of locomotion with more glamour and speed than a chariot. When Hippias tells

Socrates to give his arguments free rein, it is like telling someone to give a sports car full throttle. **a4 μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι . . . εὐσχημονέστεροι:** Hippias, no doubt pointedly, shows how he differs from Prodicus by using these two words without a careful distinction between them; cf. 337c7n. on συγγενεῖς . . . οἰκείους, 337e1n., 338a7–b1n. ὑμῖν suggests, as the variant ἡμῖν would not, that Hippias is somehow above the fray; cf. 337c7n. **a5 πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα:** the κάλως is the rope used to control how much sail is unfurled to catch the wind, and 'loosing the κάλων' is as common a metaphor as our 'pulling out all the stops'. Ar. *Knights* 756–7 uses it in connection with putting every effort into λόγοι: 'Now you must shake out all your reefs [νῦν δή σε πάντα δεῖ κάλων ἐξιέναι σεαυτοῦ], and wield a forceful air and inescapable arguments [λόγους ἀφύκτους] with which you will outdo him.' **a5–6 τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων:** the image of the high seas of discourse is found also, though much less lavishly developed, in *Prm.* 137a, where Parmenides doubts his ability, at his age, 'to swim through τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων'. For those who navigate by picking their way past the coasts and islands of the Aegean, the image implies discourse which leaves you simply not knowing where you are. **a6 ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν:** i.e. getting so far away from the land that it sinks beneath the horizon. To describe Protagoras as 'concealing the land' suggests that his speech has an awesome power, like the spells whereby Thessalian witches were thought to pull the moon down (e.g. *Grg.* 513a τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας). There is a similar suggestion in Callimachus *Epigram* 2.3 Pfeiffer ἥλιον ἐν λέσχῃ κατεδύσαμεν ('we sank the sun in conversation'). **a6–7 μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν** 'both sail down the middle', and hence 'make a compromise' (as in *Laws* 793a). At least, that is the meaning that Hippias hopes to convey by this phrase. But, in his excitement with his metaphors, he has forgotten that the phrase has unhelpful resonances activated by his recent talk of πέλαγος. In Hom. *Od.* 3.174–5, Nestor describes how a portent resolved his dilemma over which of two cautious island-hugging routes to take, both well south of the direct route to Euboea. The portent told him instead πέλαγος μέσον εἰς Εὔβοιαν | τέμνειν ('sail to Euboea right across the middle of the open sea'). A phrase with this antecedent is not the happiest metaphor for compromise between Socratic brevity and Protagorean voyages εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων. **a7 ποιήσετε:** like ἐπιστατήσετε in 338e2, and like the future indicatives of military English ('The whole line will advance!'), Hippias' future indicative has something of the force of an imperative. Cf. the interweaving of the future indicative with other constructions in the lesson at Antiphanes fr. 57.15–20 *PCG:* δεῖ καρκινοῦν . . . ἐγχέαι . . . ἀφήσεις . . . βλέπε . . . ποιήσεις . . . μάνθανε. **a7 ῥαβδοῦχον . . . ἐπιστάτην . . . b1 πρύτανιν:** on Hippias' failure to distinguish between these three, see 338a4n. A ῥαβδοῦχος or 'stickholder' was named from the stick he carried as his sign and instrument of office; when refereeing an athletic or dramatic competition, he might use his stick to discipline unruly competitors (Thuc. 5.50.4, Ar. *Peace* 734). Meetings of the Athenian Assembly were supervised by a body of πρυτάνεις, under the

chairmanship of an ἐπιστάτης. The ἐπιστάτης controlled what questions could be put to the meeting (see *Ap.* 32a–c, *Grg.* 473e–474a, Xen. *HG* 1.7.14–15, *Mem.* 1.1.18, 4.4.2 on how Socrates exercised this control on the day when he was allotted this job); and anyone who attempted to speak out of turn was liable to be dragged away on the orders of the πρυτάνεις (319c5–6n.).

338b1–2 τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἑκατέρου: Hippias concludes his speech with what may be an allusion to Prodicus, who 'claimed that he alone had discovered the art of what speeches one was to have, and that one was to have speeches that were neither long, nor short, but properly measured [οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων ἀλλὰ μετρίων]' (*Phdr.* 267b; cf. 335b7–c1n. for rival sophists' claims about the length of speeches). **b5 αἰσχρὸν εἴη βραβευτὴν ἑλέσθαι τῶν λόγων:** a βραβευτής is a referee or umpire: see 329b1n. for other comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sport. Dialectic generally seeks to negotiate an agreement between the parties to the discussion, regardless of any exterior authority. Thus in *Grg.* 471e–472c, Socrates reproves Polus for appealing to the evidence of public opinion: Socrates and Polus may invoke the testimony of one another, but not of any third party. The refusal of dialectic to defer to exterior authority sounds agreeably high-minded; it can, however, be quite sinister when the dialectic is between unequals, and the weak would welcome an exterior authority to stop the strong being judges in their own case. Thus at the start of their dialogue with the Melian authorities (Thuc. 5.85), the Athenian ambassadors tell them κρίνετε ('you are to be the judges'), rather than the Melian masses (οἱ πολλοί), who might be bamboozled by a continuous speech (ξυνεχεῖ ῥήσει; cf. 329b2 μακροὺς λόγους), not subject to criticism (ἀνέλεγκτα; cf. 347e6 ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι); and the Melian authorities respond that mutual instruction (διδάσκειν . . . ἀλλήλους; cf. 327b5 ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν) is all very well, but in this dialogue the Athenians too are there as κριταί (Thuc. 5.86.1). With Socrates' refusal to countenance umpires for dialectic, contrast *Laws* 640a, where it is agreed that 'in all gatherings and associations for the purpose of any activity whatsoever, the right thing is in each case to have a ruler'.

338c1 ὥστε ἐκ περιττοῦ ᾑρήσεται 'so that his election will turn out to have been pointless'. For this use of the future perfect, cf. *Hp. Mi.* 287e–288a, where the speaker expects that any answer he gives will be subject to ruthless attempts at refutation: 'If I give this answer, then my answer will turn out to be [ἀποκεκριμένος ἔσομαι] both apposite and correct, and I will never be refuted.' (ᾑρήσεται, the future perfect passive third person singular indicative of αἱρέω, is to ᾕρηται (e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.19), its counterpart in the perfect tense, what λελείψεται (e.g. Xen. *An.* 2.4.5) is to λέλειπται (e.g. *Laws* 695c), λελέξεται (e.g. *Rep.* 457b) to λέλεκται (e.g. *Laws* 732e), and λελύσεται (e.g. Demos. 14.2) to λέλυται (e.g. Demos. 25.25). LSJ s.v. αἱρέω nevertheless classify ᾑρησεται here as a rare form of the simple future.) ἀλλὰ δή is a standard device for a speaker to introduce an objection

that he is about to dismiss. It is of course used more often in oratory than in dialectic. Other Platonic examples in long speeches are at *Ap.* 37c and *Cri.* 54a. **c2 ἀδύνατον . . . ὥστε:** for the construction, cf. *Phdr.* 269d τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι . . . ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι ('the ability to become a perfect competitor'); Hdt. 6.136.2 οὐκ ἀπελογέετο (ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ) ('he did not speak in his own defence (this was because, what with his thigh going septic, he was unable to do so)'); Hipp. *On the sacred disease* 20 οὐδὲ οἶδα ἔγωγε τίνα δύναμιν ἔχουσιν αἱ φρένες ὥστε φρονέειν τε καὶ νοέειν ('I don't know what capacity the diaphragm has for thought and understanding'). **c3–4 εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ** 'if you are going to choose someone who is not superior to Protagoras and nevertheless say that he is superior, then . . .' **c5 ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει:** i.e. 'I am talking so much about politeness to Protagoras, since I am not concerned about politeness to me.'

338d2–3 ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῶι δεῖξαι ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι: Socrates' narrative will not explain how successfully he takes himself to have kept this promise to try to show how to answer questions, or where he would place the blame for any failure. Certainly, he soon ceases to speak with the brevity and relevance that in 336a5–b1 he claimed were the marks of a good answer. But then, Protagoras puts no questions to him after 339d6. **d4–5 λόγον ὑποσχέτω:** the phrase is standard when officials and others submit to public scrutiny their accounts of their activities (e.g. *Laws* 774b, Xen. *HG* 1.7.4. Demos. 19.95, Grg. DK 82 B 11a.28; cf. 336c2n.). The insinuation therefore is that if Protagoras does not answer Socrates' questions, then he has something to hide. And Protagoras can hardly resist this insinuation, while still maintaining, as he did at 326d6–e2, the importance of public scrutiny for making and keeping us virtuous.

338e1–2 τούτου ἕνεκα: i.e. simply in order to get Protagoras to take part in dialectic. This qualification renders Socrates' advice that all should be ἐπιστάται consistent with his refusal at 338b4–5 to appoint any ἐπιστάτης to regulate the length of speeches. **e2 ἐπιστατήσετε:** for future indicatives with imperative force, see 338a7n.

338e4–339d8: PROTAGORAS PERPLEXES SOCRATES

Protagoras agrees to resume discussion by question and answer. This time round, he will ask the questions. He asks Socrates about a poem by Simonides. Socrates agrees that the poem is well written. Protagoras asks how the poem can be well written, given that the poet contradicts himself, by saying that it is hard to be good, and then criticising Pittacus for saying exactly the same thing.

The *Protagoras* is itself our main source of evidence about this poem of Simonides. Many other works quote the poem, but their quotations at most

corroborate, rather than supplement, the quotations in the *Protagoras*. The poem has been variously reconstructed and interpreted. Two rival accounts, with ample references to their predecessors, are Hutchinson (2001) 46–8, 291–306, and Beresford (2008). To judge from 347c1–e6, Plato would not be surprised by such variety.

This commentary follows Beresford, and presumes that the gist of Simonides' poem is: 'For a man, it is hard to be perfectly good [339b1–3]. In fact, only a god could be perfectly good [341e3]. This is because men can be overwhelmed by disasters; and when they are, they cannot help being bad [344c4–5]. For a man can be good only so long as he is in good circumstances; and bad circumstances will make a man bad himself [344e6–7]. Pittacus was wrong to say that it is hard to be good: unlike perfect goodness, mere ordinary goodness is readily attainable [339c4–6]. We should be satisfied if people have mere ordinary goodness [346c2–8]. If we want to be dissatisfied, there is an endless supply of fools to be dissatisfied with; and we should regard things as good enough, so long as they are not positively faulty [346c9–13]. So I won't go looking for the impossible, a perfectly and unshakeably good man – though if I do come across one, I'll let you know [345c6–11]. I will applaud all men, so long as they achieve mere ordinary goodness and do nothing disgraceful voluntarily. And as for the fact that they would do disgraceful things when overwhelmed by disaster – well, remember that even gods are subject to necessity [345d3–6].'

We may think of the poem as composed of stanzas, each of which contains ten lines, as in the following scheme:

– ⏑⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ – –
⏑⏑ – – – ⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑ –
– ⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑ – × – ⏑ –
⏑⏑ – ⏑ – – ⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑ –
– ⏑ – ⏑⏑ – ⏑ –
⏑⏑ – ⏑ – – ⏑ – ⏑⏑ –
– – ⏑ – – ⏑ – ⏑⏑ –
⏑ – – ⏑ – –
– ⏑ – ⏑⏑ – –
– ⏑ – ⏑ – –

To accommodate all the quotations in the *Protagoras*, the original poem must have contained at least three such stanzas. On the reconstruction followed in this commentary, the poem contained exactly three such stanzas, and every line of the poem was quoted, or at least paraphrased, in the *Protagoras*.

338e7–339a2 ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή: according to *Phdr.* 267c, ὀρθοέπειά γέ τις was 'among Protagoras' many fine contributions'. The allusion may be to the title of a book: *Correctness of words* or *Correctness of verses*. Democritus wrote a book about Homer with a similar subtitle (DK 68 B 20–5 περὶ Ὁμήρου ἢ ὀρθοεπείης καὶ γλωσσέων).

Samples of what might be discussed under such a heading include: Does Homer get charioteering right in the advice on the subject that he has one of his characters deliver (*Ion* 537a–c)? Given the nasty fate foretold for Oedipus before he was ever born, was Euripides right to have a prologue say that he was 'happy to begin with' (Ar. *Frogs* 1176–86)? Since no painter would ever use purple when painting the face of a beautiful boy, how could it have been right for Phrynichus to describe blushing cheeks as purple (Ion *FGH* 392 fr. 6)? For a lower estimate than Protagoras' of the value of literary criticism, see Socrates' speech at 347b7–348a8.

339a6 Σιμωνίδης: Simonides' long career as a poet spanned the end of the sixth and the start of the fifth centuries. Eup. fr. 148.1–2 *PCG* decried him as old-fashioned; Ar. *Clouds* 1355–62, a work set around the time of the *Protagoras*, represents him as a favourite poet of the older generation, and as despised by a youngster with a sophistic education. **Σκόπαν τὸν Κρέοντος ὑὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ:** for tales about his patronage of Simonides, see Simonides frr. 510, 521, 529 *PMG*. It is said that another Scopas, who was a later member of the same dynasty, offered Socrates his patronage, but the offer was rejected (D.L. 2.25).

339b1–2 ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν: this is the start of Simonides' poem (343c7–d1). Simonides meant that it is difficult for a man to be perfectly good. He had in mind two contrasts: first, a contrast of men with gods, who find perfection easy; and second, a contrast of perfect goodness with the imperfect goodness that men can achieve in prosperity and will lose when disaster strikes. **b3 τετράγωνον** 'square', and not simply 'having four corners'. With its metaphorical use here as a term of praise, cf. English idioms like 'square meal' and 'fair and square'. The metaphor was not felt to be especially vivid (Arist. *Rh.* 1411b24–7). Pythagoreans were much taken with the metaphor: they developed fanciful theories that square goes with such things as good and light and male, while oblong goes with bad and dark and female (DK 58 B 5), and that 'justice is a number of the form *n* times *n*' (DK 58 B 4).

339c4 τὸ Πιττάκειον 'the saying of Pittacus'. Pittacus was ruler of Mytilene in Lesbos in the late seventh and early sixth centuries BC. He was to appear regularly on lists of the Seven Sages (343a4n.). **c6 χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι:** Pittacus, so the story goes, heard one day that another ruler had started well, but turned into a tyrant; fearing that he might himself be corrupted in such a way, Pittacus asked to be released from office; when his subjects asked why, he replied, 'It is hard to be good' (scholion on *Rep.* 435c = scholion on *Hi. Ma.* 304e). Socrates endorses Pittacus' thought in *Grg.* 526a: 'It is hard, Callicles, and highly praiseworthy, to live out one's life justly when one has great opportunities for injustice.' This sort of goodness – the goodness that it takes to act well when one can get away with acting badly – differs from the perfect goodness of which Simonides spoke at the start of his poem: the goodness that it takes to act well at all times and in all circumstances,

even those disasters that would forcibly prevent any ordinary mortal from acting well. Thus it is quite consistent for Simonides to call perfect goodness difficult, while thinking this lesser sort of goodness easy. **c10 ἐφοβούμην μή τι λέγοι** 'I was afraid that he might have a point.'

339d7–8 ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει: cf. *Meno* 95d–96b, where Socrates argues that the poet Theognis proves his incompetence as a teacher of virtue by contradicting himself on whether virtue is teachable.

339e1–342a5: PRODICUS HELPS SOCRATES

Socrates calls on Prodicus to help him show that Simonides' poem does not after all contradict itself. With the support of Prodicus, Socrates makes two suggestions. First, there is a difference between εἶναι and γενέσθαι: Simonides meant that it is difficult to become *good, and that, once one has become good, it is easy thereafter to* be *good. Second, although χαλεπόν usually means 'difficult', it means 'bad' in the dialect of Ceos: when Simonides criticised Pittacus for calling goodness χαλεπόν he was criticising him for saying that goodness is a bad thing. Protagoras is not impressed by either suggestion. Socrates says that Prodicus has been teasing and testing Protagoras, and offers to give his own account of what the poem means.*

339e2–3 ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς: see 329b1n. for other comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sport. This comparison recurs in *Euthd.* 303a ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου (where Socrates is again the victim of the dialectical blow), and in *Smp.* 218a πληγείς τε καὶ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίαι λόγων and *Phlb.* 22e καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων (where he is the perpetrator). **e4 ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τἀληθῆ:** on the interruption of the narrative by this reminder of the conversation between Socrates and his anonymous companion, see 335d2n. on τουτουΐ. **e6–340a1 σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης:** as often, the μέντοι marks a parenthetical clause explaining why the addressee is being addressed (*GP* 400).

340a1 δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῶι ἀνδρί 'you're the right person to come to the man's rescue'. **a4–5 φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ σχῶμεν:** quoted from Hom. *Il.* 21.308–9. The passage continues 'since soon he will sack [ἐκπέρσει, whence 340a7 ἐπέρσηι] the great city of Lord Priam'. Protagoras pronounced on the passage to which these lines belong. Parts of his pronouncement survive in a fragmentary scholion on Hom. *Il.* 21.240: 'Protagoras says that the ensuing episode of the battle between Xanthus [cf. Hom. *Il.* 20.73–4: 'the great river with deep whirlpools, whom gods call Xanthus but men call Scamander'] and the mortal [i.e. Achilles] has occurred in order to make a break in [διαλαβεῖν; see 346e2–3n.] the battle [sc. between the two mortals Achilles and Hector], to make the transition to the Battle of the Gods [Hom. *Il.* 21.328–520], and perhaps also

to give grandeur to Achilles, and, by first wearying him with the earlier dangers, to . . .' (DK 80 A 30).

340b1 μουσικῆς: see 318e3n. **b1–2 τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄν:** ἐπιθυμεῖν is used in particular for bodily appetites such as hunger and thirst (*Rep.* 437b διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας) and lust (318a2–3n.), and for yearnings and cravings generally; βούλεσθαι by contrast is used for desires that are more calculated and reasoned. Thus Xen. *An.* 2.6.21: 'he was evidently ἐπιθυμῶν to be very rich, ἐπιθυμῶν to hold office, so that he might make greater acquisitions, and ἐπιθυμῶν to be honoured, in order to make greater gains; he also ἐβούλετο to be a friend of the most powerful people, in order to avoid paying the penalty for his crimes'. Aristotle is therefore entirely in line with usage when, in a classification of desires that goes back to *Rep.* 435d–441c, he distinguishes ἐπιθυμεῖν from βούλεσθαι by saying that the former is for what one takes to be pleasant while the latter is for what one takes to be good (e.g. *EE* 1235b18–22, *Rh.* 1369a1–4). If the distinction is right, then there is something wrong with the argument presented in 353c1–356c4, that there is no difference between the pleasant and the good, and no possibility of choosing what one knows to be less good because one takes it to be more pleasant. Cf. 337c2n. on how Prodicus' other distinctions might also subvert that argument, and DK 84 B 7 for another of Prodicus' distinctions between types of desire: 'ἐπιθυμία doubled is ἔρως, and ἔρως doubled turns into μανία.' **b2 ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά:** Socrates means the four distinctions drawn at 337a1–c4. **b2–4 σκόπει εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὑτῶι Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην:** the 'successive γάρ's have the same reference' (*GP* 64–5). Each gives some explanation of Socrates' request 'See whether you agree with me.' The first spells out the precise point on which Socrates wants Prodicus to focus (see *GP* 58–9 on 'explanatory γάρ . . . after an expression . . . conveying a summons to attention'). The second 'gives the motive for saying that which has just been said' (*GP* 60); for such a use of γάρ with an imperative, cf. e.g. Ar. *Peace* 1279 ἀλλὰ τί δῆτ' ἄιδω; σὺ γὰρ εἰπέ μοι οἷστισι χαίρεις ('But what exactly shall I sing? *I ask this because I want you to* tell me what sort of song you like'). **b5 τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι:** when these words are to be contrasted, the contrast between them is basically that εἶναι means being permanently or stably whereas γενέσθαι means being impermanently or unstably. Hence e.g. Emp. DK 31 B 17.11–13 'in one respect, they γίγνονται and have no stable life; in another respect, in that they never cease their perpetual interchanging, they ἔασιν always, changeless in a cycle'; Lys. 14.38 'he wanted γενέσθαι a citizen of Thrace and of every city, rather than εἶναι one of his own fatherland'; and John 8:58 'before Abraham γενέσθαι, I εἰμί'. It is in keeping with this contrast that ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι can be used for growing up to be a good man (as in Xen. *Smp.* 3.5, quoted in 326a1n.), and also for performing well in a battle (as in e.g. Hdt. 1.169.1 'ἄνδρες ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοί, each fighting for his

own land'; Thuc. 5.9.9 'You ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνου yourself, as is right and proper for a ruler of Sparta; and you lot, follow along bravely').

340c3–5 τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν . . . μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς οἴεται Πρωταγόρας, ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῶι λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγεν τὸ "χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν", ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἔμμεναι": it is entirely fanciful to suggest that Simonides made anything of the distinction between γενέσθαι and ἔμμεναι. Cf. the quotation from his poem at 344c4, where he says κακὸν ἔμμεναι and means, even on Socrates' interpretation, coming to be bad, rather than being bad all along.

340d1–2 καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί: Socrates alludes to Prodicus' *Choice of Heracles* (DK 84 B 2), which had the hero at a fork in the road: Vice urged him to take the downward path, promising him lots of pleasures; but he took the upward path, as Virtue urged. The 'many others' would include Epich. DK 23 B 36, 37. These passages from Prodicus and Epicharmus are known to us from Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.20–34, where Socrates quotes them together with the passage of Hesiod that he is about to quote here. **d2 καθ' Ἡσίοδον:** Socrates alludes to *WD* 289–92 'The immortal gods decreed sweat before virtue, and the path to virtue is long and steep and rugged at first; but once you reach the summit, thereupon it is easy, for all its difficulties [τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν | ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν | καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, | ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα].' Simonides himself alluded to this passage in fr. 579 *PMG*. **γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπόν:** in the light of his putative parallel with Hesiod, Socrates is now having Simonides avow that it is difficult to acquire virtue, and thus taking the γενέσθαι at the start of his poem as 'to become'. This is indeed a sense that γενέσθαι can bear (340b5n.), however unlikely it is that Simonides meant it in that sense (339b1–2n.). **d4 ἐκτῆσθαι:** this perfect tense means 'to keep hold of, to possess'; the present κτῆσθαι would mean 'to get hold of, to acquire'. The difference between ἐκτῆσθαι virtue and κτῆσθαι virtue is in effect the difference that Socrates has Simonides make between εἶναι virtuous and γίγνεσθαι virtuous.

340e2 τις: cf. 309c8n. **γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἰώμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ:** a doctor who makes an illness worse is as illogical as a guard who needs guarding, and is therefore rightly found amusing (compare *Rep.* 403e γελοῖον . . . τόν γε φύλακα φύλακος δεῖσθαι, and contrast *Rep.* 457a–b on why it is wrong to laugh at women stripped for exercise). Antiphanes fr. 259 *PCG* and Adespota fr. 727 *PCG* also joke about the illogicality of iatrogenic ailments. Cf. also 355c7–d1n.

341a2–3 ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα: given his own claims at 316d3–e4 about hidden traditions of wisdom, Protagoras can hardly object to this claim by Socrates. Cf. 342b1–2n. **a4–5 ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ**

μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουΐ: Socrates repeats this claim to have been Prodicus' pupil in *Chrm.* 163d, *Meno* 96d, and *Cra.* 384b–c (where he adds that he had been able to afford only the cheap course). Perhaps this indicates a genuine, if limited, respect for what Prodicus had to teach. At any rate, Socrates makes no such claims to have been the pupil of any other sophist. **a7 περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ:** Prodicus' complaint about the idiomatic use of δεινός ('fearsome', whence 'impressive' generally and 'impressively clever' in particular) is like saying that nothing is terribly good because good things can hardly be terrible. Prodicus complained also about the idiomatic use of the word φλέγμα: a word that sounds like words for flame is, he said, hardly right for something so cold and wet as phlegm, which should be called βλέννα instead (DK 84 B 4). **a8 σοφὸς καὶ δεινός:** a less laudatory phrase than ἐπαινῶν might suggest. Hdt. 5.23.2, Soph. *Phil.* 440 and Demos. 19.126 use the phrase for a plausible talker who cannot be trusted.

341b1 ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ: when εἰ introduces an indirect question, and can be translated by 'whether' as well as by 'if', then the clause that it introduces is standardly negated by οὐ, rather than by μή like the protasis of a conditional. Cf. e.g. 351e4–5, Demos. 33.11 ἠρώτα εἰ οὐχ, Hdt. 1.90.4 εἰρωτᾶν εἰ οὐ, Aeschin. 1.135 ἐπερωτῶν εἰ οὐκ, Arist. *Rh.* 1419a10 ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ. **b2–3 λέγει ἑκάστοτε δεινοῦ πλούτου** 'harps on about terrible wealth'. The genitive is more easily translated than explained. If it came with an invocation of a god, it would clearly be a genitive of exclamation (cf. *Euthd.* 303a ὦ Πόσειδον, δεινῶν λόγων, Ar. *Lys.* 967 ὦ Ζεῦ, δεινῶν ἀντισπασμῶν). If it came with some reported speech, it would clearly be a genitive to mark the subject of discourse (cf. *Rep.* 439b τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι . . . , *Laws* 804e εἴποιμ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς . . .). **b6–c1 ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον — δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν:** Prodicus can be expected to know about Simonides' dialect, since they both came from the same city (339e6–340a1).

341c2 κακόν, ἔφη: Prodicus connives with Socrates. Not only is the curt form of this answer just as Socrates would wish (315e5n.); so too is its content. There is more such conniving at 358b3–7. **c8 Λέσβιος ὢν:** and therefore a speaker of the Aeolic dialect of Greek, whose distinctive features are conveniently summarised in Page (1955) 327–9. **ἐν φωνῆι βαρβάρωι τεθραμμένος:** Pittacus' father came from Thrace (Duris *FGH* 76 fr. 75), and the name 'Pittacus' was itself Thracian (Thuc. 4.107.3). But perhaps Prodicus also or instead insinuates that Aeolic itself is too incomprehensible to count as Greek; cf. Ar. *Birds* 1700–1.

341d8–9 σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι 'that he sees fit to be testing you'. It is legitimate, indeed thoroughly worthwhile, to test people dialectically (348a2–5; cf. 311b1–2, 342a1, *Euthd.* 275b); and even novices at dialectic appreciate that

the tester need not be saying what he thinks. Thus in *Tht.* 157c Socrates has just expounded a version of Protagoras' doctrine that Man is the Measure (356d3–4n.), and Theaetetus says, 'I can't tell whether you are saying what you think, or testing me [ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾶι].' Compare 349d1, where Protagoras is offered the chance to save face by agreeing that he made some earlier statement only to test Socrates, and contrast *Ap.* 27e: the setting is a court of law, where litigants do not have the dialecticians' privilege of testing one another and the jury by putting falsehoods to them, and Socrates, after refuting Meletus' charges, says to him, 'You must have brought this writ either because you were testing [ἀποπειρώμενος] us, or because you were at a loss for any genuine wrongdoing to bring against me.' **d9–e1 ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν:** this puts great stress on the name of Simonides. The implication is: 'Whatever Pittacus may or may not mean by χαλεπόν, there is proof that Simonides does not say that the χαλεπόν is bad.' Cf. e.g. Lys. 19.13 ὅτι γε οὐ χρημάτων ἕνεκα, ῥάιδιον γνῶναι ἐκ τοῦ βίου παντὸς καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν τοῦ πατρός (i.e. 'whatever my father's motives were, the entire tenor of his life makes it plain that they were not financial').

341e4–5 οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, "κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι," εἶτα τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν: Socrates has in mind the first sentence of Simonides' poem (ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν κτλ at 339b1–3, summarised by χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν at 340c5) as the place where, if he meant a bad thing by one that is χαλεπόν, Simonides would be saying that it is a bad thing to be good. The statement of 341e3 that 'only a god could have this prize' of being good, being 'the statement that comes immediately after this' (341e1–2), is therefore the second sentence of the poem, and Socrates is, for the purposes of his current argument, conceding to Protagoras that ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι and ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι are different wordings for the same thing. (On an alternative reconstruction, the statement of 341e3 comes further into the poem, immediately after the complaint of 339c4–6 that Prodicus was wrong to say that χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. On this alternative, Socrates has a very peculiar argument against the assumption that Simonides means a bad thing by one that is χαλεπόν. The argument is that when Simonides first criticises Pittacus for saying that it is χαλεπόν to be good, and next asserts that only a god has the prize of being good, Simonides himself would, on this assumption, somehow or other be blasphemously saying that it is a bad thing to be the way that only a god could be.) **e6 ἀκόλαστον . . . καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον:** according to Phylarchus *FGH* 81 fra. 42, 'there are neither courtesans nor pipe-girls [αὐλητρίδας; cf. 347c3–d5] to be seen in the cities of the Ceians'; a Ceian inscription of the fifth century contains laws to prevent extravagance at funerals (*IG* XII.v 593); and, to illustrate the point that having the right laws to curb drunkenness does not guarantee military success, *Laws* 638b cites a battle that the Ceians lost to the Athenians. Contrast 316d4–6 on the luxurious behaviour of Prodicus the Ceian.

342a1–2 λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν 'to test my attitude to – if I may use your expression – verses'. Protagoras used περὶ ἐπῶν at 338c7–339a1. The more usual term for a poem like Simonides' would be ᾆσμα (as in e.g. 341e7), and Socrates is trying to distance himself from Protagoras' application to the poem of a term that was usually confined to epic. The rest of the phrase is characteristic of Socrates, who uses λαβεῖν τινος πεῖραν at 348a2–5 (cf. 348a2–3n. for other talk of testing people by talking), and πῶς ἔχειν for attitudes at 352a6–b2, *Smp.* 174a–b, *Rep.* 456d. **a1 τοῦτο:** see 313a6n. on τὴν ψυχήν.

342a6–343c5: THE MOTIVATIONS OF SIMONIDES

Socrates begins his explanation of Simonides with a long and rambling account of how the Spartans show their love of wisdom by keeping their remarks short and pointed. As a wise man himself, Pittacus imitated the laconic style of speech in the remark that Simonides quotes. This remark was under attack throughout Simonides' poem. Simonides hoped that by refuting such a remark, he would win himself a reputation for wisdom.

342a7 φιλοσοφία: here, as at 335e1, Socrates' audience will take him to mean by φιλοσοφία nothing more technical than intellectual interests, and therefore nothing incompatible with a liking for sophists.

342b1 ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι: Crete and Sparta were both renowned for austerely militarised societies, in which all was so intently focused on victory in war as to leave no scope for intellectual cultivation of any sort (*Laws* 626b–c, Hdt. 1.65.4–5, Arist. *Pol.* 1324b7–9; there is a detailed comparison of the two societies in Arist. *Pol.* 1269a29–1272b23). A speech about the enormous φιλοσοφία of these societies therefore requires the perverse ingenuity of the sophistic speeches that praised the splendours of salt, bees, pebbles, ladles or death (*Smp.* 177b, Isoc. 10.12, Alexander *On starting points for rhetoric* 3.11–12, Cic. *Tusculans* 1.116), defended the innocence of Helen of Troy (Grg. DK 82 B 11), courted a youth with the argument that he should grant his sexual favours to one who does not love him (*Phdr.* 230e–234c), or purported to demonstrate that nothing exists, that even if something did exist, it would not be knowable, and that even if something did exist and were knowable, this knowledge would be incommunicable (Grg. DK 82 B 3). So perverse a speech is a fitting prelude to the perverse interpretation of Simonides that Socrates will give at 343c1–347a5. Cf. 347b1–2n.

342b1–2 σοφισταὶ πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσιν· ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται: everybody knew that Spartans evinced a public disdain for sophists (e.g. the elaborate teasing of Hippias in *Hp. Ma.* 283b–286a relies on its being obvious that not even the most successful travelling sophist can hope to make money in Sparta). Protagoras,

having himself talked so fancifully about hidden sophistic traditions at 316d3–e4, cannot easily object to the fanciful suggestion that this public disdain hides a great respect. Cf. 341a2–3n. **b3** ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὦσιν ὅτι σοφίαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν . . . **b4–5** ἀλλὰ δοκῶσιν τῶι μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείαι περιεῖναι: who can the Spartans hope to deceive in this way? They cannot hope to deceive those who identify ἀνδρεία and σοφία, as Protagoras will in effect do at 360d8–e5. And they could not hope to deceive anyone else either, if ἀνδρεία and σοφία are just two names for one virtue, and if we may in consequence identify the belief that the secret of their success is ἀνδρεία with the belief that the secret of their success is σοφία. But of course, they can hope to produce the one belief without producing the other, even if ἀνδρεία and σοφία are just two names for one virtue. It follows that, even if the good is the same as the pleasant, we should hesitate to infer, as the sophists do at 358b8–c4, that believing a thing to be good is the same as believing the thing to be pleasant. **b4** τοὺς σοφιστάς: see 313a6n. on τὴν ψυχήν. **b6–7** ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας: Ar. *Birds* 1281–3 suggests that Socrates was himself among those tricked into copying the Spartans' most superficial traits: 'In those days, they were all mad on being Spartan [ἐλακωνομάνουν]: they grew their hair, they went hungry, they didn't wash, they Socratesed [ἐσωκράτουν], they carried swagger sticks.' Even Socrates' friends agree that he was like Spartans in superficial ways (cf. 335d2n. on his simple dress, *Smp.* 174a on his infrequent bathing). But they stress also that he liked to praise Spartans for their obedience to their laws (*Cri.* 52e, Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.15; cf. *Rep.* 544c, where Socrates says that the constitutions of Sparta and Crete are inferior only to the ideal constitution that he has been describing). **b7** ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται: they get cauliflower ears from too much boxing. Cf. *Grg.* 515e τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, where ταῦτα are complaints that Pericles has made the Athenians 'lazy, cowardly, money-grubbing chatterboxes', i.e. has made them thoroughly unSpartan.

342c1 φιλογυμναστοῦσιν: the Spartans 'were the first to go naked and strip off their clothes in public' (Thuc. 1.6.5), and even their womenfolk stripped naked for physical exercise (*Laws* 806a, Ar. *Lys.* 82). **c2** βραχείας ἀναβολάς: short cloaks, thrown back over a shoulder. Critias (316a4–5n.) was one of those impressed by Spartan clothes: in his *Constitution of the Spartans*, he described them as 'extremely pleasant and extremely practical to wear' (DK 88 B 34). **c2–3** ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους 'as if it's these things [i.e. the superficialities imitated by Laconophiles] that make the Spartans masters of Greece'. ὡς δή with a participle is 'almost always ironical, sceptical, or indignant in tone' (*GP* 230). **c5** ξενηλασίας: fifth-century Athenians noted the way that Sparta periodically expelled aliens (Ar. *Birds* 1012–13; Thuc. 1.144.2), and sometimes contrasted it with the openness of their own city (Thuc. 2.39.1), an openness exemplified in this gathering at Callias' house. Sparta's

periodic expulsion of aliens was, like its reluctance to allow its own citizens to travel abroad (342c7–d1), part of a policy of preserving its citizens from corruption by luxurious foreign ways (cf. Xen. *Lac.* 14.4, which implies that the policy was being abandoned in the fourth century). A moderate form of such a policy is proposed in *Laws* 949e–953e for an ideal city to be founded in Crete (342b1n.).

342d2–3 εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες: Socrates is here ascribing to intellectual education in these cities something that was notoriously true of Spartan physical education: the women, no less than the men, trained for, and took part in, athletic competitions (e.g. Xen. *Lac.* 1.4, and 342c1n.). Plu. *Sayings of Spartan women* suggests that the intellectual education of Spartan women led to sayings quite as pithy as any of their menfolk's. **d3–4 γνοῖτε δ' ἂν ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω . . . d5 ὧδε:** Socrates apes the orators, who all use such phrases when introducing evidence; cf. Protagoras in 349d5–6, and Aeschin. 3.30 ὅτι δὲ ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων μαθήσεσθε, And. 1.123 ὡς δ'ἀληθῆ λέγω, κάλει μοι τοὺς μάρτυρας, Ant. 6.41 ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ μόνον μάρτυσιν ὑμῖν ἀποδείξω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἃ τούτοις πέπρακται ῥαιδίως γνώσεσθε ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, Demos. 24.146 ὡς δὲ σαφῶς γνώσεσθ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ, Isae. 1.16 ὡς οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγω, κάλει μοι τοὺς μάρτυρας, Isoc. 21.14 καὶ ταῦθ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, αὐτὸς ἂν ὑμῖν Εὐθύνους μαρτυρήσειεν, and Lys. 31. 14 ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ταῦτα πρῶτον ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἀκούσατε τῶν μαρτύρων.

342e2 ἐνέβαλεν is a 'gnomic aorist'. It is gnomic because it formulates some γνώμη or maxim about how conversations with Spartans generally go. It is aorist because in such a conversation the Spartan makes just the one astounding remark. Cf. the variation between gnomic presents and gnomic aorists in *Rep.* 566d–e, on how a tyrant typically acts at the start of his rule: he greets with a smile anyone he meets, he says he is no tyrant, he makes lots of promises, he pretends to be nice to everyone (προσγελᾷ, ἀσπάζεται, φησιν, ὑπισχνεῖται, προσποιεῖται – present, because he does each repeatedly); he has a cancellation of debts and a redistribution of land (ἠλευθέρωσε, διένειμε – aorist, because, for obvious reasons, he can hardly do these things habitually). See 310a2n. for other aorist indicatives without reference to the past. **συνεστραμμένον:** the Spartan's short and powerful phrase is described as if it were a wild beast coiled up ready to pounce. *Rep.* 336b says that the sophist Thrasymachus συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἧκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος. Arist. *Rh.* 1400b34–1401a8 describes how useful 'coiled up and antithetical phrasing [τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν]' will be to the orator who means to reason fallaciously. **e3 ἀκοντιστής:** with the single javelin that this man hurls into the discussion, contrast *Tht.* 180a on the argumentative arrows that fill the quivers of Heracliteans, and *Smp.* 219b on the volley of conversational missiles with which Alcibiades hoped to have

wounded Socrates. Cf. 329b1n. for other comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sport.

343a2 Θαλῆς: he had unsuccessful plans for a federation among the Ionians, and, unlike most others listed here, had a reputation that went beyond statesmanship: it was said that he predicted the solar eclipse of 28 May 585, speculated very profitably on futures in olive presses, and fell down a well while stargazing (DK 11 A 4, 5, 9, 10). A character in Ar. *Birds* 1009 is impressed by someone's brilliance, and exclaims, 'The chap's a Thales!' **Πιττακός:** see 339c4n. **Βίας:** all would have been well had the Ionians followed his far-sighted proposal to unite in a single city (Hdt. 1.170.1–2). His judiciousness was praised by two who were very hard to please: Heracleitus (DK 22 B 39; cf. 104) and Hipponax (fr. 123 *IEG*). **a3 Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος:** i.e. Solon the Athenian (cf. 316e2 Ἀγαθοκλῆς ὁ ὑμέτερος). Solon was archon of Athens in 594–3; he was a legislator and reformer whom at least some Athenians of classical times regarded as the founder of their ancestral constitution. He is unique among these sages in that substantial fragments of what he wrote have come down to us; they are gathered in *IEG*. **Κλεόβουλος** was tyrant of Lindus (Plu. *On the E in Delphi* 385e). Simonides fr. 581 *PMG*, no doubt from the competitiveness specified in 343c1–3, called him a fool for describing a funerary monument as if it were as durable as the works of nature. **Μύσων** was more or less the Socrates of his day. According to Hipponax fr. 63 *IEG*, the Delphic oracle announced that Myson was σωφρονέστατον of all men, as it later announced that nobody was σοφώτερος (*Ap.* 21a) or σωφρονέστερος (Xen. *Ap.* 14) than Socrates. **a4 ἕβδομος:** cf. *Tim.* 20d–e, which speaks of ὁ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφώτατος Σόλων. Such phrases suggest that there was already in Socrates' day a canonical list (316d6–e4n.) of Seven Sages. But these phrases are our earliest evidence for such a list, and later lists of the Seven Sages, although they all agreed with Socrates' in containing Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon, had very varied ways of filling the last three places (D.L. 1.41–2; cf. 343a6–7n.). **Χίλων** was ephor of Sparta in the 550s (D.L. 1.68). Alcidamas found an ingenious way to reconcile Chilon's reputation for wisdom with his high position in Sparta: 'Everybody honours sages: at any rate, the Parians have honoured Archilochus, in spite of his insults; the Chians have honoured Homer, although he was no citizen; the Mytileneans have honoured Sappho, in spite of her being a woman; and the Lacedaimonians even made Chilon a member of their Senate, although they of all people have the least love of rational discussion' (part of a list (316d6–e4n.) quoted in Arist. *Rh.* 1398b10–15). From Chilon's name was formed the adjective Χειλώνειος, for brevity of utterance (D.L. 1.72). **οὗτοι:** the repetition of the pronoun from τούτοις in the previous sentence provides all the connection that is needed; cf. 315b3n. **a6 αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν:** their expertise, according to many, was not to be distinguished from that of Protagoras. Hdt. 1.29.1 called Solon a sophist. Demos. 61.50 held that Solon 'laboured on, above all, becoming one of the Seven Sophists'. Isoc. 15.235 said 'Solon was called one of the Seven

Sophists, and took the title that is now dishonoured and condemned.' Isocrates' pupil Androtion (315c4n.) 'spoke of the Seven Sophists, meaning of course the Sages, and even referred to Socrates, *the* Socrates, as a sophist' (*FGH* 324 fr. 69). By contrast, Aristotle's pupil Dicaearchus said that the Seven were 'neither sages nor philosophers, but pretty shrewd folk, good at legislation [οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε φιλοσόφους . . . συνετοὺς δέ τινας καὶ νομοθετικούς]' (fr. 30 Wehrli). **a6–7 ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα ἑκάστωι εἰρημένα:** this description is certainly true of the *Apophthegms of the Seven Sages*, compiled by Demetrius of Phalerum in the late fourth or early third century BC (DK 10.3; the Seven of Demetrius are the same as the Seven of Socrates, save that, instead of Myson, Demetrius has Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, for whom *Rep.* 336a expresses contempt). **a7 κοινῆι συνελθόντες:** Plu. *Symposium of the Seven Sages* purports to be an account of their meeting, and locates it in a village near Corinth. D.L. 1.41 records five other supposed locations.

343b2 γνῶθι σαυτόν: ascribed to Chilon by Demetrius (DK 10.3.3.1), to Thales by Chamaeleon fr. 2 Wehrli, to 'Labys, a eunuch who was the temple sacristan' by Hermippus fr. 47 Wehrli. **b3 μηδὲν ἄγαν:** this bit of folk wisdom was ascribed to the Laconian Chilon by the Laconophile Critias (fr. 7 *IEG* = DK 88 B 7). Other authors cite it with no source at all (Theogn. 219, 335, 401, 657), or with no source more definite than 'wise men' (Pind. fr. 35b Maehler and Eur. *Hipp.* 264–6). **b3 τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω;** Socrates teases his audience of rhetoricians by putting to them the rhetorical question that rhetoricians love to put to others; cf. e.g. *Grg.* 457e τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; (where Socrates is teasing the rhetorician Gorgias), *Meno* 97c πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; (where Socrates is teasing a fan of Gorgias), Lys. 13.20 τοῦ δ' ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω ὑμῖν; Aeschin. 1.49 διὰ τί οὖν ταῦτα προλέγω; Demos. 4.3 τίνος οὖν εἵνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; Demos. 10.7 τοῦ χάριν δὴ ταῦτα λέγω καὶ διεξέρχομαι; **b4 βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική:** cf. *Laws* 721e 'the Spartan habit of always giving preference to what is shorter [τὰ βραχύτερα]', the words of some Spartan delegates in Thuc. 4.17.2 'our national custom is not to use lots of speeches [λόγοι] when short ones [βραχεῖς] are enough', and 334d1n. **b5–c1 τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ "χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι":** 'celebrated by sages' contrasts with 'what everybody hymns' of 343b2. The contrast is some acknowledgement that 'It is hard to be good' had much less renown than 'Know yourself' and 'Nothing to excess.' In fact, the only sign of any attention to Pittacus' dictum is the proverbial status of a related phrase χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά (*Cra.* 384b, *Hp. Ma.* 304e, *Rep.* 435c and 497d).

343c2–3 ἔγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει: the direct speech would be ἐὰν καθέλω . . . καὶ περιγένωμαι . . . , εὐδοκιμήσω. See 329b1n. for other comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sport.

343c6–345c3: SIMONIDES ON WHY GOODNESS IS UNSTABLE

Socrates finally starts to expound the poem. Simonides meant that becoming a good man is extremely difficult, but nevertheless possible; that continuing to be a good man for ever after is not merely difficult (as Pittacus said), but downright impossible; that this is because disasters can strike good men, making them become bad; that only good men can become bad; that men become good or bad by doing good or bad things; that men become good at things – spelling, for instance, or medicine – by acquiring knowledge about those things; and that losing knowledge is the bad action – the disaster – which makes good men bad.

343d1 ἔπειτα here, as at e.g. 358c1, expresses only surprise, and has lost its original connotation of temporal sequence. The surprise is expressed, not at the mere idea of inserting μέν into a statement that it is hard to become good, but at the idea of inserting μέν into such a statement if one does not mean to contrast it with another. **d1-2 τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι:** this obscure clause, unhelpfully placed in the middle of the conclusion that it is meant to support (a 'parenthetical' γάρ: *GP* 68–9), alludes to the fact that, since μέν is a connective, it evidently would not have been inserted into Simonides' remark about the difficulty of becoming a good man if that remark were a single, isolated, statement, not presented as part of a contrast with some other statement. Thus the clause might be translated as 'for this does not even seem to have been inserted into a single statement'; and the combination of γάρ, οὐδέ and φαίνεται would mark the introduction of a point that clinches an argument, as in *Rep.* 506b οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι . . . φαίνεται ('for to my mind it does not even look just either'), and Arist. *EN* 1097a11–13, on how wrong it would be to imagine that we can act more effectively by focusing our thoughts on the Platonic Form of the Good: φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε ('for the doctor does not even seem to think of health in this way either; instead, he focuses on the health of man – or rather, perhaps, on the health of this particular individual'). (Some commentators would instead interpret this phrase as 'for this looks to have been inserted quite irrelevantly'. On this interpretation, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον is an emphatic form of πρὸς οὐδένα λόγον (cf. 335d4n.), which in its turn is the negation of the idiom πρὸς λόγον ('relevant'), as at 344a4, 351e7. But that is not how πρὸς λόγον is negated elsewhere: *Tht.* 188a πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν, *Phlb.* 42e οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, *Alc. Mi.* 147b οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν δοκεῖ πρὸς λόγον εἰρηκέναι.) **d3 ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα . . . d4 ἀμφισβητοῦντα:** Socrates here blurs a distinction that Prodicus was careful to draw: see 337b1–2n. This blurring is only one of several ungainly features of this passage (cf. the obscure γάρ clause at 343d1–2, the asyndeta after 343d3 Σιμωνίδην and 343e5 ἀποκρινόμενον, and the awkward word order at 344e4–5): the idea may be that Socrates gabbles when his interpretation of Simonides is at its most strained.

343e1–2 ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς: it is indeed absurd to suppose that, of things that are good, only some are such that it is true that they are good (cf. 331a7–b1nn.). But it is no less absurd to suppose that, of things that are difficult, only some are such that it is true that they are difficult. If putting ἀλαθέως with χαλεπόν, as Socrates immediately proposes, is to avoid this absurdity, then that will be because ἀλαθέως is put there as an intensifier, tantamount to 'very' or 'thoroughly' or 'extremely'. But in that case, we may without absurdity leave ἀλαθέως where Simonides put it, take the phrase to mean (as the next line of the poem suggests) 'a thoroughly good man', and interpret the μέν to mark a contrast between thorough goodness, which only gods can have, and ordinary goodness, which men can attain more easily than Pittacus allows. **e3** ὑπερβατόν: the later use of this word as a technical term for 'an expression transferred from its proper place' (Trypho *On modes* 11) may stem from its occurrence here. **e4** οὑτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ 'stating Pittacus' remark first, in some such way as this'. **e4–5** ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον: it is in keeping with Socrates' liking for conversation, and disdain for other uses of language (314c4n.), both that he should try to reformulate Simonides' poem as an imaginary conversation with Pittacus, and that the imagined conversation should so soon relapse into a one-sided harangue. **e5** εἰπόντα . . . **344a1** τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον 'representing [understood from θεῖμεν in 343e4] the one as having said . . . , and the other as replying'. On the omission of τὸν μέν before εἰπόντα, see 330a4n. With the lack of any connective to bind these clauses to their predecessor, cf. the similar lack at 343d3–4. **e5–344a1** ὦ ἄνθρωποι: see 314d5n.

344a4–5 οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς λόγον τὸ "μέν" ἐμβεβλημένον καί 'On this interpretation, the inserted μέν looks relevant, and . . .' For this use of πρὸς λόγον, cf. 351e7. (All manuscripts add a τὸ after the φαίνεται. With this reading, the clause would presumably mean 'The μέν inserted into the statement looks like this, and . . .' But that is awkward in itself, and also out of balance with the ensuing 'the ἀλαθέως looks correctly placed at the end'. Perhaps the τὸ was added under the influence of the phrase τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι at 343d1–2.)

344b3 τὸν τύπον 'the gist'. Cf. *Rep.* 491c '"You've got τὸν τύπον of what I'm saying." "I have; and I would like to know in greater detail [ἀκριβέστερον] what you're saying."' **b6** ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι . . . ὅτι ktl: the speech that Socrates here imagines on behalf of Simonides continues uninterrupted until 345b7 γενέσθαι.

344c1–2 γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτηι τῆι ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν . . . ἀδύνατον: Socrates here invokes a particularly exaggerated contrast between γενέσθαι and εἶναι. Some men are lucky enough to live out their lives without ever

actually being laid low by what 344c5 describes as 'an unmanageable disaster'. If such a man is consistent with the claim that εἶναι a good man is impossible, then the mere possibility of his meeting an unmanageable disaster must make him not εἶναι a good man. And in that case, εἶναι means not merely 'be', nor even merely 'be permanently', but 'be unshakeably' (cf. 340b5n. for such contrasts). Such a meaning for εἶναι is far stronger than the meaning that its poetic equivalent ἔμμεναι will have in 344c4. **c3–5 ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέληι** 'It is not possible for a man not to be bad, when brought low by a stroke of fortune that he cannot resist.' Simonides takes sides in a debate. With him are Hom. *Od.* 17.322–3 'wide-seeing Zeus deprives a man of half his virtue, when the day of slavery brings him down [κατά . . . ἕλῃσιν]' and Bacch. 13.3–4 'a stroke of fortune [συμφορά] crushes a good man [ἐσθλόν], if it advances upon him unendurably'; against him is Theogn. 319–22 'A good man always keeps his character permanently, and is resilient, whether placed among evils or among goods. But if God gives a bad man a livelihood and prosperity, he is too stupid to hold his badness in check.' Cf. 330c1n., 332b1–9nn. on the connections that Socrates would draw between the internal state of an agent and the way the agent acts. **c3–4 οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ** may seem to contain one negation too many; but μὴ οὐ is the idiomatic way of negating an infinitive to form a phrase for something which is said or implied to be impossible or improper. Cf. 352d2–3 and *Phd.* 72d τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; ('What prospect is there that they will not all get used up on being dead?'). **c6 τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῆι; δῆλον ὅτι:** see 345a1–4n., on this mannerism of a rhetorical question answered immediately by a δῆλον ὅτι. **c6–7 οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ καθήιρηται:** i.e. the landlubber in charge of a ship cannot, by any stroke of fortune, be brought down low, since he is in any case permanently down low. The perfect tense of καθήιρηται describes his present state, and the adverb ἀεί signals that his present state is his permanent state. For while a perfect tense often suggests that the present state was reached by change from a previous one, it does not invariably do so (e.g. when Arist. *Pol.* 1275b1 uses perfect tenses to describe constitutions like tyranny as ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας, it means simply that those constitutions are mistaken and deviant); and any suggestions of change are readily cancelled by an 'always' (e.g. *Phdr.* 246d τὸν ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα συμπεφυκότα 'these things are permanently fused'; *Sph.* 246c ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις . . . ἀεὶ συνέστηκεν 'there is an unending battle between the two, permanently joined'; *Rep.* 581b πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται 'is wholly and permanently aimed'; and *Meno* 86a describes as τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα an everlasting soul whose knowledge was never acquired by any process of learning, but is as everlasting as the soul itself). **c7–8 οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι . . . d1 τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὔ:** the illustration is from wrestling (see LSJ s.v. κεῖμαι 6), on which Protagoras wrote (350e1n.). The repetition, at the end of the sentence, of its starting point about not being able to throw a man who is down, exemplifies a favourite mannerism of Plato's; cf. e.g. *Grg.* 507c–d

τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι . . . εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι, *Ap.* 20c σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου . . . εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, and, for an ampler version of the same mannerism 321d1–e2.

344d7 αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός: this hexameter line is of unknown authorship and context. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.20 quotes the line to support an argument that the virtuous must keep in training if they are not to become vicious, as Critias and Alcibiades did when they no longer had Socrates to help them.

344e4 τὸ δέ 'but in fact' (LSJ s.v. ὁ, ἡ, τό A.VIII.3). **e4–5 ἔστι γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον:** a translation like 'it is difficult but possible to become, but impossible to be, good' mirrors this awkwardly interlaced phrasing. **e6–7 πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθος, κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς:** Simonides evidently meant this as a generalisation of the point he made in 344c3–5: people are affected by their circumstances, in such a way that prosperity makes them better and adversity makes them worse. But when he calls prospering and its opposite εὖ and κακῶς πράττειν, he gives an opportunity to misinterpret him as saying that people are affected by their actions, in such a way that they become better by acting correctly and worse by acting incorrectly. Cf. the ways in which one might interpret or misinterpret the English phrases 'doing well' and 'doing badly'.

345a1 τίς . . . ; a2 δῆλον ὅτι. . . . τίς . . . ; a3 δῆλον ὅτι. . . . a4 τίς . . . ; δῆλον ὅτι . . .: the insistent repetition of this turn of phrase (which occurred also in 344c6) arouses the suspicion that Socrates is copying a sophistic mannerism; but the nearest thing to a parallel in extant literature, the string of rhetorical questions and answers in Isae. 8.14, introduces only one of its answers with δῆλον ὅτι. **a1–2 τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις:** Socrates seizes the opportunity to misinterpret Simonides, as meaning, not that good fortune improves people, but that people improve themselves by acting correctly. He also lays foundations for having Simonides think that human goodness is a matter of knowledge, and that correct action – the action whereby people acquire human goodness – is therefore a matter of learning. For those thoughts about human goodness and its acquisition might appear to follow from, for example, the fact that we become good at reading and writing by learning how to do those things (cf. 345b4–5n. on why this appearance might be wrong). Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.14 gives another attempt by Socrates to shift our focus from what happens to us to what we do: 'He was once asked what he thought was the most important thing for a man to pursue [κράτιστον ἀνδρὶ ἐπιτήδευμα]. He answered "Acting well [εὐπραξία]." He was then asked whether he thought good luck [εὐτυχίαν] a thing to pursue. "Luck," he said, "I regard as quite the opposite of action. For when, without looking for it,

one chances upon [ἐπιτυχεῖν] something that one needs, that I take to be good luck; whereas I count it as good action when one does something well as a result of study and practice [μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν], and it is those who make this their concern who are, in my opinion, acting well."' **a4–5** τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι ὧι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῶι εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῶι ἰατρῶι: Socrates has Simonides breezily ignore the fact that when people change to being good doctors from not being doctors at all, they may pass through an intermediate stage, at which they know a bit about doctoring, but not enough for them to be, as yet, anything better than bad doctors. **a6–b1** κακῶς πράξαντες and **b2** κακῶς πράξας: Simonides emphasises acting badly, because he relies on our presuming that people can become bad doctors only by bad actions. For when we combine this presumption with the fact that only good doctors can become bad doctors by bad actions, we will readily agree to his conclusion that only good doctors can become bad doctors. However, we should recall that when people who were once wholly ignorant of doctoring have now learnt enough to become doctors, even though only bad ones as yet, then they are the better for it, not the worse, and that the studies which make such people bad doctors are therefore good actions, not bad.

345b4–5 αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι: this would seem less obvious if Socrates considered a wider range of examples: breaking an ankle may make you a worse runner, but not by depriving you of any knowledge. **b5–6** οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο 'never could come to be'. Contrast *Laws* 918d μή ποτε γένοιτο ('never should come to be'). **b6–7** εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι: an alternative view is that we start life neutrally, without any character definite enough to count as either good or bad, that we acquire our characters as we grow, and that some of us go from neutral to bad without ever passing through a stage of being good; see Arist. *EN* 1103a14–1105b18.

345c3 ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν: Socrates now paraphrases words that perhaps, in their original context, went beyond the thought of 344e6, that human goodness results from prosperity, by adding the thought that prosperity results from being loved by the gods (cf. e.g. Eup. fr. 330 *PCG* πόλιν γε θεοφιλεστάτην | οἰκοῦσιν ἀφθονεστάτην τε χρήμασιν, and Isoc. 9.70 εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον). Socrates' paraphrase contrives, however, to suggest the no less standard thought that gods love human beings when they are virtuous (e.g. Diotima in *Smp.* 212a τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένωι ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, Cyrus in Xen. *Cyr.* 4.1.6 θεοφιλεῖς καὶ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σώφρονες) and not otherwise (e.g. Athena in Soph. *Aj.* 132–3 τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας | θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς, Democ. DK 68 B 217 μοῦνοι θεοφιλέες, ὅσοις ἐχθρὸν τὸ ἀδικέειν, Adeimantus in *Rep.* 382e οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλής).

345c3–347a5: SIMONIDES ON WHY BADNESS IS INVOLUNTARY

Socrates completes his exposition of Simonides' poem in the same fanciful style. Simonides was pointing out how rare it was for him to condemn anybody: since no one can be perfectly good, he gladly praises anyone who is moderately good, that is, who does nothing downright disgraceful; moreover, he sometimes is compelled to praise people who do not meet even that modest standard. The purpose of this was to intensify his condemnation of Pittacus: to elicit condemnation from someone who gives so much praise, Pittacus must have erred quite grotesquely.

345c11 ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω 'if I come across one, I'll let you know'. This is compatible with what Simonides has just said about not searching, because εὑρίσκειν is not limited to succeeding in a search. Cf. the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 22–4: Hermes set off looking for (ζήτει) Apollo's cattle, went into a cave, and there acquired the materials for his first lyre by coming across (εὑρών) a tortoise. Simonides' ἐπί ... εὑρών is an example of what is called 'tmesis': in classical Attic prose, these two expressions would coalesce into the compound verb ἐφευρών. The form ὑμῖν is the Attic form, which at some stage displaced what metre indicates was, in the original poem, the Aeolic form ὔμμιν. If we knew that the displacement occurred after Plato wrote the *Protagoras*, then we should undo the displacement, and read the Aeolic form here.

345d3–5 πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκὼν ὅστις ἔρδηι μηδὲν αἰσχρόν: i.e. 'I like people even if they are imperfect, so long as their imperfections are no worse than the bad deeds that adversity might compel any one of us to do; but I do not like those who do bad deeds in prosperity; for their bad deeds are (contrary to what Pittacus said) easily avoided, and therefore voluntary.' ἐπαίνημι is Aeolic for what would be ἐπαινῶ in Attic and ἐπαινέω in Ionic (346d8–e2). The subjunctive mood of ἔρδηι makes the relative clause general ('whoever does', rather than merely 'who does'), and that is why the singular relative pronoun ὅστις can have the plural antecedent πάντας. Cf. 345e4 and Ar. *Frogs* 701–2 πάντας ἀνθρώπους ... ὅστις ἂν ξυνναυμαχῆι (where the generality is provided by the subjunctive with ἄν) and *Grg.* 503e πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν (where the generality is provided by the βούλει 'you like'). **d5–6 ἀνάγκηι δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται**: this formula is described as proverbial in *Laws* 741a and 818b. And the thought was widely current: in Hom. *Il.* 16.431–61, Zeus cannot postpone the death of Sarpedon; in Aesch. *Pr.* 515–18, Zeus cannot extend his own power indefinitely; in Hdt. 1.91.1–3, Apollo can only postpone, not prevent, the capture of Sardis. The Athenian in *Laws* 818a–d would take these to be examples of a popular misconception that gods are subject to what he describes as merely human necessities; but, he adds, there are also necessities to which even gods must conform, such as the need to know the basics of arithmetic if one is to take care of humanity; and, he reasons in an argument like that of Socrates in 345d7–e5, it

is these necessities that Simonides, being sensible, would have had in mind. See Agathon fr. 5 *TrGF* (quoted in 324b3–4n.) for another necessity to which even gods are supposedly subject.

345e1–2 οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν: the wise men who agree with Socrates on this point include various other characters in Plato: Timaeus in *Tim.* 86d–e, the Eleatic Stranger in *Sph.* 228c–d, and the Athenian Stranger in *Laws* 731c, 733c–734b (cf. 860d–864c, on the distinctions that law should observe instead of the bogus distinction between voluntary and involuntary injustice). In *Grg.* 467c–468e and *Meno* 77b–78b Socrates presents arguments to induce others to join the consensus of the wise, but there is no sign that anybody else did, apart from the speakers of Epich. DK 23 B 7 and Anon. fr. 75a *TrGF*. **e4 ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῆι ἑκών, τούτων:** on the combination of singular ὅς with plural τούτων, see 345d3–4n.

346a1–2 μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων: for other expressions of the thought that one's country is the same sort of thing as one's father or mother, see *Cri.* 51c, *Rep.* 575d, Demos. 18.205. **a5 αὐτοῖς:** i.e. the bad sons. It is dative because it is the object of ἐγκαλῶσιν. **ἀμελοῦσιν:** present active participle, masculine dative plural in agreement with αὐτοῖς. **αὐτῶν:** i.e. the parents neglected by the bad sons. It is genitive because it is the object of the ἀμελοῦσιν that immediately precedes it.

346b1 ἀμελοῦσιν: present active indicative, third person plural. Its subject is the negligent sons. **b6–c1 Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος:** the compulsion would have been exercised by Simonides' desire for money, and consequent need of patrons. Both were the subject of frequent anecdotes, e.g. Stobaeus 3.10.38 and 61: 'Someone asked Simonides to write an encomium, and said he would be grateful. Since he was not offering any money, Simonides said "I keep two chests, one for gratitude and one for money. Whenever I open the one for gratitude, I find it empty of anything that might meet my needs; it is only the other one that I find useful"'; and 'Simonides was asked why, in extreme old age, he was so fond of money. "It's because," he said, "I'd rather die, leaving something to my enemies, than live, needing something from my friends."'

346c1 ταῦτα 'for these reasons'; cf. 310e2–3n. on the absence of any preposition. **λέγει ὅτι ktl:** the speech that Socrates here imagines on behalf of Simonides continues, with minor interruptions at 346d1–3 and d8–e3 for comment by Socrates, until 347a3 ψέγω. **c2–3 ἔμοιγε ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦι:** Simonides is therefore, to use the useful jargon, a satisficer (that is, ready to accept what is good enough), rather than a maximiser (that is, insisting always on the best). In arguments to come, Socrates will get his interlocutors to assume that all rational

agents are maximisers rather than satisficers (cf. 353e9–354a1n., 358b8–d4), and to conclude from this that, if we know how to act aright, then neither pleasure nor fear can ever make us act amiss. **c4–5 εἰδώς τ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν:** Simonides evidently would not distinguish this 'knowing justice' from being just. This is not merely because Simonides gives a positive answer to the question that Socrates will ask 352b1–c6: do those who know what is good always do what is good? It is rather because that is not yet even a question. Cf. 352d5–7n., and Homeric turns of phrase like *Il.* 16.356–7 οἳ δὲ φόβοιο | δυσκελάδου μνήσαντο, λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς: troops in a panic 'remember' to flee and 'forget' to fight, as if their motivations are solely a matter of what they do or do not know. **c9–10 τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα** 'there is no end to the generation of fools'. The adjective ἀπείρων agrees with the noun γενέθλα: each is feminine nominative singular.

346d4 πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον κτλ: Socrates reverts to the passage already cited at 345c9–11. For such reversions, see 321d7–e1n. They are on a larger scale what constructions like that of 344c7–d1 are on the scale of a single sentence. **d6 ὑμῖν:** see 345c11n.

346e2–3 ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῶι ἑκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα: on pauses, and punctuation to indicate them, and the difference that they can make logically, see Arist. *Rh.* 1407b11–18 (in Her. DK 22 B 1 τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται, should we break before the ἀεί, and have Heraclitus talk about perpetual human ignorance? or after, and have him talk about the perpetual validity of the λόγος?), and *SE* 166a23–38 (on δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν, which 'combined' means 'has the ability to walk-when-seated', and 'divided' means 'has-when-seated the ability to walk'). **e3 ἔστιν οὕς:** phrases like this, where the subject is given by a relative clause and the verb is εἶναι, are the only exceptions to the rule that a masculine or feminine plural subject requires a plural verb. Such exceptions can occur in writing of any degree of formality, whether prose or verse (e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 2.3.18 ἔστιν οἵ, Hipp. *De capitis vulneribus* 4 ἔστιν αἵ, Demos. 27.46 ἔστιν ἅς, Thuc. 7.11.2 πόλεων ἔστιν ὧν, Eur. fr. 504 *TrGF* ἀνθρώποισιν ἔστιν οἷς, Arist. *Historia animalium* 636b1 ἔστιν αἷς).

347a6–348c4: THE VALUE OF LITERARY DISCUSSION

Hippias offers to deliver his own exposition of Simonides. The offer is refused. Socrates, in a speech that should embarrass those who treat literature as authoritative, suggests abandoning the discussion of literature. People who discuss literature, he says, are like people who are incapable of making their own entertainment at parties, and who therefore resort to hired musicians and dancing girls. He would rather continue the discussion of ethical questions that was interrupted by the discussion of Simonides. Eventually Protagoras agrees, and says he will answer Socrates' questions.

347b1–2 ἔστιν μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων: Hippias' boasts about the splendid speeches he had ready to deliver were a favourite jest. See *Hp. Mi.* 363d (quoted in 315c6n.), and *Hp. Ma.* 286a, where he is made to say 'On these topics I have a speech that is altogether beautifully composed [παγκάλως λόγος συγκείμενος], and its diction is particularly fine [καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι].' In Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.9–10 Hippias criticises Socrates for not having a speech in which to express his views about what is just; and Socrates retorts that he instead gives his views a more trustworthy expression by how he acts. **b2 ἐπιδείξω:** people contrasted the ἐπιδεικτικόν kind of oratory with those kinds that are meant to convince the audience (Demos. 61.2, Isoc. 4.17; cf. 320c1–2n.). An ἐπίδειξις about the meaning of Simonides' poem can therefore seem good, not becauses it convinces the audience that it is true to what the poem means, but because it ingeniously extracts a message startlingly at odds with what the poem seems to say (cf. 342b1n.). In offering to give an ἐπίδειξις, Hippias thus confirms the impression created by his claims that Socrates' interpretation is good, that his own is good too, and that his own is still worth hearing even after hearing Socrates': such claims could hardly all be true if the goodness of an interpretation consisted in its accurately explaining what the poem means. Other interpretations of poetry that evidently aim at something else instead of accuracy are the interpretations of Homer which take his characters, both human and divine, to be natural stuffs, or astronomical objects, or states of mind, or bodily tissues and organs (Theagenes in DK 8.2; Metrodorus in DK 61.4); the wrangle over whether Orpheus meant time or the sky when he spoke of Olympus (Betegh (2004) 27); and the various applications of Pind. fr. 169a.1–2 Maehler νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς | θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, in Hdt. 3.38.4, *Grg.* 484b, Chrysippus *SVF* 3.314, and Plu. *To an uneducated prince* 780c. **b3 ναί . . . εἰς αὖθίς γε· νῦν δέ:** it is standard enough to say εἰς αὖθις ('some other time') as a polite refusal (cf. 357b7, 361e5). Alcibiades is however being more than ordinarily polite when he introduces his refusal of Hippias' offer by saying ναί ('Yes'), as if he really does mean to listen to Hippias' speech later; contrast *Euthphr.* 6c–d, where Euthyphro says, 'I'll tell you lots of other things too about the divine that, I'm sure, you'll be astonished to hear', and Socrates replies 'You can describe them all to me εἰς αὖθις, when we've got the time. νυνὶ δέ do try to explain more clearly the point I just asked you about'; and *Cra.* 440e, where Cratylus says 'I've taken a lot of trouble over my investigation, and things do seem to be much more as Heraclitus claims', and Socrates replies, 'So you can give me a lesson εἰς αὖθις, my friend, once you're back. νῦν δέ . . .' **b3–4 δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἃ ὡμολογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης:** since Alcibiades here simply reminds Protagoras and Socrates of the agreement they made at 341e7–342a4, and does not himself tell them what to do, he contrives to steer the discussion without actually claiming any authority of the sort that Socrates spoke against in 338b5–e3. Cf. 348b3–7.

347c3–4 δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι κτλ: contrast Protagoras' assertions at 338e6–339a3 about the educational importance of literary criticism, and cf. 314c4n. and Isoc. 12.18: 'in the Lyceum were seated together three or four of the common-or-garden sophists, the sort who claim to know everything, the sort who in a flash are all over the place. They were talking about the poetry of various poets, above all of Hesiod and Homer. None of what they said was original to them [οὐδὲν μὲν παρ' αὐτῶν λέγοντες; cf. 347c5–348a5 δι' ἑαυτῶν . . . διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν . . . ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς . . . διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς . . . οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν . . . δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν]: they just chanted the poets' works, and brought out from memory the cleverest remarks made by others about them in the past.' Ion *FGH* 392 fr. 6 is an extended account, from a contemporary, of a discussion about poetry, including some poetry by Simonides, at a symposium in 428–7. **c4 συμποσίοις:** in spite of its derivation, some tried to make this word mean, not just any drinking together, but a particularly ceremonious kind of drinking together, done by men with claims to breeding and refinement. See Ar. *Wasps* 1208–64, where someone tries to teach a man of the people how to ξυμποτικὸς εἶναι καὶ ξυνουσιαστικός: he must learn how to move and hold his body elegantly, how to pass graceful compliments on his host's *objets d'art*, how to wash his hands both before and after eating, how to take his turn in singing, and how to charm the victims of his drunken hooliganism into feeling it was amusing, as he will be able to do if he parties ἀνδράσι καλοῖς τε κἀγαθοῖς. Proposals for the better regulation of symposia are made in *Laws* 637a–642a, 645c–652a, 666a–b, 671a–674b, Xenophanes DK 21 B 1, Theogn. 467–96, Crt. fr. 6 *IEG*. **c4–5 φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων:** with this disdain for trade, cf. the insults in Ar. *Knights* 181 'you are wicked and ἐξ ἀγορᾶς', 218–19 'your accent is disgusting, your birth is low, you're ἀγοραῖος: you've got all you need for a career in politics', and Arist. *Pol.* 1328b39–41, which maintains that citizens should not live an ἀγοραῖον life, since it is ἀγεννής, and incompatible with virtue. Some would have found a wilful incongruity in describing as συμπόσια the drinking parties of 'low types from the marketplace': the lower orders do their drinking in καπηλεῖα ('taverns') instead. Cf. Theopompus *FGH* 115 fr. 62 'The inhabitants of Byzantium have long had a democratic constitution, their city is founded on a trading-post, and the entire people spends its time in the marketplace and the port. In consequence they are ἀκόλαστοι, and accustomed to συνουσιάζειν and drink in καπηλεῖα' – something that, in the good old days, was not done even by slaves of any decency (Isoc. 7.49, 15.286–7).

347d1 τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας: the law tried to limit to two drachmas the fee for hiring an αὐλητρίς, a ψάλτρια or a κιθαρίστρια (see Arist. *Ath.* 50.2 for the law itself, and Hyperides 3.3 for prosecutions under it). Two drachmas was six times the daily subsistence allowance of an Athenian juror. We may infer

that few other than οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί could afford such entertainment. **d3–5 ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας:** slave-girls providing musical and other entertainment, as illustrated in Murray (1990) plates 10, 11, 16, were in fact a routine part of the most aristocratic symposia: one was hired by Agathon (*Smp.* 176e); one performs in the symposium imagined at Ar. *Wasps* 1219; more than one performed at a symposium given by Callias himself (Xen. *Smp.* e.g. 2.1–2, 22; 1.1 announces that the work will describe the relaxations of τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν). In *Tht.* 173d, Socrates says that true lovers of wisdom would never dream of such entertainments; and in Xen. *Smp.* 3.2 he calls it shameful that guests, in spite of thinking themselves superior to the professional entertainers, should not even try to entertain one another. **d6–e1 λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως:** etiquette required taking one's proper turn in the doings of a normal symposium (cf. Crt. DK 88 B 33 on drinking; Ar. *Wasps* 1222–49 on singing), and an etiquette of taking turns is still in force even during the abnormal symposium of *Smp.* 177d, 214b–c, and the radically reformed symposia of *Laws* 671c. Cf. 362a3n., on how taking turns to speak and listen is not yet proper dialectic.

347e2–3 ἀνδρῶν οἷοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοί φασιν εἶναι: Socrates does not actually say that 'the majority of us' are wrong in their claims about themselves; and 'the majority of us' is in any case not quite the same as a simple 'the majority'. Even so, it is hard to avoid hearing in this phrase some of the disdain with which Socrates speaks of 'the majority' (347e5n.). **e4 οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν:** *Hp. Mi.* 365c–d makes a similar complaint about the impossibility of engaging in dialectic (cf. 314c4n.) with a poet: 'So let's forget about Homer, since it is in point of fact impossible to ask what on earth he had in mind in composing these lines.' Cf. 329a3–4n., on the impossibility of engaging in dialectic with a long speech by an orator, or with a book. **ἐπαγόμενοί τε** 'citing as witnesses'; see LSJ s.v. ἐπάγω II.3; for the τε, see 309b7–8n. **e5 οἱ πολλοί:** here, as often on the lips of Socrates, the phrase conveys some disdain for the intellectual and moral attainments of the masses: see e.g. *Rep.* 431c τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις, *Rep.* 602b τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσιν, *Phd.* 82c οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι, *Cri.* 47c τῶν πολλῶν ... καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, Xen. *Mem.* 3.7.9 'Know yourself [cf. 343b3], and do not make the mistake that οἱ πλεῖστοι do. For οἱ πολλοί have set out to consider the condition of other people, and do not turn to investigate themselves.' Cf. *Smp.* 218d, where Alcibiades, seeking to ingratiate himself with Socrates, speaks of τούς τε πολλοὺς καὶ ἄφρονας, and Ar. *Clouds* 891–2, where the Weaker Argument (a personification of Socratic reasoning) threatens the Stronger: 'When I speak ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖσι, I'll destroy you.'

348a1 ἐῶσιν χαίρειν 'forget about'. This idiom stems from the use of the imperative χαῖρε in bidding goodbye; see LSJ s.v. χαίρω III.2.c. The subject of ἐῶσιν

is 'men of the sort that the majority of us claim to be', understood from 347e2–3. **a2–3 ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες:** talk of 'testing one another' belongs to the vocabulary of combat (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 23.804, Hdt. 1.76.3, Thuc. 7.38.1). In a remark addressed to Theaetetus at *Tht.* 154d–e, Socrates applies this vocabulary to testing one another verbally, and suggests that sophists will find more congenial than he does such a combative way with words: 'If you and I were δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοί, then . . . ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν [cf. 336d1: ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους]. But as things are, since we are no experts . . .' *Laws* 650b elaborates on the traditional point that a man's character is revealed when he is drunk (Xenophanes DK 21 B 1.19, Theogn. 499–502), by saying that in a suitably regulated symposium, we have a πεῖραν ἀλλήλων that for cheapness, safety and speed has no rivals. Cf. 341d8–9n. **a4–5 καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι** 'set the poets to one side, and make speeches to one another all by ourselves and in reliance on our own resources'. τοὺς ποιητάς is accusative because it is the object of καταθεμένους; αὐτούς is accusative because it is the subject of the infinitive ποιεῖσθαι. **a6 ἕτοιμός εἰμί σοι παρέχειν . . . a7 σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχες:** with the omission of the reflexive pronoun for 'myself' and 'yourself', cf. *Grg.* 475d τῶι λόγωι ὥσπερ ἰατρῶι παρέχων ἀποκρίνου.

348b3 ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν: the καὶ νῦν is 'now, as well as at 336b4'; the pun on Καλλία, καλῶς is repeated from 336b7. **b5 ἤτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι:** as at 347b3–6, Alcibiades contrives to steer the discussion without arrogating to himself much authority over Protagoras.

348c2 τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι 'almost all the others'. The word for 'all' may be omitted when it is obvious what generalisation is being toned down by σχεδόν. Cf. *Laws* 644a οἵ γε ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται ('those who have been properly educated more or less *all* turn out right'), Hdt. 1.10.3 παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι ('among the Lydians, and among more or less *all* other barbarians'). **c3 μόγις προυτράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι:** of course, one might in principle be 'turned towards' anything; but since Protagoras is eventually turned towards discussing things in the proper way (314c4n.), it is hard to forget that προτρέπειν was widely used for urging people to be virtuous (e.g. *Euthd.* 275a προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν, Isoc. 4.75 προτρέψαντες ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ χαλεποὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς τοῖς βαρβάροις ποιήσαντες, Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.11 προτρέψασθαι ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, Demos. 18.120 εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν εὖ τὴν πόλιν προτρέπονται, Aeschin. 1.191 τὰ τῶν νέων ζηλώματα ἐπ' ἀρετὴν προτρέψεσθε, Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 10 τοὺς νεωτέρους ἅπαντας ἐπ' ἀρετὴν προτρέψετε, Arist. *EN* 1180a6–7 παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ

χάριν), so widely that a book encouraging people to care for virtue could simply be called Προτρεπτικός (Isoc. 1.3; fourth-century authors who wrote under such a title include Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aristotle, Chamaeleon of Heracleia, and Demetrius of Phalerum).

348c5–349d8: IS COURAGE SPECIAL?

By enticing him with thoughts of heroism, Socrates leads Protagoras back to their earlier question about the relationships between the various virtues. This time, Protagoras agrees promptly that justice, holiness, temperance and wisdom are all pretty much the same as one another, but he insists that courage is quite distinct: it is possible, he says, to lack all the other virtues, while yet having courage.

348c6–7 ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν Ὅμηρον τό . . . 'I think that Homer's line, ". . .", makes a really good point.' The quotation of the line is in apposition to the name of its author. For the construction, cf. Arist. *Prob.* 894b34 διὸ καὶ Ὅμηρος εὖ τό . . . ('which is why Homer's phrase ". . ." puts it well too').

348d1 σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν 'Two men going together, the one notices before the other.' This tag from Hom. *Il.* 10.224 was a more or less proverbial way of making the point that two heads are better than one (cf. the brief allusions to it in *Smp.* 174d, *Alc. Mi.* 140a, Arist. *Pol.* 1287b14). The tag also gives Protagoras the encouraging hint that he will, by engaging in dialectic, merit comparison with Odysseus. For it comes from Diomedes' call for someone to partner him on a night-time raid, a call which leads to Odysseus' volunteering, and being chosen. **d4 μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε νοήσηι** 'and one man by himself, if he does notice'. Socrates continues to quote from Diomedes' call for volunteers. In their original context (Hom. *Il.* 10.225–6), these words were followed by the apodosis 'still, he notices little and his wits are light'.

349a3 μισθόν: on the sale of wisdom for money, see 310d7–8n.

349b1–2 ἦν δέ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε: in spite of his affectation of a poor memory (359a4n.), Socrates gives an exact account of the question discussed at 329c1–334a3. **b4 ἑκάστωι . . . ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία** 'each is assigned some property of its own'. The most obvious and immediate meaning of the phrase is as a metaphor drawn from finance; cf. e.g. Demos. 18.115 ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἔδωκε ('made a gift from his own estate') and 49.11 ἡ ἄλλη οὐσία ὑπέκειτο ('the rest of the estate was assigned to'). Aristotle made extensive applications of this vocabulary in metaphysics (e.g. *Met.* 985b10 τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν ('underlying substance'), 1038b10 οὐσία ἑκάστου ἡ ἴδιος ἑκάστωι ('in each case, the substance of a thing is that which is peculiar to it')), and he was to some degree anticipated by Plato (e.g. *Phd.* 76d and *Cra.* 401c use οὐσία metaphysically); the

first readers of this dialogue, even if not Socrates and Protagoras, were probably conscious of such metaphysical applications. Combining the apparently masculine form ἴδιος with the feminine noun οὐσία (i.e. treating ἴδιος as an 'adjective of two terminations') is perhaps a joke at Protagoras' expense: Protagoras had theories of grammatical gender, in particular that one should describe μῆνιν 'wrath' as οὐλόμενον, not (as Hom. *Il.* 1.2 did) οὐλομένην (DK 80 A 27, 28; such theories were notorious enough to be the subject of extended mockery in Ar. *Clouds* 658–93). At any rate, nobody before Plato seems to use ἴδιος as a two-termination adjective; this is the only passage in which Plato himself does so (contrast ἰδίαν used with δύναμιν in 330a6, 349c5, 359a6, and *Rep.* 416d οὐσίαν . . . ἰδίαν, *Phd.* 101c ἰδίας οὐσίας); and only in the generations after Plato does ἴδιος come to be used frequently as two-termination. **b4–5 καὶ πρᾶγμα:** the καί is 'epexegetic', indicating that what follows is an explanation of the financial metaphor in ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία; the neuter πρᾶγμα perhaps continues the joke about gender.

349c7–d1 ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πηι ἄλληι νῦν φήσηις 'I don't hold you to anything [sc. of what you said previously] if you now want to say something different.'

349d1–2 οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες: the suggestion that Protagoras' earlier statements were only meant to test Socrates allows him to withdraw them without losing face. Cf. 341d8–9n. **d4–5 τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν:** the four are justice, holiness, temperance and wisdom, the four that were the subject of Socrates' arguments in 330b4–333b6. In calling them 'reasonably comparable to one another' Protagoras comes close to granting that Socrates' arguments were right, perhaps as close as he can come if he is troubled about saving face. **d5–6 ὧδε δὲ γνώσηι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω:** on the orators' use of such phrases, see 342d3–5n. **d6–8 εὑρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως:** Protagoras has in mind the sort of people described in *Laws* 630a–b, when, to illustrate the point that 'better is justice and temperance and wisdom united with courage [ἀνδρείας] than courage all by itself', the Athenian says, 'there are very many mercenaries who stand firm and are ready to die in battle; with very few exceptions, the vast majority are bold [θρασεῖς] and unjust yahoos, about as stupid as they come.' Elsewhere Socrates allows that those who are bold without being wise may have what he calls 'civic courage' (πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία *Rep.* 430c); but a merely 'civic' virtue is not the real thing (*Phd.* 82a–b). **d6 πολλούς:** we would be wrong to imagine, as Protagoras no doubt hopes we will, that many examples amount to lots of evidence for particularly pronounced similarities and dissimilarities among the virtues. It takes only one person who is a Capricorn, but neither a Scorpio nor a Gemini, to prove that Capricorn is not identical to Scorpio or to

Gemini; likewise, it takes only one person who is courageous, but neither shrewd nor just, to prove that courage is not identical to shrewdness or to justice. And millions of people who were courageous, but neither shrewd nor just, would be no evidence that shrewdness and justice are very like one another, nor any evidence that shrewdness and justice are very unlike courage. For there are millions of people who are neither Scorpios nor Geminis but who are Capricorns; yet these millions are no evidence that Scorpio and Gemini are very like one another, nor any evidence that Scorpio and Gemini are very unlike Capricorn. **d6–7 ἀδικωτάτους κτλ:** the superlatives add nothing to Protagoras' case. As evidence that youth and riches are very like one another, and very unlike plumpness, lots of people who are very old and very poor and very thin are no better than lots of people who are old and poor and thin. **d8 ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως:** the unadorned superlative ἀνδρειοτάτους would already mean 'very brave', as would the positive ἀνδρείους adorned with διαφερόντως. It is unsurprising therefore that such adorned superlatives are hardly found elsewhere (*Tim.* 23c, Thuc. 8.68.3, Anon. Iamb. DK 89.4.1 seem to be the only examples). Protagoras presumably intends the adorned superlative ('very and exceptionally brave'?) to make us think that he is arguing with especial force.

349e1–351b3: COURAGE, BOLDNESS AND WISDOM

Socrates argues that wisdom is courage. His argument relies on various considerations about how knowledge and courage make people bolder, how all courage is good, and how some boldness is bad. Protagoras parries the argument: we might as well argue, he says, that since both knowledge and strength can give us greater capacity to do things, knowledge is strength.

349e1 ἔχε δή: this otherwise unusual phrase is a favourite of Plato's Socrates, and to some extent of the Athenian in the *Laws*, to get an interlocutor to pause and reflect at what may be a crucial point of the argument. **e4 τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῂς εἶναι:** cf. *La.* 192b–d, where Socrates coaxes Laches into reasoning that courage is fine; that pertinacity is sometimes stupid; that when pertinacity is stupid it is not fine; and therefore that courage cannot be identified with pertinacity in general, but only with sensible pertinacity (ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία). **e6 εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι** is a conversational way of adding emphasis: it occurs in *Euthd.* 283e, Ar. *Clouds* 660 and *Th.* 470, but is not elevated enough for either tragedy or oratory. The turn of phrase will retrospectively acquire a special resonance at 350b6, when Protagoras observes that madness can make people confident.

350a1 εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν: those who dive into wells are also mentioned, along with cavalrymen (cf. 350a5–6) and various others, in *La.* 193b–c, where they are used to make the point that if you face up to something because your skills enable you to know that it is no danger to you, then you are not showing courage. Thuc. 2.49.5 gives some sense of quite how the danger of diving into wells was

perceived, when he reports that sufferers from a plague were so fevered that 'they would gladly have flung themselves into cold water; and many of those who were uncared for actually did fling themselves into wells, so unquenchable was the thirst by which they were gripped'. For an extended description of the horrors of diving, see Oppian *Halieutica* 5.612–74. **a2** οἱ κολυμβηταί are presumably those who earned their living by diving into the sea to hunt for pearls and sponges (cf. *Sph.* 220a). It is not known why they should ever have dived into wells; perhaps they did so as an occasional act of bravado. **a8** πέλτας: shields borne by a sort of lightly armed infantry called peltasts. Peltasts are not mentioned in the parallel passage, which at *La.* 193b has instead slingers and archers. In 390, an army in which Callias was serving as general, and which contained the first force of peltasts that Athens ever formed, won a stunning victory over Sparta (Xen. *HG* 4.5.13–17). We might therefore guess that the *Protagoras* was written when this victory was still topical, and that the *Laches* was written at some other time. **a9–10** οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν: this is the wrong way to generalise from the examples that Socrates has just been giving. For it can be taken to imply that in any area, anyone who is an expert is more confident than anyone who is not; so it can be taken to imply that any expert is even more confident than the most recklessly confident madman. Socrates will soon attempt to take it this way (350c1–4n.). All that Protagoras should be saying is that expertise gives confidence, but need not be the only thing that does so. Protagoras will later claim, in effect, that this was all that he meant (350c5–351b3).

350b7–8 πῶς οὖν . . . λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι; 'How then do you describe the brave? Don't you say that they are the confident?' The presence of the definite article in τοὺς θαρραλέους means that Socrates can treat Protagoras' assent as affirming, not only that the brave are confident, but also that they are the confident, as affirming, in other words, both that everyone who is brave is confident, and that everyone who is confident is brave. **b9** καὶ νῦν γε 'Yes, and I say so now.' Protagoras unwarily assents; after seeing where his assent might lead, he will deny at 350c5–d1 that he has ever been asked whether everyone who is confident is brave.

350c1 οὐκοῦν οὗτοι . . . οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες . . . **c4** ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη: spelled out in full, the argument would presumably be: in saying that the brave are the confident (350b7–9), Protagoras cannot mean to equate bravery with just any degree of confidence; for those who are inexpert may have some degree of confidence (350b2–4), yet their confidence, if any, would be due to madness, and so would be disgraceful (350b6), and so would not be a matter of bravery, which is, like other parts of virtue, extremely honourable (349e4–9); but any confidence that the inexpert may have would be a lesser degree of confidence, for any expert is always more confident than anyone who is not an expert (350a9–b1); so Protagoras must mean that the brave are those who possess the highest

degree of confidence, the degree of confidence that only expertise can give; and so, by this argument, expertise would be bravery after all.

350d1–2 ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν: this clause expounds, not the agreement that Protagoras made, but what Socrates will prove in proving that Protagoras was wrong to make this agreement. The οὐ is therefore more logical than the proximity of τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα may make it appear. There is the same apparent illogicality, with the same explanation, in e.g. *Grg.* 482b ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἁπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν (the speaker has just been saying that to get away with injustice *is* the worst of all evils) and *Lys.* 222b ἀποβαλεῖν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ὅμοιον τῶι ὁμοίωι κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἄχρηστον (where the talk is of abandoning a previous theory that similar things *are* useless to one another, since neither can do for the other what it could not do for itself). **d5–6 τούτωι δὲ τῶι τρόπωι μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν:** the presupposition is that you would have to be pretty stupid not to realise the difference between sturdiness and wisdom. The same presupposition underlies Antisth. fr. 54.13 *SSR*, where the wily Odysseus addresses the doltish Ajax: 'Just because you're sturdy, you think you're brave too [διότι γὰρ ἰσχυρός, οἴει καὶ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι]. Don't you realise that being sturdy isn't the same as wisdom about warfare and being brave [οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι σοφίαι περὶ πόλεμον καὶ ἀνδρείαι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἰσχῦσαι]?'

350e1 οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν: there may be a special appropriateness in having Protagoras mention those who know about wrestling: he wrote a textbook on the topic (*Sph.* 232d), and his book *Truth* (356d3–4n.) bore the alternative title οἱ καταβάλλοντες λόγοι ('*The arguments that throw*'; DK 80 B 1). See 344c6–d1 for other wrestling talk, and 329b1n. for other descriptions of intellectual activity as a competitive sport.

351b2–3 ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται: this remark may glance at a passage from the *Great Speech* of Protagoras: φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται (DK 80 B 3; cf. 325c5–6n.). However, if this remark is to be incompatible with Socrates' suggestion that wisdom is bravery, then the relevant natural endowment of souls had better not be an aptitude for learning, and what constitutes the good nutrition of souls had better not be knowledge (contrast 313c9).

351b4–e11: PLEASURE AND PAIN, GOOD AND BAD

In an apparent change of subject, Socrates tries to get Protagoras to say whether pleasure is a good thing and pain a bad one.

351b7 δοκοῖ: this optative is to the indicative δοκεῖ in 351b10 much as the English 'Would you think he was...?' is to 'Do you think he'd be...?' The two are different (if I were a consummate conman you would not think I was cheating, but you do think I would be cheating if I were a consummate conman); nevertheless, idiom sometimes ignores the difference. Other examples are *Lys.* 206a (δοκοῖ for δοκεῖ) and Xen. *Oec.* 10.5 (δοκοίην for δοκῶ). **ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος:** the former means being distressed that something or other is so; the latter means feeling a locatable pain. Thus ἀνιῶμαι is used by someone troubled at the thought of not living up to the noble standards set by his father (Soph. *Phil.* 906), by someone saddened that girls are turning into old maids, while potential husbands are away at the wars (Ar. *Lys.* 593), and by someone whose painful duty it is to remind a jury of disasters that befell the city of Athens (Lys. 13.43). By contrast ὀδυνῶμαι is used of e.g. bellyache, earache and headache, and of acute pain at the beginning and end of urination (Hipp. *De morbis popularibus* 5.1.17, 7.1.112). It is therefore not obvious that ἀνία differs from ὀδύνη only quantitatively, as Socrates will in effect suggest at 356a1–5. Cf. Andronicus of Rhodes *On passions* 1.2.1 for a taxonomy of these and another twenty-three species of λύπη, 354b2n. for more on different sorts of pain, and 337c2n. on different sorts of pleasure. **b10–11 τί δ' εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν; οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι;** Socrates is asking whether you have done well for yourself if you have taken pleasure in living out a full and human life. He is not asking, for example, whether every pleasure is a good thing, however undignified its object, or whether a baby has done well if it is killed young, having had some pleasures, and having had anaesthetics to preserve it from all pains. For there is a difference between βιοῦν (as here) and ζῆν (as in the last and next few speeches): ζῆν simply means to be alive, whereas βιοῦν implies something more like living out a life (thus Amm. 100–1, says that even brute beasts have ζωή, but only a human being can have a βίος, and adds that Aristotle defined βίος as rational ζωή). Cf. 355a2 καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον.

351c3 μή... καλεῖς 'I hope you don't call'. For this use of μή with the indicative, cf. 310b4–5n. **c4–5 ἆρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο;** 'are they not in this respect good, never mind whether they have any other consequence?' For this use of μή, cf. 319e1n. **c5–6 καὶ αὖθις αὖ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά;** by putting this question about the badness of pain immediately after his question about the goodness of pleasure, Socrates insinuates that they amount to a single question, and that a single Yes or No should suffice to answer them both. And they are a single question, if we may presume that pleasure and pain are opposites, as are good and bad, and that nothing has more than one opposite (332c18–d2). However, *Grg.* 495e–497a contains materials for an argument that they are two questions: some pleasures, such as those that we get from eating when hungry and drinking when thirsty, consist in the process of satisfying our desires, not in the state of having no

desire left unsatisfied; we can be satisfying our desires only so long as we have not yet satisfied them all; but unsatisfied desires, such as pangs of hunger and thirst, are painful; so if pain is bad, pleasure cannot all be good; for the presence of something good cannot require the compresence of something bad. Cf. *Grg.* 466d–e and Arist. *SE* 167b38–168a16, 169a6–18, 175b39–176a18 on how to deal with someone who presents to you multiple questions as if they were a single question.

351d3–4 ἀσφαλέστερον: see 316d5n. for the significance of Protagoras' concern for safety. **d5–6 ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά:** this is not quite an answer to the question that Socrates has just asked: for example, there might be, as Protagoras says, something pleasant that is not good (not overall, not with everything taken into account), even though, as Socrates has just put it, things that are in some respect pleasant are in that respect good. Nevertheless, this gets closer than the remainder of Protagoras' remark to answering Socrates' question. **d6–7 καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθά:** Protagoras has just listed (316d6–e4n.) three kinds of thing (pleasant things that are not good, painful things that are not bad, and painful things that are bad); so why should he call this a third kind, rather than a fourth? And why should he treat this as an extra kind, whatever its number, when it could include some of the pleasant things that are not good, and some of the painful things that are not bad? Anyone tempted to reflect on these points will be liable to forget the question that Protagoras is supposed to be answering. And that presumably is Protagoras' intention. For a similar device, cf. 334a4–c6.

351e1–2 τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν 'the things that either contain pleasure or produce pleasure'. Wine produces pleasure; tipsiness contains it. **e4–5 τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν** 'When I ask whether pleasure itself is not a good thing, this is what I mean: are not things good to the extent that they are pleasant?' See 341b1n. for the negation with οὐ of an εἰ clause that expresses an indirect question. **e6 ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις . . . ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό:** in this dialogue alone, Socrates says 'Let's look' five other times (314b4, 330b8, 332a3, 333b7, 343c6; cf. 347c2–3 ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος, 349a6–b1 ἐπιθυμῶ . . . συνδιασκέψασθαι, 361d5 μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην). A sophist is more likely to instruct another σκέψαι (325b3) or (given his preference for speaking to crowds) instruct others σκέψασθε (Thrasymachus DK 85 B 1.44, Grg. DK 84 B 11a. 13, 20). See 316c5n. on ὦ Σώκρατες for other signs that Protagoras is familiar with Socrates. **e7 πρὸς λόγον** 'relevant to our discussion', of whether things that are in some respect pleasant are in that respect good. By including this phrase in the protasis of his conditional, Protagoras in effect acknowledges that the proposed investigation

might turn out to be irrelevant, as indeed it will on one reading of what he proposes to investigate. **e7–8** τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν is rendered ambiguous by the lack of articles before ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν. It might mean 'It seems that a single thing is both pleasant and good, i.e. that something is both pleasant and good' – in which case, it would be irrelevant to the discussion. (For such a meaning of such a phrase, cf. *Prm.* 143a ἓν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, *Euthphr.* 8a τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ὂν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον.) Or it might mean 'It seems that the pleasant and the good are a single thing, i.e. that everything pleasant is thereby good, and everything good is thereby pleasant' – in which case, it would have every relevance. (For such a meaning, cf. *Grg.* 495a φῄς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, to express an identity that *Grg.* 506c will put, with articles, and without ambiguity, as τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.) In an argument at *Alc. Ma.* 116b–c, Socrates himself exploits such an ambiguity: he records by ταὐτόν . . . ἐφάνη . . . καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν a step which, given what it is inferred from, had better mean only 'Something is both fine and good,' and which, given what is inferred from it, had better mean also 'All good things are pleasant and all pleasant things good.' **e8** εἰ δὲ μή: by the contrast between this and the ἐὰν μέν κτλ that has just preceded it, Protagoras suggests that the protasis of the ἐὰν μέν conditional is likelier than not (cf. 325d5–6n.), and therefore that his proposed investigation is likely to bring him into agreement with Socrates. Protagoras thus contrives to suggest a readiness to cooperate, even as he continues to refuse to say whether things that are pleasant in some respect are good in that respect. **e9** ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως: i.e. to be the one asking the questions.

352a1–353b5: KNOWLEDGE AND THE CONTROL OF ACTION

Socrates and Protagoras agree that knowing what to do is always enough to get us to do it. The masses are therefore wrong to say that our emotions and appetites, pleasures and pains, can overcome us to make us do what we know not to. But the masses are not completely deluded. There is a quite real experience which they misdescribe when they talk in those terms. If Socrates and Protagoras can explain what the experience actually amounts to, this will help them understand the relation of courage to the other virtues.

352a2–3 ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων: 'bodily operations' would include running and jumping (*Chrm.* 159c θεῖν δὲ καὶ ἅλλεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἅπαντα ἔργα). **a3** τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας 'hands'. The χεῖρες run all the way from fingertips to shoulder. Hence Socrates speaks of their 'extremities' – the χεῖρες ἄκραι – now that he needs to pick out the parts of them that are visible even in someone fully clothed. Hence also Eur. *Alc.* 350–1, where 'wrapping the χεῖρας around' is equivalent to 'holding in the crooks of the arms' and 'embracing'; and *Anth. Pal.* 11.268, on a man with a nose so long that his χείρ was too short to wipe it.

352b7–c1 τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον: Socrates could add to this list those impulses to sneeze or yawn or weep or giggle which we know we could and should resist but to which we nevertheless succumb. Moreover, even as it stands, the list includes too many motivations to fit well with the argument ahead. For Socrates will argue that pleasure (352d4–356c3) and fear (358d6–360d9) cannot stop us doing what we know we should and can; and none of his arguments will even mention anger or love; yet he will proceed as if his arguments have shown that knowledge cannot be overcome by any rival motivation whatsoever.

352c2 ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης: for the proper treatment of slaves, cf. perhaps 310a3, where Socrates makes a slave give up his seat. **c3–4 καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου:** the thought that knowledge is a fine thing, and such as to take charge of a human being, was typically based on the thought that knowledge is stably and reliably correct (e.g. Grg. DK 82 B 11.11). Of course, opinions too can be correct; and when they are correct, the actions that they govern will succeed: as *Meno* 97a–b points out, the correct opinion about the road to Larissa will get you there as effectively as any knowledge would. But opinions, unlike knowledge, can also be incorrect (e.g. *Grg.* 454d, *Rep.* 477e); and acting on an incorrect opinion about the road to Larissa will not get you there. Moreover, even correct opinions are, unlike knowledge, easily lost: as *Meno* 97e–98a puts it, once one 'tethers [δήσηι]' correct opinions 'by a calculation of why they are correct [αἰτίας λογισμῶι]' they become knowledge, but until then they are liable to run away like bad slaves (cf. 352c2 ἀνδραπόδου). These claims about knowledge went largely uncontested (cf. Arist. *Categories* 8b29–30, who says 'knowledge is classified with things that are abiding and difficult to move'; and Diotima in *Smp.* 207e–208a, who describes as particularly 'outlandish' her own thesis that 'even' knowledge is evanescent). People were readier to contest the claims about opinion. See 356d3–4n. for claims by Protagoras that opinions are never incorrect; *Rep.* 430a–c, which identifies courage with an unshakeable ('dyed-in-the-wool [δευσοποιός]') and accurate opinion about what is and is not terrible; and Arist. *EN* 1146b24–31, on how 'some people are quite as convinced of what they believe as others are of what they know (Heraclitus is a good example)'. **c4–6 ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκηι τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύηι:** if this claim is to stand any chance of being correct, then 'knowing good and bad' must mean knowing precisely what to do. If, for example, I know in a general sort of way that I should take the road to Letchworth, but do not know, when I reach the junction, which is the road to Letchworth, then I may well fail to act as directed by my knowledge. Let us therefore treat the claim as being that if I know precisely what to do then I will do it. The truth or otherwise of this claim will now depend on what it takes to have such knowledge. One view is that such knowledge is easily acquired and often ineffectual. On this view, I might know precisely what to do

at the junction (turn left for Letchworth, where duty calls) and still do something else instead (turn right for Royston, where pleasure beckons). This is the view from which the many start, and which Socrates is trying to get them to reject. Those who reject this view face a choice between two alternatives. The first is that knowledge of good and bad demands something like the long and intense schooling of appetite, emotion and intellect that the *Republic* prescribes for those who are to rule an ideal society. On this alternative, we will know much less than we might have thought; but at least it will be clear why knowledge cannot be overcome by pleasure. The second alternative is that knowledge of good and bad is unchallengeably dominant, but still as easily acquired as the many originally thought: misdeeds are all due to ignorance; but I can learn about good and bad as easily as I learn your name when you tell me; and as soon as I have this knowledge of good and bad, everything else about me falls into line. Bertrand Russell may have come near to holding this second alternative (see Keynes (1949) 102: 'Bertie in particular sustained simultaneously a pair of opinions ludicrously incompatible. He held that in fact human affairs were carried on after a most irrational fashion, but that the remedy was quite simple and easy, since all we had to do was to carry them on rationally.'). Socrates says nothing here to rule out this second alternative. Nor, however (contrary perhaps to Arist. *NE* 1144b17–32, *EE* 1216b2–16 and 1246b32–6), does Socrates here say anything to indicate that he is adopting the second alternative, rather than the first.

352d2 αἰσχρόν: the fact that Protagoras lets himself be moved by shame, here as at 333c2, may make a dialectical victory over him too easy to be worth having. In *Grg.* 461b–c and 482c–e, Socrates' interlocutors complain that he likes getting people to say things because not to say them would be shameful: Socrates likes doing this, the interlocutors say, because once people say things for some reason other than that they are true, it is easy for Socrates to catch them out. In *Grg.* 486e–487e, Socrates agrees that we cannot prove a thesis by getting those who contradict it to contradict themselves, if they contradict themselves only because they are shamed into saying what they do not believe. Cf. 331c5–d2n. on granting objections to oblige the objector. **καὶ ἐμοί** 'for me in particular'. It would be particularly disgraceful for Protagoras to cast doubt on the power of knowledge, given his assertions about the large amounts of money that he deserves in return for the small amounts of knowledge that he imparts (328a6–b4). **σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην:** as he will make clear by using the singular adjective κράτιστον for both of these together, Protagoras assumes that they are a single thing. For this assumption, see 330b5n. **μὴ οὐχί:** for the idiomatic use here of what seems to be one negation too many, see the explanation in 344c3–5n. and the parallel in *Tht.* 151d αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπωι προθυμεῖσθαι ('it would be disgraceful not to make every effort'). **d5–7 πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν:** Homer and his characters do not talk like this, not even when Helen is led astray by love (*Il.* 3.426–47),

Achilles by anger (*Il.* 9.643–55) and Hector by fear (*Il.* 22.90–137), from doing what a later generation might describe as what they know to be the best thing and also in their power (cf. 346c4–5n.). Our first traces of talk to the contrary are from characters in Euripides: Phaedra in *Hipp.* 380–3 'We understand and know what is good [τὰ χρήστ' ἐπιστάμεσθα καὶ γιγνώσκομεν], but do not make the effort to carry it through, some of us because we are lazy, others, because we put something else – pleasure [ἡδονήν] – ahead of what is noble [τοῦ καλοῦ]'; Medea in *Med.* 1078–80 'I appreciate [μανθάνω] the evils [κακά] that I am about to do, but anger, which brings the greatest evils to mortals, holds sway over my plans [θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων]'; and Laius in fr. 841 *TrGF* 'Whenever someone knows the good, but does not do it [ὅταν τις εἰδῆι τἀγαθόν, χρῆται δὲ μή], then that's an evil sent to men by gods.' Such talk soon came to sound entirely natural: Arist. *EN* 1145b27–8 describes as 'in stark conflict with the way things look' the theory that such talk is wrong.

352e1–2 ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους: like talk about failing to do what we know we should do, such talk about being overcome by pleasure seems to emerge in the last decades of the fifth century, and is soon widely current. Cf. e.g. Hipp. *Airs, waters, places* 12, on how in the wrong sort of climate 'there could never be courage or endurance or industry or high spirits, . . . but τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάγκη κρατέειν instead'; Eur. fr. 187 *TrGF*, on the way that when an indolent man prospers, 'his family and his city will find him idle, and his friends will find him a nullity; for once someone is γλυκείας ἡδονῆς ἥσσων, his natural talents depart'; and Thuc. 3.38.7, where Cleon lambasts an Athenian assembly for 'just sitting there ἀκοῆς ἡδονῆι ἡσσώμενοι, more like an audience for sophists than like people deliberating about public affairs'. In *Laws* 633e, Clinias says that there is a consensus that being overcome by pleasure is more reprehensible than being overcome by pain. Perhaps this consensus explains why, as the order of words in our *Protagoras* passage concedes, and these other passages illustrate, pleasure was, of all these things, the one most commonly said to overcome people. **e3–4 πολλά . . . καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι:** this is not formally inconsistent with Protagoras' elaborate argument in 320d1–328d2 that everyone shares, to a high degree, in knowledge about virtue. Even so, Protagoras cannot feel altogether comfortable in being forced to say such a thing. Cf. 317a5; 353a7n. **e5–353a1 διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος** 'inform them what this experience is that they have'. Socrates' point is that people do have this experience (the masses perhaps more than Protagoras and Socrates, as the αὐτοῖς insinuates), and that, through ignorance of how powerful knowledge is, people are prone to misdescribe the experience as one in which knowledge is overcome. Socrates is no more denying that people have this experience than we deny that people get influenza when we deny that influenza is, as people have sometimes thought, an astral influence. Aristotle nevertheless reports Socrates here as denying that this experience ever

occurs (*EN* 1145b22–6). Aristotle's report is further misleading in that it uses the name of ἀκρασία for this experience. In fact, that name and its cognates do not occur in the *Protagoras*; and when people who knew Socrates do represent him as using that name and its cognates, they represent him as assuming that someone might be ἀκράτωρ (*Rep.* 579c) or ἀκρατής (Xen. *Mem.* 1.5.2–3), and that there is such a thing as ἀκρατία (*Grg.* 525a), ἀκράτεια (*Rep.* 461b) or ἀκρασία (Xen. *Mem.* 4.5.4–11).

353a1–2 οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα 'for this reason [i.e. because overcome by pleasure] not to do what is best'. **a2** ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά: elliptical for '*which is odd,* given that they do know what things are best'. For such ellipses with ἐπεί, see 333c2n. Socrates uses the infinitive γιγνώσκειν to indicate that he is continuing to report what the masses say. **a3** ὦ ἄνθρωποι: see 314d5n. **a5** ἀλλά suggests that 'the apodosis gives a more or less inadequate substitute for what is left unrealized in the protasis' (*GP* 12). The interlocutors, on being told not to use their preferred description, ask what to make do with instead. **a5–6** τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; see 312c2n., on what it would take to answer properly such a request for a definition. **a7** τί δέ . . . δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν: if the opinion of the masses can be scorned in this way, then they are hardly going to be, on any topic, the effective teachers that Protagoras described them as in e.g. 327b3–4. Cf. 352e3–4n. **a8** ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν: cf. e.g. Isoc. 12.25 'inventing false charges and saying ὅτι ἂν τύχωσιν', Isoc. 12.74 'those who boast and say ὅτι ἂν τύχωσιν', and Demos. *Epistles* 1.4 'those who will say ὅτι ἂν τύχωσιν lightly, and without calculation'.

353b3 ἄρτι: at 351e9–11.

353c1–354e2: THE MASSES ACCEPT HEDONISM

The masses must accept that pleasure is the only good thing, and pain the only bad one. They will of course insist, and rightly, that some things – such as the pleasures of overindulgence – are pleasant but bad. However, if we ask them how something that contains pleasure can nevertheless be bad, their only explanations will be that the thing prevents more pleasures in the long run than it produces in the short, or that the thing will overall produce more pain than pleasure. Likewise with such things as exercise. The masses will describe this as painful but good: painful because, in its immediate consequences, pain preponderates over pleasure; and good because, and only because, in all its consequences, immediate and remote, pleasure preponderates over pain.

353c1–2 τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; see 312c2n., on what it would take to answer properly such a request for a definition. **c4** ὦ ἄνθρωποι: see 314d5n.

353d5 ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπηιοῦν; 'would they nevertheless be bad, and all because they gave rise to enjoyment of whatever sort?' The ὅμως δέ marks the transition to the apodosis of the conditional whose protasis began with 353d4 κἂν εἴ τι τούτων (cf. *GP* 177–81 on 'apodotic δέ'). The phrase ὅτι μαθόντα presents a reason, while suggesting scornfully that the reason is inadequate, much as the phrases τί μαθών; and τί μαθόντες; (e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 402, 1506) seek a reason, while suggesting scornfully that no adequate reason can be presented (cf. LSJ s.v. μανθάνω V). Much as, but not exactly as. Indeed, the present passage is the only passage to use any such phrase in connection with objects that are not rational, or even animate. The suggestion that even the operations of these inanimate objects may be explained by what they know has a certain wry consonance with Socrates' thesis about the enormous power of knowledge.

353e3 ἐγὼ μέν: cf. 312c7n. **e8 ὦ ἄνθρωποι:** see 314d5n. **e9 δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα ἢ διότι κτλ:** the ταῦτα here are presumably just the sickness and poverty mentioned at 353e2–5. For on this presumption, it might well be clear to the masses (353e8 φαίνεται, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν), and Socrates and Protagoras might well assert (353e8–9 ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας), that ταῦτα are bad only because they result in pain and deprive us of pleasure. An alternative presumption would have ταῦτα include also the bad but pleasant indulgences in food, drink and sex mentioned at 353c5. But will it be clear to the masses that adultery is bad only because it results in pain and deprives us of pleasure? And even if this is clear to the masses, is it something that Socrates and Protagoras will assert? After all, in *Phd.* 68e–69a Socrates is thoroughly scornful of those whose temperance has such a motive: 'they lust after other pleasures, and are afraid that they will be deprived [στερηθῆναι] of them; and so they hold aloof from some pleasures because they are dominated [κρατούμενοι] by others; . . . in a way, it is dissipation that has made them temperate [δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι].' Cf. 354b7n. **e9–354a1 εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾶι καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ:** it is contentious to assume that things are bad, not only if they result in pain, but also if they deprive us of pleasure. If a restaurant adds to the menu a new option that is even more pleasant than the old, that does not make the old options bad. It does not even make them less good than they were before. At most, it means that those diners who look for the pleasantest option on the menu will now make a different choice; other diners might make just the same choice as before, and they could include diners who have no end in view save getting pleasure and avoiding pain, but who are satisfied with a pleasant meal, free of pain, even if it is not the most pleasant meal possible (cf. 355a3–4n.). Socrates, however, wants to get the masses to think that a well-informed chooser is a maximiser, always choosing what is, all things considered, the best option available, not a satisficer, sometimes happy to settle for what is good enough. Cf. 346c2–3n., 355a3–4n., 356b1n.

354a3 **ὦ ἄνθρωποι:** see 314d5n. **a5 τὰς στρατείας:** this talk of soldiering is the closest that Socrates comes to mentioning the most obvious difficulty for his argument: the masses will take noble death in battle to be a good thing that is not a pleasant one. **a6 καύσεών τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν:** burning, cutting and drugging the patient were the three main ways for Greek medicine to intervene therapeutically (cf. e.g. *Grg.* 456b, Aesch. *Agamemnon* 848–9). They are listed here in order of decreasing pain (contrast increasing pain in Hipp. *Aphorisms* 7.87 'What drugs do not heal, the knife heals; what the knife does not heal, fire heals; what fire does not heal must be considered unhealable'), and followed by the least painful therapy of them all: starvation dieting.

354b2 **ὀδύνας . . .ἀλγηδόνας:** ὀδύνη is the most common and most general word for pains with a bodily location (351b7n.). ἀλγηδών seems to be used for the more severe of such pains: the pains of surgical operations with cautery or knife (*Plt.* 293b, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.54, Isoc. 8.40), of childbirth (Eur. *Med.* 1031), of dreadful wounds (Eur. *Andromache* 259), and of hair being pulled from the roots (Arist. *Prob.* 893a24–5), the pains that may paralyse a patient or make him shriek out loud (Hipp. *Internal Afflictions* 51). Beautiful women who could be seen but not touched were once called 'ἀλγηδόνες in the eyes' (Hdt. 5.18.4); but that was a cheap and frigid conceit, scarcely tolerable even among barbarians (Long. 4.7), and imitated by Greeks only when joking (Plu. *Alexander* 21.10). **b4 τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι:** this phrase is some sign that there is something altruistic about the hedonism which Socrates is here pressing on the masses (contrast Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4–5, quoted in 329c7–d1n.); for the preservation of cities is a good thing that can be secured by noble death in battle (cf. 354a5n.), and that might be said to owe its goodness to considerations of pleasure and pain (354c1–2); yet those whose noble death in battle secures the preservation of cities will not themselves feel the pleasure that makes preserving cities a good thing. Does this altruism mean that Socrates has adequately accounted for the value of noble death in battle? The masses would be unwise to agree that he has, so long as they continue to admire the 300 Spartans who died at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.207–33), in a battle which they lost, and which therefore did not secure the preservation of their city. **b4 ἄλλων ἀρχαί:** this phrase allows both an altruistic and an egoistic reading of the hedonism that Socrates is pressing on the masses. For it can include both an individual's ruling over other individuals in his own community and a community's ruling over other communities (cf. Gorgias in *Grg.* 452d on how he can provide 'the greatest good, and cause simultaneously both of personal freedom for people [ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] and of rule over others for each in his own city [ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῆι αὐτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστωι]', and Hdt. 1.210.2 'you made the Persians to be free instead of slaves [ἀντὶ μὲν δούλων ἐποίησας ἐλευθέρους Πέρσας εἶναι], and to rule over everyone instead of being ruled over by others [ἀντὶ δὲ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων

ἄρχειν ἁπάντων]'). **b7 ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι κτλ:** the ταῦτα here suffers from much the same vagueness as the ταῦτα at 353c9: does it cover just the good things of 354b3–4, or does it include also all the good but painful things of 354a4–6? By being vague on this point, Socrates manages to evade embarrassing questions about the value of noble defeats in battle.

354c5 ἡδονὴν . . . ἀγαθὸν ὄν: on the mix of genders, see 333b2n. **c8 τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ' εἶναι κακόν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν:** the masses have already, at 354c5–6, accepted that pain is an evil and pleasure a good; Socrates here gets them to identify pain with evil and pleasure with good. For the use of such a phrase to encourage an identification, cf. the identification of beauty with beneficial pleasure in *Hp. Ma.* 303e: τοῦτ' ἄρα . . . λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον; The precise import of the present identification of the good with the pleasant will depend on what other ideas are added to the identification. If we add a familiar idea about pleasure, then we will reach the low-minded conclusion that the best life might consist of nothing but wine, women and song. And no doubt the masses have resisted the identification because they accept the familiar idea about pleasure, and reject the low-minded conclusion. We might instead add the ideas of *Rep.* 580d–588a, which argue that greater by far than the pleasures of wine, women and song are the pleasures of the intellect. In that case, the identification of the good with the pleasant will be high-minded enough to satisfy the most austere. Presumably, if Socrates himself identifies the good with the pleasant, he does so in the more high-minded way. **c9–d1 ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῆι ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζηι τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι κτλ:** Socrates defends the identifications that he wishes the masses to make by rebutting their obvious objection: they call some enjoyment bad. The rebuttal is that the masses can explain the badness of bad enjoyment only by invoking these identifications; in particular, since the masses call enjoyment bad *whenever* (ὅταν) it prevents greater pleasures, or causes greater pains, than the pleasures that it itself contains, the masses concede that nothing else can override these things to make the enjoyment good. Socrates here gets the masses to make four contentious assumptions. (i) The first is that pleasures are like the bits of gold in 329d6–8: they are so uniform that the only significant differences between them are differences of size; and the sizes of the various pleasures consequent on doing something can be summed to give the total amount of pleasure consequent on doing that thing. The first assumption is contentious for the reason given in *Phlb.* 12c–13c: the pleasures that a debauchee takes in debauchery are quite opposite to the pleasures that a sobersides takes in sobriety (cf. 331d4–5n. on colours; cf. also 337c2n. and 358a7n. on Prodicus' distinctions between kinds of pleasure). (ii) The second assumption is that pains too are uniform, in the same way as pleasures. The second assumption is contentious for much the same reason as the first: the upset

that sobriety causes a debauchee is quite opposite to the upset that debauchery causes a sobersides. The second assumption is contentious also because it is hard to think that a locatable pain like a toothache differs only quantitatively from being troubled by bad news (cf. 351b7n. on ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος). (iii) A third assumption is that quantities of pleasure are comparable to quantities of pain. Why should the masses assume this? Should those who live by the slogan 'You can't be too thin or too rich' assume that a waistline of 34 inches is bigger than or smaller than or the same size as a weekly wage of £600? Likewise, even if the masses do assume that we can measure pains and pleasures (by the sade, say, and the epicure), why should they assume that 1 sade of pain is bigger than or smaller than or the same size as 1 epicure of pleasure? (iv) The fourth assumption is that pleasure and pain cancel out like credits and debits in a ledger, the assumption that if 1 sade is the same size as 1 epicure, then the overall value of something that will bring 100 sades and 110 epicures equals the overall value of something that will bring 0 sades and 10 epicures, and is higher than the overall value of something that will bring 0 sades and only 9 epicures. This fourth assumption is contentious, since it means that for any life that was nothing but pleasure, there would be a better life which was almost half pain. These assumptions were not implicit in the agreement at 353c8–354c3 that things can be judged good or bad only by reference to pleasure and pain. They will become explicit in the comparison at 356a7–c3 between using scales and making wise choices.

354d2 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε is almost 'But you can't, as you will find if you try.' The future tense is used because the addressees' recognition of their inability lies in the future, not because the inability itself does. There is a similarly motivated future tense in 354e1. **d5–6 τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττηι ἢ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζηι:** good pains are a second objection to the identifications that Socrates wishes the masses to make. His rebuttal of it relies on the same contentious assumptions as his rebuttal of the first. Socrates does not deal with other potential objections: things of which one is wholly unaware and which therefore cause neither pleasure nor pain, but which are nevertheless good (or bad), like being admired (or despised) behind one's back. No doubt the masses are intended to think that all such objections can be dealt with along the lines of the first and second objections.

354e1 ἔχετε 'you can', by contrast with ἔχοιτε ἄν 'you might be able to' in the parallel passage at 354d2. The change to an apodosis with the indicative, from an apodosis with the optative and ἄν, seems to mark some greater urgency or immediacy, as the argument reaches the point at which it is clinched. Cf. 331a6–7n. **ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε:** see 354d2n. **e3 ὦ ἄνθρωποι:** see 314d5n.

354e3–356c4: OVERCOME BY GOODNESS?

Now that the masses have acknowledged their identifications of the pleasant with the good and the painful with the bad, they can be brought to abandon their talk of 'being overcome by pleasure'. To know that one alternative is better than another is, they agree, to know that the surplus of pleasure over pain in the one alternative is greater than the surplus of pleasure over pain in the other. In short, to know that one alternative is better than another is, they agree, to know that it is, all things considered, more pleasant. Hence the masses will now agree that it is absurd to talk of 'being overcome by pleasure', as if we can know one alternative to be better (that is, more pleasant), but choose the other for being more pleasant (that is, better). What lies behind talk of 'being overcome by pleasure' is this: we are liable to underestimate remote pains and pleasures and overestimate immediate ones; in consequence, we are liable to make mistakes when we try to pick what is best and pleasantest; and if we make mistakes, we do not know what is correct.

354e7 ἀναθέσθαι 'take back'. The metaphor is from retracting a move in a board game. Cf. *Grg.* 461d, and *Hipparchus* 229e: 'As in a board game, I am happy for you, in our discussions, to ἀναθέσθαι any statement you like, so that you don't feel you're being bamboozled.' There is a more elaborate comparison between dialectic and board games in *Rep.* 487b–c: if a grandmaster defeats you, you might reasonably explain your defeat by your own ineptitude, rather than by any intrinsic weakness in the position from which you started, even though you cannot identify any particular mistakes that you made when playing; similarly, Socrates might refute a view of yours without persuading you that your view was false, and not just inepdy defended. If the more elaborate comparison is correct, then we might still feel bamboozled even if we are allowed the opportunity to retract a statement. Cf. 329b1n. for comparisons between intellectual life and competitive sports.

355a2–3 τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν 'to live out a life pleasantly, without any pains'. Socrates is asking about a full and human life, not about absolutely every existence that contains some pleasure and no pain; cf. 351b10–11n. **a3–4** εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾶι: the connective καί here comes close to being 'and therefore' or 'that is'. Socrates wants the masses to reason that since they would be satisfied with living out a pleasant life free of pain, it follows that pleasure and pain are their only standards of goodness and badness. The reasoning is contentious, in at least two ways. First, perhaps the masses would not be satisfied with an existence, however pleasant it was and free of pain, unless it was also complete enough to count as a proper βίος, lived out to the end. Second, perhaps the masses would be satisfied with a life that is less than what they take to be the very best; in other words, perhaps the masses are, to use the convenient jargon, satisficers, not maximisers (cf. 353e9–354a1n.; 346c2, where Simonides satisfices; and Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4, quoted in 329c7–d1n., where Socrates maximises). Either

way, the masses might be satisfied with, and choose, a pleasant life, free of pain, even though pleasure and pain are not their only standards. In the comparison at 356a7–b3 between using scales and making wise choices, Socrates will again have the masses make the contentious assumptions that we never choose any option less than what we take to be the best, and that we are to judge the merits of an option solely by its pleasures and pains.

355b5–6 ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά: there can be pitfalls in calling two things by just two names. For example, we can use three names to say that Lois prefers Superman to Clark; but if we confine ourselves to two names on the grounds that we are talking about just two people – Lois Lane and Clark Kent, that is, Superman – then we have to say 'Lois prefers Clark to Clark' or 'Lois prefers Superman to Superman'; yet such formulations miss something. However, we cannot easily take such pitfalls as objections to Socrates' argument. For if we must use more than one name for Clark Kent when reporting Lois Lane's preferences, that is only because of her ignorance. And so the fact that Lois prefers Superman to Clark hardly shows that someone might knowingly prefer pleasure to goodness. Contrast 358b8–d4, where Socrates takes the identity of the good with the pleasant to preclude acting contrary to any thought about what is best, whether or not that thought amounts to knowledge; contrast also this argument for 'showing' that someone is a bastard: 'You don't know who the man under the bedclothes is; but the man under the bedclothes is your father; so you don't know who your father is' (Arist. *SE* 179a34, Lucian *Sale of lives* 22–3).

355c7–d1 ἂν οὖν τύχηι ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστὴς ὤν, γελάσεται: for laughter at the illogical, see 340e2n. on γελοῖος ἰατρός. Laughter can be a mark of ὕβρις (as here and in e.g. *Smp.* 219c, Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.33 and Soph. *Aj.* 367) because the essence of that offence, as important as any bodily harm, is the gratuitous belittlement of the victim. Arist. *Rh.* 1379a30–4 explains: 'People get angry with those who laugh at them and mock and jeer (for they are committing ὕβρις), and with those who inflict the sort of damage that is indicative of ὕβρις. This has to be the sort of thing that is not done in retaliation for anything, or in order to benefit the perpetrator; for that looks, without further ado, to result from ὕβρις.' Demos. 54.8–9 describes a mugger, whose ὕβρις was particularly manifest in the way he mocked his victim: 'for he kept on crowing, mimicking fighting cocks that have been victorious'.

355d3 ἐν ὑμῖν: i.e. when there is a conflict going on inside one of you.

355e2 πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω: for the omission of τὰ μέν, cf. 330a4n. **e3–4 τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν** 'by "being overcome" you mean accepting unduly large evils to set against unduly

small goods'; i.e. being ready to adopt a course of action which contains so much evil and so little good that it is not worth adopting. For the turn of phrase, and for the thought that such a turn of phrase would not apply to anyone, cf. Grg. DK 82 B 11a.9 οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀντὶ μεγάλων ὑπουργημάτων ὀλίγα χρήματα λαμβάνειν ('it is not likely that one would accept small sums to set against large services'). In these passages, λαμβάνειν has the sense it does in 356d2, where it stands to πράττειν (actually adopting a course of action) as φεύγειν (trying to avoid a course of action) does to μὴ πράττειν. This is why the fact that somebody λαμβάνει something can sometimes explain why he πράττει such a thing. This is also why, although it is easy πράττειν something that is not worth doing (for it is possible πράττειν such a thing in ignorance), it sounds absurd to say that somebody λαμβάνει a course of action containing so much evil and so little good that it is not worth doing. **e5–6 τό ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρόν:** on this use of the article, see 313d1n.

356a2–3 τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῆι πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; 'How else can pleasure not deserve to win out over pain unless there is some quantitative difference between them?' More literally: 'What lack of desert can pleasure have with respect to pain, apart from there being more of the one and less of the other?' ἀναξία is a feminine singular abstract noun, apparently coined especially for this occasion. It is related to the adjective ἀνάξιος as ἀξία is related to ἄξιος. **a3–5 ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον** 'That is, by their differing in size or number or intensity.' This relentlessly quantitative talk reinforces the assumptions made in 354c9–d1 and makes us ready to accept the analogies with weighing, measuring and counting in 356b1–357b3. A later age might wish to talk also about differences in probability, so that a 50 per cent chance of two pleasures of a given size and intensity deserves to win out over the same pains as the certainty of one pleasure that size and intensity (see Hacking (1975) on how people came to talk this way). However, the point that Socrates is making here would not be materially affected by adding another way in which pleasures and pains differ quantitatively. **a5–6 ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ:** see 324b3–4nn. for related ideas about the differences between different times, and see Ant. 6.25 for an application of precisely this idea to explain how torture makes people say things now, even though they know that they will eventually be killed for having said them: 'Everyone finds current coercion more forceful than coercion to come [ἡ γὰρ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη ἑκάστωι ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι].'

356b1 ἱστάναι: for the simplest case, where your options differ in value, and you have just two to choose between, the analogy with weighing is this: each pan of your balance is assigned to one of the two options; you put into the pan of an option all the pleasures of that option, together with all the pains of the

other option; you then choose the option whose pan goes down. Generalised to cases where your options need not all differ in value, and where you may have more than two, the analogy requires that you weigh each option against each of the others, and that you choose an option that none of the others outweighs. If the analogy is to be correct, then the contentious assumptions listed in 353e9–354a1n., 354c9–d1n. and 355a3–4n. must all be true. And even then, there is still room for doubt that virtue is the skill of weighing the pleasures and pains attached to the various options between which one chooses, whatever they may be. For virtue seems to require choosing from a proper menu of options. For example, I do not have the virtue of honesty if I so much as consider the possibility of cheating you, even if, after weighing what I take to be my options, I then decide not to cheat; and I do not have the virtue of tact if I can never think of a kind word when one is called for, however skilfully I weigh the words that do occur to me. Moreover, virtue seems to require also attaching the correct pleasures and pains to the various options. For example, I am not temperate if simple and wholesome meals leave me angry and frustrated, however accurately I estimate the anger and frustration.

356c3 ὦ ἄνθρωποι: see 314d5n.

356c5–357e8: A SCIENCE OF MEASUREMENT

To save us from errors about quantities of good and bad, and thus to ensure that we will always act correctly, we need a science for measuring these things. This science is presumably what the sophists are talking about when they promise to teach us virtue.

356c5–6 φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῆι ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω: this fact is demonstrated as Euclid *Optics* Proposition 5: 'Equal magnitudes at unequal distances look unequal, and the one that is nearer to the eye always looks bigger.' Later Propositions put related facts to work in explanations of e.g. 'How to measure a given height, when the sun is shining' (18) and 'How, when there is no sun, to measure a given height' (19). It is pleasant to imagine that such results were among what Plato's student Hermodorus had in mind when he wrote *On Plato* Frag. D, Col. Y, 2–9: 'At that time there was great progress in the mathematical sciences. Plato took overall charge, and set the problems; the mathematicians investigated them enthusiastically. This is how studies of measurement [τὰ περὶ μετρολογίαν] then first reached their peak.' **c9–10 αἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι:** antique studies of measurement never seem to have given a quantified account of this fact, as they did of the corresponding fact about visible size. Arist. *De audibilibus* 801a21–801b1 sketches a qualitative account (sound scatters over distance), and uses it to explain how ear trumpets work (they stop the sound scattering).

356d1–2 τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν: as the opposite of φεύγειν, λαμβάνειν means 'try to get', as in 355e3–4. **d3–4 ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις:** in contrasting measurement with appearance, Socrates glances at one of Protagoras' most notorious doctrines. Protagoras began his book *Truth* (DK 80 B 1) by asserting 'Man is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not [πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι].' He meant by this, explains *Tht.* 152a, that 'each thing is for me such as it appears to me, and for you such as it appears to you [οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί]'; cf. 334a1–3n. *Tht.* 152b gives one application: if a wind blows upon us both but makes only one of us shiver, then the wind is neither absolutely cold, nor absolutely not cold; rather, 'it is cold for the one who shivers, and not for the one who does not [τῶι μὲν ῥιγῶντι ψυχρόν, τῶι δὲ μὴ οὔ]'. In another application, at *Tht.* 170a–171c, this measure doctrine trips itself up: it appears to men that men are not measures of all things; so someone who starts by saying that men are measures of all things must, in the face of this fact, end by agreeing that men are not. Contrast the measure doctrine of *Laws* 716c, whereby the measure of all things is God; this is not liable to trip itself up, unless gods disagree. **d6–e1 ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα:** this phrase allows for the appearance to persist, even after the art of measurement has rendered it ineffectual (Demos. 20.37 talks of rendering an agreement ineffectual, without destroying the document in which the agreement is contained). There could therefore be an analogy with the way that optical illusions persist, even for those who know not to be deceived by them. Take for example the Müller–Lyer illusion, where there are two lines, each with arrow heads at either end, one with the arrow heads pointing in, the other with the arrow heads pointing out: if you measure the two lines, you will find that they are the same length, and you will no longer be tempted to act as if they were different; even so, the one will continue to look longer than the other. Similarly, perhaps, knowing that something is the best thing for you to do might guarantee that you do it, even though your appetites direct otherwise; for your knowledge might simply render these appetites ineffectual, rather than remove them altogether.

356e6–357a1 τί δ' εἰ ἐν τῆι τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὁπότε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁπότε τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτ' ἐγγὺς εἴτε πόρρω εἴη; is a mystifying way to ask 'What if our lives depended on being able to tell which of two numbers was the larger?' The numbers generally were described as 'the odd and the even' (cf. e.g. *Rep.* 510c, *Tht.* 198a). When Socrates speaks of what is bigger or smaller 'itself with respect to itself', he has in mind a comparison between two numbers, of which both are odd, or both are even; when he speaks of what is bigger or smaller

'the one with respect to the other' he has in mind a comparison between two numbers, of which one is odd and the other even (cf. the descriptions of λογιστική in *Grg.* 451c καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον, and *Chrm.* 166a ἐστίν που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα).

357a2 μετρητική τις 'measurement of a sort' (309c8n.). Plain μετρητική would be the art of measuring lengths. **a3** ἀριθμητική is the knowledge of numbers generally, by contrast with the art of calculation or λογιστική (cf. 318e2–3n., and *Grg.* 451b–c); thus it includes both counting and the upper reaches of number theory. Counting, like weighing and measuring (356b1–e5), answers questions with impressive ease and rigour (*Alc. Ma.* 126c–d, *Rep.* 602d, *Phlb.* 55e, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.9). All three techniques were contrasted with our less impressive techniques for resolving disputes over good and bad, and right and wrong (*Euthphr.* 7b–c, *Laws* 757b, *de Justo* 373c–d). Cf. 328c1–2n. on a technique of Protagoras' for resolving such a dispute without resort to measurement. **a6** ὦ ἄνθρωποι: see 314d5n. **a7** ὑμῖν: we owe this reading to the scribe who corrected our fragmentary ancient manuscript. That manuscript originally had ἡμῖν, which is also the reading of all our medieval manuscripts. We do not know why the corrector made the correction. Was it to conform better with the manuscript that was his source? Or was it simply to avoid having Socrates express his own agreement with the position into which he has just been arguing the masses? Cf. *Phd.* 103a, where manuscripts again offer a choice between ὑμῖν and ἡμῖν, and how we choose again has consequences for who is agreeing to what part of the argument.

357b2 οὐ μετρητική φαίνεται: the subject is ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου in 357a7: 'is it not clear that what saves our lives is measurement?' Contrast the disdain for all mathematicised sciences that Protagoras evinced at 318e2–4. **b7** εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα 'we will consider some other time' and therefore not now; cf. 347b3n.

357c2 ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον: Socrates alludes to his agreement with Protagoras at 352c2–d3. **c6** ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες . . . **d1** εἴπατε ἡμῖν: in spite of his supposedly poor memory (334c8–d1), Socrates quotes almost verbatim from 353a4–5. Cf. 359a7–c1n.

357e2–3 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη: compare and contrast *Laws* 689a–b, which says that the greatest ignorance is found 'whenever someone does not love [φιλῆι], but hates [μισῆι], something that he thought fine or good [δόξαν καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι], and loves and welcomes [ἀσπάζηται] what he thinks bad and unjust [πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον δοκοῦν εἶναι]. This

dissonance between his rational thought and his feelings of pleasure and pain [διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν; cf. 333a7–8] I describe as the ultimate ignorance. And I describe it as the greatest ignorance because it belongs to the majority [τοῦ πλήθους] of the soul, for what feels pain and pleasure is to a soul what the people and the majority are to a city.' Both passages alike maintain that we cannot act contrary to our knowledge of good and bad, and that those who would commonly be described as so acting suffer in fact from the greatest ignorance. The passages differ, in that the *Laws*, unlike the *Protagoras*, distinguishes finding pleasure in things from thinking that those things are good, and so allows 'overcome by pleasure' as a correct description of those who would commonly be described as acting contrary to their knowledge of good and bad: their appetites and aversions move them to act against their thoughts about good and bad, and thus show that those thoughts, however true, however well-founded, do not amount to knowledge. In consequence, we might, without accepting the hedonism into which the masses have been argued, accept the conclusion into which Socrates hopes to argue the masses on the basis of that hedonism, the conclusion that we always do a thing if we know it to be the best thing in our power. For more on ἀμαθία, see 358c5–6n. **e4 ἰατρός:** see 313e3n. In *Tht.* 166e–167b Protagoras develops a more sophisticated comparison of sophists to doctors that is not obviously compatible with his comparison here: 'To a sick man, his food seems and is bitter, while to a healthy man it is and seems the opposite. Now we need not – indeed, we could not – make either of the two wiser; nor should we describe the man in bad health as ignorant because he has such thoughts, nor the man in good health as wise because his thoughts are different. We do, however, need to make a change from one state to the other; for the other state is superior. Likewise in education, we need to make a change from one state to its superior, except that, whereas the doctor makes the change with drugs, the sophist makes it with words. For one cannot think things that are not the case, nor can one think anything apart from one's experiences, and these are always true. On the contrary, I suppose that when a man's mind is in a bad way, then he has thoughts in conformity with that; and when his mind is in a good way, that makes him have different thoughts, still in conformity with the way his mind is. Some people are so naïve as to call these impressions true. I, by contrast, say that the one lot are better than the other, but not any truer.' **e5 οὔτε αὐτοί:** this sketchy clause requires substantial supplementation from context, and means something like 'neither did you go yourselves to these teachers'. Perhaps the clause originally contained some verb like ἦιτε to make this explicit. And perhaps not, for even more substantial supplementation is required in e.g. Demos. 49.52 οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἄνευ γε σταθμοῦ ἔμελλεν οὔτε ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος οὔθ' ὁ ὑποτιθεὶς τὸν χαλκὸν παραδώσειν ('for without actually weighing it, the one who was taking the deposit was hardly likely *to accept the copper*, and the one who was making the deposit was hardly likely to hand the copper over'). Cf. 320a1–2.

358a1–358d5: THE SOPHISTS ON PLEASURE, GOODNESS AND ACTION

The sophists agree to identify the pleasant with the good and the painful with the bad. They agree also to infer from these identifications that we always do what, of all the things in our power, we believe to be the best.

358a4 ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα: this phrase is vague about what exactly all the sophists accepted. Are τὰ εἰρημένα things expressed, or things asserted? (For λέγειν without asserting cf. e.g. 351c4; for λέγειν assertively cf. e.g. 353a3.) And if they are things asserted, are they the things asserted by the masses, or the things asserted by Socrates himself? (Cf. 330e4–331a5 for difficulties in keeping track of who is responsible for the various assertions made in dialectic.) This vagueness in Socrates' record of what all the sophists accepted presumably corresponds to a vagueness in their acceptance itself. **a5–6 ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν;** a question, because the sophists left it vague quite what they were accepting of the various thoughts expressed at various stages in the discussion. The question might simply be whether pleasure is a good thing, and pain a bad one. But at 358b8–c4 the sophists will not protest when Socrates treats them as having agreed that pleasure is the good; and at 360a4–5 Protagoras will say it has been agreed that if something is fine and good then it is pleasant. **a7 εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν:** according to Aristotle (DK 84 A 19), τέρψις and χαρά were two subspecies that Prodicus distinguished within ἡδονή. According to Hermias (scholion on *Phdr.* 267b, not in DK), his distinction was that τέρψις is pleasure in hearing something, while χαρά is pleasure of the soul (τέρψιν καλῶν τὴν δι' ὤτων ἡδονήν, χαρὰν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς). For more on Prodicus' nice distinctions between the different sorts of pleasure, see 337c2n. **a7–b1 εἴτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων:** the phrase χαίρω ὀνομάζων regularly recurs for arbitrary choice among words (e.g. *Smp.* 212b–c, *Crt.* 400e, *Hp. Mi.* 369a, *Euthd.* 288b, Antiphanes fr. 180.7 *PCG*); by contrast, ἥδομαι ὀνομάζων and τέρπομαι ὀνομάζων do not seem to have ever been used. We may have here a hint that there is some difference after all between ἡδύ and τερπνόν and χαρτόν, and therefore that, contrary to 356a1–5, pleasures differ more than just quantitatively. See also 332b11–c3n. on Plato's casualness about terminology.

358b1 ὦ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε: a very polite form of address, to make the implied reproof more palatable. **b3 γελάσας:** the laugh may mean that Prodicus is again conniving with Socrates, as he did at 341c2. **συνωμολόγησε:** aorist, to mark the contrast between Prodicus' agreement on this occasion and his earlier hesitation to agree; see 333b4n. **b4 ὦ ἄνδρες:** see 314d5n. **b4–5 αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἆρ' οὐ καλαί;** Socrates puts to the sophists a coarser hedonism than the hedonism put to the masses at 355a2–3

ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; The masses were asked about what would be adequate (ἀρκεῖ; cf. 355a3–4n.), not about what would be noble (καλαί), and about living out a life (καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον; cf. 351b10–11n.), not about having an animate existence (ζῆν). Moreover, the masses were asked to evaluate pleasure and freedom from pain, not actions with such ends in view (αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις). The hedonism put to the masses can therefore accommodate, as the coarser form cannot, the thought that evaluating lives might differ from choosing actions, and that however we are to evaluate lives, we will choose our actions correctly if we forget about pleasure and pain and choose on other grounds instead. In particular, it can accommodate a thought that Virtue puts to Vice in Prodicus' *Choice of Heracles*, the thought that because Vice seeks pleasure, she gets less pleasure than Virtue does: 'You never hear the most pleasant sound of all, praise of yourself; and you never see the most pleasant sight of all, for you have never seen any fine achievement of your own' (DK 84 B 2.31; see 340d1–2n. on a sign that Socrates knows this work). **b8 εἰ ἄρα . . . τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν:** see 358a5–6n. **b8–c1 οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος:** earlier, the claim was that if we have knowledge of good and bad (352c4–6n.) then we are bound to act accordingly (352b2–d6, using the words ἐπιστήμη, γιγνώσκειν, φρόνησις, σοφία). There was no claim earlier that we are bound to act as directed by our beliefs when those beliefs do not amount to knowledge (contrast Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4, quoted in 329c7–d1n.). Such a claim would in any case be peculiarly problematic. For example, how can you act on both your beliefs if in your ignorance you believe that each of two things is better than the other? (Lois Lane says, 'Dinner out with Superman would be better than a quiet evening at home; but better a quiet evening at home than dinner out with Clark.' We ask her, 'What about dinner out with Superman in a sober suit? Or with Clark Kent dressed in yellow, blue and red?' She is adamant: 'It doesn't matter how they dress. It's Superman I love, not his clothes. I still rank the alternatives in this order: dinner out with Superman; quiet evening at home; dinner out with Clark.') Moreover, the argument at 355b4–e4 would not begin to work if it were about thought in general rather than about knowledge in particular (see 355b5–6n., and 342b3–5n.). Yet the talk here of thinking, as well as knowing, is no momentary slip (cf. 358d1 οἴεται, 358d2 οἴεται, 358e5 ἡγεῖσθαι, 358e5 ἡγεῖται). Moreover, the distinction between thinking and knowing was not too subtle for the sophist Gorgias to grasp at *Grg.* 454c–455a. Why then do Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus now accept, not only the earlier claim that our actions cannot go against what we know, but also the new and more general claim that our actions cannot go against what we think? Perhaps Protagoras, under the influence of his theory that man is the measure (356d3–4n.), finds it hard to distinguish thinking from knowing; perhaps Hippias is as insensitive to this distinction as he was to so many others (337c7–338b2); perhaps Prodicus can see the distinction between thinking and knowing as he saw so many others (337a1–c4), but is conniving with Socrates to ignore it (cf. 358b3n.).

358c1 ἔπειτα expresses surprise, rather than temporal sequence; cf. 343d1n. **c5–6 ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων;** in Plato, ἀμαθία is always worse than simply not having knowledge. Thus in *Smp.* 202a Diotima says that having correct opinions of which one can give no rational account is not knowledge, and not ἀμαθία either; 'for how could what is in touch with reality [τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον] be ἀμαθία?' Sometimes ἀμαθία is equated with error generally. Thus Socrates says in *Euthd.* 286d that ἀμαθία would be 'getting things wrong [ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων]', and in *Tht.* 170b that people take ἀμαθίαν to be ψευδῆ δόξαν. More often, however, ἀμαθία is conceived to be a false belief that one has some knowledge (*Sph.* 229c τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι, *Smp.* 204a τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὑτῶι εἶναι ἱκανόν; cf. *Ap.* 29b, which describes ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν as 'the reprehensible ἀμαθία', and *Alc. Ma.* 118a, which uses that description for the state of οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἰόμενοι δ' εἰδέναι). That conception of ἀμαθία reduces to the present conception of ἀμαθία as a false belief about matters of great importance, on the assumption (explicit in *Alc. Ma.* 117d, *Sph.* 229c and *Chrm.* 171d–e) that errors about the limits of one's knowledge are the source of all erroneous action. Contrast *Laws* 689a (quoted in 357e2–3n.) on 'the greatest ἀμαθία'.

358d6–360e5: FEAR, COURAGE AND WISDOM

We are bound to flee what frightens us; for we take what frightens us to be bad, and we are bound to flee what we take to be bad. Likewise, we are bound to pursue what emboldens us; for we take what emboldens us to be good, and we are bound to pursue what we take to be good. The trouble with cowards is that they flee what is in fact good, and pursue what is in fact bad; this is because they are frightened and emboldened by the wrong things; and this in turn is because they are ignorant. Since this ignorance makes them cowards, this ignorance is cowardice. The opposite of ignorance is knowledge. And the opposite of cowardice is courage. Courage therefore is knowledge. So courage is not as different from the other virtues as Protagoras earlier maintained.

358d6 καλεῖτέ τι . . . ; see 332a3–4n. for this turn of phrase, to bring a subject into the discussion. **δέος καὶ φόβον:** the two are paired with no evident distinction between them in Hdt. 4.115.2, Hipp. *On the sacred disease* 12, Lys. 20.8, Demos. 21.124, 23.103; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.5–6, where Socrates argues that φόβος makes people obedient by citing the docility of sailors so long as they δείσωσιν the weather or the enemy. **d7–8 προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε:** such accounts of fear were commonplace: in *La.* 198b Socrates describes δέος as προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ, and Arist. *EN* 1115a9 says that people generally define φόβος in just that way (τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ). Such accounts are entirely acceptable if they mean (as the

τινά in προσδοκίαν τινά here emphasises) that fearing things is a special way of expecting them to be bad. For they allow you to expect a thing to be bad in such a way that you fear to do it, while still believing it the best thing to do – as might happen if you tremble when you imagine what the enemy will do if you stand your ground, but you are convinced that you should stand your ground nevertheless. But acceptable accounts of this kind will not serve the purposes of the argument: see 358e4–6n.

358e1 Προδίκωι δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ: perhaps Prodicus would wish to distinguish them along the lines of Amm. 128, which explains that δέος is 'a long-standing presentiment of evil [πολυχρόνιος κακοῦ ὑπόνοια]', while φόβος is 'a momentary flutter [παραυτίκα πτόησις]' (cf. *Definitions* 415e: φόβος is 'a mental jolt at an expectation of evil [ἔκπληξις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ κακοῦ προσδοκίαι]'). But so long as Prodicus does not distinguish them solely by quantities of evil apprehended, his distinction between these forms of apprehension will, like his distinctions between pleasures and between desires (cf. 337c2n.), subvert the simplistic theory of motivation that Socrates inveigles the sophists into accepting. **e4–6 ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὡμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἑκόντα:** when they allow this reasoning, the sophists display a strange idea of the way in which fear is a προσδοκία κακοῦ (358d7n.). For they must suppose that fearing to do a thing means expecting that it will be less good than something else that one can do.

359a3 ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο: the answers that Protagoras gave in 349d3–e3; cf. 361d4–5 ὅπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, referring to 347c1–3. **a4 ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι:** the answers that Protagoras gave in 329d3–330b7. The suggestion is that, of the various things said by Protagoras before 329d3, none counts as an answer, or perhaps that, because they were so long, Socrates has forgotten them all (cf. 334c8–d1, 336a5–b1n.). **a7 τὰ μὲν τέτταρα . . . c1 ἴτας γε:** so accurate a summary of 349d3–e3 suggests that Socrates' memory is not as bad as he pretends. Cf. 349b1–c6, 357c6–d1.

359d4 ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις: Protagoras alludes to 358b8–c3 and 358c2–6. To equate the point that he accepted then with the point that he is accepting now, he must suppose taking something to be dreadful (359d2 ἡγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι), fearing that thing (358e4 δέδοικεν), and in a certain way expecting that thing to be bad (358d7 προσδοκίαν τινά . . . κακοῦ), all to be identical. He must also suppose this (or these) to be identical with, or at least to imply, thinking that the thing has a net value (resultant pleasure minus resultant pain; cf. 356b1n.) less than the net value of some other thing that is an open option. It does not take the subtlety of Prodicus to doubt such identifications. **d6 καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ὥστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη:** with this turn of phrase, Socrates is politely evasive about whether he accepts for himself the point that he has just

got Protagoras to accept. Strictly speaking, the ὀρθῶς is redundant; for proof is distinguished from mere argument by the fact that, whereas arguments can be incorrect, proofs cannot. By insinuating that there is some difference between the redundant τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη and the bare τοῦτο ἀπεδείχθη, Socrates insinuates that, when endorsing Protagoras' assertion of the latter, he endorses only an assertion of 'That was argued' rather than an assertion of 'That was proved.' **d7–8 τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ εὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα:** for the mix of genders, see 333b2n.

359e3 αὐτίκα 'to make the obvious objection'; see 318b4n. **e5 καλὸν ὂν ἰέναι:** the absolute form of the phrase καλόν ἐστιν ἰέναι. The absolute form is in the accusative, rather than the genitive, because in this phrase καλόν ἐστιν is in effect an impersonal verb like δοκεῖ, ἔξεστιν and δεῖ. Cf. the accusative absolutes 314c3 δόξαν, 352d6 ἐξόν, 355d2 δέον). **e7 ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν:** at 358b5–7.

360a2 καλὸν ὂν καὶ ἀγαθόν is an accusative absolute. Cf. 359e5n. **a4–5 εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ; ὡμολόγηται γοῦν:** Protagoras agreed to this at 358a5, if the formula τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν used there means that pleasure is *the* good, and hence that whatever is good is pleasant. Protagoras agreed to no such thing, if that formula means merely that pleasure is *a* good, and hence merely that whatever is pleasant is good. **a6–7 τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον:** contrast the positive forms καλόν, ἀγαθόν and ἡδύ in 360a4. Presumably, Protagoras licenses the move from positive to comparative because he assumes that fineness, goodness and pleasantness are all identical. At any rate, the move is not licensed on the simpler assumption that whatever is any one of fine, good and pleasant is also both the others; for even if all and only the educated are good at sums, it does not follow that all those with more education are better at sums, and or that all those who are better at sums have more education. Socrates moves to this string of comparatives so that he can represent what cowards refuse to approach as superior in every respect to what they are prepared to remain with. If he instead described what cowards refuse to approach simply as the fine, or even as the finer, he would leave room for an objection like 'People might reject what they know to be finer in favour of an alternative that they know to be superior in some other respect, in favour of an alternative that they know to be, for instance, safer or more fun.' But if Socrates' string of comparatives is to leave no room for any such objection, then fineness, goodness and pleasantness must be supposed the only respects in which things can be of value. Traditional wisdom did indeed suppose as much. But traditional wisdom supposed also that what is more valuable in one of these respects might be less valuable in others. Thus, according to an anonymous epigram inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delos, 'Justice is the finest thing [κάλλιστον], health the best [λῷστον], and most pleasant [ἥδιστον] of all is to get what one wants.' (The epigram is endorsed in Soph. fr. 356 *TrGF*, but criticised in Arist. *EE* 1214a1–8 and *NE* 1099a24–9 on the grounds that εὐδαιμονία is supreme in all three respects.)

a8–9 τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας: Protagoras has in mind the agreement at 358b8–c2.

360b1–2 οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι . . . ὅταν φοβῶνται: the courageous have fears, in that they expect some things to be bad, and fear is 'an expectation of bad' (358d6–9). **b4 εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἆρ' οὐ καλά;** the neuters here, agreeing with 360b2 θάρρη, mean that strictly speaking, Socrates is asking only about attitudes of boldness that animate the courageous, and not also about their fears (360b1 φόβους masculine). Nevertheless, the idea does seem to be that both courageous and cowardly have attitudes both of boldness and of fear (in other words, have expectations both of good and of bad), and that they are distinguished solely by whether those attitudes are foul or fair. In accepting the inference, that since the courageous do not have foul attitudes, they therefore have attitudes that are fair, Protagoras fails to distinguish negations from opposites. As Socrates points out in *Smp.* 201e–202b (cf. 331a8–b1n.), since αἰσχρόν and καλόν are opposites of one another, not negations, there is the possibility of middle ground: things that are neither foul nor fair, but somewhere in between. **b8 καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι:** this turn of phrase suggests that the mad are a third group, distinct from the cowardly and from the reckless. Perhaps the idea is that while the cowardly are systematically too eager to seek safety, and the reckless are systematically too eager to run risks, the mad are unsystematic, being sometimes too eager to run risks, and sometimes too eager to seek safety.

360c2 τοῦτο δι' ὃ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; the question is not as trivial as it looks. For it presumes that we are not all, in ourselves, pretty much the same, coming to be cowardly or courageous as our circumstances shift and vary; it presumes instead that what makes cowards cowards is some single state which they have in common and which distinguishes them from others; and if those presumptions are correct, that will make a big difference to how we can avoid being cowardly (cf. 330c1n.). For kindred thoughts, but expressed by constructions other than διά with an accusative, see 332b1–c3nn. **c10 ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη:** what is supposed to be the relation between the ignorance that is here described as cowardice and the ignorance which accounts for the attitudes of the reckless and the mad in 360b8–12? They can hardly be the same; for then cowardice and recklessness would have to be the same. They can hardly be different; for then recklessness would not have to differ from courage, which is supposed to be the wisdom opposite to the ignorance that is cowardice (360d8–9). Socrates would therefore be wiser to define cowardice, not simply as ignorance of what is and is not scary, but as such ignorance together with a tendency to overestimate the value of safety. That would allow him to distinguish cowardice from recklessness; for he could then define recklessness as another sort of ignorance of what is and is not scary: such ignorance together with a tendency to misjudge in the opposite direction and underestimate the value of

safety. And it would also allow him to distinguish recklessness from courage; for he could continue to define courage as knowledge of what is and is not scary. **c11 ἐπένευσε:** he nodded, instead of using words, presumably because words would have been even more humiliating. Cf. *Euthd.* 276b, where someone, who has hitherto cooperated by saying Yes and No, simply nods his answer to the question that clinches his refutation.

360d1 ἐναντίον ἀνδρεία δειλίαι: if courage is opposite to cowardice, where do recklessness and madness (360b8: οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι) fit in? They hardly seem to fit between courage and cowardice as, say, the tepid and the cool fit between the two opposite extremes of hot and cold. Indeed, cowardice and recklessness might look to be opposite extremes, with courage in the middle (for this and subtler suggestions, see Arist. *EN* 1115a6–1117b22). **d8 ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν:** cf. the *Laches*, where Nicias defines courage as 'knowledge of terrible and emboldening things, both in war and in all other circumstances' (194e–195a τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμωι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν), and Socrates reduces this to a definition of courage as 'knowledge of good and bad quite generally' (199c–d περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων), which would make courage the whole of virtue and not just a bit of it (199e), as Nicias had earlier agreed (198a). Cf. also the words of Pericles in Thuc. 2.40.3: 'Rightly judged to be particularly strong of mind [κράτιστοι δ' ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθεῖεν] would be those who have a particularly clear knowledge of things that are terrible and pleasant [οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες], and who for this reason are not deflected by danger [καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων].' **d8–9 ἐναντία οὖσα τῆι τούτων ἀμαθίαι:** to use this fact as they do, they must presuppose that nothing has more than one opposite. What is presupposed here was spelled out explicitly in 332c18–19. **d10 οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε:** by this stage, Protagoras finds even a nodded assent too humiliatingly explicit an acknowledgement that his earlier claims are untenable. For the coordinating particles οὔτε . . . τε, see 309b7–8n. **d13 αὐτός . . . πέρανον:** Protagoras is eager to bring this humiliating experience to a close, without having to undergo the further humiliation of openly contradicting either what he said previously or what now seems to have been proved. Cf. what Callicles says to Socrates at a similar juncture in *Grg.* 506c: λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε. Callicles uses the present imperative πέραινε, to enjoin what will be a complicated process of completing the argument. Protagoras uses the aorist imperative πέρανον, because it will take just one more step to complete this argument.

360e1 ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον: Socrates alludes to 349d5–8. **e3 φιλονικεῖν μοι . . . δοκεῖς:** cf. *Grg.* 515b, where Socrates is pressing a reluctant Callicles to give what will be a humiliating answer, and Callicles accuses him: φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. **e4 χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι:** cf. *Grg.* 516b, where Socrates has asked whether Callicles

agrees to a point, and Callicles replies: πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι. In both cases, the speaker is forced to concede an objection, but tries to mitigate the defeat for his thesis by pretending that he concedes the objection voluntarily, in order to humour Socrates. Cf. 331c3–4n.

360e6–362a3: DEFINITIONS AND FAREWELLS

Socrates suggests a reason why he and Protagoras have shifted their views on whether virtue is teachable: they have yet to define what virtue is. He then politely proposes that they turn to discussing the definition of virtue. Protagoras politely refuses. Socrates departs.

360e7–361a1 πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή: the contrast between 'what the thing itself is' and 'the condition of things connected with it' can be illustrated by chemical and medical examples: the definitions (312c2n.) 'salt is sodium chloride' and 'rickets is the disease caused by a deficiency of vitamin D' say what salt and rickets are themselves, whereas 'the colour of salt is white' and 'rickets often leads to bow legs' say something about the condition of things connected with salt and rickets. Elsewhere Plato marks the contrast by talking of a thing's οὐσία as opposed to its πάθη (*Euthphr.* 11a–b), and of τί ἐστι; as opposed to ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι; (e.g. *Meno* 71b, *Grg.* 448e, *Chrm.* 159a). **e7–361a1 αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή** 'the thing itself, virtue', and not just 'virtue itself', which would be αὐτὴ ἡ ἀρετή. A feminine noun can sometimes take a neuter pronoun without there being any particular significance to the switch of gender (cf. 357c2–3 ἐπιστήμης . . . τοῦτο). Here, however, the switch of gender is too obtrusive to be insignificant; cf. 361b5 ὅλον and e.g. *Meno* 71a οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ τυγχάνω εἰδώς ('I don't have even the slightest knowledge of what on earth the thing itself, virtue, is'), *Tht.* 146e γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν ('to know what the thing itself, knowledge, is'), *Rep.* 363a οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις ('praising not the thing itself, justice, but rather the good reputation that comes from it').

361a2 μακρὸν λόγον has contemptuous connotations (329b2n.). In *Grg.* 465e–466a, Socrates uses different terminology for a speech that has been justifiably long: 'I may have done something absurd in that I have made a big and extensive speech [συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα] myself, while not allowing you to make long speeches [μακροὺς λόγους]. But I do deserve to be forgiven. When I was making short remarks, you did not understand me, and you could not cope with the answer I gave; instead, you needed amplification. So if I cannot cope when you are giving answers, then you too must give an extended speech [ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον]; but if I can cope, then allow me to do so.' **a4 ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων:** a safe translation is 'the recent outcome of our arguments'. But such a sense for the compound ἔξοδος, although natural enough given the elements from

which it is compounded, is not easily documented elsewhere. And senses that are easily documented elsewhere may be active here as metaphors: Socrates may be comparing the arguments to ladies on an outing, to soldiers in an expeditionary force, or to a chorus leaving the stage at the end of a play (see LSJ s.v. ἔξοδος (A) 2, 3, III.3).

361b2–3 καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία: this distribution of two articles among three nouns implies, in deference to the view expressed by Protagoras in 349d3–8, that justice and temperance are the same as one another, while courage is something different from either. **b5 ὅλον** 'the whole lot' i.e. virtue in its entirety. For the gender, cf. 360e7n. and *Meno* 79b–c 'I asked you ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, but – so far from telling me what virtue itself is – you say that every deed is virtue, so long as it is done with some little bit of virtue, as if you had already said ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον, and I was already sure to recognise it, even if you chop it up into little bits.'

361c1 ὀλίγου πάντα 'practically anything'. This idiomatic use of ὀλίγου is short for ὀλίγου plus some appropriate part of the verb δεῖν 'to be in need of'. By inserting such an expression into a statement, a speaker claims that the statement is not far short of being strictly and absolutely true. **c4–6 βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν:** see 312c2–4nn. on knowing what virtue is, and on why knowing what virtue is would enable us to know whether it is teachable. **c6 πολλάκις** 'as may well happen'. See LSJ s.v. πολλάκις III. **c6–361d1 καὶ ἐν τῆι σκέψει . . . ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῆι διανομῆι:** this apparently redundant use of καί (literally 'also in the inspection, as also in the distribution') is 'almost confined to prose, and is commonest in Plato and Xenophon' (*GP* 324).

361d2 ὡς φῂς σύ: Socrates alludes to what Protagoras said in 321b6–c2. He uses the present tense, in the understanding that Protagoras still holds what he said then. Cf. 322e2n., and contrast ἔφησθα at 349c1, alluding to a statement which Protagoras might wish to abandon. **d2 Προμηθεύς . . . d3 προμηθούμενος:** for the pun, cf. 336b7n. **d4–5 καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλοις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην:** Socrates paraphrases his remark at 347c1–3. See 359a4n. for the implications of describing so recent a remark as 'what I was saying at the start too'. With the loose paraphrase here, contrast the much greater exactness of Socrates' rendering at 359a7–c1 of Protagoras' remarks at 349d3–e3. Greater exactness was of course necessary if Socrates' refutation of those remarks was to be properly targeted. **d6 ἐγὼ μέν:** cf. 312c7n.

361e1–2 οὔτε τἆλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἥκιστ' ἀνθρώπων: the connectives οὔτε . . . τε put special stress on Protagoras' claim to be ungrudging; see 309b7–8n. **e3–4 τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ:** the μέν

apparently marks this out as contrasting with the previous phrase (*GP* 377–8): while Socrates is superior to all whom Protagoras meets, his superiority over his contemporaries is particularly marked. **e4–5 τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίαι** is more than simply 'you might get a reputation for wisdom'. It amounts almost to 'you might come to be ranked with the Seven Sages' (343a4n.). For this use of the genitive plural to indicate membership of a well-known group, cf. 316b7n. **e5 εἰς αὖθις:** see 347b3n.

362a1–2 ἐμοὶ οἶπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα: cf. 335c5n. **a2 Καλλίαι τῶι καλῶι:** see 336b7n. **a3 εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες** brings us back full circle to 310a1, where Socrates' statement that he had exchanged many remarks with Protagoras (πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας) produced the request for the narrative of which he now marks the completion. The phrase has none of the intellectual refinements that Plato attaches to διαλέγεσθαι (314c4n.). It can be used of any occasion on which all parties have their say, from a fair trial in a court of law (Eur. *Heraclidae* 181–3) or an orderly symposium where guests take turns at speaking (347d6–e1), to an exchange of insults (*Grg.* 457d) or a deftly parried attempt at seduction (*Smp.* 219b). **ἀπῇμεν:** the plural perhaps means that Hippocrates, in spite of his earlier enthusiasm for Protagoras, left with Socrates.

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The *Protagoras* is one of Plato's most entertaining dialogues. It represents Socrates at a gathering of the most celebrated and highest-earning intellectuals of the day, among them the sophist Protagoras. In flamboyant displays of both rhetoric and dialectic, Socrates and Protagoras try to out-argue one another. Their arguments range widely, from political theory to literary criticism, from education to the nature of cowardice; but in view throughout this literary and philosophical masterpiece are the questions of what part knowledge plays in a successful life, and how we may acquire the knowledge that makes for success.

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